4.8 Scenario Visualization: The Psychological Evidence

Thus far in this chapter, my primary aim has been to describe how it is

that our early hominin ancestors evolved scenario visualization. However,

since modern humans evolved from early hominins, it is important that I

present evidence that this conscious activity occurs in our present-day

species. Support for my suggestion that scenario visualization occurs in our

species, and is a form of conscious behavior, comes from two broad areas

of evidence. The fi rst is psychological evidence derived from case studies,

interviews, introspective reports, and biographical studies of people who

either are involved in controlled problem solving experiments or who have

exhibited creativity in terms of their livelihood as inventors, artists, theorists,

and the like. The second is neurobiological evidence derived from

studies on monkeys as they perform simple problem solving exercises and

from PET and fMRI scans of humans performing simple mental tasks such

as forming mental images, recalling images in memory, and engaging in

future planning as well as performing more advanced problem solving

exercises.

Many people report using visual images to answer questions and solve

problems in controlled experiments. Answering a question as simple as,

How many traffi c lights are there at the end of your street? or solving a

problem such as lining up balls on pegs, in a certain way, in the least

amount of moves—as in the Tower of London test—can involve the utilization

of mental pictures (see Tye, 1991; Shallice, 1988; Beveridge & Parkins,

1987). In fact, as Finke, Ward, & Smith (1992, p. 45) point out, “there is

considerable evidence that much of our everyday thinking is based on the

formation and transformation of visual images.” This makes sense given

the visual animals we are, and in the words of Tye (1991, p. 59), “Just as

it is much easier to see whether three cities lie on a straight line by looking

at a map than by performing calculations on a list of descriptions of their

longitudes and latitudes, so too it is often much easier to construct and

examine a mental map or quasi-picture than it is to proceed in any other

way.”

In one experiment put together by Shephard & Metzler (1971), people

were shown 1,600 pairs of Rubik’s-cubish-looking three-dimensional block

fi gures and then asked whether they were congruent with one another or

not (if you have ever taken a battery of IQ tests, then you may remember

a similar spatial manipulation test). People reported that, in order to

answer the question, they needed to form mental images of the block

fi gures and then manipulate and rotate them around in a variety of scenarios

against a variety of imagined backgrounds “in their minds” and/or

“in their heads” (also see Shephard & Cooper, 1992; Kosslyn, 1980, 1996;

Gregory, 1997).

The Tower of Hanoi puzzle was invented by the French mathematician

Edouard Lucas in 1883 and has been used by researchers in problem

solving experiments with humans (Simon, 1975). In the puzzle, the subject

is given a tower of eight disks, initially stacked in increasing size on one

of three pegs. The objective is to transfer the entire tower to one of the

other pegs, moving only one disk at a time and never moving a larger disk

onto a smaller one. Neth & Payne (2003) report that while subjects engaged

in the Tower of Hanoi experiment, the moves were used to plan ahead,

indicating that the subjects were visualizing possible scenarios. They noted

that, rather than “learning by doing,” subjects meticulously utilized “online

planning” of one move to the next.

Further, when children begin to pretend, they set up visual scenarios

and then suppose themselves to be in the scenario. They pretend that

bananas are phones while an important business call is being made, or

they simulate teatime occurring with stuffed animals all around a table

The Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 127

(Jarrold, Carruthers, Smith, & Boucher, 1994; Nichols & Stich, 2000; Harris,

2000). Also, the drawing of pictures to express situations, scenarios, and

circumstances appears to be integral to the developing psyche of a child,

and children instinctively will engage in such activity (Richert & Lillard,

2002). Picture drawing resonates with early hominin cave painting and

other forms of pictorial representation (Eshleman, 2003).

As Arnheim (1969) makes clear, not only is visual imagery necessary for

childhood development but it is arguable that the very elements of reasoning—

thoughts, concepts, abstractions, and words—require visual

imagery and the further use of that imagery in creative and imaginative

ways. Kosslyn & Koenig (1995, p. 146) bolster this argument when they

maintain that visual imagery is integral to reasoning and that “using

imagery to reason involves not only inspecting objects and generating

them, but also transforming objects in imagery and retaining images long

enough to work with them.” Reasoning itself can be viewed as the ability

to either solve novel problems, manipulate several disparate concepts

simultaneously, or deal adaptively with a complex and changing environment

(see the papers in Sternberg, 1998, 1999, 2001; Sternberg & Frensch,

1991; Sternberg & Kaufmann, 2002). When viewed in this way, reasoning

could require the use of visual images in a variety of ways, against a

variety of imagined backgrounds, and in a variety of visually imagined

scenarios.

