1.4 Informational Integration

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The mere fact that information is exchanged among the various processes

and subsystems of an organism does not seem to capture fully or adequately

the nature of an organism as a hierarchically organized system.

The distinction between higher and lower levels in a hierarchy suggests

that the higher levels exhibit signifi cant control over the lower levels. This

makes sense, since the more complex some process or system becomes, the

more there is a need for mechanisms of control so that the process or

system can operate effi ciently. These mechanisms are like command centers

where activity can be integrated and monitored, much like the central

processing unit of a computer. In fact, Sperber (1994), Dennett (1991),

Johnson-Laird (1988), and Dawkins (1986), each in their own way, envision

computational systems equipped with central processing units as

appropriate models of biological processes.

Now, there are at least two modes of control present in an organism

conceived of as a hierarchically organized system, namely, selectivity and

integration. Already, we have seen that selectivity is a mode of control, since

this property of organisms acts as a kind of fi ltering mechanism that distinguishes

raw data from information. Biologists and other researchers use

the word constraint to describe mechanisms of selectivity associated with

organisms, whether they are talking about cellular processes (Kulin, Kishore,

Helmerson, & Locascio, 2003; Rosen, 1968), embryological development

(Amundson, 1994), visual attentiveness (Hatfi eld, 1999), the fi ght-or-fl ee

response (Nesse & Abelson, 1995), organismic homeostasis (Audesirk et al.,

2002), or the adaptability of organisms to environments (Gould, 1980;

Darwin, 1859).

In the four examples from the previous section, we can describe forms

of selectivity that manifest a mode of control. In example 1, genetic information

is passed along from parent to offspring, but the gene transfer in

reproduction is restricted to a particular species. Genetic information cannot

pass from euglena to cat, for example, or from human to euglena. With

respect to example 2, proteins actually contribute in regulating the amount

of neurotransmitters that can be released into a given synaptic cleft when

a neuron fi res. In example 3, mitochondria are said to fi lter any excess

glucose to facilitate cellular homeostasis. Finally, in example 4, the brain ultimately can control the amount of force exerted in a jump (see Mayr,

1976; Hastings, 1998; Kitcher, 1992; Allman, 2000; Cziko, 1992, 1995;

Pelligrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1996).

Once a useful piece of data has been selected for—thereby becoming

information—it still has to be integrated into the overall workings of a

process or subsystem. Informational integration is another mode of control

in the organism viewed as a hierarchically organized system. It refers

to the fact that the various processes and subsystems in an organism are

equipped with a capacity to organize the information that has been

selected for by the processes and subsystems so that, ultimately, generalized

homeostasis can be achieved. Processes and subsystems achieve particularized

homeostasis, the results of which contribute to generalized

homeostasis in an organism. If there were not some mechanism by which

the pieces of information were organized in processes and subsystems,

then the hierarchy would not achieve generalized homeostasis, thereby

ceasing to function or, at least, ceasing to function optimally in some

environment. Selectivity and integration are like two sides of the same

coin concerning control in an organism conceived of as a hierarchical

organization—both are needed for proper functioning of the components

and, consequently, for particularized and generalized homeostasis of the

organism.

Consider an analogous thought experiment. If a painter selects all of the

colors for a painting, but then splashes the colors on the canvas in a

random fashion, there would be no organized piece of art produced (unless

the goal is some modern art piece intended to be randomized). Or, consider

that the very idea of a system entails a coordination of the components

that make up the referent of such an idea. What would happen to a system

if there were no integration of information to be found therein, that is, no

coordination of components in the processes and subsystems that make

up such a thing? The system would cease to be known as, and cease to be,

a system, really. Instead it would be known as, as well as become, an

aggregate of some sort. Although he cashes out an organism under the

general rubric of a “mechanism,” this is why Craver (2001, p. 59), echoing

Wimsatt (1994, 1997) and Cummins (1975, 1983, 2002), can maintain that

the “components of mechanisms, in contrast to those of mere aggregates,

have an active organization [italics mine].”

Informational integration is achieved at many levels in an organism,

from the coordinated operations of organelles in a cell, to the coordinated

cellular processes in an organ, to the coordinated activities of organs in a

subsystem, to the overall coordination of the subsystems of the organism.

Further, in a multicellular organism like an animal, all of these processes

and subsystems function together in coordinated ways to produce the

generalized homeostasis of the organism. In light of this property of organisms,

the image of a triangle that I used in fi gure 1.1 is all the more appropriate

as a schematization of an organismic hierarchy. The subsystems near

the top part of the triangle control the entire system, just as the processes

near the top of a subsystem control the subsystem, through the integration

of information received from lower levels (see the papers in Terzis & Arp,

2008). Analogously, we can think of organizations like the Catholic Church

or a corporation as manifesting this triangular model in their own actions

and interactions. The pope and other bishops are at the top of the Church

triangle and exhibit control over the rest of the Church as a whole. So too,

the corporate members (CEO, chief fi nancial offi cer, etc.) are at the top of

the corporation triangle and exhibit control over the corporation as a

whole.

