CHAPTER 22 Maintaining and Building Relationships
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The capital markets, like any business, are driven by relationships, and
there is no better way to maximize the process for everyone involved than
a long-term commitment to transparency and consistency. Investors depend
on analysts, analysts rely on management, and management teams rely on
investors.
Successful long-term interactions between companies and the capital
markets are not one-sided and depend greatly on building mutual trust. This
mating dance between company and analyst or company and portfolio
manager is at the core of building that trust. Over time, if each party understands
and respects one another’s job, shareholders are positioned to come
out on top.
MUTUAL RESPECT AND TRUST
To build long-term relationships, strategic IR must respect the interaction
and trust that the analyst maintains with both investors and management
teams. If senior management is unaware of the importance of this relationship,
IR should lay out concrete examples of how a lack of understanding in
this area can cost the CEO and shareholders millions.
One way IR can protect the relationship is to continually educate analysts,
through honest and frequent communication. In that spirit, IR might
suggest to senior management that a schedule of earnings pre-announcements
would heighten and improve the ongoing dialogue. It would ensure
that the market is updated eight rather than four times per year, and more
frequent information means less risk for an analyst. That’s protection
brought on by IR policy.
Management may find that the analyst is equally motivated to return
that protection. This subtle protection can be as basic as the analyst being
upfront with management about her rating system and how it works, price
targets, estimate changes, and under what circumstances she might downgrade
the stock. This in turn helps the CEO and CFO to better understand
the analyst and her job and makes it less likely that management will take
the analyst’s action personally, which always plays poorly in public forums.
To that point, IR professionals see many management teams that are
overly focused on their day-to-day stock prices when they should actually
be focused on their businesses. What these management teams need to realize
is that stocks go up and down based on many factors, from a shift in
an investor’s position to a strategist’s call on the economy. But because analysts
hold such sway with the investment community, their negative opinions
can grate loudest on a CEO’s nerves. In our experience, management
teams that take analyst downgrades personally are only setting themselves
up to look bad.
Ultimately, analysts have a job to do, to give unbiased opinions, right or
wrong. A CEO who doesn’t understand that fact, or understand that analysts’
opinions are part of the double-edged sword of being public, should
probably be working for a private company. IR must educate management
personnel to check their emotions and make them understand that the only
way to counter analyst’s negative opinions is to consistently produce solid
earnings relative to expectations.
Below is an example where the CEO’s lack of understanding positioned
the company in a very negative light.
Building bridges from IR and management to Wall Street can prevent
this type of unnecessary and unproductive antagonism. It’s harmful to
everyone, hurts shareholders, and would have been a non-event had the
CEO been better educated when it came to the analyst’s job and the way perceptions
are created on Wall Street. Management should have ignored the
downgrade and focused on running the business. If management was right,
the analyst would have been proven wrong eventually anyway.
MAINTAINING AND BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS—
THE SELL-SIDE
IR should have a plan to improve its relationships with key sell-side analysts
while cultivating relationships with new ones. The first step in this process is
to establish policies that position the company as more forthcoming and
transparent, which in turn reduces risk for analysts. The key to actually implementing these policies, however, is management’s understanding of why
they are so important. In other words, if analysts understand that they will
get honest information on a systematic basis, their career risk and their
firm’s risk is materially reduced.
Policies that help maintain a solid relationship include conducting conference
calls after the market closes when material positive or negative
events occur. This allows the analyst to understand the events and ask questions
while the market is closed and formulate an educated opinion. The
policies can also include regularly scheduled pre-announcements, which ensure
timely information at the end of each quarter but before the earnings release.
Finally, extra tables in a company’s press release that describe historical
drivers of the business would be helpful.
Ultimately, IR and management must work together to understand analyst
concerns—what information they need and when they need it—and out
of that process better communication will likely result. Better communica-
Maintaining and Building Relationships 199
A June 19, 2003, article in The Wall Street Journal portrayed the consequences
of not establishing a trusting relationship between management
and The Street and shows a lack of understanding when it comes
to the IR Dialogue stage. It cited the case of Fresh Del Monte Produce
Inc. when an analyst at BB&T downgraded the company’s stock, citing
risks from litigation and her perception of threats to the core business.
On the day of her downgrade, the stock fell more than 10 percent.
As the Journal tells it: “In a February 2003 conference call with the
company, the analyst asked a question about pricing and the company’s
chief executive said: ‘Let me tell you one thing, please. You are covering
us without our will and we would not like you to ask questions on this
conference call.’ When the analyst asked why, the CEO said: ‘We don’t
want you to ask questions. You can make your own conclusion. You
can cover us the way you want, but you have not been covering us in
any objective way and we thank you for being on this call, but we don’t
like to answer your question.’”
