5.7 Scenario Visualization and the Psychological–Neurological–Biological Continuum

In this section, I want to bring my analysis of scenario visualization in this

book around full circle, so to speak, and connect the conscious processes

entailed in scenario visualization with similar neurobiological and biological

processes spoken about in previous chapters. In the fi rst chapter, I noted

that biological processes of organisms exhibit the properties of environmental

information exchange, selectivity, and integration. Even at the

level of the cell, we see these properties being exhibited in the various

functions of the organelles, including endocytosis, exocytosis, and nucleic

control. Also, we saw that the property of internal–hierarchical data

exchange in an organism manifests upward causation, whereby the lower

levels of the hierarchy exhibit causal infl uence over the higher levels.

Likewise, the dual properties of data selectivity and informational integration

manifest downward causation, whereby the higher levels of the hierarchy

exhibit causal infl uence over the lower levels, in terms of control. I

asked the reader to think of the complex upward and downward causal

relations taking place when the human body simply gets up out of bed.

Put crudely, the brain must exhibit downward causation, as a necessary

condition, upon its own neurochemical constituents in order to cause the

body to get up, while the neurochemical constituents must exhibit upward

causation, as a necessary condition, for movement to occur in the fi rst

place. Further, in the third chapter, I presented evidence that at higher

levels of the visual hierarchy, the systems and processes therein segregate

relevant from irrelevant data and integrate visual modules so as to produce

a coherent visual picture.

My claim is that just as biological processes, in general, exhibit selective

and integrative functions, and just as visual integration performs the function

of selecting and integrating visual module areas, so too, a certain form

of consciousness emerged as a property of the brain to act as a kind of

metacognitive process that scenario visualizes, namely, selects and integrates

relevant visual information from psychological modules for the

purpose of solving vision-related problems in environments creatively (also

see Arp, 2005b). I think that by envisioning this feature of conscious activity

as a biologically emergent activity performing similar kinds of activities

of selection and integration found at other levels in the biological hierarchy,

the case for consciousness playing an active role in the solving

of nonroutine, creative forms of problem solving can be made more

fortifi able.

The idea that a conscious activity like scenario visualization is a biologically

emergent phenomenon involving both the selectivity and integration

of visual information comports well with neurobiological data from a

variety of sources. First, several neuroscientists point to attention as a

primary mechanism for consciousness (e.g., Desimone, 1992; Desimone

et al., 1994; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Treisman, 1977, 1988). In the

third chapter, I noted that attention is like a selective mechanism in the

visual system, segregating relevant from irrelevant information. When one

is said to be conscious of something, say a patch of red in one’s visual fi eld

or a memory of a roller-coaster ride, one is obviously attentive to that

something. One is focusing in on that piece of information to the exclusion

of other nonrelevant pieces of information.

Second, several philosophers, neuroscientists, and other researchers

think that integration of information is essential for a unifi ed conscious

percept (e.g., Baars, 1988, 1997; Baars & Newman, 2001; Lumer, 2000;

Singer, 1999, 2000; Singer & Gray, 1995; Cziko, 1992, 1995; Damasio,

2000; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Goguen & Harrell, 2004). This is really

the issue of binding that is present at various levels of the psychophysical

hierarchy. As Gray (1999, p. 31) notes, “Binding isn’t a problem for nervous

systems, as evolution has sculpted their organization to solve the problem

effi ciently and effectively. It is just a problem for those of us trying to

understand how the nervous system achieves the task.” Gray basically is

admitting that integration is a fundamental feature of the mind, despite

our ignorance of the exact mechanisms by which it occurs. Tononi &

Edelman (1998) and Velmans (1992) specify integration as the essential

feature of consciousness. When we are conscious of the tree outside our

window blowing in the wind, we must be able to integrate several visual

modalities so as to attain a coherent picture of what we are experiencing.

Likewise, as a form of conscious visual processing, scenario visualization

enables one to integrate several other mental modules of visual information

that, in turn, integrate several other brain-process modules.