The mere fact that information is exchanged among the various processes

and subsystems of an organism does not seem to capture fully or adequately

the nature of an organism as a hierarchically organized system.

The distinction between higher and lower levels in a hierarchy suggests

that the higher levels exhibit signifi cant control over the lower levels. This

makes sense, since the more complex some process or system becomes, the

more there is a need for mechanisms of control so that the process or

system can operate effi ciently. These mechanisms are like command centers

where activity can be integrated and monitored, much like the central

processing unit of a computer. In fact, Sperber (1994), Dennett (1991),

Johnson-Laird (1988), and Dawkins (1986), each in their own way, envision

computational systems equipped with central processing units as

appropriate models of biological processes.

Now, there are at least two modes of control present in an organism

conceived of as a hierarchically organized system, namely, selectivity and

integration. Already, we have seen that selectivity is a mode of control, since

this property of organisms acts as a kind of fi ltering mechanism that distinguishes

raw data from information. Biologists and other researchers use

the word constraint to describe mechanisms of selectivity associated with

organisms, whether they are talking about cellular processes (Kulin, Kishore,

Helmerson, & Locascio, 2003; Rosen, 1968), embryological development

(Amundson, 1994), visual attentiveness (Hatfi eld, 1999), the fi ght-or-fl ee

response (Nesse & Abelson, 1995), organismic homeostasis (Audesirk et al.,

2002), or the adaptability of organisms to environments (Gould, 1980;

Darwin, 1859).

In the four examples from the previous section, we can describe forms

of selectivity that manifest a mode of control. In example 1, genetic information

is passed along from parent to offspring, but the gene transfer in

reproduction is restricted to a particular species. Genetic information cannot

pass from euglena to cat, for example, or from human to euglena. With

respect to example 2, proteins actually contribute in regulating the amount

of neurotransmitters that can be released into a given synaptic cleft when

a neuron fi res. In example 3, mitochondria are said to fi lter any excess

glucose to facilitate cellular homeostasis. Finally, in example 4, the brain ultimately can control the amount of force exerted in a jump (see Mayr,

1976; Hastings, 1998; Kitcher, 1992; Allman, 2000; Cziko, 1992, 1995;

Pelligrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1996).

Once a useful piece of data has been selected for—thereby becoming

information—it still has to be integrated into the overall workings of a

process or subsystem. Informational integration is another mode of control

in the organism viewed as a hierarchically organized system. It refers

to the fact that the various processes and subsystems in an organism are

equipped with a capacity to organize the information that has been

selected for by the processes and subsystems so that, ultimately, generalized

homeostasis can be achieved. Processes and subsystems achieve particularized

homeostasis, the results of which contribute to generalized

homeostasis in an organism. If there were not some mechanism by which

the pieces of information were organized in processes and subsystems,

then the hierarchy would not achieve generalized homeostasis, thereby

ceasing to function or, at least, ceasing to function optimally in some

environment. Selectivity and integration are like two sides of the same

coin concerning control in an organism conceived of as a hierarchical

organization—both are needed for proper functioning of the components

and, consequently, for particularized and generalized homeostasis of the

organism.

Consider an analogous thought experiment. If a painter selects all of the

colors for a painting, but then splashes the colors on the canvas in a

random fashion, there would be no organized piece of art produced (unless

the goal is some modern art piece intended to be randomized). Or, consider

that the very idea of a system entails a coordination of the components

that make up the referent of such an idea. What would happen to a system

if there were no integration of information to be found therein, that is, no

coordination of components in the processes and subsystems that make

up such a thing? The system would cease to be known as, and cease to be,

a system, really. Instead it would be known as, as well as become, an

aggregate of some sort. Although he cashes out an organism under the

general rubric of a “mechanism,” this is why Craver (2001, p. 59), echoing

Wimsatt (1994, 1997) and Cummins (1975, 1983, 2002), can maintain that

the “components of mechanisms, in contrast to those of mere aggregates,

have an active organization [italics mine].”

Informational integration is achieved at many levels in an organism,

from the coordinated operations of organelles in a cell, to the coordinated

cellular processes in an organ, to the coordinated activities of organs in a

subsystem, to the overall coordination of the subsystems of the organism.

Further, in a multicellular organism like an animal, all of these processes

and subsystems function together in coordinated ways to produce the

generalized homeostasis of the organism. In light of this property of organisms,

the image of a triangle that I used in fi gure 1.1 is all the more appropriate

as a schematization of an organismic hierarchy. The subsystems near

the top part of the triangle control the entire system, just as the processes

near the top of a subsystem control the subsystem, through the integration

of information received from lower levels (see the papers in Terzis & Arp,

2008). Analogously, we can think of organizations like the Catholic Church

or a corporation as manifesting this triangular model in their own actions

and interactions. The pope and other bishops are at the top of the Church

triangle and exhibit control over the rest of the Church as a whole. So too,

the corporate members (CEO, chief fi nancial offi cer, etc.) are at the top of

the corporation triangle and exhibit control over the corporation as a

whole.