The article stated that the analyst was surprised by this and even
more surprised when “Fresh Del Monte named her in a lawsuit a
month later. A part of a complicated dispute with the company’s former
owners, Del Monte Fresh filed a suit in State Supreme Court in New
York in March, charging that certain business people were part of a
‘conspiracy’ that caused the company’s stock to drop precipitously.”
tion can often buy management an edge in getting its point of view across to
Wall Street.
IR should seek out new analysts as well, and the timeliness of this outreach
may depend on the company’s relative valuation. For example, if the
price of a company’s stock has been forced down because of a temporary
setback, each multiple compression and each dollar drop may represent an
opportunity for analysts looking for ideas. For that reason, IR must make it
a point to constantly educate all the analysts in advance rather than wait for
a problem to reach out. If that course is taken, the likelihood increases that
an analyst will move quickly with a recommendation. Without that groundwork,
the analyst would likely take many weeks, if not more, to learn about
the company, visit management, and talk to vendors and consumers before
gaining the comfort level to publish. Therefore, as part of the relationship
process, IR must be aware of analyst movement around The Street, investment
banks that are starting an industry practice, or analysts who are free to
publish on multiple groups of stocks.
Additionally, an investment bank occasionally drops research coverage
altogether. This move can be the result of many factors, including a company
that doesn’t seem to fit into a particular coverage universe or a company that
doesn’t fit with the philosophy of the investment bank’s organization (another
company might be a better fit with research/trading/and investment banking).
Finally, stocks that languish are also candidates for the revolving door.
IR must be aware of why analysts drop stocks and attempt to prevent it.
Because most analysts are looking for something that will lead them to believe
the stock will move either up or down, it’s simply a matter of engaging
the analyst and conservatively communicating the story. But if there’s no
news to tell, IR has to be clever. By feeding analysts industry information
like new products or promising consumer trends, IR gives the analyst incremental
intelligence, which can be a huge help. Why would an analyst want
to stop that flow of information by dropping coverage, even if the company
isn’t the most exciting?
The next chapter covers in-person meetings, but just in terms of information
sharing, analyst tracking, and policies, IR has many ways in which it
can add value to the process.
MAINTAINING AND BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS—
BUY-SIDE
The buy-side approach to relationships is essentially the same as the sell-side
approach, but involves a bit more guesswork and a dramatically longer list.
IR can never know on a daily basis who actually owns stock in his or her
company. That exact information is only issued four times per year, about
six weeks after the close of each quarter.
IR should take this information, identify the contact information for the
appropriate portfolio manager, and create a master distribution list that will
be adjusted and updated each quarter. Regardless of what accounts on the
buy-side own the company’s stock at any given time, however, they should
all be on the distribution in an effort to educate them on an ongoing basis.
IR’s job is to fight for shelf space with the buy-side, and regardless of ownership,
portfolio managers should always have a flow of information.
Unlike the sell-side list, which may only involve 10 to 20 names at any
given time, institutional buyers can be segmented into multiple categories.
They can be growth or value buyers or some variation on those themes. In
addition, they can be mutual funds or hedge funds with long- or short-term
orientation. IR’s job is to constantly create relationships with these buyers
and make sure that they receive a steady stream of company information.
Again, as stocks move up and down, any one of these groups can gain in
importance. In other words, while the stock is increasing, IR shouldn’t overlook
educating value investors whom the company may need if unforeseen
events sharply decrease valuation. Such knowledge comes too late if IR waits
for the negative event to happen before understanding who the value players
are and educating them on the company story.
HANDLING AND PRIORITIZING NEW INQUIRIES
Although not highly strategic, handling and processing inquiries is extremely
important. First, this activity brings structure to the process so management
isn’t just reacting to requests. Second, dealing with new inquiries efficiently
saves money and time. For example, having the tools to identify callers prevents
management teams from spending time with the wrong investors or
with potential investors who misrepresent themselves. Bob James might call
one afternoon and request an hour with management. Mr. James seems to
have all the right credentials as he manages over $1 billion for a reputable
mutual fund. The only problem, as it turns out, is that Mr. James is the
largest shareholder of the company’s competitor. Not that the meeting is a
waste, because Bob James could be converted into a shareholder. Our point
is that it’s important to know who management is talking to and prioritizing
those conversations because Bob James might be meeting only to protect his
investment in the competitor. It comes down to access to software that can
quickly and easily identify the financial caller, his fund, the amount of money he manages, and his recent behavior in the sector. Before any calls are
returned or any meetings are taken, the company should know the answers
to those questions.