Thus, we must not think that consciousness is some kind of entity existing

completely on its own, like some thing totally detached from the processes

and functions of the brain. I am trying to put forward a view of

consciousness as an emergent metacognitive process, one that utilizes

several areas of the brain concerned with the visual system, memory, planning,

and voluntary movements. To think that consciousness is some kind

of entity completely divorced from the processes of the brain catapults one

into what is known as the problem of the homunculus, a problem that is faced

most directly by metaphysical dualists in the philosophy of mind (see Dennett, 1986, 1987, 1991; Lycan, 1995; Baars & Newman, 2001). The

problem of the homunculus is the idea that consciousness is a “little person

inside the head” who perceives the world through the senses, as well as

thinks, plans, and executes voluntary motions. The homunculus is used

by some thinkers to explain how it is that the mind is able to bind together

or integrate relevant information so as to generate a coherent picture or

experience of the world. Dennett’s (1991) notion of the Cartesian theater,

whereby a person (representing consciousness) sits in a theater observing

pictures on a screen (representing mental representations, volitions, emotions,

etc.), is another expression of the homunculus idea.

Unfortunately, if one holds the homunculus view, a few problems result.

First, there is the problem of consciousness being a thing that is too disassociated

from the workings of the brain. If consciousness is a thing too

disassociated from the brain, then we run into the further problems of (1)

explaining how it is that consciousness, which presumably would exist on

a nonbiological level, can interact with a brain that exists on the biological

level (Jackson, 1982; McGinn, 1982; Baars, 1997), (2) specifying what the

objective laws associated with consciousness would be if they are not biological,

physical, chemical, or otherwise scientifi c laws (McGinn, 1982;

Kim, 2000), (3) third man kinds of arguments whereby our mental life is

(not really) explained by consciousness, which is explained by consciousness2,

which is explained by consciousness3, and so forth, ad infi nitum,

(4) making consciousness out to be a “spooky” thing (Churchland, 1997;

Heil, 2004a, 2004b) too removed from empirical, objectifi able, third-person

evidence.

Thankfully, my account of consciousness as dependent upon biological

processes skirts a lot of the problems just listed, although, of course, there

may be a host of other problems that become evident. Some of these

problems just mentioned are avoided because consciousness is an emergent

phenomenon subject to the same laws as any other neurobiological and

biological phenomena, although it is not reducible to such phenomena

(also see Arp, 2008d). Provided that we switch the terms “constituted of”

with “dependent upon, but not reducible to” in his defi nition of consciousness,

Sperry (1980, p. 204) has stated the position succinctly: “Consciousness

is a functional property of brain processing, constituted of neuronal

and physicochemical activity, and embodied in, and inseparable from, the

active brain.” The psychological realm, although not reducible to these

realms, is an extension of the neurobiological and biological realms, and

all three of these realms are subject to evolutionary principles. Just as cellular

process exhibit internal–hierarchical data exchange, data selectivity, and informational intregration, so too, neurobiological and psychological

processes exhibit the same kinds of properties.

Scenario visualization is a form of conscious cognitive visual processing

that enables one to select visual information while bracketing out irrelevant

visual information. It also allows us to transform and project visual

images into future scenarios, as well as coordinate and integrate visual

information, so that the perceiver has a coherent picture of both the imagined

and real worlds. This feature of the conscious mind—scenario visualization

in terms of selectivity and integration—is a psychological process

that has emerged from neurobiological processes exhibiting the same kinds

of features, and subject to the same evolutionary principles, as any biological

process. Another way to say this is that the mental and neurobiological

processes of selectivity and integration are really analogous extensions of

similar general biological processes. The upshot of my hypothesis is a biologically

based account of vision-related, creative problem solving whereby

the most complex psychological phenomena and processes are explained

as emerging from neurobiological phenomena and processes, which, in

turn, are explained as emerging from general biological phenomena and

processes—all phenomena and processes being subject to evolutionary

principles.

