4.7 The Evolution of the Javelin and Scenario Visualization

In what follows, I trace the development of the multipurposed javelin from

its meager beginnings as a stick, through the modifi cation of the stick into

the spear, to the specialization of the spear as a javelin equipped with a

launcher. We need an example that illustrates the emergence of scenario

visualization in our evolutionary past, and the development of this tool

gives us concrete evidence of this emergence. The following story is meant

to be presented as a plausible account of how it is that scenario visualization

would have emerged in our early hominin past and, like all evolutionary

stories, is not meant to be an account for which we have decisive

evidence.

However, before proceeding, it is necessary to make some general points

about the possibility of reconstructing early hominin environments and

erecting hypotheses concerning hominin mental evolution. Researchers

and thinkers doing work concerning the evolution of the human mind are

in agreement with the fact that certain environmental selection forces were

present in our early hominin past, and that these forces contributed to the

mind’s formation. Further, forming an accurate picture of what those selection

forces were like is integral to our understanding of the mental mechanisms

that have survived the process. At the same time, once we have an

understanding of the environmental challenges faced by our early hominins,

we can get a better picture of what our mental architecture has

evolved to look like.

A common criticism leveled against thinkers who put forward accounts

of the evolution of the human mind is that they too readily accept hypothThe

Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 119

eses concerning the adaptive pressures associated with our human mental

architecture. As Gould & Vrba (1982) and Rose, Kamin, & Lewontin (1984)

note, we must remember that a great deal of evolutionary hypothesizing

comprises “just so” stories. Now, Laland & Brown (2002, p. 100) are correct

to claim that “inventing evolutionary stories is a seductively easy exercise,”

and Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycett (2002, p. 10) are wise to point out that “we

shouldn’t extrapolate beyond the realms of our data.” Nonetheless, these

stories can become well-informed stories if we integrate several pieces of

evidence and lines of inference from a variety of disciplines relevant to the

mind and its evolution.

First, the geological evidence suggests that the environments in which

our early hominin ancestors lived rapidly changed—rapid in the sense of

hundred- or thousand-year intervals of wet, cold, hot, and dry climates as

well as several combinations thereof.

Second, the archeological evidence of fossilized tools suggests that we

had to have been able to do some fairly sophisticated problem solving in

order to survive in these rapidly changing environments.

Third, the technological and psychological evidence associated with

present-day human behavior indicates that we do some sophisticated

problem solving in order to deal with novelty in our environments. One

of the ways in which we deal with this novelty is through the construction

of tools. If we are consistent in applying the Darwinian rule of common

evolutionary heritage, then we can draw the inference—given the correlation

between modern and fossilized tools—that our early hominins must

have had to deal with novelty in their environments. Further, the variety

and complexity of the tools used by certain early hominins suggests that

they must have had a cognitive architecture similar to ours.

Fourth, we can make comparisons between human and primate brains

and behaviors, and again, given the rule of common evolutionary heritage,

we are justifi ed in drawing certain conclusions about early hominin life.

Fifth, we can look to present-day peoples whose cultures, as far as we

know, have not changed in hundreds or thousands of years and draw

inferences concerning what our early hominin cultures might have been

like. For example, it seems that the !Kung San peoples of the Kalahari

desert, as well as the Australian Aborigines, exist in hunter–gatherer types

of cultures that have been fairly stable for thousands of years (see Bahn,

1996). Further, Mithen (1996) and Oswalt (1976) document the Angmagsalik

hunters of Greenland and their construction of harpoons utilized to

hunt seals. Their harpoons are fairly complex, having a spearhead equipped

with a line attached to a fl otation device, as well as several other parts designed to make the harpoon sturdy, accurate, and easy to throw. These

hunters are an interesting case because it is likely that their harpoon technology

has not changed much in thousands of years; thus, their technology

can be studied to get a sense of what some early hominin toolmaking

may have been like.

The upshot is that we do not need to know directly what the early

hominin environment looked like (obviously, we never will be able to!).