SHORT SELLERS
Unfortunately, IR relationships should extend to those groups that don’t
necessarily have the company’s best interests at heart. At the top of that list
are short sellers, who bet against the company’s outlook and hope that the
share price will go down. Although normally short-term in nature, these bets
are nonetheless infuriating to most management teams as emotions get the
best of senior executives. Therefore, it’s important to identify short sellers
whenever possible and counsel management on the best course of action for
dealing with them.
An SEC rule is that short sellers must report their holdings and through
various databases. The Short Interest Ratio (SIR) records the short interest
outstanding over the average daily volume of shares traded. If that number
is 2, for example, that means it would take two full days of average trading
for short sellers to cover—that is, buy back the shares they borrowed and
sold. If this number goes up, a company can look at it as a group betting
against them, although many look at a high SIR as bullish because of the
built-in buying if fundamentals take a turn for the positive.
If short sellers are active in a company’s stock, IR first and foremost
should counsel management as to what the approach should be. A cool and
detached mind-set is preferable. Waging a public battle trying to prove them
wrong is almost always a losing game.
In fact, according to a January 26, 2003, article in The New York
Times, Professor Owen A. Lamont, associate professor of finance at the University
of Chicago’s graduate school of business, analyzed the returns of 270
companies that waged public battles with short sellers. He found that their
stocks lagged the market by 2.34 percent in each of the 12 months after the
battles began. The study, which covers 25 years, not only found that the
companies involved were generally overpriced, but also found that the short
sellers were consistently right. Professor Lamont went on to divide the tactics
used against short sellers into three types:
1. Belligerent statements which include claims of a conspiracy
2. Taking legal action against the short sellers
3. Undertaking technical maneuvers to prevent short selling (like urging
shareholders to register shares in their own name to prevent borrowing)
The study included companies like Conseco, Samsonite, and Micro-
Strategy, and more recently Allied Capital, MBIA, Farmer Mac, and Pre-
Paid Legal Services. What seems to be the common thread is that when
stocks begin to fall, “companies, investors, and even regulators often attack
short sellers.”
“But short sellers are not the enemy of investors. The fact is, short sellers
actually reduce volatility in the market. Their selling helps keep stocks
from flying too high, and when they close out their trades, the buying often
gives beleaguered stocks support.”
Therefore, with historical proof that companies locking horns with
short sellers is the wrong move, IR might question pursuing the relationship
at all.
Staying close to shorts and finding out their arguments allows management
to confront issues head-on in conference calls and earnings releases.
Short interest can be bullish and useful, because short sellers invariably
cover (buy the stock back), and when they do, the stock will likely be
“squeezed” upward.
Shorts can often force irrational management teams to be realistic about
guidance. However, some management teams have actually promised a
higher earnings growth rate in an attempt to scare the shorts away. This
tactic only adds risk to the stock and is totally the wrong way to go.
Maintaining and Building Relationships 203
Big Muscles, a company in the fitness sector, had a significant short interest
position. Through some reconnaissance IR was able to discover
that the shorts were betting against Big Muscle for four specific reasons:
the core product was 95 percent of revenues, the market was approaching
full penetration, their financing of customers was a perceived
risk, and the cost of their primary source of promotion—TV advertising—
was rising.
The shorts’ presence also signaled a lack of faith in management
and fueled the CEO, along with IR, to discern what might have been
broken in the business and fix it. Big Muscles ultimately lowered its financial
guidance to The Street, admitted some mistakes, and articulated
the plan to get back on track. Over time the shorts covered, and
the company’s valuation improved.
IR is the ideal group to craft a short seller strategy. As a third party outside
of the executive suite, IR will likely be less emotional about hearing the
short story and know best how to use those points. Though bringing down
overly optimistic guidance can often solve the short seller problem, IR’s job
is to dig deeper, discover the underlying short argument, and make sure each
point has a counterpoint in every communication to The Street.
Ultimately, maintaining relationships with the capital markets is about
sharing information and laying the groundwork for introductions when
out-of-the-ordinary events occur. That might include meeting growth versus
value investors once operations pick up. Similarly, it could mean targeting
value investors as the stock decreases and short positions grow. These
value investors will be looking for a turn in the business, knowing that
when it does, built-in buying pressure will exist as short sellers cover their
open positions.