In this chapter, I presented the ideas and arguments put forward by

evolutionary psychologists such as Cosmides, Tooby, and Mithen that the

mind evolved certain capacities to creatively problem solve. I tried to

respond to some of the debates in which evolutionary psychologists are

engaged concerning our human mental architecture and the early hominin

environments that have occasioned its evolution. We saw that Cosmides

& Tooby think that the complex activities in which the human mind can

be engaged are the result of specifi ed mental modules having evolved

during our Pleistocene past to deal with the various and sundry problems

early humans had experienced. We also saw that Mithen shows the defi -

ciency in this position and makes an advance upon Cosmides & Tooby’s

idea by arguing that problem solving is possible because the mind has

evolved cognitive fl uidity. I agreed with Mithen that cognitive fl uidity acts

as a necessary condition for creative problem solving, but I disagreed that

cognitive fl uidity alone will suffi ce for such an activity. I transformed

Mithen’s account by arguing that, while it may be true that the fl exible

exchange of information between and among mental modules is a feature

of consciousness, conscious abilities to segregate, integrate, transform, and

project visual information from mental modules—in terms of scenario

visualization—are what have accounted for the possibility of vision-related, nonroutine creative problem solving in Pleistocene environments. As I

have shown, my hypothesis regarding scenario visualization is an advance

upon Mithen’s account of cognitive fl uidity, which itself (viz., Mithen’s

account) is an advance upon Cosmides & Tooby’s model of the mind as

being composed of encapsulated mental modules.

Further, I suggested that by envisioning this feature of consciousness as

a psychologically emergent activity performing similar kinds of activities

of segregation and integration found at other levels in the neurobiological

and biological hierarchies, the case for consciousness’s playing an active

role in the solving of nonroutine, creative forms of problem solving can

be made more fortifi able. Scenario visualization is a psychological process

that has emerged from neurobiological processes exhibiting the same

kinds of features, and subject to the same evolutionary principles, as any

biological process. My intention has been to produce a coherent account

of scenario visualization envisioned as part of a psychological–neurobiological–

biological continuum that is subject to evolutionary history.

In the introduction to this book, I noted that I am a philosopher of mind

and biology, and, insofar as this is the case, I am concerned with two

principle questions concerning human nature, namely, What are humans,

in essence, that distinguishes them from the rest of reality? and How did

we get this way? The hypothesis of scenario visualization and its emergence

in an evolutionary history are my small attempts to answer these fundamentally

philosophical questions. Obviously, I have not answered these

questions completely. But I hope that I have offered a plausible hypothetical

“piece to the puzzle” that will inform and enliven the discussion and

research concerning our mental architecture and its evolution.

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Animal cognition, 78, 84,

150–153

birds and, 78, 150–151

cats and, 78

chimpanzees and, 78, 120, 122

monkeys and, 78

octopi and, 151–152

orangutans and, 120, 151

rats and, 150

Antirealism, 38–39

Argument from the sciences,

42–45

Argument from miracles, 47, 49

As-if realism, 4, 36, 38–47

Associations, mental, 8–9, 120, 150–

153. See also Animal cognition;

Bissociation

Attention, 81, 68–69

Binding problems, 71, 163

Bissociation, 8–9, 150–153

Brain

evolution and (see Evolution)

visual system and, 60–66

Causation

bottom-up, 14–15, 33–34, 162

top-down, 14–15, 33–34, 162

Cell functions, 32–33

Index

Cognition. See Animal cognition;

Associations, mental; Bissociation;

Vision

Cognitive fl uidity, 147–150

Component, 12

Computer processing, 70, 141

Consciousness. See Scenario

visualization

Constraint, 21

Constructivism, 39

Cosmides, Leda, and Tooby, John,

135–139

Critical period, 86

Data selectivity

in organisms generally, 17–21

in the visual system, 67–69

Drosophila, 26

Dummett-style assertibility conditions,

46

Emergentism, 29–31, 136

nomological emergence and,

30–35

representational emergence and,

36–46

Environment, 23, 84

Environmental-organismic information

exchange

in organisms generally, 23–26

in the visual system, 84–88

Eureka moments, 153

Evolution, 91–95

brain and, 99–102

Darwin and, 92

environments and, 94–95, 123–125,

140–141

genetic variability and, 91–95

hominins and, 7–8, 103–105, 140–141

javelin and, 118–123

mutations and, 92–93

natural selection and, 91–95

nervous systems and, 95–99

principle of economy and, 98, 142

scenario visualization and (see

Scenario visualization)