Even though we are constrained by an inability to reconstruct such environments

fully, we can get several clues from the combined input of

biology, archeology, paleogeography, paleoanthropology, geology, evolutionary

psychology, primatology, psychology, cognitive science, and neurobiology,

to name just a few of the disciplines. However, we then must

go about the business of presenting a coherent and systematic picture of

these ancient worlds; thus, the well-informed storytelling. This is part of

the business of offering a philosophy of biology, archeology, paleogeography,

paleoanthropology, and so forth. After all, it is hypothesis formation

that, in many ways, leads thinkers to discover new ideas, pieces of evidence,

and ways to interpret data.

This having been said, I will now trace the development of the multipurposed

javelin from its meager beginnings as a stick, through the modifi

cation of the stick into the spear, to the specialization of the spear as a

javelin equipped with a launcher.

Step 1: The stick As was noted already, we can take present-day chimpanzee

activities to be representative of early hominin life, and we can see that

chimps in their native jungle environments do indeed use tools. As was

noted also, the chimps use rocks, leaves, and sticks to crack open nuts,

carry items, fi sh for termites, and hit in self-defense or in attack. This is

probably what our early hominins did while in the jungles of Africa as

well.

The kind of activities chimps engage in when they use tools can be categorized

as trial-and-error learning, or imitative learning. If we watch baby

chimps, they try to imitate the actions of older chimps, including the usage

of tools. Researchers have tried to get chimps to make tools to make other

tools with cobbles and stones (the way in which early Homo habilis likely

made tools to make tools) by fl aking and edging, but they cannot do it

(McGrew, 2004; Byrne, 1995, 2001; Tomasello et al., 1987, 1993). Thus, it

seems that chimps form visual images and can even recall visual images

from memory when they use tools. However, they clearly do not have the

capacity to produce tools like those found in the Upper Paleolithic indusThe

Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 121

try, let alone those found in the Mousterian, Acheulian, and Oldowan

industries. Their tool usage merely is imitative and wholly lacking in

innovation.

When the climate changed and our early hominins moved from the

jungles to forage and kill food out on African savannas and other environments,

they eventually constructed javelins that they could throw from a

distance in order to kill prey. One could continue to hit prey or a predator

with a stick until it dies, as was done in jungle environments. This may

work for some prey and predators, but what about the ones that are much

bigger than you? Imagine being stuck out on the savanna with a stick as

your only tool of defense against wooly-mammoth-type and saber-toothedtiger-

type creatures. Stated simply, you would need to become more creative

in your toolmaking just to survive. Calvin (2004, p. 25) asks a simple

question related to the survival of our early hominins: “Could they innovate?”

If the answer was no, then such hominins ultimately went the way

of the dodo.

The progression from stick to thrown javelin went through its own evolution

that is indicative of the advance from cognitive visual processing in

terms of forming visual images to conscious cognitive visual processing in

terms of scenario visualization. The kind of toolmaking that our early

Homo ancestors engaged in was likely to be little more than trial-and-error

or imitative learning that was passed on from generation to generation,

the same way certain activities are passed on from one chimp generation

to the next. Flakes were constructed. So too, sticks were constructed. Apparently,

however, it never occurred to members of these species to place one

of their fl aked stones on the edge of a stick.

Step 2: The spear By the end of the Mousterian industry, archaic Homo

heidelbergensis and Homo neandertalensis were going through a three-step

stone-forming process, allowing for the possibility that a variety of tools

be constructed in the outcome. Also, such stone fl akes were placed on the

end of sticks as spears. The most basic step in constructing a stone tool has

to do with simply striking a fl ake from a cobble. We have been able to get

chimpanzees to imitate this behavior in captivity, but there is no evidence

of apes in the wild performing this rudimentary procedure (McGrew, 2004;

Griffi n, 1992; Stanford, 2000).

