5.5 Scenario Visualization as an Active Feature of the Conscious Mind

However, Mithen’s model of consciousness and its relationship to problem

solving remain incomplete. In what follows, I transform Mithen’s account

by speaking about the role of scenario visualization as an active feature of the conscious mind necessary for solving vision-related, nonroutine problems

creatively. Doing so will draw upon the information and arguments

from previous chapters, making for a coherent picture of my project as a

whole.

Consciousness probably is the essential mystery of the universe, arguably

more mysterious than notions of the divine. Consequently, it is

incredibly diffi cult to defi ne. Roth (2000) gives a list of the party-line features

of consciousness including everything from being awake, to selfawareness,

experience, intentionality, and indexicality. Sternberg (1996,

2000) thinks consciousness comprises the ability to coherently form a

belief or set up a goal that a human being ultimately can act upon,

through selectivity and fi ltering of information. Chalmers (1996, pp. 6–11)

generates a list of conscious experiences, noting that the “phenomenal

feel,” “qualia,” or “what it is like” (all meaning the same thing) of our

psychological experiences is what is meant by consciousness (also see

Jackson, 1982; Arp, 2007b, 2008d). Chalmers claims that consciousness

has many elements, from nonsensory aspects such as volition, emotion,

memory, and thought to sensory experiences such as audition, bodily

sensation, and vision.

Our visual perceptions are integral to our conscious experience of ourselves

and the world around us. This is one reason Crick & Koch (1998,

p. 98) give as to why they study the visual system in trying to understand

consciousness and its neural correlates: “Humans are very visual animals

and our visual percepts are especially vivid and rich in information.” This

is also why Logothetis (1999) titles his article in Scientifi c American “Vision:

A Window on Consciousness.” Further, this is why, after a lengthy discussion

regarding the relationship between the visual system and consciousness,

Damasio (2003, p. 208) has claimed that “without mental images,

the organism (viz., a human) would not be able to perform in timely

fashion the large-scale integration of information critical for survival, not

to mention well-being.”

As I have noted already, one way to understand conscious activity is in

terms of scenario visualization. This feature of consciousness comes to light

most clearly when humans engage in vision-related forms of problem

solving. I am not suggesting that people always visualize or never use

semantic forms of reasoning, or other forms of reasoning, when solving

nonroutine problems. Nonetheless, it seems implausible that no one ever

visualizes when trying to solve problems creatively. I simply am pointing

out that there exists this capacity to scenario visualize in our species as a

whole and that, at times, people utilize it to solve problems creatively. In fact, as I noted in the previous chapter, whether one utilizes scenario visualization

most likely will depend upon the type of problem with which

one is confronted. There are some problems—for example, certain mathematical

problems—that can be solved without the use of scenario visualization.

Other problems, like spatial relation or depth perception problems,

may require scenario visualization. As noted earlier, the kinds of problems

with which our hominin ancestors were confronted most likely were of

the spatial relation and depth relation types, and so the capacity to scenario

visualize would have been useful for their survival. Scenario visualization

has been and still continues to be relevant for vision-related forms of

creative problem solving.

Mithen’s account of cognitive fl uidity allows for the free movement of

information between and among modules. I think this is important as a

precondition for mental activities, like imagination, requiring the simultaneous

utilization of several modules. Thus, for example, Mithen would

think that totemic anthropomorphism associated with animals in, say, a

totem pole made up of part-human/part-animal fi gures derives from the

free fl ow of information between a natural history module dealing specifi -

cally with animals and their characteristics and a social module dealing

specifi cally with people and their characteristics. A totem carved out of

wood is the material result of the free fl ow of information between the

natural history and social modules that has occurred in the mind of the

artist. Another example would be conceiving of talking bananas, which

entails the merger of a language module and a natural history module

associated with food (I am thinking of the kid’s show called “Bananas in

Pajamas”).

Mithen’s model is unsatisfactory, however, because he makes consciousness

out to be a passive phenomenon. On his account, consciousness is

just a fl exible fl uidity, a free fl owing of information between and among

mental modules. This does not seem to be the full account of consciousness.

When we are engaged in conscious activity, we are doing something.

The fundamental insight derived from Kant (1929), and reiterated by

numerous philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, is that consciousness

is an active process (e.g., Rock, 1984; Crick & Koch, 2003;

Cziko, 1992; Singer, 2000; Sigala & Logothetis, 2002; Arp, 2005a, 2005b,

2006a).

Kandel et al. (2000, p. 412) bolster Kant’s insight when they claim that

perception “organizes an object’s essential properties well enough to let us

handle the object.” Drawing directly on Kant’s insights, they claim further

that our perceptions “are constructed internally according to constraints imposed by the architecture of the nervous system and its functional abilities.”

