17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36
After the market crash of 1929, many regulators and investors realized that
market manipulators, with their access to nonpublic information, seemed
to undermine two of the key tenets of capitalism and democracy: fair play
and a level playing field. In 1934, Congress created the Securities and Exchange
Commission to establish and enforce rules for the financial exchanges
and companies that would keep the capital markets fair and open.
For the past 70 years, the SEC has regulated the markets and monitored
corporate merger, acquisition, and finance activities to protect investors. All
of these activities enforce the umbrella creed that companies must disclose
any material information, and this disclosure cannot, by statement or omission,
be false or manipulative. Material information is generally defined to
mean anything that would affect the understanding and decision making of
an investor—that is, anything that would cause a rational investor to act.
The declining stock market of 2000, 2001, and 2002, and the unethical
behavior of several investment banks and CEOs, brought several issues to
light and drove the SEC and Congress to create regulations to promote clarity
of information and equal access to that information. Regulation Full Disclosure,
Reg FD, established in 2000 by the SEC, attempted to create a level
playing field for all investors while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed by Congress
in 2002, required transparency and accountability from corporations.
MATERIAL INFORMATION
Corporations must understand and determine what information the investing
public deems to be material. Obvious material information includes fi-
*Note: Readers seeking specifics on securities law should seek advice from securities
professionals. This chapter is provided only to highlight the new rules and regulations
as they pertain to strategic IR and it does not, in any way, constitute an accurate
legal reference.
nancial events (such as earnings news, financial restatements), operational
activities (such as acquisitions, joint ventures, research developments, new
product introductions), management news (such as executive changes, insider
sales), and regulatory announcements (such as new rules, approvals,
and rejections). However, material information is not limited to these items,
so management must be prepared, along with legal and IR, to determine materiality
on an ongoing basis—in other words, which information or events
must be disclosed to the investing public.
According to Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act public companies
should disclose “on a rapid and current basis, such additional information
concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the
issuer.” As the SEC hones in on improving disclosure, IR must step up to
guide management through the process. IR should develop a disclosure template,
and when in doubt, the company should be conservative and assume
almost any event is material. Along with IR, however, management must
also show some degree of restraint in terms of releasing too much news to
the financial wires. This can come across as promotional and adversely affect
management credibility.
TO ONE AS TO THE MANY
Information is disclosed, buyers and sellers trade on this information, and
the price of the stock, in theory, moves either up or down to a new value
“Material information” is not defined under federal securities laws,
according to the SEC. Materiality was defined in TSC v. Northway,
Inc. In that case, the court stated, in part, that a fact is material where:
“[T]here is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted
fact would have caused the reasonable shareholder to change his/her
vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial
likelihood that, under all circumstances, the omitted fact would
have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder. Put another way, there must be substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information
made available.”
that discounts the new information. Therefore, those who have access to
the information in question before others have a distinct trading advantage.
To level the playing field, all participants must receive information
simultaneously, which is what the SEC has attempted to enforce with Reg
FD.
What the last few years brought to light was the fact that although companies
may have been disseminating material information to the markets,
they may have selectively disseminated that information to some and not to
all. Most companies had found that the easiest way to get information out
to investors was through conference calls, one-on-one conversations with
fund managers, or at dinner with sell-side and buy-side analysts. This activity
was standard operating procedure, and the general public was left out in
the cold in the form of delayed information.
PUBLIC TALK
Discrepancies of timing and access also highlighted the confusion about inside
information and insider trading. Inside information is any material
information that has not been disclosed to the public. Having inside information
is not illegal per se, but acting on it is. In fact, at certain times a company
should not immediately disclose material information because that disclosure
would compromise its competitive position and do a disservice to
shareholders. However, if a company decides not to disclose certain information,
then it cannot disclose it to anyone externally. Of course, if the information
is related to a merger or acquisition, management will notify its
investment bankers and the analyst in the sector will likely be “brought over
the wall” to restrict any research activity for a set period.
REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE, REG FD
In October 2000, the SEC stepped in to require a timely and even approach
for companies to disclose material information to each and every investor.
This requirement is called Reg FD, or Regulation Fair Disclosure, and states
that when a public company discloses any material nonpublic information,
the company must make public disclosures of that information simultaneously
and promptly. If the disclosure is selective and unintentional, then it
must be made fully available quickly to correct the situation. The goal is to
prevent selective disclosure and to reduce insider trading liability by preventing
the misappropriation of information. Reg FD is designed to encourage full and fair disclosure, inside and outside the company, and to clarify
and enhance the intent of the existing laws.