Considering that our early hominin ancestors not only had to select

certain materials that were appropriate to solve some problem but also

engaged in a number of mental steps that resulted in the construction of

a variety of tool types, it becomes apparent that a fairly advanced form of

cognitive activity had to occur. The various steps in the process must be evaluated, and it may be the case that previous steps be seen in light of

future steps. It does not seem that this kind of toolmaking could be performed

by an animal with an infl exible and mechanical trial-and-error or

imitative mental routine, because there are too many potential outcomes

at every strike of the stone. Thus, Wynn (1993, pp. 396–397) claims that

tool behavior “entails problem solving, the ability to adjust behavior to a

specifi c task at hand, and, for this, rote sequences are not enough.” This

mental complexity has caused McNabb & Ashton (1995) to refer to our

hominin toolmaking ancestors as “thoughtful fl akers.”

It is safe to say that the variety of tools constructed is evidence that

these hominins were visualizing future scenarios in which these tools

could be used; otherwise, what would be the point of constructing a variety

of tools in the fi rst place? Chimps use the same medium of sticks or rocks

to either hit, throw, or smash. However, the construction of a variety of

tools indicates that they have a variety of purposes. What is a purpose in

this context, other than the formation of a visual image, the projection

of that visual image onto some future scenario, and the intent to carry

out or act on such a visualization? The variety of tools is the material result

of purposive scenario visualization. Following Wynn, Mithen (1996, p. 36)

notes that a mind with an ability to “think about hypothetical objects and

events is absolutely essential for the manufacture of a stone tool like the

hand axe. One must form a mental image of what the fi nished tool is to

look like before starting to remove fl akes from the stone nodule. Each

strike follows from a hypothesis as to its effect on the shape of the

tool.”

Step 3: The javelin Around 40,000 ya, some 80,000 years after the arrival

of modern humans on the scene, we fi nd evidence of a variety of types of

javelins, spears, and javelin launchers. Archeologists like Mithen (1996)

and Wynn (1979, 1981, 1991, 1993) have shown that the construction of

a javelin would require several mental visualizations, as well as numerous

revisions of the material, so as to attain optimal performance of such a

tool. Different types of javelins with different shaped heads and shafts were

constructed, depending upon the kind of kill or defense anticipated. If our

early hominin ancestors tried simply to walk up to and hit a large animal,

they likely would have been killed. In fact, this is probably what happened

on more than one occasion to the early hominin who attempted to utilize

a familiar problem solving solution in some totally new environment and

subsequently failed. Eventually our ancestors, such as Homo neandertalensis,

developed the spear; however, the evidence suggests that they could only

develop spears and not javelins. Homo sapiens developed javelins, equipped

The Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 123

with launchers, that could be used in creative ways to not only throw from

a distance but also spear at close range, hack, and cut (Mithen, 1996;

Wynn, 1991).

Again, when we consider that our early hominin ancestors not only

had to select certain materials that were appropriate to solve some problem

in a particular environment but utilized a diverse set of stone working

techniques and went through a number of steps involving an array of

stages that resulted in a variety of tool types, then it becomes apparent

that a fairly advanced form of mental activity had to occur. Thus, the

emergence of the javelin and its myriad uses would seem to indicate the

presence of a different kind of mind that could creatively form, recall,

readjust, select, and integrate visual scenes and scenarios for the purposes

of producing tools that would enable one to survive and fl ourish in novel

environments.

We must reiterate the importance of the effect that novel environments

have on the brain. As I pointed out at the end of the third chapter, there

is now solid evidence that the environment contributes to the formation

and maintenance—even regrowth or co-opting—of neurons and neural

processes in the brain. For example, it has been shown that neuronal size

and complexity, as well as numbers of glial cells, increase in the cerebral

cortices of animals exposed to so-called enriched environments, namely,

environments where there are large cages and a variety of different objects

that arouse curiosity and stimulate exploratory activity. Also, I noted that

recent data suggest that regions of the brain can be trained, through mental

and physical exercises, to pick up tasks from other regions.