sieve illustration and, 94

visual system and, 105–109

Evolutionary psychology, 8, 135–146

broad evolutionary psychology,

135–148

narrow evolutionary psychology,

135–148

Exaptation, 52

Face-selective cells, 63

Fallibilism, 46

Functions, 5, 36–38, 47–55

Cummins’ organizational view of,

49–55

Griffi ths/Godfrey-Smith’s modern

history view of, 49–55

General intelligence, 138, 147

Gestalt psychology, 87

Geological time, 102

Good trick, 124–125

Hierarchical organization, 4, 11–12, 15

of living systems generally, 11–17

of visual systems (see Vision)

Homeostasis

generalized, 4, 13–14, 31–35

particularized, 4, 13–14, 31–35

Homeostatic organization view, 4,

31–36

Hominin evolution (see Evolution)

Homunculus problem, 163–165

Humphrey’s distinction between “in

here” and “out there,” 96, 98

Imagination, 155

Information, 17–18

Informational integration

in organisms generally, 21–23

in the visual system, 69–74

Integration. See Selectivity and

integration

Internal-hierarchical data exchange

of living systems generally,

12, 15–17

of the visual system, 57–67

Javelin, 118–125

Just-so stories, 119

Kantianism, 41, 155–156

Knowledge, 38

Long-term potentiation. See Memory

MacLean’s model of evolution, 99–101

Mayr, Ernst, 11–12

Memory, 79–81

Mind-body problems, 77

Mithen, Steven, 9, 147–150

Modularity, 9

evolutionary psychology and,

135–139

visual system and, 71–72

Nervous system

central, 98–100, 109

peripheral, 98–100

Neurulation, 85

Neuronal synchrony, 82–84

Neurotrophic theory, 86

208 Index

Organisms, 11–27

Parallel processing, 72, 141

Phenotypic traits, 25

Philosophy of science

epistemological issues in, 36–46

metaphysical issues in, 29–35

Pictorialist approach, 128

Pleistocene epoch and its importance,

139–146

Pragmatism, 38–42

Preaptation, 52

Problem solving

creative (nonroutine), 2, 9, 126–128,

133–135, 146 (see also Bissociation)

routine, 2, 9, 133–135

Realism. See As-if realism

Reductionism, 29–31, 136

Scenario visualization

consciousness and, 2–3, 7–9, 113–118,

149, 153–158, 162–163

goal-directness and, 117–118

illustrations of, 115, 159, 161

neurobiological evidence and, 7–8,

129–131

psychological evidence and, 7–8,

125–129

psychological-neurobiologicalbiological

continuum and, 10,

162–166

selectivity, integration and, 7–8, 113–

115, 153–158, 163

steps involved in, 113–114

tool-making and, 6–7, 109–125,

158–161

trial-and-error learning and, 124–125

Selectivity and integration, 3–4, 8–10

in organisms generally, 17–21

in scenario visualization (see Scenario

visualization)

