11.1 Not justification

At least two well-known philosophers have called for epistemological

theories that do not focus on justification. In 1979, Alvin Goldman argued

for an approach to epistemology he called epistemics that would focus on

assessing and guiding our mental processes. While we clearly do not share

Goldman’s appreciation for our ‘‘epistemic folkways’’, his call for a ‘‘scientific

epistemology’’ has not received the response it deserves (1992). In

1990, Stephen Stich defended a pragmatic account of ‘‘cognitive evaluation’’

and it was clearly not a theory for the assessment of belief tokens,

but something very much like what we offer here: it was a theory for the

assessment of a person’s reasoning strategies. We could cite other philosophers’

work who do not focus primarily on justification (e.g., Harman

1986), but the theory we have presented in this book is very much in the

spirit of the proposals of Goldman and Stich.

What about virtue epistemology? These theories tend to focus on

providing an account of epistemic virtue rather than epistemic justification

(although many virtue theorists offer an account of epistemic justification

in terms of epistemic virtue). There are, of course, quite different

theories of virtue epistemology (e.g., Sosa 1991, Zagzebski 1996). We

admire much of Sosa’s epistemology. For example, we agree that ‘‘it is

philosopher’s arrogance to suppose mere reflection the source of all intellectual

virtue’’ (Sosa 1991a, 266). Still, we do not take virtue theories of

epistemology, as they currently stand, to be fellow travelers. Our primary

worry is that current virtue theories are not sufficiently informed by

empirical psychology. If we take an epistemic virtue to be (roughly) a

habit of mind that tends to lead to truths, it is a thoroughly empirical

question which habits of mind will do this. While virtue theorists would

agree (e.g., Sosa 1991b), we suspect that they have underestimated how

counterintuitive the ‘‘virtues’’ are likely to be. One worry is that insofar as

virtues are dispositions that are reasonably stable across contexts, there is some reason to wonder whether people exhibit virtues of this sort (see

Doris 2002 for a discussion of the moral virtues along these lines). Another

problem is that the psychological evidence is likely to show that we just

aren’t as wise about epistemic matters as we think we are. Given the

evidence presented in this book, it must be the case that we have a lot of

mistaken beliefs about what habits of mind are virtuous. In a nutshell, the

framework of virtue epistemology—roughly, that we should seek to instill

in ourselves habits of mind that tend to be reliable—is fine as far as it goes.

But to think we have a good intuitive sense of what those habits of mind

might be strikes us as optimistic.

At least two well-known philosophers have called for epistemological

theories that do not focus on justification. In 1979, Alvin Goldman argued

for an approach to epistemology he called epistemics that would focus on

assessing and guiding our mental processes. While we clearly do not share

Goldman’s appreciation for our ‘‘epistemic folkways’’, his call for a ‘‘scientific

epistemology’’ has not received the response it deserves (1992). In

1990, Stephen Stich defended a pragmatic account of ‘‘cognitive evaluation’’

and it was clearly not a theory for the assessment of belief tokens,

but something very much like what we offer here: it was a theory for the

assessment of a person’s reasoning strategies. We could cite other philosophers’

work who do not focus primarily on justification (e.g., Harman

1986), but the theory we have presented in this book is very much in the

spirit of the proposals of Goldman and Stich.

What about virtue epistemology? These theories tend to focus on

providing an account of epistemic virtue rather than epistemic justification

(although many virtue theorists offer an account of epistemic justification

in terms of epistemic virtue). There are, of course, quite different

theories of virtue epistemology (e.g., Sosa 1991, Zagzebski 1996). We

admire much of Sosa’s epistemology. For example, we agree that ‘‘it is

philosopher’s arrogance to suppose mere reflection the source of all intellectual

virtue’’ (Sosa 1991a, 266). Still, we do not take virtue theories of

epistemology, as they currently stand, to be fellow travelers. Our primary

worry is that current virtue theories are not sufficiently informed by

empirical psychology. If we take an epistemic virtue to be (roughly) a

habit of mind that tends to lead to truths, it is a thoroughly empirical

question which habits of mind will do this. While virtue theorists would

agree (e.g., Sosa 1991b), we suspect that they have underestimated how

counterintuitive the ‘‘virtues’’ are likely to be. One worry is that insofar as

virtues are dispositions that are reasonably stable across contexts, there is some reason to wonder whether people exhibit virtues of this sort (see

Doris 2002 for a discussion of the moral virtues along these lines). Another

problem is that the psychological evidence is likely to show that we just

aren’t as wise about epistemic matters as we think we are. Given the

evidence presented in this book, it must be the case that we have a lot of

mistaken beliefs about what habits of mind are virtuous. In a nutshell, the

framework of virtue epistemology—roughly, that we should seek to instill

in ourselves habits of mind that tend to be reliable—is fine as far as it goes.

But to think we have a good intuitive sense of what those habits of mind

might be strikes us as optimistic.