11. Strategic Reliabilism and the cannon

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I understand that you haven’t tried to set your view in context of (what you

have been calling) Standard Analytic Epistemology. But isn’t your theory,

Strategic Reliabilism, really just a trivial variant of standard reliabilism (e.g.,

Armstrong 1973, Dretske 1981, Goldman 1986)?

Actually, our theory is unlike any traditional theory of justification

defended by proponents of SAE. But we do gladly admit that there are

many theories and views in contemporary epistemology that we believe

point in the right direction. We will begin by briefly pointing out the ways

in which our theory differs from the standard theories of SAE (see chapter

1 for a fuller discussion). We will then turn to some of the views that we

think point in the right direction.

There are four ways in which Strategic Reliabilism differs from the

standard theories of justification found in the SAE literature.

1. It is not a theory of justification.

2. It does not take as a major starting point philosophers’ considered

judgments about the epistemic status of beliefs, theories, or reasoning

strategies.

3. Strategic Reliabilism is an explicitly cost-benefit approach to epistemology.

4. Strategic Reliabilism takes significance to be an ineliminable feature of

epistemic evaluation.

As far as we know, no contemporary theory of justification has features

1–3. And only contextualism embraces something like 4 (DeRose 1995).

Still, some of these ideas can be found in contemporary epistemology.

I understand that you haven’t tried to set your view in context of (what you

have been calling) Standard Analytic Epistemology. But isn’t your theory,

Strategic Reliabilism, really just a trivial variant of standard reliabilism (e.g.,

Armstrong 1973, Dretske 1981, Goldman 1986)?

Actually, our theory is unlike any traditional theory of justification

defended by proponents of SAE. But we do gladly admit that there are

many theories and views in contemporary epistemology that we believe

point in the right direction. We will begin by briefly pointing out the ways

in which our theory differs from the standard theories of SAE (see chapter

1 for a fuller discussion). We will then turn to some of the views that we

think point in the right direction.

There are four ways in which Strategic Reliabilism differs from the

standard theories of justification found in the SAE literature.

1. It is not a theory of justification.

2. It does not take as a major starting point philosophers’ considered

judgments about the epistemic status of beliefs, theories, or reasoning

strategies.

3. Strategic Reliabilism is an explicitly cost-benefit approach to epistemology.

4. Strategic Reliabilism takes significance to be an ineliminable feature of

epistemic evaluation.

As far as we know, no contemporary theory of justification has features

1–3. And only contextualism embraces something like 4 (DeRose 1995).

Still, some of these ideas can be found in contemporary epistemology.