Consider fi gure 5.1. We immediately recognize the space in the

middle as an octagon. However, the reason why we can do so seems to be

because our visual perception is constructive. The mind brings something

to the diagram and fi lls in the blank (literally!) in generating the image of

the octagon.

I want to proffer Kant’s fundamental insight and suggest that scenario

visualization involves conscious mental activities of selecting and integrating

visual information from mental modules for the purposes of negotiating

environments and that Mithen’s account of cognitive fl uidity acts as a

precondition for the possibility of the information contained in these

modules to intermix. Thus, on the one hand, Mithen is correct about the

possibility of information between and among mental modules as intermixing,

and, contrary to NEPers, he is correct that cognitive fl uidity probably

is a better description of our mental architecture, given the early

hominin ability to survive in the ever-changing Pleistocene environments.

On the other hand, I am transforming Mithen’s account by arguing that

possible intermixing of modular information is not the full story of conscious,

vision-related, creative problem solving. I am arguing for scenario

visualization, and this form of conscious visual processing is not merely

an intermixing of visual information from mental modules but involves

the active selection and integration of that information for the purposes

of solving some nonroutine problem creatively in an environment that a

human inhabits.

Figure 5.1

A fi ll-in-the-blank octagon

Further, in light of the fi rst and third chapters, I am suggesting that these

psychological properties of selectivity and integration are similar to the

properties that other neurobiological and biological processes exhibit. In

other words, I want to argue that this conscious capacity shares an analogous

affi nity with neurobiological processes of selectivity and integration

in the visual system, namely, processes that enable animals to select relevant

information from environmental stimuli and to organize this information

in ways useful for the problem solver. For example, visual processes

actively select and integrate the information concerning the lines and

spaces in fi gure 5.1 so as to produce a coherent picture of the octagon. So

too, the conscious activity of scenario visualization—which is a psychological

phenomenon that has emerged from neurobiological processes—

actively selects and integrates visual information from mental modules so

as to produce coherent imagined pictures. Further, similar processes of

selectivity and integration can be found in the activities of organisms in

general. I will say more about this psychological–neurobiological–biological

continuum later in this chapter.

Mithen thinks that the kinds of unique behaviors we engage in are the

result of a free fl ow of information between and among modules. This

cannot be the full story. My claim is that scenario visualization emerged

as a conscious property of the brain to act as a kind of metacognitive

process that selects and integrates relevant visual information from psychological

modules, in performing vision-related, creative problem solving

tasks in environments. More accurately, we scenario visualize, that is, we

selectively attend to visual information from certain modules, and actively

integrate that visual information from those modules so as to solve some

problem. If this kind of conscious activity were merely free fl ow of information,

there would be no mental coherency; the information would be

chaotic and directionless, and not really informative at all. It would be more

like meaningless data that free fl oated around. However, as was noted in

the fi rst and third chapters, data must be segregated and integrated so that

they can become informative for a system or a cognizer. Just as other

neurobiological and biological processes engage in selectivity and integration

of information relevant to their specifi c levels, so too, the most

complex psychological processes involved in problem solving engage in

selectivity and integration of information relevant to its level. Selectivity

and integration of visual information from mental modules are two of the

jobs of scenario visualization.

For example, that the visual images in the social module pertaining

to human behaviors and the visual images in the natural history module pertaining to animal behaviors are put together in anthropomorphic

animal totemism (the material result of which might be a totem pole

fashioned out of wood) means that these images had to be selected out

from or segregated from other visual images as relevant. Other modular

visual images would be bracketed out as irrelevant, as the images in these

two modules would be focused upon. However, it is not just that channels

have been opened between these modules, so that their specifi ed

and selected information can intermix. Cognitive fl uidity is necessary;

however, something more active needs to occur when the idea of anthropomorphic

animal totemism is brought to mind. The modules pertaining

to such an idea must be integrated so that a coherent imagined product

results. Another way to say this is that the visual information from both

modules is synthesized, allowing for something sublimated (to use a

Hegelian notion) or innovative to emerge anew as a result of the process.

While speaking about Mithen’s idea of cognitive fl uidity, Fodor (1998,

p. 159) expresses a similar claim about integration: “Even if early man

had modules for ‘natural intelligence’ and ‘technical intelligence,’ he

couldn’t have become modern man just by adding what he knew about

fi res to what he knew about cows. The trick is in thinking out what

happens when you put the two together; you get steak au poivre by

integrating [my italics] knowledge bases, not by merely summing

them.”

Finally, the entire process requires that one be able to form, recall, and

utilize visual images: from the image formation of human characteristics

in one module, and the animal characteristics in another module; to the

selective attention of these images in short-memory, or the recollection of

these images in working memory; to the projecting of these images together

in some future scenario where they are shifted, transformed, and fi nally

integrated, in the coherent picture of the animal totem.

