4. How does Strategic Reliabilism handle the naturalist challenge?
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Many readers will quite reasonably point out that we have leveled an
extremely difficult challenge to the proponent of SAE. What’s more, our
view faces the same challenge, and we would not claim to have fully and
adequately addressed it. So what do we say about the naturalist challenge?
From our perspective, the Aristotelian Principle provides at least part of
the motivation for bridging ‘‘is’’ (successful outcomes) and ‘‘ought’’ (how
we ought to reason). At least part of the story for why the dictates of
Strategic Reliabilism are normatively binding is that following the prescriptions
of Strategic Reliabilism will tend over the long run to lead to
better outcomes than violating those prescriptions. The appeal to the Aristotelian
Principle might strike some, particularly those who are wedded
to the methods of analytic philosophy, as mildly disappointing. Surely it
would be more dramatic, more fitting, to claim that we have direct access
to the normative domain. Surely it would be more profound, indeed more
philosophical, to aver that we have plunged deep, deep into our own consciousness,
engaged in tortured investigations that tested the limits of
our will and intellect, and resurfaced to report on the intricate structure of
the normative realm. But alas, no. Our access to the normative comes
from what we can infer about the regularities in the world that are responsible
for the success of certain reasoning strategies. It is indirect and
The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology 115
empirical—and so subject to standard skeptical concerns. But our access
also relies on the powerful methods of contemporary science. While
neither perfect nor unassailable, such methods seem to us to be at least as
good as any other on offer, and better than most.
Many readers will quite reasonably point out that we have leveled an
extremely difficult challenge to the proponent of SAE. What’s more, our
view faces the same challenge, and we would not claim to have fully and
adequately addressed it. So what do we say about the naturalist challenge?
From our perspective, the Aristotelian Principle provides at least part of
the motivation for bridging ‘‘is’’ (successful outcomes) and ‘‘ought’’ (how
we ought to reason). At least part of the story for why the dictates of
Strategic Reliabilism are normatively binding is that following the prescriptions
of Strategic Reliabilism will tend over the long run to lead to
better outcomes than violating those prescriptions. The appeal to the Aristotelian
Principle might strike some, particularly those who are wedded
to the methods of analytic philosophy, as mildly disappointing. Surely it
would be more dramatic, more fitting, to claim that we have direct access
to the normative domain. Surely it would be more profound, indeed more
philosophical, to aver that we have plunged deep, deep into our own consciousness,
engaged in tortured investigations that tested the limits of
our will and intellect, and resurfaced to report on the intricate structure of
the normative realm. But alas, no. Our access to the normative comes
from what we can infer about the regularities in the world that are responsible
for the success of certain reasoning strategies. It is indirect and
The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology 115
empirical—and so subject to standard skeptical concerns. But our access
also relies on the powerful methods of contemporary science. While
neither perfect nor unassailable, such methods seem to us to be at least as
good as any other on offer, and better than most.