2. The end points: The theories generated by the two approaches
К оглавлению1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
The two approaches to epistemology we have been considering differ in
terms of what they take to be the appropriate subject matter of epistemology
(our considered judgments vs. Ameliorative Psychology). Given
that they differ so fundamentally regarding what epistemology is about, it is
not surprising that they end up with quite different normative theories.
Indeed, they end up with theories of different phenomena. The fundamental
aim of SAE is to deliver an account of epistemic justification or
knowledge (or one of their close relatives, e.g., warrant). The fundamental
aim of our approach to epistemology is to provide an account of reasoning
excellence. Is this really a deep difference? Yes, it is.
Justification, the target of theories of SAE, is a property of belief
tokens. Judy might be justified in believing that George is a dolt, while
Mary is not. So a theory of SAE will provide an account that distinguishes
the justified belief tokens from the unjustified belief tokens (or, perhaps,
the more justified belief tokens from the less justified belief tokens). Epistemic
excellence, the target of our theory, we take to be a property of
reasoning strategies. The primary normative assessments made by Ameliorative
Psychology are of ways of reasoning. Ameliorative Psychology is in
the business of telling us what are the best ways to go about (say) making
tentative diagnoses of psychiatric patients (Goldberg Rule) or making
judgments about a person’s ability to repay a loan (credit-scoring models).
So an epistemology that puts Ameliorative Psychology at center stage will
yield a theory of reasoning excellence (see also Goldman 1979, Stich 1990).
While the notion of epistemic excellence might not have the common
currency or the philosophical pedigree of notions like justification, rationality,
or reason, it is a very useful concept to have at the center of one’s
epistemology. When a thoughtful person is faced with a reasoning problem,
she will sometimes think about and try to figure out what is the best way to
tackle this problem. We often have a sense (though perhaps sometimes a mistaken sense) that certain reasoning strategies are better than others for
handling certain reasoning problems. For example, deciding whether a
prisoner up for parole is a threat to society on the basis of his record in
prison is better than flipping a coin (and, as it turns out, not as good as
using a decision tree; see Quinsey, et al. 1998). So we understand that some
reasoning strategies are better than others; and often there is a reasoning
strategy that is the best available. Our epistemological theory aims to
provide an account of what it is for a reasoning strategy to be excellent, or
better than any of the alternatives.
If our theory and the theories of SAE are theories of different epistemological
categories, one might wonder whether they can conflict. Perhaps
by so radically altering what we take epistemology to be, we have changed the
subject? We don’t think this is a serious worry. A theory of justification will
yield normative conclusions about belief tokens—whether they are justified or
not (or the degree to which they are justified). A theory of epistemic excellence
will yield normative conclusions about the epistemic quality of a reasoning
strategy. But reasoning strategies typically produce belief tokens. So
whenever a theory of reasoning excellence recommends a particular reasoning
strategy for tackling a particular problem, it normally recommends
a belief token, but at one remove. And this leaves open the possibility of
conflict. It is possible for a theory of reasoning excellence to recommend
a reasoning strategy to S that yields the belief that p, and for a theory of
justification to conclude that S’s belief that not-p is justified and that S’s belief
that p is not justified. Insofar as the two approaches to epistemology are
meant to guide reasoning, it is possible for them to yield recommendations
that are mutually incompatible (in the sense that both cannot be followed).
The two approaches to epistemology we have been considering differ in
terms of what they take to be the appropriate subject matter of epistemology
(our considered judgments vs. Ameliorative Psychology). Given
that they differ so fundamentally regarding what epistemology is about, it is
not surprising that they end up with quite different normative theories.
Indeed, they end up with theories of different phenomena. The fundamental
aim of SAE is to deliver an account of epistemic justification or
knowledge (or one of their close relatives, e.g., warrant). The fundamental
aim of our approach to epistemology is to provide an account of reasoning
excellence. Is this really a deep difference? Yes, it is.
Justification, the target of theories of SAE, is a property of belief
tokens. Judy might be justified in believing that George is a dolt, while
Mary is not. So a theory of SAE will provide an account that distinguishes
the justified belief tokens from the unjustified belief tokens (or, perhaps,
the more justified belief tokens from the less justified belief tokens). Epistemic
excellence, the target of our theory, we take to be a property of
reasoning strategies. The primary normative assessments made by Ameliorative
Psychology are of ways of reasoning. Ameliorative Psychology is in
the business of telling us what are the best ways to go about (say) making
tentative diagnoses of psychiatric patients (Goldberg Rule) or making
judgments about a person’s ability to repay a loan (credit-scoring models).
So an epistemology that puts Ameliorative Psychology at center stage will
yield a theory of reasoning excellence (see also Goldman 1979, Stich 1990).
While the notion of epistemic excellence might not have the common
currency or the philosophical pedigree of notions like justification, rationality,
or reason, it is a very useful concept to have at the center of one’s
epistemology. When a thoughtful person is faced with a reasoning problem,
she will sometimes think about and try to figure out what is the best way to
tackle this problem. We often have a sense (though perhaps sometimes a mistaken sense) that certain reasoning strategies are better than others for
handling certain reasoning problems. For example, deciding whether a
prisoner up for parole is a threat to society on the basis of his record in
prison is better than flipping a coin (and, as it turns out, not as good as
using a decision tree; see Quinsey, et al. 1998). So we understand that some
reasoning strategies are better than others; and often there is a reasoning
strategy that is the best available. Our epistemological theory aims to
provide an account of what it is for a reasoning strategy to be excellent, or
better than any of the alternatives.
If our theory and the theories of SAE are theories of different epistemological
categories, one might wonder whether they can conflict. Perhaps
by so radically altering what we take epistemology to be, we have changed the
subject? We don’t think this is a serious worry. A theory of justification will
yield normative conclusions about belief tokens—whether they are justified or
not (or the degree to which they are justified). A theory of epistemic excellence
will yield normative conclusions about the epistemic quality of a reasoning
strategy. But reasoning strategies typically produce belief tokens. So
whenever a theory of reasoning excellence recommends a particular reasoning
strategy for tackling a particular problem, it normally recommends
a belief token, but at one remove. And this leaves open the possibility of
conflict. It is possible for a theory of reasoning excellence to recommend
a reasoning strategy to S that yields the belief that p, and for a theory of
justification to conclude that S’s belief that not-p is justified and that S’s belief
that p is not justified. Insofar as the two approaches to epistemology are
meant to guide reasoning, it is possible for them to yield recommendations
that are mutually incompatible (in the sense that both cannot be followed).