Finke et al. (1992) recount a test utilized by McKim (1980) called the

monk problem. In the problem, subjects are told that a monk walks a path

to the top of a mountain to meditate, stays overnight, and then descends

the mountain the next day. Subjects then are asked the question as to

whether the monk was ever at the same place on his path, at exactly the

same time of day, on both days. As Finke et al. (1992, p. 175) point out,

the solution to the problem “becomes obvious by visualizing the monk

simultaneously ascending and descending the mountain. Since there must

be a point at which he would ‘meet’ himself, such a place must indeed

exist.”

McKim’s problem along with the Tower of Hanoi puzzle and the experiment

put together by Shephard & Metzler are examples that are representative

of the various kinds of problem solving exercises people engage in on

a regular basis either in think tanks, brainstorming sessions, analysis of

problems on the GRE exam, even fi guring out where to place a new couch

in one’s living room. People fi nd themselves constantly constructing visual

images and future scenarios—either in one’s mind, or on paper, or on a

chalkboard—and then transforming, moving, shifting, rotating, and/or manipulating the images around in order to visualize a solution to the

problem (Huttenlocher, 1968; Meyer, 1989; Prince, 1970).

The scenario visualization hypothesis I have been putting forward comports

well with what is known as the pictorialist approach, whereby mental

images are understood as pictures in the mind. This approach to images

has been put forward by Kosslyn (1980, 1983, 1996), Kosslyn et al. (2001),

Marr (1983), Pinker (1984), and Finke & Pinker (1982). In their human

studies, Finke & Pinker (1982) have argued that images are generated from

three-dimensional representations of the spatial relationships and appearances

of parts of objects in the visual fi eld. Such images may be stored in

one’s memory, fi led away like slides or photographs that can be recalled

spontaneously or by certain stimulus cues, if necessary. We should note

that the visual image that is immediately constructed in the visual fi eld,

as well as the memory of such an image, are both understood as pictorial

representations. Tye (1991) traces this idea back to Aristotle (1941, 427b19):

“For imagining lies within our power whenever we wish, e.g., we can call

up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images.”

Kosslyn et al. (2001, p. 635) have referred to visual mental imagery as

“giving rise to the experience of ‘seeing with the mind’s eye.’ ”

Someone may object at this point that not everyone visualizes when

they solve problems, and/or that blind persons, who cannot visualize in

the way I have defi ned the term, surely have the ability to solve problems.

I will respond to these two points.

First, it seems implausible that no one ever visualizes when trying to solve

a problem. There is a debate concerning whether people use visual images

or some other form of semantic reasoning when they solve problems

(e.g., Pylyshyn, 2003; Kosslyn, 1996; Tye, 1991). I am not suggesting that

people always visualize or never use semantic forms of reasoning, or other

forms of reasoning, when solving problems. I simply am pointing out that

there exists this capacity to scenario visualize in our species as a whole and

that, at times, people utilize it to solve problems in innovative ways. In

fact, whether one utilizes scenario visualization most likely will depend

upon the type of problem with which one is confronted. There are some

problems—for example, certain mathematical problems—that can be

solved without the use of scenario visualization. Other problems, like

spatial relation or depth perception problems, may require scenario visualization.

The kinds of problems with which our early hominin ancestors

were confronted most likely were of the spatial relation and depth relation

types, and so the capacity to scenario visualize would have been useful for

their survival. Our early hominin ancestors were not solving math equaThe

Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 129

tions; they were negotiating environments primarily with the use of their

visual systems.

Second, I am trying to give an account of how it is that the human species

as a whole, with their visual systems intact, evolved the ability to solve visionrelated

problems. Thus, my account skirts the issue of a blind person’s

capacity to solve problems because such a person does not have an intact

visual system and so does not solve vision-related problems. Blind persons

assuredly have the capacity to solve problems in sophisticated and innovative

ways. Louis Braille, the man who invented Braille as a means for blind

persons to communicate information with the usage of bumps on pieces

of paper, is a prime example (see Davidson, 1971). However, he obviously

could not scenario visualize (maybe he could scenario tactilize?). The

human species as a whole has evolved the capacity to engage in scenario

visualization, even though certain members of our species do not have this

capacity because of blindness. This makes sense, since humans, in general,

are not coded genetically for blindness—they are coded for sight.