The implications of synapse strengthening from environmental stimuli,

as well as the ability of neuronal processes to perform alternate functions,

are integral to an evolutionary explanation of conscious creative problem

solving in humans. This so because the novel promotes unusual or extreme

stimulation of cells, such stimulation of cells causes new connections to

be made in the brain, new connections cause better response of the animal

to external stimuli, and better response causes likelihood of survival so as

to pass genes on to progeny.

Again, environment is only half of the two-sided biological coin that

includes nurture (the environmental infl uence) as well as nature (the

genetic infl uence). On the genetic side, chance mutations cause a trait—

like the brain and consciousness that emerges from it—to come to be, this

trait may be useful in some environment, the animal with that trait may

survive to pass it on to its progeny, and this is an endless progressing cycle of genetic adjustment, readjustment, adjustment, readjustment, and so

forth. It is wholly plausible that the mental properties necessary for creative

problem solving evolved from this interplay of genes and a novel

environment. Thus, Barlow (1994, p. 10) maintains: “Anything that

improves the appropriateness and speed of learning must have immense

competitive advantage, and the main point of this proposal is that it

would explain the enormous selective advantage of the neocortex. Such

an advantage, together with the appropriate genetic variability, could in

turn account for its rapid evolution and the subsequent growth of our

species to its dominant position in the world.” This aforementioned information

is signifi cant to my hypothesis of scenario visualization because,

given the novelty our early hominins dealt with in their environments,

we can see how it would have been possible for newer connections between

areas of the brain to have been made, as well as how wholly new connections

could have arisen, acting as the neurobiological conditions for scenario

visualization.

Given the concrete evidence of fossilized tools, Mithen (1996), Donald

(1997), Sperber (1994), and Pinker (1997) speculate that Homo sapiens were

clearly conscious, whereas Australopithecines clearly did not have consciousness.

This is consistent with my claim that one aspect of consciousness

involves scenario visualization and that such conscious cognitive visual

processing emerged so as to enable the production of more complex

tools.

Of course, our hominin ancestors were living in social groups, watching

and learning from each other. I am not suggesting that scenario visualization

occurs in some solipsistic vacuum. Just as with other primates, our

ancestors would have learned a lot from trial and error, and various forms

of imititative expression, in their social groups. At the same time, we can

think of the proverbial “mad scientists” who might lock themselves away

to work on some problem into which they have some insight. There are

always those innovators who are present in some social group. My suggestion

is that, somewhere between the close of the Mousterian and the

beginning of the Upper Paleolithic industries, the brains of our hominin

ancestors were fortunate enough, through genetic variability, to have the

right connections in their neural hardware so as to allow for the possibility

of scenario visualization. With these neural connections already in place,

all that was needed was some environmental cue to prompt the psychological

connections, inferences, and insights to be made. All it took was some

psychologically creative “good trick” (to use the words of Dennett, 1995)—

implemented, possibly, by even one hominin—to get the creative juices

The Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 125

fl owing, so to speak, and prompt scenario visualization in our hominin

ancestry. I would imagine that there would have been a complex interplay

of trial-and-error and creative learning and implementation occurring in

our hominin lineage with respect to negotiating environments, just as

there is today. Still, at some point, at least one of our hominin ancestors

had to have broken from the trial-and-error mode of thinking so as to

begin scenario visualizing.

To reiterate, through the fortunes of genetic variability and natural selection,

the brains of our hominin ancestors would have had to have all the

right neural connections in place to allow for the possibility of scenario

visualization. In other words, the wiring was all there and hooked up, and

the right switch just needed to be pulled. The hominins were living in

social groups, learning from each other and implementing behaviors

through trail-and-error and imitation. Some environmental cue prompted

a psychological response that actually utilized the neural connections—a

switch was pulled that allows for a response in terms of scenario visualization.

This good trick was just that, a useful device for handling certain

vision-related problems encountered by our ancestors, and the ones who

could utilize it survived so as to pass their genes and memes (trial-and-error

kinds as well as more innovative kinds) on to the next generation. And

those of us in our species living today still retain this capacity.

