11. Strategic Reliabilism and the cannon
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I understand that you haven’t tried to set your view in context of (what you
have been calling) Standard Analytic Epistemology. But isn’t your theory,
Strategic Reliabilism, really just a trivial variant of standard reliabilism (e.g.,
Armstrong 1973, Dretske 1981, Goldman 1986)?
Actually, our theory is unlike any traditional theory of justification
defended by proponents of SAE. But we do gladly admit that there are
many theories and views in contemporary epistemology that we believe
point in the right direction. We will begin by briefly pointing out the ways
in which our theory differs from the standard theories of SAE (see chapter
1 for a fuller discussion). We will then turn to some of the views that we
think point in the right direction.
There are four ways in which Strategic Reliabilism differs from the
standard theories of justification found in the SAE literature.
1. It is not a theory of justification.
2. It does not take as a major starting point philosophers’ considered
judgments about the epistemic status of beliefs, theories, or reasoning
strategies.
3. Strategic Reliabilism is an explicitly cost-benefit approach to epistemology.
4. Strategic Reliabilism takes significance to be an ineliminable feature of
epistemic evaluation.
As far as we know, no contemporary theory of justification has features
1–3. And only contextualism embraces something like 4 (DeRose 1995).
Still, some of these ideas can be found in contemporary epistemology.
I understand that you haven’t tried to set your view in context of (what you
have been calling) Standard Analytic Epistemology. But isn’t your theory,
Strategic Reliabilism, really just a trivial variant of standard reliabilism (e.g.,
Armstrong 1973, Dretske 1981, Goldman 1986)?
Actually, our theory is unlike any traditional theory of justification
defended by proponents of SAE. But we do gladly admit that there are
many theories and views in contemporary epistemology that we believe
point in the right direction. We will begin by briefly pointing out the ways
in which our theory differs from the standard theories of SAE (see chapter
1 for a fuller discussion). We will then turn to some of the views that we
think point in the right direction.
There are four ways in which Strategic Reliabilism differs from the
standard theories of justification found in the SAE literature.
1. It is not a theory of justification.
2. It does not take as a major starting point philosophers’ considered
judgments about the epistemic status of beliefs, theories, or reasoning
strategies.
3. Strategic Reliabilism is an explicitly cost-benefit approach to epistemology.
4. Strategic Reliabilism takes significance to be an ineliminable feature of
epistemic evaluation.
As far as we know, no contemporary theory of justification has features
1–3. And only contextualism embraces something like 4 (DeRose 1995).
Still, some of these ideas can be found in contemporary epistemology.