Reg FD is an important improvement in the capital markets. It protects
every investor and supports executive compliance by taking any disclosure
leeway out of company hands. Reg FD allows a CEO to take charge of her
story, puts a halt to selective disclosure and pressure from Wall Street, and
gives all shareholders equal opportunity to hear the information first.
This regulation has made the analyst’s job tougher, however. Once in
the business of prying incremental information from management teams
over dinner or in one-on-one meetings or on conference calls, the analyst
now must work with information that is widely disclosed. The opportunities
to get a proprietary scoop are more difficult than ever, which can result
in fewer “research calls” and diluted commissions. Being the “ax”—the
most influential analyst in a given stock—these days is less about a personal
relationship with the CEO and more about traditional research. Incremental
information now comes from customer surveys, channel checks, and a
detailed analysis of the competitive environment. Only the best analysts can
survive in this environment, so the pendulum will ultimately swing back to
where analysts are highly respected.
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
The stock market has no shallow end; everyone must do their homework
and enter at their own risk. Investors are responsible for due diligence, and
though most would like to walk through the company and kick the tires,
only a few institutional investors can. The privilege is certainly not extended
to individuals.
Financial statements and SEC disclosures are the most likely source of
reliable facts and figures. The income statement, balance sheet, and cash
flow statement are critical in this respect. Many investors have always
viewed accounting as a dispassionate science with little room for nuance,
For a thorough explanation of Reg FD and Sarbanes-Oxley, helpful
references include: SEC.gov, Sarbanes-Oxley.com, FASB.gov, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board at PCAOBUS.org, and
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, at AICPA.org.
but this is not true. When the markets were going up and executives were
challenged by short-term expectations, the lines of this subjective art became
too flexible. The government moved in to improve the transparency
of those numbers as well as increase the accountability of the people
behind them.
FASB, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, is an independent organization
that governs the standards of financial accounting and reporting.
FASB has established uniform guidelines for the preparation of financial reports,
the standard recognized by the SEC, but in 2000 and 2001 some very
serious violations of these accounting principles by several corporate executives
and their auditors were discovered. These violations cost shareholders
billions, and the fallout was extensive. The government decided that the corporate
governance structure, the directors on the board of a company as
well as its management team, needed strict and specific rules to incorporate
into their accounting and reporting procedures.
In 2002 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Act created a
new oversight board to which public companies and accounting firms must
answer. Sarbanes-Oxley also tackles many issues of accounting, auditing,
corporate reporting, financial investigations, and relationships with capital
markets. In addition to many heightened demands, the law requires public
companies to engage in a series of checks and balances along each stage of
gathering, documenting, and certifying financial data. Each step of the
process is calculated to improve internal controls, ensure the accuracy and
clarity of financial reports and corporate disclosures, and encourage executives
and directors to meet corporate ethical standards of accountability and
integrity.
Sarbanes-Oxley, in addition, addresses the conflict of interest that results
when analysts recommend stocks of companies with which their firm
has investment banking business. At one time, analysts were in the habit of
showing their reports to companies to check accuracy, which was not necessarily
a terrible thing. Sarbanes-Oxley restricts the practice of prepublication
viewing and also declares periods when analysts cannot write research on
companies with which their firm is actively involved in a transaction, such
as an initial public offering. The Act also requires a strengthening of the Chinese
Wall.
In an attempt to become poster children of the new order, many investment
banks have strict rules that prohibit analysts from even talking to
their investment bankers, and if they do the conversation must be monitored.
In fact, some bankers and analysts will run for cover if a person with
a camera enters a room in which they both happen to be. This short-term
over-compensation will most likely relax slightly in the coming years, but the impact of these new rules and the necessary rebuilding of credibility by
the investment banks almost require them to run a tight ship by any historical
standard.
RISING TO THE OCCASION
Both Reg FD and Sarbanes-Oxley are attempts to level the playing field for
investors through equitable dissemination and transparency of information.
The concepts are great, but the regulators are not perfect. The ultimate fix is
good governance, solid ethics, a balanced compensation package for management,
and a realization that slow and steady wins the race. This approach
mitigates risk and almost ensures a premium valuation given the underlying
fundamentals at any given time.