In what follows, I trace the development of the multipurposed javelin from

its meager beginnings as a stick, through the modifi cation of the stick into

the spear, to the specialization of the spear as a javelin equipped with a

launcher. We need an example that illustrates the emergence of scenario

visualization in our evolutionary past, and the development of this tool

gives us concrete evidence of this emergence. The following story is meant

to be presented as a plausible account of how it is that scenario visualization

would have emerged in our early hominin past and, like all evolutionary

stories, is not meant to be an account for which we have decisive

evidence.

However, before proceeding, it is necessary to make some general points

about the possibility of reconstructing early hominin environments and

erecting hypotheses concerning hominin mental evolution. Researchers

and thinkers doing work concerning the evolution of the human mind are

in agreement with the fact that certain environmental selection forces were

present in our early hominin past, and that these forces contributed to the

mind’s formation. Further, forming an accurate picture of what those selection

forces were like is integral to our understanding of the mental mechanisms

that have survived the process. At the same time, once we have an

understanding of the environmental challenges faced by our early hominins,

we can get a better picture of what our mental architecture has

evolved to look like.

A common criticism leveled against thinkers who put forward accounts

of the evolution of the human mind is that they too readily accept hypothThe

Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 119

eses concerning the adaptive pressures associated with our human mental

architecture. As Gould & Vrba (1982) and Rose, Kamin, & Lewontin (1984)

note, we must remember that a great deal of evolutionary hypothesizing

comprises “just so” stories. Now, Laland & Brown (2002, p. 100) are correct

to claim that “inventing evolutionary stories is a seductively easy exercise,”

and Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycett (2002, p. 10) are wise to point out that “we

shouldn’t extrapolate beyond the realms of our data.” Nonetheless, these

stories can become well-informed stories if we integrate several pieces of

evidence and lines of inference from a variety of disciplines relevant to the

mind and its evolution.

First, the geological evidence suggests that the environments in which

our early hominin ancestors lived rapidly changed—rapid in the sense of

hundred- or thousand-year intervals of wet, cold, hot, and dry climates as

well as several combinations thereof.

Second, the archeological evidence of fossilized tools suggests that we

had to have been able to do some fairly sophisticated problem solving in

order to survive in these rapidly changing environments.

Third, the technological and psychological evidence associated with

present-day human behavior indicates that we do some sophisticated

problem solving in order to deal with novelty in our environments. One

of the ways in which we deal with this novelty is through the construction

of tools. If we are consistent in applying the Darwinian rule of common

evolutionary heritage, then we can draw the inference—given the correlation

between modern and fossilized tools—that our early hominins must

have had to deal with novelty in their environments. Further, the variety

and complexity of the tools used by certain early hominins suggests that

they must have had a cognitive architecture similar to ours.

Fourth, we can make comparisons between human and primate brains

and behaviors, and again, given the rule of common evolutionary heritage,

we are justifi ed in drawing certain conclusions about early hominin life.

Fifth, we can look to present-day peoples whose cultures, as far as we

know, have not changed in hundreds or thousands of years and draw

inferences concerning what our early hominin cultures might have been

like. For example, it seems that the !Kung San peoples of the Kalahari

desert, as well as the Australian Aborigines, exist in hunter–gatherer types

of cultures that have been fairly stable for thousands of years (see Bahn,

1996). Further, Mithen (1996) and Oswalt (1976) document the Angmagsalik

hunters of Greenland and their construction of harpoons utilized to

hunt seals. Their harpoons are fairly complex, having a spearhead equipped

with a line attached to a fl otation device, as well as several other parts designed to make the harpoon sturdy, accurate, and easy to throw. These

hunters are an interesting case because it is likely that their harpoon technology

has not changed much in thousands of years; thus, their technology

can be studied to get a sense of what some early hominin toolmaking

may have been like.

The upshot is that we do not need to know directly what the early

hominin environment looked like (obviously, we never will be able to!).

