7 The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology

The nonsocial components of our approach to epistemology have a

particular structure. Epistemology begins with a descriptive core,

which naturally yields various epistemic prescriptions; these prescriptions

are supported by the Aristotelian Principle (good reasoning tends to lead

to good outcomes) and are guided by some general normative assumptions.

On our view, the descriptive core of epistemology consists of the

empirical findings of Ameliorative Psychology. An example of an epistemic

prescription that flows naturally from Ameliorative Psychology would

be, ‘‘Use Goldberg’s Rule to make preliminary diagnoses of psychiatric

patients.’’ And we have argued that Strategic Reliabilism articulates the

general assumptions that guide the prescriptions of Ameliorative Psychology.

But there is a different way to do epistemology. For much of the past

century, epistemology in the English-speaking world has employed the

tools of analytic philosophy. Contemporary theories of Standard Analytic

Epistemology include versions of foundationalism (Chisholm 1981, Pollock

1974), coherentism (BonJour 1985, Lehrer 1974), reliabilism (Dretske

1981, Goldman 1986), and contextualism (DeRose 1995, Lewis 1996).

While proponents of SAE don’t agree about how to define naturalistic

epistemology, most agree it can’t work. What makes our approach naturalistic

is that it begins with a descriptive core and works out from there.

(We take this to be sufficient for an approach to be naturalistic; we don’t

know whether it is also necessary.) The standard objection to this version

of naturalism is that epistemology is essentially prescriptive, and

a descriptive theory cannot yield normative, evaluative prescriptions. Our

aims in this chapter are three. First, we will argue that the theories of SAE

are structurally analogous to our own naturalistic approach. They have at

their core a descriptive theory, and from that descriptive theory, proponents

of SAE draw normative, epistemological prescriptions. Second, we

will argue that the prospects for the theories of SAE overcoming the isought

gap are not good. And finally, we will argue directly for the superiority

of Strategic Reliabilism over any extant theory of Standard Analytic

Epistemology.

The nonsocial components of our approach to epistemology have a

particular structure. Epistemology begins with a descriptive core,

which naturally yields various epistemic prescriptions; these prescriptions

are supported by the Aristotelian Principle (good reasoning tends to lead

to good outcomes) and are guided by some general normative assumptions.

On our view, the descriptive core of epistemology consists of the

empirical findings of Ameliorative Psychology. An example of an epistemic

prescription that flows naturally from Ameliorative Psychology would

be, ‘‘Use Goldberg’s Rule to make preliminary diagnoses of psychiatric

patients.’’ And we have argued that Strategic Reliabilism articulates the

general assumptions that guide the prescriptions of Ameliorative Psychology.

But there is a different way to do epistemology. For much of the past

century, epistemology in the English-speaking world has employed the

tools of analytic philosophy. Contemporary theories of Standard Analytic

Epistemology include versions of foundationalism (Chisholm 1981, Pollock

1974), coherentism (BonJour 1985, Lehrer 1974), reliabilism (Dretske

1981, Goldman 1986), and contextualism (DeRose 1995, Lewis 1996).

While proponents of SAE don’t agree about how to define naturalistic

epistemology, most agree it can’t work. What makes our approach naturalistic

is that it begins with a descriptive core and works out from there.

(We take this to be sufficient for an approach to be naturalistic; we don’t

know whether it is also necessary.) The standard objection to this version

of naturalism is that epistemology is essentially prescriptive, and

a descriptive theory cannot yield normative, evaluative prescriptions. Our

aims in this chapter are three. First, we will argue that the theories of SAE

are structurally analogous to our own naturalistic approach. They have at

their core a descriptive theory, and from that descriptive theory, proponents

of SAE draw normative, epistemological prescriptions. Second, we

will argue that the prospects for the theories of SAE overcoming the isought

gap are not good. And finally, we will argue directly for the superiority

of Strategic Reliabilism over any extant theory of Standard Analytic

Epistemology.