The capital markets, like any business, are driven by relationships, and
there is no better way to maximize the process for everyone involved than
a long-term commitment to transparency and consistency. Investors depend
on analysts, analysts rely on management, and management teams rely on
investors.
Successful long-term interactions between companies and the capital
markets are not one-sided and depend greatly on building mutual trust. This
mating dance between company and analyst or company and portfolio
manager is at the core of building that trust. Over time, if each party understands
and respects one another’s job, shareholders are positioned to come
out on top.
MUTUAL RESPECT AND TRUST
To build long-term relationships, strategic IR must respect the interaction
and trust that the analyst maintains with both investors and management
teams. If senior management is unaware of the importance of this relationship,
IR should lay out concrete examples of how a lack of understanding in
this area can cost the CEO and shareholders millions.
One way IR can protect the relationship is to continually educate analysts,
through honest and frequent communication. In that spirit, IR might
suggest to senior management that a schedule of earnings pre-announcements
would heighten and improve the ongoing dialogue. It would ensure
that the market is updated eight rather than four times per year, and more
frequent information means less risk for an analyst. That’s protection
brought on by IR policy.
Management may find that the analyst is equally motivated to return
that protection. This subtle protection can be as basic as the analyst being
upfront with management about her rating system and how it works, price
targets, estimate changes, and under what circumstances she might downgrade
the stock. This in turn helps the CEO and CFO to better understand
the analyst and her job and makes it less likely that management will take
the analyst’s action personally, which always plays poorly in public forums.
To that point, IR professionals see many management teams that are
overly focused on their day-to-day stock prices when they should actually
be focused on their businesses. What these management teams need to realize
is that stocks go up and down based on many factors, from a shift in
an investor’s position to a strategist’s call on the economy. But because analysts
hold such sway with the investment community, their negative opinions
can grate loudest on a CEO’s nerves. In our experience, management
teams that take analyst downgrades personally are only setting themselves
up to look bad.
Ultimately, analysts have a job to do, to give unbiased opinions, right or
wrong. A CEO who doesn’t understand that fact, or understand that analysts’
opinions are part of the double-edged sword of being public, should
probably be working for a private company. IR must educate management
personnel to check their emotions and make them understand that the only
way to counter analyst’s negative opinions is to consistently produce solid
earnings relative to expectations.
Below is an example where the CEO’s lack of understanding positioned
the company in a very negative light.
Building bridges from IR and management to Wall Street can prevent
this type of unnecessary and unproductive antagonism. It’s harmful to
everyone, hurts shareholders, and would have been a non-event had the
CEO been better educated when it came to the analyst’s job and the way perceptions
are created on Wall Street. Management should have ignored the
downgrade and focused on running the business. If management was right,
the analyst would have been proven wrong eventually anyway.
MAINTAINING AND BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS—
THE SELL-SIDE
IR should have a plan to improve its relationships with key sell-side analysts
while cultivating relationships with new ones. The first step in this process is
to establish policies that position the company as more forthcoming and
transparent, which in turn reduces risk for analysts. The key to actually implementing these policies, however, is management’s understanding of why
they are so important. In other words, if analysts understand that they will
get honest information on a systematic basis, their career risk and their
firm’s risk is materially reduced.
Policies that help maintain a solid relationship include conducting conference
calls after the market closes when material positive or negative
events occur. This allows the analyst to understand the events and ask questions
while the market is closed and formulate an educated opinion. The
policies can also include regularly scheduled pre-announcements, which ensure
timely information at the end of each quarter but before the earnings release.
Finally, extra tables in a company’s press release that describe historical
drivers of the business would be helpful.
Ultimately, IR and management must work together to understand analyst
concerns—what information they need and when they need it—and out
of that process better communication will likely result. Better communica-
Maintaining and Building Relationships 199
A June 19, 2003, article in The Wall Street Journal portrayed the consequences
of not establishing a trusting relationship between management
and The Street and shows a lack of understanding when it comes
to the IR Dialogue stage. It cited the case of Fresh Del Monte Produce
Inc. when an analyst at BB&T downgraded the company’s stock, citing
risks from litigation and her perception of threats to the core business.
On the day of her downgrade, the stock fell more than 10 percent.
As the Journal tells it: “In a February 2003 conference call with the
company, the analyst asked a question about pricing and the company’s
chief executive said: ‘Let me tell you one thing, please. You are covering
us without our will and we would not like you to ask questions on this
conference call.’ When the analyst asked why, the CEO said: ‘We don’t
want you to ask questions. You can make your own conclusion. You
can cover us the way you want, but you have not been covering us in
any objective way and we thank you for being on this call, but we don’t
like to answer your question.’”
