2. Circularity worries

You begin your epistemological investigations with empirical findings, i.e.,

some findings of Ameliorative Psychology. Any epistemological project that

begins with empirical findings raises a circularity objection. We can put it in

the form of a dilemma. Why did you begin your epistemological investigations

with these particular empirical findings? In particular, do you have good

reasons for believing them? If so, you are presupposing epistemological

principles before you begin your epistemological investigations. And this is

viciously circular. If not, if you don’t have good reasons for believing the

empirical findings on which your epistemological theory is based, then how

can you defend this book with a straight face?

Your theory, Strategic Reliabilism, raises a particularly dramatic form of

this circularity objection. Chapter 1 says that a good epistemological theory

doesn’t just mimic the findings of Ameliorative Psychology, and chapter 8

employs your theory to resolve disputes in Ameliorative Psychology. But when

you constructed your epistemological theory in the first part of the book, it

could not have been ‘‘informed’’ by the instances of Ameliorative Psychology

you argue are mistaken in chapter 8. So you must have been making decisions

about which instances of Ameliorative Psychology are good and which are

not-so-good in the construction of your theory. If so, you must have been

presupposing epistemological principles in deciding which empirical findings

to accept, and these empirical findings informed your normative theory,

which in turn justified those very empirical findings. Again, isn’t this viciously

circular?

In doing any sort of science, including physics, biology or Ameliorative

Psychology, scientists bring substantive normative assumptions to bear in

deciding what theories are good or true or worthy of pursuit. But this

point is not restricted to scientists. Anyone who provides reasons of any

kind in support of any kind of doctrine is up to their ears in substantive

epistemological assumptions. And that includes epistemologists. We

challenge the proponent of the circularity objection to show us the epistemological

theory that begins without relying on any judgment that is

informed by some kind of substantive epistemological assumption. Such

an epistemology would not begin by assuming, for example, that we have

beliefs (for that assumes that we have good reason to reject eliminativism,

the view that propositional attitudes don’t exist). It would not begin by

assuming that certain ways of reasoning about normative, epistemic

matters are superior to others (for that would require epistemological assumptions about how we ought to reason about epistemology). The circularity

objection seems to require that we begin construction of an epistemological

theory without making any normative, epistemic assumptions

whatsoever. And that’s a fool’s errand.

I’m certainly not insisting that epistemology proceed without any normative

assumptions whatsoever. Rather, our epistemological investigations should be

based on some privileged class of normative, epistemic assumptions. These are

the epistemological assumptions of a priori epistemology.

The circularity objection seems to leave us with a choice. But it is not a

choice between beginning our epistemological theorizing with substantive

epistemological assumptions or without substantive epistemological assumptions.

It is a choice between beginning our epistemological theorizing

with the epistemological assumptions of a priori epistemology (whatever

they may be) or the epistemological assumptions of science (whatever they

may be). On what grounds do we make this choice? It is certainly not

based on the relative success of a priori epistemology (or a priori philosophy

in general) over science in coming up with theories that are

fruitful and can lay some claim to being true. In fact, if we were to use any

reasonable version of the major philosophical theories of justification

(reliabilism, coherentism or foundationalism) to assess itself and our best

scientific theories, each would surely return the verdict that our best scientific

theories are far more justified than the epistemological theory. If

this is right, why not embrace the normative presuppositions of the theories

that all parties to this debate agree are superior?

But the epistemological assumptions of a priori epistemology are superior to

those of naturalistic epistemology. The reason is that the former are a subset

of the latter. Naturalists give themselves permission to reason about a priori

matters and a posteriori matters when doing epistemology; a priori epistemologists

permit only the former. Therefore, the epistemological assumptions

of a priori epistemology are safer and more likely to be true.

Even if we grant this point, why is safer better? Epistemologists have a

choice about what sorts of epistemic assumptions to adopt when doing

epistemology. We suspect that many epistemologists haven’t explicitly

made a choice about this. They have simply absorbed a tradition still

haunted by Descartes and the neurotic abhorrence of error. But error isn’t

the only enemy—or even the greatest enemy—in life, or in philosophy. Our approach does risk error by taking Ameliorative Psychology seriously.

But what is the risk of constructing an epistemological theory in happy

ignorance of such findings—findings that have a half-century’s worth of

empirical support? Two possible risks stand out. First, if our a priori theories

contradict such findings, we risk error. Second, if our a priori

theories imply nothing very specific about such findings, we risk irrelevance.

And if the proponent of a priori epistemology insists that his approach

does not carry these risks, we wonder: How on earth could he

possibly be so sure? Any choice we make about where to begin our epistemological

investigations carries risk of some kind. From our perspective,

there are moral, political and pragmatic grounds for doing what we can to

make sure that our epistemological theory is informed by our best scientific

findings about how we can reason better about significant matters

(for an interesting discussion of failures to meet this standard in moral

reasoning, see Sunstein 2003). After all, when people fail to heed the advice

offered by Ameliorative Psychology about how best to reason about diagnosing

disease or predicting violence, people die. Why build an epistemological

theory that risks endorsing or not condemning such epistemic

practices?

Let’s end our thoughts about the circularity objection by considering

why the objection is supposed to be damning. The problem, presumably,

is that the epistemological assumptions the naturalist begins with will

ultimately be vindicated by the naturalist’s epistemological theory. In this

way, the naturalist’s epistemology is self-justifying and so viciously circular.

There are three points to make about the viciousness contention.