Thus far in this chapter, my primary aim has been to describe how it is

that our early hominin ancestors evolved scenario visualization. However,

since modern humans evolved from early hominins, it is important that I

present evidence that this conscious activity occurs in our present-day

species. Support for my suggestion that scenario visualization occurs in our

species, and is a form of conscious behavior, comes from two broad areas

of evidence. The fi rst is psychological evidence derived from case studies,

interviews, introspective reports, and biographical studies of people who

either are involved in controlled problem solving experiments or who have

exhibited creativity in terms of their livelihood as inventors, artists, theorists,

and the like. The second is neurobiological evidence derived from

studies on monkeys as they perform simple problem solving exercises and

from PET and fMRI scans of humans performing simple mental tasks such

as forming mental images, recalling images in memory, and engaging in

future planning as well as performing more advanced problem solving

exercises.

Many people report using visual images to answer questions and solve

problems in controlled experiments. Answering a question as simple as,

How many traffi c lights are there at the end of your street? or solving a

problem such as lining up balls on pegs, in a certain way, in the least

amount of moves—as in the Tower of London test—can involve the utilization

of mental pictures (see Tye, 1991; Shallice, 1988; Beveridge & Parkins,

1987). In fact, as Finke, Ward, & Smith (1992, p. 45) point out, “there is

considerable evidence that much of our everyday thinking is based on the

formation and transformation of visual images.” This makes sense given

the visual animals we are, and in the words of Tye (1991, p. 59), “Just as

it is much easier to see whether three cities lie on a straight line by looking

at a map than by performing calculations on a list of descriptions of their

longitudes and latitudes, so too it is often much easier to construct and

examine a mental map or quasi-picture than it is to proceed in any other

way.”

In one experiment put together by Shephard & Metzler (1971), people

were shown 1,600 pairs of Rubik’s-cubish-looking three-dimensional block

fi gures and then asked whether they were congruent with one another or

not (if you have ever taken a battery of IQ tests, then you may remember

a similar spatial manipulation test). People reported that, in order to

answer the question, they needed to form mental images of the block

fi gures and then manipulate and rotate them around in a variety of scenarios

against a variety of imagined backgrounds “in their minds” and/or

“in their heads” (also see Shephard & Cooper, 1992; Kosslyn, 1980, 1996;

Gregory, 1997).

The Tower of Hanoi puzzle was invented by the French mathematician

Edouard Lucas in 1883 and has been used by researchers in problem

solving experiments with humans (Simon, 1975). In the puzzle, the subject

is given a tower of eight disks, initially stacked in increasing size on one

of three pegs. The objective is to transfer the entire tower to one of the

other pegs, moving only one disk at a time and never moving a larger disk

onto a smaller one. Neth & Payne (2003) report that while subjects engaged

in the Tower of Hanoi experiment, the moves were used to plan ahead,

indicating that the subjects were visualizing possible scenarios. They noted

that, rather than “learning by doing,” subjects meticulously utilized “online

planning” of one move to the next.

Further, when children begin to pretend, they set up visual scenarios

and then suppose themselves to be in the scenario. They pretend that

bananas are phones while an important business call is being made, or

they simulate teatime occurring with stuffed animals all around a table

The Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 127

(Jarrold, Carruthers, Smith, & Boucher, 1994; Nichols & Stich, 2000; Harris,

2000). Also, the drawing of pictures to express situations, scenarios, and

circumstances appears to be integral to the developing psyche of a child,

and children instinctively will engage in such activity (Richert & Lillard,

2002). Picture drawing resonates with early hominin cave painting and

other forms of pictorial representation (Eshleman, 2003).

As Arnheim (1969) makes clear, not only is visual imagery necessary for

childhood development but it is arguable that the very elements of reasoning—

thoughts, concepts, abstractions, and words—require visual

imagery and the further use of that imagery in creative and imaginative

ways. Kosslyn & Koenig (1995, p. 146) bolster this argument when they

maintain that visual imagery is integral to reasoning and that “using

imagery to reason involves not only inspecting objects and generating

them, but also transforming objects in imagery and retaining images long

enough to work with them.” Reasoning itself can be viewed as the ability

to either solve novel problems, manipulate several disparate concepts

simultaneously, or deal adaptively with a complex and changing environment

(see the papers in Sternberg, 1998, 1999, 2001; Sternberg & Frensch,

1991; Sternberg & Kaufmann, 2002). When viewed in this way, reasoning

could require the use of visual images in a variety of ways, against a

variety of imagined backgrounds, and in a variety of visually imagined

scenarios.