in the visual system, 67–74

Sensory systems, 59–60

Skepticism, 38

Swiss Army Knife model of the mind,

144

Synfi re chain, 82

System, 12–15

Thought-experiments, as helpful to a

point, 53–54

Tool-making, 109–113. See also

Scenario visualization

Tool-making industries, 110–113

Truth, 39–41, 43

Veil of perceptions, 47

Vision

cognitive awareness and, 6, 75–78,

83–84, 89

conscious awareness and, 6, 75–78, 84

disorders and, 75–76

evolution of, 6, 91

eye evolution and, 105–106

hierarchical organization of, 57–67

illustrations of areas in, 64–65

levels of processing in, 6, 75–78

neuronal wiring of, 60–67, 129–132

what system in, 60, 64–67

where system in, 60, 64–67

Visual integration, 6, 71–72, 83, 89

Visual modularity, 6, 71–72, 83, 89

Index 209

In this section, I want to bring my analysis of scenario visualization in this

book around full circle, so to speak, and connect the conscious processes

entailed in scenario visualization with similar neurobiological and biological

processes spoken about in previous chapters. In the fi rst chapter, I noted

that biological processes of organisms exhibit the properties of environmental

information exchange, selectivity, and integration. Even at the

level of the cell, we see these properties being exhibited in the various

functions of the organelles, including endocytosis, exocytosis, and nucleic

control. Also, we saw that the property of internal–hierarchical data

exchange in an organism manifests upward causation, whereby the lower

levels of the hierarchy exhibit causal infl uence over the higher levels.

Likewise, the dual properties of data selectivity and informational integration

manifest downward causation, whereby the higher levels of the hierarchy

exhibit causal infl uence over the lower levels, in terms of control. I

asked the reader to think of the complex upward and downward causal

relations taking place when the human body simply gets up out of bed.

Put crudely, the brain must exhibit downward causation, as a necessary

condition, upon its own neurochemical constituents in order to cause the

body to get up, while the neurochemical constituents must exhibit upward

causation, as a necessary condition, for movement to occur in the fi rst

place. Further, in the third chapter, I presented evidence that at higher

levels of the visual hierarchy, the systems and processes therein segregate

relevant from irrelevant data and integrate visual modules so as to produce

a coherent visual picture.

My claim is that just as biological processes, in general, exhibit selective

and integrative functions, and just as visual integration performs the function

of selecting and integrating visual module areas, so too, a certain form

of consciousness emerged as a property of the brain to act as a kind of

metacognitive process that scenario visualizes, namely, selects and integrates

relevant visual information from psychological modules for the

purpose of solving vision-related problems in environments creatively (also

see Arp, 2005b). I think that by envisioning this feature of conscious activity

as a biologically emergent activity performing similar kinds of activities

of selection and integration found at other levels in the biological hierarchy,

the case for consciousness playing an active role in the solving

of nonroutine, creative forms of problem solving can be made more

fortifi able.

The idea that a conscious activity like scenario visualization is a biologically

emergent phenomenon involving both the selectivity and integration

of visual information comports well with neurobiological data from a

variety of sources. First, several neuroscientists point to attention as a

primary mechanism for consciousness (e.g., Desimone, 1992; Desimone

et al., 1994; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Treisman, 1977, 1988). In the

third chapter, I noted that attention is like a selective mechanism in the

visual system, segregating relevant from irrelevant information. When one

is said to be conscious of something, say a patch of red in one’s visual fi eld

or a memory of a roller-coaster ride, one is obviously attentive to that

something. One is focusing in on that piece of information to the exclusion

of other nonrelevant pieces of information.

Second, several philosophers, neuroscientists, and other researchers

think that integration of information is essential for a unifi ed conscious

percept (e.g., Baars, 1988, 1997; Baars & Newman, 2001; Lumer, 2000;

Singer, 1999, 2000; Singer & Gray, 1995; Cziko, 1992, 1995; Damasio,

2000; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Goguen & Harrell, 2004). This is really

the issue of binding that is present at various levels of the psychophysical

hierarchy. As Gray (1999, p. 31) notes, “Binding isn’t a problem for nervous

systems, as evolution has sculpted their organization to solve the problem

effi ciently and effectively. It is just a problem for those of us trying to

understand how the nervous system achieves the task.” Gray basically is

admitting that integration is a fundamental feature of the mind, despite

our ignorance of the exact mechanisms by which it occurs. Tononi &

Edelman (1998) and Velmans (1992) specify integration as the essential

feature of consciousness. When we are conscious of the tree outside our

window blowing in the wind, we must be able to integrate several visual

modalities so as to attain a coherent picture of what we are experiencing.

Likewise, as a form of conscious visual processing, scenario visualization

enables one to integrate several other mental modules of visual information

that, in turn, integrate several other brain-process modules.