Even though we are constrained by an inability to reconstruct such environments

fully, we can get several clues from the combined input of

biology, archeology, paleogeography, paleoanthropology, geology, evolutionary

psychology, primatology, psychology, cognitive science, and neurobiology,

to name just a few of the disciplines. However, we then must

go about the business of presenting a coherent and systematic picture of

these ancient worlds; thus, the well-informed storytelling. This is part of

the business of offering a philosophy of biology, archeology, paleogeography,

paleoanthropology, and so forth. After all, it is hypothesis formation

that, in many ways, leads thinkers to discover new ideas, pieces of evidence,

and ways to interpret data.

This having been said, I will now trace the development of the multipurposed

javelin from its meager beginnings as a stick, through the modifi

cation of the stick into the spear, to the specialization of the spear as a

javelin equipped with a launcher.

Step 1: The stick As was noted already, we can take present-day chimpanzee

activities to be representative of early hominin life, and we can see that

chimps in their native jungle environments do indeed use tools. As was

noted also, the chimps use rocks, leaves, and sticks to crack open nuts,

carry items, fi sh for termites, and hit in self-defense or in attack. This is

probably what our early hominins did while in the jungles of Africa as

well.

The kind of activities chimps engage in when they use tools can be categorized

as trial-and-error learning, or imitative learning. If we watch baby

chimps, they try to imitate the actions of older chimps, including the usage

of tools. Researchers have tried to get chimps to make tools to make other

tools with cobbles and stones (the way in which early Homo habilis likely

made tools to make tools) by fl aking and edging, but they cannot do it

(McGrew, 2004; Byrne, 1995, 2001; Tomasello et al., 1987, 1993). Thus, it

seems that chimps form visual images and can even recall visual images

from memory when they use tools. However, they clearly do not have the

capacity to produce tools like those found in the Upper Paleolithic indusThe

Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 121

try, let alone those found in the Mousterian, Acheulian, and Oldowan

industries. Their tool usage merely is imitative and wholly lacking in

innovation.

When the climate changed and our early hominins moved from the

jungles to forage and kill food out on African savannas and other environments,

they eventually constructed javelins that they could throw from a

distance in order to kill prey. One could continue to hit prey or a predator

with a stick until it dies, as was done in jungle environments. This may

work for some prey and predators, but what about the ones that are much

bigger than you? Imagine being stuck out on the savanna with a stick as

your only tool of defense against wooly-mammoth-type and saber-toothedtiger-

type creatures. Stated simply, you would need to become more creative

in your toolmaking just to survive. Calvin (2004, p. 25) asks a simple

question related to the survival of our early hominins: “Could they innovate?”

If the answer was no, then such hominins ultimately went the way

of the dodo.

The progression from stick to thrown javelin went through its own evolution

that is indicative of the advance from cognitive visual processing in

terms of forming visual images to conscious cognitive visual processing in

terms of scenario visualization. The kind of toolmaking that our early

Homo ancestors engaged in was likely to be little more than trial-and-error

or imitative learning that was passed on from generation to generation,

the same way certain activities are passed on from one chimp generation

to the next. Flakes were constructed. So too, sticks were constructed. Apparently,

however, it never occurred to members of these species to place one

of their fl aked stones on the edge of a stick.

Step 2: The spear By the end of the Mousterian industry, archaic Homo

heidelbergensis and Homo neandertalensis were going through a three-step

stone-forming process, allowing for the possibility that a variety of tools

be constructed in the outcome. Also, such stone fl akes were placed on the

end of sticks as spears. The most basic step in constructing a stone tool has

to do with simply striking a fl ake from a cobble. We have been able to get

chimpanzees to imitate this behavior in captivity, but there is no evidence

of apes in the wild performing this rudimentary procedure (McGrew, 2004;

Griffi n, 1992; Stanford, 2000).