After the market crash of 1929, many regulators and investors realized that
market manipulators, with their access to nonpublic information, seemed
to undermine two of the key tenets of capitalism and democracy: fair play
and a level playing field. In 1934, Congress created the Securities and Exchange
Commission to establish and enforce rules for the financial exchanges
and companies that would keep the capital markets fair and open.
For the past 70 years, the SEC has regulated the markets and monitored
corporate merger, acquisition, and finance activities to protect investors. All
of these activities enforce the umbrella creed that companies must disclose
any material information, and this disclosure cannot, by statement or omission,
be false or manipulative. Material information is generally defined to
mean anything that would affect the understanding and decision making of
an investor—that is, anything that would cause a rational investor to act.
The declining stock market of 2000, 2001, and 2002, and the unethical
behavior of several investment banks and CEOs, brought several issues to
light and drove the SEC and Congress to create regulations to promote clarity
of information and equal access to that information. Regulation Full Disclosure,
Reg FD, established in 2000 by the SEC, attempted to create a level
playing field for all investors while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed by Congress
in 2002, required transparency and accountability from corporations.
MATERIAL INFORMATION
Corporations must understand and determine what information the investing
public deems to be material. Obvious material information includes fi-
*Note: Readers seeking specifics on securities law should seek advice from securities
professionals. This chapter is provided only to highlight the new rules and regulations
as they pertain to strategic IR and it does not, in any way, constitute an accurate
legal reference.
nancial events (such as earnings news, financial restatements), operational
activities (such as acquisitions, joint ventures, research developments, new
product introductions), management news (such as executive changes, insider
sales), and regulatory announcements (such as new rules, approvals,
and rejections). However, material information is not limited to these items,
so management must be prepared, along with legal and IR, to determine materiality
on an ongoing basis—in other words, which information or events
must be disclosed to the investing public.
According to Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act public companies
should disclose “on a rapid and current basis, such additional information
concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the
issuer.” As the SEC hones in on improving disclosure, IR must step up to
guide management through the process. IR should develop a disclosure template,
and when in doubt, the company should be conservative and assume
almost any event is material. Along with IR, however, management must
also show some degree of restraint in terms of releasing too much news to
the financial wires. This can come across as promotional and adversely affect
management credibility.
TO ONE AS TO THE MANY
Information is disclosed, buyers and sellers trade on this information, and
the price of the stock, in theory, moves either up or down to a new value
“Material information” is not defined under federal securities laws,
according to the SEC. Materiality was defined in TSC v. Northway,
Inc. In that case, the court stated, in part, that a fact is material where:
“[T]here is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted
fact would have caused the reasonable shareholder to change his/her
vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial
likelihood that, under all circumstances, the omitted fact would
have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder. Put another way, there must be substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information
made available.”
that discounts the new information. Therefore, those who have access to
the information in question before others have a distinct trading advantage.
To level the playing field, all participants must receive information
simultaneously, which is what the SEC has attempted to enforce with Reg
FD.
What the last few years brought to light was the fact that although companies
may have been disseminating material information to the markets,
they may have selectively disseminated that information to some and not to
all. Most companies had found that the easiest way to get information out
to investors was through conference calls, one-on-one conversations with
fund managers, or at dinner with sell-side and buy-side analysts. This activity
was standard operating procedure, and the general public was left out in
the cold in the form of delayed information.
PUBLIC TALK
Discrepancies of timing and access also highlighted the confusion about inside
information and insider trading. Inside information is any material
information that has not been disclosed to the public. Having inside information
is not illegal per se, but acting on it is. In fact, at certain times a company
should not immediately disclose material information because that disclosure
would compromise its competitive position and do a disservice to
shareholders. However, if a company decides not to disclose certain information,
then it cannot disclose it to anyone externally. Of course, if the information
is related to a merger or acquisition, management will notify its
investment bankers and the analyst in the sector will likely be “brought over
the wall” to restrict any research activity for a set period.
REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE, REG FD
In October 2000, the SEC stepped in to require a timely and even approach
for companies to disclose material information to each and every investor.
This requirement is called Reg FD, or Regulation Fair Disclosure, and states
that when a public company discloses any material nonpublic information,
the company must make public disclosures of that information simultaneously
and promptly. If the disclosure is selective and unintentional, then it
must be made fully available quickly to correct the situation. The goal is to
prevent selective disclosure and to reduce insider trading liability by preventing
the misappropriation of information. Reg FD is designed to encourage full and fair disclosure, inside and outside the company, and to clarify
and enhance the intent of the existing laws.