Thus, we must not think that consciousness is some kind of entity existing

completely on its own, like some thing totally detached from the processes

and functions of the brain. I am trying to put forward a view of

consciousness as an emergent metacognitive process, one that utilizes

several areas of the brain concerned with the visual system, memory, planning,

and voluntary movements. To think that consciousness is some kind

of entity completely divorced from the processes of the brain catapults one

into what is known as the problem of the homunculus, a problem that is faced

most directly by metaphysical dualists in the philosophy of mind (see Dennett, 1986, 1987, 1991; Lycan, 1995; Baars & Newman, 2001). The

problem of the homunculus is the idea that consciousness is a “little person

inside the head” who perceives the world through the senses, as well as

thinks, plans, and executes voluntary motions. The homunculus is used

by some thinkers to explain how it is that the mind is able to bind together

or integrate relevant information so as to generate a coherent picture or

experience of the world. Dennett’s (1991) notion of the Cartesian theater,

whereby a person (representing consciousness) sits in a theater observing

pictures on a screen (representing mental representations, volitions, emotions,

etc.), is another expression of the homunculus idea.

Unfortunately, if one holds the homunculus view, a few problems result.

First, there is the problem of consciousness being a thing that is too disassociated

from the workings of the brain. If consciousness is a thing too

disassociated from the brain, then we run into the further problems of (1)

explaining how it is that consciousness, which presumably would exist on

a nonbiological level, can interact with a brain that exists on the biological

level (Jackson, 1982; McGinn, 1982; Baars, 1997), (2) specifying what the

objective laws associated with consciousness would be if they are not biological,

physical, chemical, or otherwise scientifi c laws (McGinn, 1982;

Kim, 2000), (3) third man kinds of arguments whereby our mental life is

(not really) explained by consciousness, which is explained by consciousness2,

which is explained by consciousness3, and so forth, ad infi nitum,

(4) making consciousness out to be a “spooky” thing (Churchland, 1997;

Heil, 2004a, 2004b) too removed from empirical, objectifi able, third-person

evidence.

Thankfully, my account of consciousness as dependent upon biological

processes skirts a lot of the problems just listed, although, of course, there

may be a host of other problems that become evident. Some of these

problems just mentioned are avoided because consciousness is an emergent

phenomenon subject to the same laws as any other neurobiological and

biological phenomena, although it is not reducible to such phenomena

(also see Arp, 2008d). Provided that we switch the terms “constituted of”

with “dependent upon, but not reducible to” in his defi nition of consciousness,

Sperry (1980, p. 204) has stated the position succinctly: “Consciousness

is a functional property of brain processing, constituted of neuronal

and physicochemical activity, and embodied in, and inseparable from, the

active brain.” The psychological realm, although not reducible to these

realms, is an extension of the neurobiological and biological realms, and

all three of these realms are subject to evolutionary principles. Just as cellular

process exhibit internal–hierarchical data exchange, data selectivity, and informational intregration, so too, neurobiological and psychological

processes exhibit the same kinds of properties.

Scenario visualization is a form of conscious cognitive visual processing

that enables one to select visual information while bracketing out irrelevant

visual information. It also allows us to transform and project visual

images into future scenarios, as well as coordinate and integrate visual

information, so that the perceiver has a coherent picture of both the imagined

and real worlds. This feature of the conscious mind—scenario visualization

in terms of selectivity and integration—is a psychological process

that has emerged from neurobiological processes exhibiting the same kinds

of features, and subject to the same evolutionary principles, as any biological

process. Another way to say this is that the mental and neurobiological

processes of selectivity and integration are really analogous extensions of

similar general biological processes. The upshot of my hypothesis is a biologically

based account of vision-related, creative problem solving whereby

the most complex psychological phenomena and processes are explained

as emerging from neurobiological phenomena and processes, which, in

turn, are explained as emerging from general biological phenomena and

processes—all phenomena and processes being subject to evolutionary

principles.

