2. The end points: The theories generated by the two approaches

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The two approaches to epistemology we have been considering differ in

terms of what they take to be the appropriate subject matter of epistemology

(our considered judgments vs. Ameliorative Psychology). Given

that they differ so fundamentally regarding what epistemology is about, it is

not surprising that they end up with quite different normative theories.

Indeed, they end up with theories of different phenomena. The fundamental

aim of SAE is to deliver an account of epistemic justification or

knowledge (or one of their close relatives, e.g., warrant). The fundamental

aim of our approach to epistemology is to provide an account of reasoning

excellence. Is this really a deep difference? Yes, it is.

Justification, the target of theories of SAE, is a property of belief

tokens. Judy might be justified in believing that George is a dolt, while

Mary is not. So a theory of SAE will provide an account that distinguishes

the justified belief tokens from the unjustified belief tokens (or, perhaps,

the more justified belief tokens from the less justified belief tokens). Epistemic

excellence, the target of our theory, we take to be a property of

reasoning strategies. The primary normative assessments made by Ameliorative

Psychology are of ways of reasoning. Ameliorative Psychology is in

the business of telling us what are the best ways to go about (say) making

tentative diagnoses of psychiatric patients (Goldberg Rule) or making

judgments about a person’s ability to repay a loan (credit-scoring models).

So an epistemology that puts Ameliorative Psychology at center stage will

yield a theory of reasoning excellence (see also Goldman 1979, Stich 1990).

While the notion of epistemic excellence might not have the common

currency or the philosophical pedigree of notions like justification, rationality,

or reason, it is a very useful concept to have at the center of one’s

epistemology. When a thoughtful person is faced with a reasoning problem,

she will sometimes think about and try to figure out what is the best way to

tackle this problem. We often have a sense (though perhaps sometimes a mistaken sense) that certain reasoning strategies are better than others for

handling certain reasoning problems. For example, deciding whether a

prisoner up for parole is a threat to society on the basis of his record in

prison is better than flipping a coin (and, as it turns out, not as good as

using a decision tree; see Quinsey, et al. 1998). So we understand that some

reasoning strategies are better than others; and often there is a reasoning

strategy that is the best available. Our epistemological theory aims to

provide an account of what it is for a reasoning strategy to be excellent, or

better than any of the alternatives.

If our theory and the theories of SAE are theories of different epistemological

categories, one might wonder whether they can conflict. Perhaps

by so radically altering what we take epistemology to be, we have changed the

subject? We don’t think this is a serious worry. A theory of justification will

yield normative conclusions about belief tokens—whether they are justified or

not (or the degree to which they are justified). A theory of epistemic excellence

will yield normative conclusions about the epistemic quality of a reasoning

strategy. But reasoning strategies typically produce belief tokens. So

whenever a theory of reasoning excellence recommends a particular reasoning

strategy for tackling a particular problem, it normally recommends

a belief token, but at one remove. And this leaves open the possibility of

conflict. It is possible for a theory of reasoning excellence to recommend

a reasoning strategy to S that yields the belief that p, and for a theory of

justification to conclude that S’s belief that not-p is justified and that S’s belief

that p is not justified. Insofar as the two approaches to epistemology are

meant to guide reasoning, it is possible for them to yield recommendations

that are mutually incompatible (in the sense that both cannot be followed).

The two approaches to epistemology we have been considering differ in

terms of what they take to be the appropriate subject matter of epistemology

(our considered judgments vs. Ameliorative Psychology). Given

that they differ so fundamentally regarding what epistemology is about, it is

not surprising that they end up with quite different normative theories.

Indeed, they end up with theories of different phenomena. The fundamental

aim of SAE is to deliver an account of epistemic justification or

knowledge (or one of their close relatives, e.g., warrant). The fundamental

aim of our approach to epistemology is to provide an account of reasoning

excellence. Is this really a deep difference? Yes, it is.

Justification, the target of theories of SAE, is a property of belief

tokens. Judy might be justified in believing that George is a dolt, while

Mary is not. So a theory of SAE will provide an account that distinguishes

the justified belief tokens from the unjustified belief tokens (or, perhaps,

the more justified belief tokens from the less justified belief tokens). Epistemic

excellence, the target of our theory, we take to be a property of

reasoning strategies. The primary normative assessments made by Ameliorative

Psychology are of ways of reasoning. Ameliorative Psychology is in

the business of telling us what are the best ways to go about (say) making

tentative diagnoses of psychiatric patients (Goldberg Rule) or making

judgments about a person’s ability to repay a loan (credit-scoring models).

So an epistemology that puts Ameliorative Psychology at center stage will

yield a theory of reasoning excellence (see also Goldman 1979, Stich 1990).

While the notion of epistemic excellence might not have the common

currency or the philosophical pedigree of notions like justification, rationality,

or reason, it is a very useful concept to have at the center of one’s

epistemology. When a thoughtful person is faced with a reasoning problem,

she will sometimes think about and try to figure out what is the best way to

tackle this problem. We often have a sense (though perhaps sometimes a mistaken sense) that certain reasoning strategies are better than others for

handling certain reasoning problems. For example, deciding whether a

prisoner up for parole is a threat to society on the basis of his record in

prison is better than flipping a coin (and, as it turns out, not as good as

using a decision tree; see Quinsey, et al. 1998). So we understand that some

reasoning strategies are better than others; and often there is a reasoning

strategy that is the best available. Our epistemological theory aims to

provide an account of what it is for a reasoning strategy to be excellent, or

better than any of the alternatives.

If our theory and the theories of SAE are theories of different epistemological

categories, one might wonder whether they can conflict. Perhaps

by so radically altering what we take epistemology to be, we have changed the

subject? We don’t think this is a serious worry. A theory of justification will

yield normative conclusions about belief tokens—whether they are justified or

not (or the degree to which they are justified). A theory of epistemic excellence

will yield normative conclusions about the epistemic quality of a reasoning

strategy. But reasoning strategies typically produce belief tokens. So

whenever a theory of reasoning excellence recommends a particular reasoning

strategy for tackling a particular problem, it normally recommends

a belief token, but at one remove. And this leaves open the possibility of

conflict. It is possible for a theory of reasoning excellence to recommend

a reasoning strategy to S that yields the belief that p, and for a theory of

justification to conclude that S’s belief that not-p is justified and that S’s belief

that p is not justified. Insofar as the two approaches to epistemology are

meant to guide reasoning, it is possible for them to yield recommendations

that are mutually incompatible (in the sense that both cannot be followed).