Considering that our early hominin ancestors not only had to select

certain materials that were appropriate to solve some problem but also

engaged in a number of mental steps that resulted in the construction of

a variety of tool types, it becomes apparent that a fairly advanced form of

cognitive activity had to occur. The various steps in the process must be evaluated, and it may be the case that previous steps be seen in light of

future steps. It does not seem that this kind of toolmaking could be performed

by an animal with an infl exible and mechanical trial-and-error or

imitative mental routine, because there are too many potential outcomes

at every strike of the stone. Thus, Wynn (1993, pp. 396–397) claims that

tool behavior “entails problem solving, the ability to adjust behavior to a

specifi c task at hand, and, for this, rote sequences are not enough.” This

mental complexity has caused McNabb & Ashton (1995) to refer to our

hominin toolmaking ancestors as “thoughtful fl akers.”

It is safe to say that the variety of tools constructed is evidence that

these hominins were visualizing future scenarios in which these tools

could be used; otherwise, what would be the point of constructing a variety

of tools in the fi rst place? Chimps use the same medium of sticks or rocks

to either hit, throw, or smash. However, the construction of a variety of

tools indicates that they have a variety of purposes. What is a purpose in

this context, other than the formation of a visual image, the projection

of that visual image onto some future scenario, and the intent to carry

out or act on such a visualization? The variety of tools is the material result

of purposive scenario visualization. Following Wynn, Mithen (1996, p. 36)

notes that a mind with an ability to “think about hypothetical objects and

events is absolutely essential for the manufacture of a stone tool like the

hand axe. One must form a mental image of what the fi nished tool is to

look like before starting to remove fl akes from the stone nodule. Each

strike follows from a hypothesis as to its effect on the shape of the

tool.”

Step 3: The javelin Around 40,000 ya, some 80,000 years after the arrival

of modern humans on the scene, we fi nd evidence of a variety of types of

javelins, spears, and javelin launchers. Archeologists like Mithen (1996)

and Wynn (1979, 1981, 1991, 1993) have shown that the construction of

a javelin would require several mental visualizations, as well as numerous

revisions of the material, so as to attain optimal performance of such a

tool. Different types of javelins with different shaped heads and shafts were

constructed, depending upon the kind of kill or defense anticipated. If our

early hominin ancestors tried simply to walk up to and hit a large animal,

they likely would have been killed. In fact, this is probably what happened

on more than one occasion to the early hominin who attempted to utilize

a familiar problem solving solution in some totally new environment and

subsequently failed. Eventually our ancestors, such as Homo neandertalensis,

developed the spear; however, the evidence suggests that they could only

develop spears and not javelins. Homo sapiens developed javelins, equipped

The Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 123

with launchers, that could be used in creative ways to not only throw from

a distance but also spear at close range, hack, and cut (Mithen, 1996;

Wynn, 1991).

Again, when we consider that our early hominin ancestors not only

had to select certain materials that were appropriate to solve some problem

in a particular environment but utilized a diverse set of stone working

techniques and went through a number of steps involving an array of

stages that resulted in a variety of tool types, then it becomes apparent

that a fairly advanced form of mental activity had to occur. Thus, the

emergence of the javelin and its myriad uses would seem to indicate the

presence of a different kind of mind that could creatively form, recall,

readjust, select, and integrate visual scenes and scenarios for the purposes

of producing tools that would enable one to survive and fl ourish in novel

environments.

We must reiterate the importance of the effect that novel environments

have on the brain. As I pointed out at the end of the third chapter, there

is now solid evidence that the environment contributes to the formation

and maintenance—even regrowth or co-opting—of neurons and neural

processes in the brain. For example, it has been shown that neuronal size

and complexity, as well as numbers of glial cells, increase in the cerebral

cortices of animals exposed to so-called enriched environments, namely,

environments where there are large cages and a variety of different objects

that arouse curiosity and stimulate exploratory activity. Also, I noted that

recent data suggest that regions of the brain can be trained, through mental

and physical exercises, to pick up tasks from other regions.

