3. The foibles of human prediction
К оглавлению1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
In our philosophical circles, we’re considered good athletes—well, okay,
we used to be considered good athletes. Compared to our nonacademic
friends, however, we have always aspired to athletic mediocrity. It may
be that the success of SPRs is like our athletic success—apparent only
when measured against earnest but rather undistinguished competition.
(We could put the point more bluntly, but we’re talking about our friends
here.) The right question to ask might not be ‘‘Why are SPRs so good at
prediction?’’ but rather ‘‘Why are we so bad at prediction?’’ There is a large
and fascinating literature on this topic (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Gilovich
1991; Hastie and Dawes 2001). We can hit some of the high points of this
literature by noting that in order to develop reliable reasoning strategies
for problems of social judgment, it is typically necessary (a) to be able to
determine which cues are most predictive, which requires detecting correlations
between potential cues and the target property; (b) to be able to
attend to and remember all those cues; (c) to be able to combine them
appropriately; and (d) to get accurate feedback on one’s judgments. As we
shall see, we have considerable difficulty with each of these stages.
In our philosophical circles, we’re considered good athletes—well, okay,
we used to be considered good athletes. Compared to our nonacademic
friends, however, we have always aspired to athletic mediocrity. It may
be that the success of SPRs is like our athletic success—apparent only
when measured against earnest but rather undistinguished competition.
(We could put the point more bluntly, but we’re talking about our friends
here.) The right question to ask might not be ‘‘Why are SPRs so good at
prediction?’’ but rather ‘‘Why are we so bad at prediction?’’ There is a large
and fascinating literature on this topic (Nisbett and Ross 1980; Gilovich
1991; Hastie and Dawes 2001). We can hit some of the high points of this
literature by noting that in order to develop reliable reasoning strategies
for problems of social judgment, it is typically necessary (a) to be able to
determine which cues are most predictive, which requires detecting correlations
between potential cues and the target property; (b) to be able to
attend to and remember all those cues; (c) to be able to combine them
appropriately; and (d) to get accurate feedback on one’s judgments. As we
shall see, we have considerable difficulty with each of these stages.