However, Mithen’s model of consciousness and its relationship to problem

solving remain incomplete. In what follows, I transform Mithen’s account

by speaking about the role of scenario visualization as an active feature of the conscious mind necessary for solving vision-related, nonroutine problems

creatively. Doing so will draw upon the information and arguments

from previous chapters, making for a coherent picture of my project as a

whole.

Consciousness probably is the essential mystery of the universe, arguably

more mysterious than notions of the divine. Consequently, it is

incredibly diffi cult to defi ne. Roth (2000) gives a list of the party-line features

of consciousness including everything from being awake, to selfawareness,

experience, intentionality, and indexicality. Sternberg (1996,

2000) thinks consciousness comprises the ability to coherently form a

belief or set up a goal that a human being ultimately can act upon,

through selectivity and fi ltering of information. Chalmers (1996, pp. 6–11)

generates a list of conscious experiences, noting that the “phenomenal

feel,” “qualia,” or “what it is like” (all meaning the same thing) of our

psychological experiences is what is meant by consciousness (also see

Jackson, 1982; Arp, 2007b, 2008d). Chalmers claims that consciousness

has many elements, from nonsensory aspects such as volition, emotion,

memory, and thought to sensory experiences such as audition, bodily

sensation, and vision.

Our visual perceptions are integral to our conscious experience of ourselves

and the world around us. This is one reason Crick & Koch (1998,

p. 98) give as to why they study the visual system in trying to understand

consciousness and its neural correlates: “Humans are very visual animals

and our visual percepts are especially vivid and rich in information.” This

is also why Logothetis (1999) titles his article in Scientifi c American “Vision:

A Window on Consciousness.” Further, this is why, after a lengthy discussion

regarding the relationship between the visual system and consciousness,

Damasio (2003, p. 208) has claimed that “without mental images,

the organism (viz., a human) would not be able to perform in timely

fashion the large-scale integration of information critical for survival, not

to mention well-being.”

As I have noted already, one way to understand conscious activity is in

terms of scenario visualization. This feature of consciousness comes to light

most clearly when humans engage in vision-related forms of problem

solving. I am not suggesting that people always visualize or never use

semantic forms of reasoning, or other forms of reasoning, when solving

nonroutine problems. Nonetheless, it seems implausible that no one ever

visualizes when trying to solve problems creatively. I simply am pointing

out that there exists this capacity to scenario visualize in our species as a

whole and that, at times, people utilize it to solve problems creatively. In fact, as I noted in the previous chapter, whether one utilizes scenario visualization

most likely will depend upon the type of problem with which

one is confronted. There are some problems—for example, certain mathematical

problems—that can be solved without the use of scenario visualization.

Other problems, like spatial relation or depth perception problems,

may require scenario visualization. As noted earlier, the kinds of problems

with which our hominin ancestors were confronted most likely were of

the spatial relation and depth relation types, and so the capacity to scenario

visualize would have been useful for their survival. Scenario visualization

has been and still continues to be relevant for vision-related forms of

creative problem solving.

Mithen’s account of cognitive fl uidity allows for the free movement of

information between and among modules. I think this is important as a

precondition for mental activities, like imagination, requiring the simultaneous

utilization of several modules. Thus, for example, Mithen would

think that totemic anthropomorphism associated with animals in, say, a

totem pole made up of part-human/part-animal fi gures derives from the

free fl ow of information between a natural history module dealing specifi -

cally with animals and their characteristics and a social module dealing

specifi cally with people and their characteristics. A totem carved out of

wood is the material result of the free fl ow of information between the

natural history and social modules that has occurred in the mind of the

artist. Another example would be conceiving of talking bananas, which

entails the merger of a language module and a natural history module

associated with food (I am thinking of the kid’s show called “Bananas in

Pajamas”).

Mithen’s model is unsatisfactory, however, because he makes consciousness

out to be a passive phenomenon. On his account, consciousness is

just a fl exible fl uidity, a free fl owing of information between and among

mental modules. This does not seem to be the full account of consciousness.

When we are engaged in conscious activity, we are doing something.

The fundamental insight derived from Kant (1929), and reiterated by

numerous philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, is that consciousness

is an active process (e.g., Rock, 1984; Crick & Koch, 2003;

Cziko, 1992; Singer, 2000; Sigala & Logothetis, 2002; Arp, 2005a, 2005b,

2006a).

Kandel et al. (2000, p. 412) bolster Kant’s insight when they claim that

perception “organizes an object’s essential properties well enough to let us

handle the object.” Drawing directly on Kant’s insights, they claim further

that our perceptions “are constructed internally according to constraints imposed by the architecture of the nervous system and its functional abilities.”

