5 Strategic Reliabilism: The Costs and Benefits of Excellent Judgment

Many virtues are involved in excellent reasoning, and an important

one involves the efficient allocation of one’s cognitive resources. The

excellent reasoner will occasionally spend time and energy pondering the

potential revision of her reasoning strategies, revising them when advisable,

and applying reasoning strategies to problems that are most likely to

yield significant truths. Any epistemological theory that aspires to guide

reason must recognize that we are limited creatures, and as such we have

to make choices about how to spend our cognitive resources.

Many epistemological theories ignore cost-benefit considerations. For

example, the theories of Standard Analytic Epistemology provide accounts

of what makes a belief justified. But there are infinitely many justified

beliefs one might adopt at any particular time (e.g., I am not the number

1, I am not the number 2 . . . ). Without some further guidance about

which of the infinitely many justified beliefs one ought to adopt, such

theories cannot be reason guiding in any positive sense. They can offer

negative guidance—by telling us what we ought not believe (i.e., we ought

not adopt unjustified beliefs). But this is surely disappointing. It appears

that the normative force of theories of SAE is exhausted by something like

the following prescription: ‘‘Adopt only a subset of the infinitely many beliefs

that are justified for you.’’ For such theories not to offer anything in the

way of useful, positive guidance is surprising, especially given the loud and

oft-repeated insistence on the part of proponents of SAE that Epistemology

is Normative.

Of course, defenders of SAE can argue that issues of resource allocation

are not fundamentally epistemological considerations, but are instead

pragmatic considerations. On this view, from a purely epistemological

perspective, it is immaterial whether one has a justified belief about the

length of one’s left index fingernail or about whether one has time to cross

the tracks before the train comes. While this move is certainly available,

taking it means that one’s epistemological theory will be empty of positive,

reason-guiding recommendations. It is not possible to offer an

effective reason-guiding epistemology that ignores resource allocation

considerations.

Strategic Reliabilism addresses resource allocation considerations within

a cost-benefit framework. But there are serious reasons to worry about the

feasibility of a cost-benefit approach to epistemology. First, there are serious

general objections to cost-benefit analyses; and second, it is not clear

how we can identify the costs and benefits of reasoning. Our goal in this

chapter is to tackle these two worries. Against the first, we grant that many

of the deep general concerns about cost-benefit analysis are legitimate.

Nonetheless, we argue that flawed cost-benefit analyses can be very useful,

especially if we are clear about the ways in which such analyses are flawed.

Against the second point, we argue that there are measurable proxies for

the costs and benefits of reasoning we can employ in a cost-benefit approach

to epistemology. Such analyses are flawed, but as we argued against

the first point, flawed cost-benefit analyses can be very useful.

Many virtues are involved in excellent reasoning, and an important

one involves the efficient allocation of one’s cognitive resources. The

excellent reasoner will occasionally spend time and energy pondering the

potential revision of her reasoning strategies, revising them when advisable,

and applying reasoning strategies to problems that are most likely to

yield significant truths. Any epistemological theory that aspires to guide

reason must recognize that we are limited creatures, and as such we have

to make choices about how to spend our cognitive resources.

Many epistemological theories ignore cost-benefit considerations. For

example, the theories of Standard Analytic Epistemology provide accounts

of what makes a belief justified. But there are infinitely many justified

beliefs one might adopt at any particular time (e.g., I am not the number

1, I am not the number 2 . . . ). Without some further guidance about

which of the infinitely many justified beliefs one ought to adopt, such

theories cannot be reason guiding in any positive sense. They can offer

negative guidance—by telling us what we ought not believe (i.e., we ought

not adopt unjustified beliefs). But this is surely disappointing. It appears

that the normative force of theories of SAE is exhausted by something like

the following prescription: ‘‘Adopt only a subset of the infinitely many beliefs

that are justified for you.’’ For such theories not to offer anything in the

way of useful, positive guidance is surprising, especially given the loud and

oft-repeated insistence on the part of proponents of SAE that Epistemology

is Normative.

Of course, defenders of SAE can argue that issues of resource allocation

are not fundamentally epistemological considerations, but are instead

pragmatic considerations. On this view, from a purely epistemological

perspective, it is immaterial whether one has a justified belief about the

length of one’s left index fingernail or about whether one has time to cross

the tracks before the train comes. While this move is certainly available,

taking it means that one’s epistemological theory will be empty of positive,

reason-guiding recommendations. It is not possible to offer an

effective reason-guiding epistemology that ignores resource allocation

considerations.

Strategic Reliabilism addresses resource allocation considerations within

a cost-benefit framework. But there are serious reasons to worry about the

feasibility of a cost-benefit approach to epistemology. First, there are serious

general objections to cost-benefit analyses; and second, it is not clear

how we can identify the costs and benefits of reasoning. Our goal in this

chapter is to tackle these two worries. Against the first, we grant that many

of the deep general concerns about cost-benefit analysis are legitimate.

Nonetheless, we argue that flawed cost-benefit analyses can be very useful,

especially if we are clear about the ways in which such analyses are flawed.

Against the second point, we argue that there are measurable proxies for

the costs and benefits of reasoning we can employ in a cost-benefit approach

to epistemology. Such analyses are flawed, but as we argued against

the first point, flawed cost-benefit analyses can be very useful.