5.1 Routine and Nonroutine Forms of Problem Solving

The construction of novel tools, as much as language, characterizes our

apparent human uniqueness among species in the animal kingdom. We

are the only species that has evolved the ability to fashion Velcro, construct

microchips, and send folks to the moon, all of which have involved solving

vision-related problems in creative ways. In the previous chapter, I presented

evidence of advanced forms of toolmaking in our hominin past—

specifi cally, those that began at the end of the Mousterian industry—that

require a mind having the capacity to scenario visualize. Considering

that our early hominin ancestors not only had to select certain materials

that were appropriate to solve some problem but also engaged in a number

of mental steps that resulted in the construction of a variety of tool types,

it becomes apparent that a fairly advanced form of cognitive activity had

to occur. I suggested that advanced forms of toolmaking require scenario

visualization, a conscious visual processing whereby visual images are

selected and integrated, then subsequently transformed and projected

in visual scenarios for the purposes of negotiating environments. I also

suggested that scenario visualization emerged as a natural consequence

of our evolutionary history, which includes the development of a complex

nervous system in association with environmental pressures that occasioned

the evolution of such a conscious activity. If an advanced form of

toolmaking acts as a mark of conscious behavior, then given the complex

and changing Pleistocene environments that our hominin ancestors inhabited,

as well as the production of novel tools so as to survive these environments,

visual processing most likely was the primary way in which this

consciousness emerged on the evolutionary scene.

The toolmaking processes in which our early hominins were engaged—

which researchers like Mithen, Wynn, and Pelegrin have been able to simulate—act as a microcosm example of the obstacles human beings face

on a regular basis. Not only do human beings manufacture things but they

successfully negotiate environments, invent, thrive, dominate the planet,

and solve all kinds of vision-related problems in creative ways. Some of

this problem solving is automatic and goes on unbeknownst to us. For

example, we react quickly to, and at times successfully negotiate, certain

situations where fi ghting or fl eeing are called for. Many confrontations

with bears have been avoided by campers in one of a variety of methods,

either by waving their arms, hollering, banging canteens, curling up in the

fetal position, or climbing up a tree (Kaniut, 1997). When asked about why

they chose their particular method, these folks normally respond, “I don’t

know . . . it was automatic.”

On the other hand, some of this problem solving is slower and more

deliberate, requiring us to be consciously aware of the goal of our

endeavor, the potential pitfalls, and the possible “plan Bs” that may

have to be pursued. In the introduction to this text, I used Mayer’s

(1995) terms and drew a distinction between routine problem solving

and nonroutine creative problem solving. In routine problem solving, a

person recognizes many possible solutions to a problem, given that the

problem was solved through one of those solutions in the past. People

constantly perform routine problem solving activities that are concrete

and basic to their survival such as pursue goals that have been established,

form think tanks to troubleshoot regarding product placement,

gather with their girlfriends at Starbucks to plan successful Halloween

parties for their children, devise committees to update school curriculums,

and meet with counselors to talk about how best to carry out an

intervention.

We also can engage in activities that are more abstract and creative, such

as invent new tools based upon mental blueprints, synthesize concepts

that, at fi rst glance, seemed wholly disparate or unrelated, and devise novel

solutions to problems. If a person decided to pursue a wholly new way to

solve a problem by, say, inventing some kind of tool, then we would have

an instance of nonroutine creative problem solving. Nonroutine creative

problem solving involves fi nding a solution to a problem that has not been

solved previously. The invention of a tool would be an example of nonroutine

creative problem solving because the inventor did not possess a

way to solve the problem already. The signifi cant question—the one to

which I have been trying to respond throughout this book—becomes, How

is it that humans are able to engage in vision-related forms of nonroutine

creative problem solving?

In this chapter, I present the ideas and arguments put forward by evolutionary

psychologists such as Cosmides, Tooby, and Mithen that the

mind evolved certain capacities to solve problems creatively. Specifi cally,

Cosmides & Tooby (1987, 1992, 1994) think that the complex activities in

which the human mind can be engaged—such as those that result in

complex problem solving, the construction of novel tools, artwork, and

analogy—are the result of specifi ed mental modules having evolved in our

early hominin Pleistocene past to deal with the various and sundry problems

a human may experience. Mithen (1996, 1999, 2001) shows the

defi ciency in this position and makes an advance upon Cosmides & Tooby’s

idea by arguing that problem solving, the novel construction of tools,

artwork, and the like are possible because the mind has evolved cognitive

fl uidity, an ability to exchange information fl exibly between and among

the mental modules. In fact, according to Mithen, cognitive fl uidity is what

is meant by consciousness, our uniquely human ability.

While I agree with Mithen that cognitive fl uidity acts as a necessary

condition for vision-related, creative problem solving, I disagree that cognitive

fl uidity alone will suffi ce for such an activity. Cognitive fl uidity

allows for the fl exible exchange of information among mental modules.

However, since Mithen’s description of the mind makes it out to be a

passive thing, I transform Mithen’s account by arguing that, while it may

be true that the fl exible exchange of information between and among

mental modules is a feature of consciousness, conscious abilities to select,

integrate, transform, and project information from mental modules into

imagined visual scenarios—in terms of scenario visualization—are what

account for vision-related, nonroutine creative problem solving. In essence,

my hypothesis regarding scenario visualization is an advance upon Mithen’s

account of cognitive fl uidity, which itself (Mithen’s account) is an advance

upon Cosmides & Tooby’s model of the mind as being composed of encapsulated

mental modules (also see Arp, 2005a, 2006a, 2008c).

