2. The costs and benefits of reasoning

Some of the best Ameliorative Psychology concerns itself with discovering

ever cheaper and easier ways of tackling reasoning problems. There are obvious

pragmatic benefits to employing simple reasoning strategies, particularly

when quick action is imperative. But simpler reasoning strategies can also bring epistemic benefits. By reducing the price we pay for truths,

simple reasoning strategies allow for the possibility of purchasing more

truths or more significant truths at the same price. Let’s look at some

examples in which the drive to construct high-reliability, low-cost reasoning

strategies is evident in Ameliorative Psychology.

Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999) propose a reasoning strategy they

call Take the Best , which they praise as a ‘‘fast and frugal’’ heuristic. One

way they argue for the high quality of Take the Best is by comparing it to

more expensive reasoning strategies (e.g., Bayesian models). They argue

that in many sorts of cases, Take the Best is considerably more frugal than

other strategies (in the sense that it uses fewer cues in coming to its

judgment), while at the same time being about as reliable (or more reliable)

than costlier strategies (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1999, 87). Another

example involves the flat maximum principle (see chapter 2). Lovie and

Lovie argue that one of the benefits of the flat maximum principle is that it

‘‘allows a relatively low cost choice’’ between different SPRs of approximately

equal reliability (1986, 167). Often in Ameliorative Psychology, a

concern for tractable, easy-to-use reasoning strategies (or SPRs) is evident

when it comes to high-stakes predictions. For example, in assessing the

benefits of SPRs over clinical prediction, Dawes, Faust, and Meehl point to

their lower opportunity costs: ‘‘Even when actuarial methods merely equal

the accuracy of clinical methods, they may save considerable time and

expense. For example, each year millions of dollars and many hours of

clinicians’ valuable time are spent attempting to predict violent behavior.

Actuarial prediction of violence is far less expensive and would free time

for more productive activities, such as meeting unfulfilled therapeutic needs’’

(1989, 1673). Developing simpler, easier-to-use reasoning strategies is important

in the prediction of violence (see, e.g., Swets, Dawes, and Monahan

2000) and in the prediction of serious disease, such as Sudden Infant

Death Syndrome (see, e.g., Carpenter et al. 1977, Golding et al. 1985).

Some of the best Ameliorative Psychology concerns itself with discovering

ever cheaper and easier ways of tackling reasoning problems. There are obvious

pragmatic benefits to employing simple reasoning strategies, particularly

when quick action is imperative. But simpler reasoning strategies can also bring epistemic benefits. By reducing the price we pay for truths,

simple reasoning strategies allow for the possibility of purchasing more

truths or more significant truths at the same price. Let’s look at some

examples in which the drive to construct high-reliability, low-cost reasoning

strategies is evident in Ameliorative Psychology.

Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999) propose a reasoning strategy they

call Take the Best , which they praise as a ‘‘fast and frugal’’ heuristic. One

way they argue for the high quality of Take the Best is by comparing it to

more expensive reasoning strategies (e.g., Bayesian models). They argue

that in many sorts of cases, Take the Best is considerably more frugal than

other strategies (in the sense that it uses fewer cues in coming to its

judgment), while at the same time being about as reliable (or more reliable)

than costlier strategies (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1999, 87). Another

example involves the flat maximum principle (see chapter 2). Lovie and

Lovie argue that one of the benefits of the flat maximum principle is that it

‘‘allows a relatively low cost choice’’ between different SPRs of approximately

equal reliability (1986, 167). Often in Ameliorative Psychology, a

concern for tractable, easy-to-use reasoning strategies (or SPRs) is evident

when it comes to high-stakes predictions. For example, in assessing the

benefits of SPRs over clinical prediction, Dawes, Faust, and Meehl point to

their lower opportunity costs: ‘‘Even when actuarial methods merely equal

the accuracy of clinical methods, they may save considerable time and

expense. For example, each year millions of dollars and many hours of

clinicians’ valuable time are spent attempting to predict violent behavior.

Actuarial prediction of violence is far less expensive and would free time

for more productive activities, such as meeting unfulfilled therapeutic needs’’

(1989, 1673). Developing simpler, easier-to-use reasoning strategies is important

in the prediction of violence (see, e.g., Swets, Dawes, and Monahan

2000) and in the prediction of serious disease, such as Sudden Infant

Death Syndrome (see, e.g., Carpenter et al. 1977, Golding et al. 1985).