Finke et al. (1992) recount a test utilized by McKim (1980) called the

monk problem. In the problem, subjects are told that a monk walks a path

to the top of a mountain to meditate, stays overnight, and then descends

the mountain the next day. Subjects then are asked the question as to

whether the monk was ever at the same place on his path, at exactly the

same time of day, on both days. As Finke et al. (1992, p. 175) point out,

the solution to the problem “becomes obvious by visualizing the monk

simultaneously ascending and descending the mountain. Since there must

be a point at which he would ‘meet’ himself, such a place must indeed

exist.”

McKim’s problem along with the Tower of Hanoi puzzle and the experiment

put together by Shephard & Metzler are examples that are representative

of the various kinds of problem solving exercises people engage in on

a regular basis either in think tanks, brainstorming sessions, analysis of

problems on the GRE exam, even fi guring out where to place a new couch

in one’s living room. People fi nd themselves constantly constructing visual

images and future scenarios—either in one’s mind, or on paper, or on a

chalkboard—and then transforming, moving, shifting, rotating, and/or manipulating the images around in order to visualize a solution to the

problem (Huttenlocher, 1968; Meyer, 1989; Prince, 1970).

The scenario visualization hypothesis I have been putting forward comports

well with what is known as the pictorialist approach, whereby mental

images are understood as pictures in the mind. This approach to images

has been put forward by Kosslyn (1980, 1983, 1996), Kosslyn et al. (2001),

Marr (1983), Pinker (1984), and Finke & Pinker (1982). In their human

studies, Finke & Pinker (1982) have argued that images are generated from

three-dimensional representations of the spatial relationships and appearances

of parts of objects in the visual fi eld. Such images may be stored in

one’s memory, fi led away like slides or photographs that can be recalled

spontaneously or by certain stimulus cues, if necessary. We should note

that the visual image that is immediately constructed in the visual fi eld,

as well as the memory of such an image, are both understood as pictorial

representations. Tye (1991) traces this idea back to Aristotle (1941, 427b19):

“For imagining lies within our power whenever we wish, e.g., we can call

up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images.”

Kosslyn et al. (2001, p. 635) have referred to visual mental imagery as

“giving rise to the experience of ‘seeing with the mind’s eye.’ ”

Someone may object at this point that not everyone visualizes when

they solve problems, and/or that blind persons, who cannot visualize in

the way I have defi ned the term, surely have the ability to solve problems.

I will respond to these two points.

First, it seems implausible that no one ever visualizes when trying to solve

a problem. There is a debate concerning whether people use visual images

or some other form of semantic reasoning when they solve problems

(e.g., Pylyshyn, 2003; Kosslyn, 1996; Tye, 1991). I am not suggesting that

people always visualize or never use semantic forms of reasoning, or other

forms of reasoning, when solving problems. I simply am pointing out that

there exists this capacity to scenario visualize in our species as a whole and

that, at times, people utilize it to solve problems in innovative ways. In

fact, whether one utilizes scenario visualization most likely will depend

upon the type of problem with which one is confronted. There are some

problems—for example, certain mathematical problems—that can be

solved without the use of scenario visualization. Other problems, like

spatial relation or depth perception problems, may require scenario visualization.

The kinds of problems with which our early hominin ancestors

were confronted most likely were of the spatial relation and depth relation

types, and so the capacity to scenario visualize would have been useful for

their survival. Our early hominin ancestors were not solving math equaThe

Evolution of the Visual System and Scenario Visualization 129

tions; they were negotiating environments primarily with the use of their

visual systems.

Second, I am trying to give an account of how it is that the human species

as a whole, with their visual systems intact, evolved the ability to solve visionrelated

problems. Thus, my account skirts the issue of a blind person’s

capacity to solve problems because such a person does not have an intact

visual system and so does not solve vision-related problems. Blind persons

assuredly have the capacity to solve problems in sophisticated and innovative

ways. Louis Braille, the man who invented Braille as a means for blind

persons to communicate information with the usage of bumps on pieces

of paper, is a prime example (see Davidson, 1971). However, he obviously

could not scenario visualize (maybe he could scenario tactilize?). The

human species as a whole has evolved the capacity to engage in scenario

visualization, even though certain members of our species do not have this

capacity because of blindness. This makes sense, since humans, in general,

are not coded genetically for blindness—they are coded for sight.