Consider fi gure 5.1. We immediately recognize the space in the

middle as an octagon. However, the reason why we can do so seems to be

because our visual perception is constructive. The mind brings something

to the diagram and fi lls in the blank (literally!) in generating the image of

the octagon.

I want to proffer Kant’s fundamental insight and suggest that scenario

visualization involves conscious mental activities of selecting and integrating

visual information from mental modules for the purposes of negotiating

environments and that Mithen’s account of cognitive fl uidity acts as a

precondition for the possibility of the information contained in these

modules to intermix. Thus, on the one hand, Mithen is correct about the

possibility of information between and among mental modules as intermixing,

and, contrary to NEPers, he is correct that cognitive fl uidity probably

is a better description of our mental architecture, given the early

hominin ability to survive in the ever-changing Pleistocene environments.

On the other hand, I am transforming Mithen’s account by arguing that

possible intermixing of modular information is not the full story of conscious,

vision-related, creative problem solving. I am arguing for scenario

visualization, and this form of conscious visual processing is not merely

an intermixing of visual information from mental modules but involves

the active selection and integration of that information for the purposes

of solving some nonroutine problem creatively in an environment that a

human inhabits.

Figure 5.1

A fi ll-in-the-blank octagon

Further, in light of the fi rst and third chapters, I am suggesting that these

psychological properties of selectivity and integration are similar to the

properties that other neurobiological and biological processes exhibit. In

other words, I want to argue that this conscious capacity shares an analogous

affi nity with neurobiological processes of selectivity and integration

in the visual system, namely, processes that enable animals to select relevant

information from environmental stimuli and to organize this information

in ways useful for the problem solver. For example, visual processes

actively select and integrate the information concerning the lines and

spaces in fi gure 5.1 so as to produce a coherent picture of the octagon. So

too, the conscious activity of scenario visualization—which is a psychological

phenomenon that has emerged from neurobiological processes—

actively selects and integrates visual information from mental modules so

as to produce coherent imagined pictures. Further, similar processes of

selectivity and integration can be found in the activities of organisms in

general. I will say more about this psychological–neurobiological–biological

continuum later in this chapter.

Mithen thinks that the kinds of unique behaviors we engage in are the

result of a free fl ow of information between and among modules. This

cannot be the full story. My claim is that scenario visualization emerged

as a conscious property of the brain to act as a kind of metacognitive

process that selects and integrates relevant visual information from psychological

modules, in performing vision-related, creative problem solving

tasks in environments. More accurately, we scenario visualize, that is, we

selectively attend to visual information from certain modules, and actively

integrate that visual information from those modules so as to solve some

problem. If this kind of conscious activity were merely free fl ow of information,

there would be no mental coherency; the information would be

chaotic and directionless, and not really informative at all. It would be more

like meaningless data that free fl oated around. However, as was noted in

the fi rst and third chapters, data must be segregated and integrated so that

they can become informative for a system or a cognizer. Just as other

neurobiological and biological processes engage in selectivity and integration

of information relevant to their specifi c levels, so too, the most

complex psychological processes involved in problem solving engage in

selectivity and integration of information relevant to its level. Selectivity

and integration of visual information from mental modules are two of the

jobs of scenario visualization.

For example, that the visual images in the social module pertaining

to human behaviors and the visual images in the natural history module pertaining to animal behaviors are put together in anthropomorphic

animal totemism (the material result of which might be a totem pole

fashioned out of wood) means that these images had to be selected out

from or segregated from other visual images as relevant. Other modular

visual images would be bracketed out as irrelevant, as the images in these

two modules would be focused upon. However, it is not just that channels

have been opened between these modules, so that their specifi ed

and selected information can intermix. Cognitive fl uidity is necessary;

however, something more active needs to occur when the idea of anthropomorphic

animal totemism is brought to mind. The modules pertaining

to such an idea must be integrated so that a coherent imagined product

results. Another way to say this is that the visual information from both

modules is synthesized, allowing for something sublimated (to use a

Hegelian notion) or innovative to emerge anew as a result of the process.

While speaking about Mithen’s idea of cognitive fl uidity, Fodor (1998,

p. 159) expresses a similar claim about integration: “Even if early man

had modules for ‘natural intelligence’ and ‘technical intelligence,’ he

couldn’t have become modern man just by adding what he knew about

fi res to what he knew about cows. The trick is in thinking out what

happens when you put the two together; you get steak au poivre by

integrating [my italics] knowledge bases, not by merely summing

them.”

Finally, the entire process requires that one be able to form, recall, and

utilize visual images: from the image formation of human characteristics

in one module, and the animal characteristics in another module; to the

selective attention of these images in short-memory, or the recollection of

these images in working memory; to the projecting of these images together

in some future scenario where they are shifted, transformed, and fi nally

integrated, in the coherent picture of the animal totem.