In this chapter, I presented the ideas and arguments put forward by

evolutionary psychologists such as Cosmides, Tooby, and Mithen that the

mind evolved certain capacities to creatively problem solve. I tried to

respond to some of the debates in which evolutionary psychologists are

engaged concerning our human mental architecture and the early hominin

environments that have occasioned its evolution. We saw that Cosmides

& Tooby think that the complex activities in which the human mind can

be engaged are the result of specifi ed mental modules having evolved

during our Pleistocene past to deal with the various and sundry problems

early humans had experienced. We also saw that Mithen shows the defi -

ciency in this position and makes an advance upon Cosmides & Tooby’s

idea by arguing that problem solving is possible because the mind has

evolved cognitive fl uidity. I agreed with Mithen that cognitive fl uidity acts

as a necessary condition for creative problem solving, but I disagreed that

cognitive fl uidity alone will suffi ce for such an activity. I transformed

Mithen’s account by arguing that, while it may be true that the fl exible

exchange of information between and among mental modules is a feature

of consciousness, conscious abilities to segregate, integrate, transform, and

project visual information from mental modules—in terms of scenario

visualization—are what have accounted for the possibility of vision-related, nonroutine creative problem solving in Pleistocene environments. As I

have shown, my hypothesis regarding scenario visualization is an advance

upon Mithen’s account of cognitive fl uidity, which itself (viz., Mithen’s

account) is an advance upon Cosmides & Tooby’s model of the mind as

being composed of encapsulated mental modules.

Further, I suggested that by envisioning this feature of consciousness as

a psychologically emergent activity performing similar kinds of activities

of segregation and integration found at other levels in the neurobiological

and biological hierarchies, the case for consciousness’s playing an active

role in the solving of nonroutine, creative forms of problem solving can

be made more fortifi able. Scenario visualization is a psychological process

that has emerged from neurobiological processes exhibiting the same

kinds of features, and subject to the same evolutionary principles, as any

biological process. My intention has been to produce a coherent account

of scenario visualization envisioned as part of a psychological–neurobiological–

biological continuum that is subject to evolutionary history.

In the introduction to this book, I noted that I am a philosopher of mind

and biology, and, insofar as this is the case, I am concerned with two

principle questions concerning human nature, namely, What are humans,

in essence, that distinguishes them from the rest of reality? and How did

we get this way? The hypothesis of scenario visualization and its emergence

in an evolutionary history are my small attempts to answer these fundamentally

philosophical questions. Obviously, I have not answered these

questions completely. But I hope that I have offered a plausible hypothetical

“piece to the puzzle” that will inform and enliven the discussion and

research concerning our mental architecture and its evolution.

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Adaptation, 35, 54, 138

Adaptive radiation, 25

Animal cognition, 78, 84,

150–153

birds and, 78, 150–151

cats and, 78

chimpanzees and, 78, 120, 122

monkeys and, 78

octopi and, 151–152

orangutans and, 120, 151

rats and, 150

Antirealism, 38–39

Argument from the sciences,

42–45

Argument from miracles, 47, 49

As-if realism, 4, 36, 38–47

Associations, mental, 8–9, 120, 150–

153. See also Animal cognition;

Bissociation

Attention, 81, 68–69

Binding problems, 71, 163

Bissociation, 8–9, 150–153

Brain

evolution and (see Evolution)

visual system and, 60–66

Causation

bottom-up, 14–15, 33–34, 162

top-down, 14–15, 33–34, 162

Cell functions, 32–33

Index

Cognition. See Animal cognition;

Associations, mental; Bissociation;

Vision

Cognitive fl uidity, 147–150

Component, 12

Computer processing, 70, 141

Consciousness. See Scenario

visualization

Constraint, 21

Constructivism, 39

Cosmides, Leda, and Tooby, John,

135–139

Critical period, 86

Data selectivity

in organisms generally, 17–21

in the visual system, 67–69

Drosophila, 26

Dummett-style assertibility conditions,

46

Emergentism, 29–31, 136

nomological emergence and,

30–35

representational emergence and,

36–46

Environment, 23, 84

Environmental-organismic information

exchange

in organisms generally, 23–26

in the visual system, 84–88

Eureka moments, 153

Evolution, 91–95

brain and, 99–102

Darwin and, 92

environments and, 94–95, 123–125,

140–141

genetic variability and, 91–95

hominins and, 7–8, 103–105, 140–141

javelin and, 118–123

mutations and, 92–93

natural selection and, 91–95

nervous systems and, 95–99

principle of economy and, 98, 142

scenario visualization and (see

Scenario visualization)