Reg FD is an important improvement in the capital markets. It protects
every investor and supports executive compliance by taking any disclosure
leeway out of company hands. Reg FD allows a CEO to take charge of her
story, puts a halt to selective disclosure and pressure from Wall Street, and
gives all shareholders equal opportunity to hear the information first.
This regulation has made the analyst’s job tougher, however. Once in
the business of prying incremental information from management teams
over dinner or in one-on-one meetings or on conference calls, the analyst
now must work with information that is widely disclosed. The opportunities
to get a proprietary scoop are more difficult than ever, which can result
in fewer “research calls” and diluted commissions. Being the “ax”—the
most influential analyst in a given stock—these days is less about a personal
relationship with the CEO and more about traditional research. Incremental
information now comes from customer surveys, channel checks, and a
detailed analysis of the competitive environment. Only the best analysts can
survive in this environment, so the pendulum will ultimately swing back to
where analysts are highly respected.
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
The stock market has no shallow end; everyone must do their homework
and enter at their own risk. Investors are responsible for due diligence, and
though most would like to walk through the company and kick the tires,
only a few institutional investors can. The privilege is certainly not extended
to individuals.
Financial statements and SEC disclosures are the most likely source of
reliable facts and figures. The income statement, balance sheet, and cash
flow statement are critical in this respect. Many investors have always
viewed accounting as a dispassionate science with little room for nuance,
For a thorough explanation of Reg FD and Sarbanes-Oxley, helpful
references include: SEC.gov, Sarbanes-Oxley.com, FASB.gov, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board at PCAOBUS.org, and
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, at AICPA.org.
but this is not true. When the markets were going up and executives were
challenged by short-term expectations, the lines of this subjective art became
too flexible. The government moved in to improve the transparency
of those numbers as well as increase the accountability of the people
behind them.
FASB, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, is an independent organization
that governs the standards of financial accounting and reporting.
FASB has established uniform guidelines for the preparation of financial reports,
the standard recognized by the SEC, but in 2000 and 2001 some very
serious violations of these accounting principles by several corporate executives
and their auditors were discovered. These violations cost shareholders
billions, and the fallout was extensive. The government decided that the corporate
governance structure, the directors on the board of a company as
well as its management team, needed strict and specific rules to incorporate
into their accounting and reporting procedures.
In 2002 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Act created a
new oversight board to which public companies and accounting firms must
answer. Sarbanes-Oxley also tackles many issues of accounting, auditing,
corporate reporting, financial investigations, and relationships with capital
markets. In addition to many heightened demands, the law requires public
companies to engage in a series of checks and balances along each stage of
gathering, documenting, and certifying financial data. Each step of the
process is calculated to improve internal controls, ensure the accuracy and
clarity of financial reports and corporate disclosures, and encourage executives
and directors to meet corporate ethical standards of accountability and
integrity.
Sarbanes-Oxley, in addition, addresses the conflict of interest that results
when analysts recommend stocks of companies with which their firm
has investment banking business. At one time, analysts were in the habit of
showing their reports to companies to check accuracy, which was not necessarily
a terrible thing. Sarbanes-Oxley restricts the practice of prepublication
viewing and also declares periods when analysts cannot write research on
companies with which their firm is actively involved in a transaction, such
as an initial public offering. The Act also requires a strengthening of the Chinese
Wall.
In an attempt to become poster children of the new order, many investment
banks have strict rules that prohibit analysts from even talking to
their investment bankers, and if they do the conversation must be monitored.
In fact, some bankers and analysts will run for cover if a person with
a camera enters a room in which they both happen to be. This short-term
over-compensation will most likely relax slightly in the coming years, but the impact of these new rules and the necessary rebuilding of credibility by
the investment banks almost require them to run a tight ship by any historical
standard.
RISING TO THE OCCASION
Both Reg FD and Sarbanes-Oxley are attempts to level the playing field for
investors through equitable dissemination and transparency of information.
The concepts are great, but the regulators are not perfect. The ultimate fix is
good governance, solid ethics, a balanced compensation package for management,
and a realization that slow and steady wins the race. This approach
mitigates risk and almost ensures a premium valuation given the underlying
fundamentals at any given time.