The article stated that the analyst was surprised by this and even
more surprised when “Fresh Del Monte named her in a lawsuit a
month later. A part of a complicated dispute with the company’s former
owners, Del Monte Fresh filed a suit in State Supreme Court in New
York in March, charging that certain business people were part of a
‘conspiracy’ that caused the company’s stock to drop precipitously.”
tion can often buy management an edge in getting its point of view across to
Wall Street.
IR should seek out new analysts as well, and the timeliness of this outreach
may depend on the company’s relative valuation. For example, if the
price of a company’s stock has been forced down because of a temporary
setback, each multiple compression and each dollar drop may represent an
opportunity for analysts looking for ideas. For that reason, IR must make it
a point to constantly educate all the analysts in advance rather than wait for
a problem to reach out. If that course is taken, the likelihood increases that
an analyst will move quickly with a recommendation. Without that groundwork,
the analyst would likely take many weeks, if not more, to learn about
the company, visit management, and talk to vendors and consumers before
gaining the comfort level to publish. Therefore, as part of the relationship
process, IR must be aware of analyst movement around The Street, investment
banks that are starting an industry practice, or analysts who are free to
publish on multiple groups of stocks.
Additionally, an investment bank occasionally drops research coverage
altogether. This move can be the result of many factors, including a company
that doesn’t seem to fit into a particular coverage universe or a company that
doesn’t fit with the philosophy of the investment bank’s organization (another
company might be a better fit with research/trading/and investment banking).
Finally, stocks that languish are also candidates for the revolving door.
IR must be aware of why analysts drop stocks and attempt to prevent it.
Because most analysts are looking for something that will lead them to believe
the stock will move either up or down, it’s simply a matter of engaging
the analyst and conservatively communicating the story. But if there’s no
news to tell, IR has to be clever. By feeding analysts industry information
like new products or promising consumer trends, IR gives the analyst incremental
intelligence, which can be a huge help. Why would an analyst want
to stop that flow of information by dropping coverage, even if the company
isn’t the most exciting?
The next chapter covers in-person meetings, but just in terms of information
sharing, analyst tracking, and policies, IR has many ways in which it
can add value to the process.
MAINTAINING AND BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS—
BUY-SIDE
The buy-side approach to relationships is essentially the same as the sell-side
approach, but involves a bit more guesswork and a dramatically longer list.
IR can never know on a daily basis who actually owns stock in his or her
company. That exact information is only issued four times per year, about
six weeks after the close of each quarter.
IR should take this information, identify the contact information for the
appropriate portfolio manager, and create a master distribution list that will
be adjusted and updated each quarter. Regardless of what accounts on the
buy-side own the company’s stock at any given time, however, they should
all be on the distribution in an effort to educate them on an ongoing basis.
IR’s job is to fight for shelf space with the buy-side, and regardless of ownership,
portfolio managers should always have a flow of information.
Unlike the sell-side list, which may only involve 10 to 20 names at any
given time, institutional buyers can be segmented into multiple categories.
They can be growth or value buyers or some variation on those themes. In
addition, they can be mutual funds or hedge funds with long- or short-term
orientation. IR’s job is to constantly create relationships with these buyers
and make sure that they receive a steady stream of company information.
Again, as stocks move up and down, any one of these groups can gain in
importance. In other words, while the stock is increasing, IR shouldn’t overlook
educating value investors whom the company may need if unforeseen
events sharply decrease valuation. Such knowledge comes too late if IR waits
for the negative event to happen before understanding who the value players
are and educating them on the company story.
HANDLING AND PRIORITIZING NEW INQUIRIES
Although not highly strategic, handling and processing inquiries is extremely
important. First, this activity brings structure to the process so management
isn’t just reacting to requests. Second, dealing with new inquiries efficiently
saves money and time. For example, having the tools to identify callers prevents
management teams from spending time with the wrong investors or
with potential investors who misrepresent themselves. Bob James might call
one afternoon and request an hour with management. Mr. James seems to
have all the right credentials as he manages over $1 billion for a reputable
mutual fund. The only problem, as it turns out, is that Mr. James is the
largest shareholder of the company’s competitor. Not that the meeting is a
waste, because Bob James could be converted into a shareholder. Our point
is that it’s important to know who management is talking to and prioritizing
those conversations because Bob James might be meeting only to protect his
investment in the competitor. It comes down to access to software that can
quickly and easily identify the financial caller, his fund, the amount of money he manages, and his recent behavior in the sector. Before any calls are
returned or any meetings are taken, the company should know the answers
to those questions.
