4. Conclusion
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Properly understanding the notion of epistemic significance is a core
problem for any epistemological theory that claims to be able to guide
reason. Any epistemological view that gives a central place to the notion of
significance is bound to be deeply empirical. We cannot know a priori what sorts of problems are significant. Perhaps this explains why so much
traditional epistemology neglects the notion of significance (but see Firth
1998). It would make epistemology dependent on contingent facts about
what sorts of problems tend to be significant and insignificant. In its
attempt to avoid empirical matters, SAE avoids issues of significance. But
it is important to keep in mind that the call to allocate our cognitive
resources to significant problems applies not only to individuals, but also
to disciplines like physics, chemistry, and indeed epistemology itself. We
have in fact identified some problems we think are important in epistemology
that have been mostly ignored by contemporary epistemologists—
for example, determining what sorts of reasoning problems are likely to be
significant or negatively significant, identifying excellent (tractable and
reliable) reasoning strategies for such problems, and setting up social
institutions that can communicate established findings responsibly. It may
seem the pinnacle of arrogance for us to declare which problems are significant
for epistemology. Perhaps. But arrogance has many forms, from
boastful certainty to aloof self-satisfaction. Would it be less arrogant for us
to suppose without any explicit defense that the current priorities of our
discipline just happen to be fine? Or that the current allocation of resources
in our discipline is optimal in terms of giving us the best chance to
achieve the normative goals of epistemology?
Properly understanding the notion of epistemic significance is a core
problem for any epistemological theory that claims to be able to guide
reason. Any epistemological view that gives a central place to the notion of
significance is bound to be deeply empirical. We cannot know a priori what sorts of problems are significant. Perhaps this explains why so much
traditional epistemology neglects the notion of significance (but see Firth
1998). It would make epistemology dependent on contingent facts about
what sorts of problems tend to be significant and insignificant. In its
attempt to avoid empirical matters, SAE avoids issues of significance. But
it is important to keep in mind that the call to allocate our cognitive
resources to significant problems applies not only to individuals, but also
to disciplines like physics, chemistry, and indeed epistemology itself. We
have in fact identified some problems we think are important in epistemology
that have been mostly ignored by contemporary epistemologists—
for example, determining what sorts of reasoning problems are likely to be
significant or negatively significant, identifying excellent (tractable and
reliable) reasoning strategies for such problems, and setting up social
institutions that can communicate established findings responsibly. It may
seem the pinnacle of arrogance for us to declare which problems are significant
for epistemology. Perhaps. But arrogance has many forms, from
boastful certainty to aloof self-satisfaction. Would it be less arrogant for us
to suppose without any explicit defense that the current priorities of our
discipline just happen to be fine? Or that the current allocation of resources
in our discipline is optimal in terms of giving us the best chance to
achieve the normative goals of epistemology?