The construction of novel tools, as much as language, characterizes our

apparent human uniqueness among species in the animal kingdom. We

are the only species that has evolved the ability to fashion Velcro, construct

microchips, and send folks to the moon, all of which have involved solving

vision-related problems in creative ways. In the previous chapter, I presented

evidence of advanced forms of toolmaking in our hominin past—

specifi cally, those that began at the end of the Mousterian industry—that

require a mind having the capacity to scenario visualize. Considering

that our early hominin ancestors not only had to select certain materials

that were appropriate to solve some problem but also engaged in a number

of mental steps that resulted in the construction of a variety of tool types,

it becomes apparent that a fairly advanced form of cognitive activity had

to occur. I suggested that advanced forms of toolmaking require scenario

visualization, a conscious visual processing whereby visual images are

selected and integrated, then subsequently transformed and projected

in visual scenarios for the purposes of negotiating environments. I also

suggested that scenario visualization emerged as a natural consequence

of our evolutionary history, which includes the development of a complex

nervous system in association with environmental pressures that occasioned

the evolution of such a conscious activity. If an advanced form of

toolmaking acts as a mark of conscious behavior, then given the complex

and changing Pleistocene environments that our hominin ancestors inhabited,

as well as the production of novel tools so as to survive these environments,

visual processing most likely was the primary way in which this

consciousness emerged on the evolutionary scene.

The toolmaking processes in which our early hominins were engaged—

which researchers like Mithen, Wynn, and Pelegrin have been able to simulate—act as a microcosm example of the obstacles human beings face

on a regular basis. Not only do human beings manufacture things but they

successfully negotiate environments, invent, thrive, dominate the planet,

and solve all kinds of vision-related problems in creative ways. Some of

this problem solving is automatic and goes on unbeknownst to us. For

example, we react quickly to, and at times successfully negotiate, certain

situations where fi ghting or fl eeing are called for. Many confrontations

with bears have been avoided by campers in one of a variety of methods,

either by waving their arms, hollering, banging canteens, curling up in the

fetal position, or climbing up a tree (Kaniut, 1997). When asked about why

they chose their particular method, these folks normally respond, “I don’t

know . . . it was automatic.”

On the other hand, some of this problem solving is slower and more

deliberate, requiring us to be consciously aware of the goal of our

endeavor, the potential pitfalls, and the possible “plan Bs” that may

have to be pursued. In the introduction to this text, I used Mayer’s

(1995) terms and drew a distinction between routine problem solving

and nonroutine creative problem solving. In routine problem solving, a

person recognizes many possible solutions to a problem, given that the

problem was solved through one of those solutions in the past. People

constantly perform routine problem solving activities that are concrete

and basic to their survival such as pursue goals that have been established,

form think tanks to troubleshoot regarding product placement,

gather with their girlfriends at Starbucks to plan successful Halloween

parties for their children, devise committees to update school curriculums,

and meet with counselors to talk about how best to carry out an

intervention.

We also can engage in activities that are more abstract and creative, such

as invent new tools based upon mental blueprints, synthesize concepts

that, at fi rst glance, seemed wholly disparate or unrelated, and devise novel

solutions to problems. If a person decided to pursue a wholly new way to

solve a problem by, say, inventing some kind of tool, then we would have

an instance of nonroutine creative problem solving. Nonroutine creative

problem solving involves fi nding a solution to a problem that has not been

solved previously. The invention of a tool would be an example of nonroutine

creative problem solving because the inventor did not possess a

way to solve the problem already. The signifi cant question—the one to

which I have been trying to respond throughout this book—becomes, How

is it that humans are able to engage in vision-related forms of nonroutine

creative problem solving?

In this chapter, I present the ideas and arguments put forward by evolutionary

psychologists such as Cosmides, Tooby, and Mithen that the

mind evolved certain capacities to solve problems creatively. Specifi cally,

Cosmides & Tooby (1987, 1992, 1994) think that the complex activities in

which the human mind can be engaged—such as those that result in

complex problem solving, the construction of novel tools, artwork, and

analogy—are the result of specifi ed mental modules having evolved in our

early hominin Pleistocene past to deal with the various and sundry problems

a human may experience. Mithen (1996, 1999, 2001) shows the

defi ciency in this position and makes an advance upon Cosmides & Tooby’s

idea by arguing that problem solving, the novel construction of tools,

artwork, and the like are possible because the mind has evolved cognitive

fl uidity, an ability to exchange information fl exibly between and among

the mental modules. In fact, according to Mithen, cognitive fl uidity is what

is meant by consciousness, our uniquely human ability.

While I agree with Mithen that cognitive fl uidity acts as a necessary

condition for vision-related, creative problem solving, I disagree that cognitive

fl uidity alone will suffi ce for such an activity. Cognitive fl uidity

allows for the fl exible exchange of information among mental modules.

However, since Mithen’s description of the mind makes it out to be a

passive thing, I transform Mithen’s account by arguing that, while it may

be true that the fl exible exchange of information between and among

mental modules is a feature of consciousness, conscious abilities to select,

integrate, transform, and project information from mental modules into

imagined visual scenarios—in terms of scenario visualization—are what

account for vision-related, nonroutine creative problem solving. In essence,

my hypothesis regarding scenario visualization is an advance upon Mithen’s

account of cognitive fl uidity, which itself (Mithen’s account) is an advance

upon Cosmides & Tooby’s model of the mind as being composed of encapsulated

mental modules (also see Arp, 2005a, 2006a, 2008c).