The implications of synapse strengthening from environmental stimuli,

as well as the ability of neuronal processes to perform alternate functions,

are integral to an evolutionary explanation of conscious creative problem

solving in humans. This so because the novel promotes unusual or extreme

stimulation of cells, such stimulation of cells causes new connections to

be made in the brain, new connections cause better response of the animal

to external stimuli, and better response causes likelihood of survival so as

to pass genes on to progeny.

Again, environment is only half of the two-sided biological coin that

includes nurture (the environmental infl uence) as well as nature (the

genetic infl uence). On the genetic side, chance mutations cause a trait—

like the brain and consciousness that emerges from it—to come to be, this

trait may be useful in some environment, the animal with that trait may

survive to pass it on to its progeny, and this is an endless progressing cycle of genetic adjustment, readjustment, adjustment, readjustment, and so

forth. It is wholly plausible that the mental properties necessary for creative

problem solving evolved from this interplay of genes and a novel

environment. Thus, Barlow (1994, p. 10) maintains: “Anything that

improves the appropriateness and speed of learning must have immense

competitive advantage, and the main point of this proposal is that it

would explain the enormous selective advantage of the neocortex. Such

an advantage, together with the appropriate genetic variability, could in

turn account for its rapid evolution and the subsequent growth of our

species to its dominant position in the world.” This aforementioned information

is signifi cant to my hypothesis of scenario visualization because,

given the novelty our early hominins dealt with in their environments,

we can see how it would have been possible for newer connections between

areas of the brain to have been made, as well as how wholly new connections

could have arisen, acting as the neurobiological conditions for scenario

visualization.

Given the concrete evidence of fossilized tools, Mithen (1996), Donald

(1997), Sperber (1994), and Pinker (1997) speculate that Homo sapiens were

clearly conscious, whereas Australopithecines clearly did not have consciousness.

This is consistent with my claim that one aspect of consciousness

involves scenario visualization and that such conscious cognitive visual

processing emerged so as to enable the production of more complex

tools.

Of course, our hominin ancestors were living in social groups, watching

and learning from each other. I am not suggesting that scenario visualization

occurs in some solipsistic vacuum. Just as with other primates, our

ancestors would have learned a lot from trial and error, and various forms

of imititative expression, in their social groups. At the same time, we can

think of the proverbial “mad scientists” who might lock themselves away

to work on some problem into which they have some insight. There are

always those innovators who are present in some social group. My suggestion

is that, somewhere between the close of the Mousterian and the

beginning of the Upper Paleolithic industries, the brains of our hominin

ancestors were fortunate enough, through genetic variability, to have the

right connections in their neural hardware so as to allow for the possibility

of scenario visualization. With these neural connections already in place,

all that was needed was some environmental cue to prompt the psychological

connections, inferences, and insights to be made. All it took was some

psychologically creative “good trick” (to use the words of Dennett, 1995)—

implemented, possibly, by even one hominin—to get the creative juices

The Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 125

fl owing, so to speak, and prompt scenario visualization in our hominin

ancestry. I would imagine that there would have been a complex interplay

of trial-and-error and creative learning and implementation occurring in

our hominin lineage with respect to negotiating environments, just as

there is today. Still, at some point, at least one of our hominin ancestors

had to have broken from the trial-and-error mode of thinking so as to

begin scenario visualizing.

To reiterate, through the fortunes of genetic variability and natural selection,

the brains of our hominin ancestors would have had to have all the

right neural connections in place to allow for the possibility of scenario

visualization. In other words, the wiring was all there and hooked up, and

the right switch just needed to be pulled. The hominins were living in

social groups, learning from each other and implementing behaviors

through trail-and-error and imitation. Some environmental cue prompted

a psychological response that actually utilized the neural connections—a

switch was pulled that allows for a response in terms of scenario visualization.

This good trick was just that, a useful device for handling certain

vision-related problems encountered by our ancestors, and the ones who

could utilize it survived so as to pass their genes and memes (trial-and-error

kinds as well as more innovative kinds) on to the next generation. And

those of us in our species living today still retain this capacity.