sieve illustration and, 94

visual system and, 105–109

Evolutionary psychology, 8, 135–146

broad evolutionary psychology,

135–148

narrow evolutionary psychology,

135–148

Exaptation, 52

Face-selective cells, 63

Fallibilism, 46

Functions, 5, 36–38, 47–55

Cummins’ organizational view of,

49–55

Griffi ths/Godfrey-Smith’s modern

history view of, 49–55

General intelligence, 138, 147

Gestalt psychology, 87

Geological time, 102

Good trick, 124–125

Hierarchical organization, 4, 11–12, 15

of living systems generally, 11–17

of visual systems (see Vision)

Homeostasis

generalized, 4, 13–14, 31–35

particularized, 4, 13–14, 31–35

Homeostatic organization view, 4,

31–36

Hominin evolution (see Evolution)

Homunculus problem, 163–165

Humphrey’s distinction between “in

here” and “out there,” 96, 98

Imagination, 155

Information, 17–18

Informational integration

in organisms generally, 21–23

in the visual system, 69–74

Integration. See Selectivity and

integration

Internal-hierarchical data exchange

of living systems generally,

12, 15–17

of the visual system, 57–67

Javelin, 118–125

Just-so stories, 119

Kantianism, 41, 155–156

Knowledge, 38

Long-term potentiation. See Memory

MacLean’s model of evolution, 99–101

Mayr, Ernst, 11–12

Memory, 79–81

Mind-body problems, 77

Mithen, Steven, 9, 147–150

Modularity, 9

evolutionary psychology and,

135–139

visual system and, 71–72

Nervous system

central, 98–100, 109

peripheral, 98–100

Neurulation, 85

Neuronal synchrony, 82–84

Neurotrophic theory, 86

208 Index

Organisms, 11–27

Parallel processing, 72, 141

Phenotypic traits, 25

Philosophy of science

epistemological issues in, 36–46

metaphysical issues in, 29–35

Pictorialist approach, 128

Pleistocene epoch and its importance,

139–146

Pragmatism, 38–42

Preaptation, 52

Problem solving

creative (nonroutine), 2, 9, 126–128,

133–135, 146 (see also Bissociation)

routine, 2, 9, 133–135

Realism. See As-if realism

Reductionism, 29–31, 136

Scenario visualization

consciousness and, 2–3, 7–9, 113–118,

149, 153–158, 162–163

goal-directness and, 117–118

illustrations of, 115, 159, 161

neurobiological evidence and, 7–8,

129–131

psychological evidence and, 7–8,

125–129

psychological-neurobiologicalbiological

continuum and, 10,

162–166

selectivity, integration and, 7–8, 113–

115, 153–158, 163

steps involved in, 113–114

tool-making and, 6–7, 109–125,

158–161

trial-and-error learning and, 124–125

Selectivity and integration, 3–4, 8–10

in organisms generally, 17–21

in scenario visualization (see Scenario

visualization)

in the visual system, 67–74

Sensory systems, 59–60

Skepticism, 38

Swiss Army Knife model of the mind,

144

Synfi re chain, 82

System, 12–15

Thought-experiments, as helpful to a

point, 53–54

Tool-making, 109–113. See also

Scenario visualization

Tool-making industries, 110–113

Truth, 39–41, 43

Veil of perceptions, 47

Vision

cognitive awareness and, 6, 75–78,

83–84, 89

conscious awareness and, 6, 75–78, 84

disorders and, 75–76

evolution of, 6, 91

eye evolution and, 105–106

hierarchical organization of, 57–67

illustrations of areas in, 64–65

levels of processing in, 6, 75–78

neuronal wiring of, 60–67, 129–132

what system in, 60, 64–67

where system in, 60, 64–67

Visual integration, 6, 71–72, 83, 89

Visual modularity, 6, 71–72, 83, 89

Index 209