SHORT SELLERS
Unfortunately, IR relationships should extend to those groups that don’t
necessarily have the company’s best interests at heart. At the top of that list
are short sellers, who bet against the company’s outlook and hope that the
share price will go down. Although normally short-term in nature, these bets
are nonetheless infuriating to most management teams as emotions get the
best of senior executives. Therefore, it’s important to identify short sellers
whenever possible and counsel management on the best course of action for
dealing with them.
An SEC rule is that short sellers must report their holdings and through
various databases. The Short Interest Ratio (SIR) records the short interest
outstanding over the average daily volume of shares traded. If that number
is 2, for example, that means it would take two full days of average trading
for short sellers to cover—that is, buy back the shares they borrowed and
sold. If this number goes up, a company can look at it as a group betting
against them, although many look at a high SIR as bullish because of the
built-in buying if fundamentals take a turn for the positive.
If short sellers are active in a company’s stock, IR first and foremost
should counsel management as to what the approach should be. A cool and
detached mind-set is preferable. Waging a public battle trying to prove them
wrong is almost always a losing game.
In fact, according to a January 26, 2003, article in The New York
Times, Professor Owen A. Lamont, associate professor of finance at the University
of Chicago’s graduate school of business, analyzed the returns of 270
companies that waged public battles with short sellers. He found that their
stocks lagged the market by 2.34 percent in each of the 12 months after the
battles began. The study, which covers 25 years, not only found that the
companies involved were generally overpriced, but also found that the short
sellers were consistently right. Professor Lamont went on to divide the tactics
used against short sellers into three types:
1. Belligerent statements which include claims of a conspiracy
2. Taking legal action against the short sellers
3. Undertaking technical maneuvers to prevent short selling (like urging
shareholders to register shares in their own name to prevent borrowing)
The study included companies like Conseco, Samsonite, and Micro-
Strategy, and more recently Allied Capital, MBIA, Farmer Mac, and Pre-
Paid Legal Services. What seems to be the common thread is that when
stocks begin to fall, “companies, investors, and even regulators often attack
short sellers.”
“But short sellers are not the enemy of investors. The fact is, short sellers
actually reduce volatility in the market. Their selling helps keep stocks
from flying too high, and when they close out their trades, the buying often
gives beleaguered stocks support.”
Therefore, with historical proof that companies locking horns with
short sellers is the wrong move, IR might question pursuing the relationship
at all.
Staying close to shorts and finding out their arguments allows management
to confront issues head-on in conference calls and earnings releases.
Short interest can be bullish and useful, because short sellers invariably
cover (buy the stock back), and when they do, the stock will likely be
“squeezed” upward.
Shorts can often force irrational management teams to be realistic about
guidance. However, some management teams have actually promised a
higher earnings growth rate in an attempt to scare the shorts away. This
tactic only adds risk to the stock and is totally the wrong way to go.
Maintaining and Building Relationships 203
Big Muscles, a company in the fitness sector, had a significant short interest
position. Through some reconnaissance IR was able to discover
that the shorts were betting against Big Muscle for four specific reasons:
the core product was 95 percent of revenues, the market was approaching
full penetration, their financing of customers was a perceived
risk, and the cost of their primary source of promotion—TV advertising—
was rising.
The shorts’ presence also signaled a lack of faith in management
and fueled the CEO, along with IR, to discern what might have been
broken in the business and fix it. Big Muscles ultimately lowered its financial
guidance to The Street, admitted some mistakes, and articulated
the plan to get back on track. Over time the shorts covered, and
the company’s valuation improved.
IR is the ideal group to craft a short seller strategy. As a third party outside
of the executive suite, IR will likely be less emotional about hearing the
short story and know best how to use those points. Though bringing down
overly optimistic guidance can often solve the short seller problem, IR’s job
is to dig deeper, discover the underlying short argument, and make sure each
point has a counterpoint in every communication to The Street.
Ultimately, maintaining relationships with the capital markets is about
sharing information and laying the groundwork for introductions when
out-of-the-ordinary events occur. That might include meeting growth versus
value investors once operations pick up. Similarly, it could mean targeting
value investors as the stock decreases and short positions grow. These
value investors will be looking for a turn in the business, knowing that
when it does, built-in buying pressure will exist as short sellers cover their
open positions.