First, it can be made equally well against any epistemological method or

theory, no matter how pristinely a priori. After all, the a priori epistemologist

must begin her investigations with epistemological assumptions

of some sort. Presumably, these assumptions will be vindicated by her

epistemological theory. So a priori epistemologies are just as viciously

circular as naturalistic epistemologies. Second, it is hard to see how the

viciousness claim can be reasonably made with any confidence (including

the viciousness claim we just made against a priori epistemology). After

all, no one has a clear and compelling account of what epistemological

assumptions are being presupposed by epistemologists, naturalists or otherwise.

Without knowing this, how can anyone be sure that the prescriptions

coming out of such theories will be the same as those that went in?

And how can anyone be sure that the prescriptions coming out of such

theories will vindicate those that went in? Third, suppose that Strategic

Reliabilism really does end up vindicating the epistemological assumptions of science. Would that mean that the naturalistic method was vicious? Not

unless there was something necessary or inevitable about this outcome. But

let’s stop to consider what it would be for Strategic Reliabilism to vindicate

every epistemological assumption of all of our best scientific theories.

This would mean that the methods and substance of every scientific theory

and discipline presuppose epistemological principles that yield prescriptive

judgments that are identical to those of Strategic Reliabilism. As we’ve

already admitted, we have no idea whether this sort of vindication is in the

offing (although we have serious reservations). But we are most eager to

see this case made by the proponent of the circularity objection. We are

confident that after articulating the epistemological assumptions of (say)

nuclear physics, cognitive psychology and evolutionary biology, and then

determining if these assumptions are vindicated by Strategic Reliabilism,

our overwhelmed philosopher will grant that there is nothing inevitable

about the outcome. And let’s suppose that after decades of work, the

proponent of the circularity objection finds—to everyone’s surprise—that

Strategic Reliabilism does vindicate all the epistemological assumptions of

our best science. Given that this result was not inevitable, we would have

no need to take this as an objection. We could simply conclude that science

makes even more terrific epistemological presuppositions than we thought.

You begin your epistemological investigations with empirical findings, i.e.,

some findings of Ameliorative Psychology. Any epistemological project that

begins with empirical findings raises a circularity objection. We can put it in

the form of a dilemma. Why did you begin your epistemological investigations

with these particular empirical findings? In particular, do you have good

reasons for believing them? If so, you are presupposing epistemological

principles before you begin your epistemological investigations. And this is

viciously circular. If not, if you don’t have good reasons for believing the

empirical findings on which your epistemological theory is based, then how

can you defend this book with a straight face?

Your theory, Strategic Reliabilism, raises a particularly dramatic form of

this circularity objection. Chapter 1 says that a good epistemological theory

doesn’t just mimic the findings of Ameliorative Psychology, and chapter 8

employs your theory to resolve disputes in Ameliorative Psychology. But when

you constructed your epistemological theory in the first part of the book, it

could not have been ‘‘informed’’ by the instances of Ameliorative Psychology

you argue are mistaken in chapter 8. So you must have been making decisions

about which instances of Ameliorative Psychology are good and which are

not-so-good in the construction of your theory. If so, you must have been

presupposing epistemological principles in deciding which empirical findings

to accept, and these empirical findings informed your normative theory,

which in turn justified those very empirical findings. Again, isn’t this viciously

circular?

In doing any sort of science, including physics, biology or Ameliorative

Psychology, scientists bring substantive normative assumptions to bear in

deciding what theories are good or true or worthy of pursuit. But this

point is not restricted to scientists. Anyone who provides reasons of any

kind in support of any kind of doctrine is up to their ears in substantive

epistemological assumptions. And that includes epistemologists. We

challenge the proponent of the circularity objection to show us the epistemological

theory that begins without relying on any judgment that is

informed by some kind of substantive epistemological assumption. Such

an epistemology would not begin by assuming, for example, that we have

beliefs (for that assumes that we have good reason to reject eliminativism,

the view that propositional attitudes don’t exist). It would not begin by

assuming that certain ways of reasoning about normative, epistemic

matters are superior to others (for that would require epistemological assumptions about how we ought to reason about epistemology). The circularity

objection seems to require that we begin construction of an epistemological

theory without making any normative, epistemic assumptions

whatsoever. And that’s a fool’s errand.

I’m certainly not insisting that epistemology proceed without any normative

assumptions whatsoever. Rather, our epistemological investigations should be

based on some privileged class of normative, epistemic assumptions. These are

the epistemological assumptions of a priori epistemology.

The circularity objection seems to leave us with a choice. But it is not a

choice between beginning our epistemological theorizing with substantive

epistemological assumptions or without substantive epistemological assumptions.

It is a choice between beginning our epistemological theorizing

with the epistemological assumptions of a priori epistemology (whatever

they may be) or the epistemological assumptions of science (whatever they

may be). On what grounds do we make this choice? It is certainly not

based on the relative success of a priori epistemology (or a priori philosophy

in general) over science in coming up with theories that are

fruitful and can lay some claim to being true. In fact, if we were to use any

reasonable version of the major philosophical theories of justification

(reliabilism, coherentism or foundationalism) to assess itself and our best

scientific theories, each would surely return the verdict that our best scientific

theories are far more justified than the epistemological theory. If

this is right, why not embrace the normative presuppositions of the theories

that all parties to this debate agree are superior?

But the epistemological assumptions of a priori epistemology are superior to

those of naturalistic epistemology. The reason is that the former are a subset

of the latter. Naturalists give themselves permission to reason about a priori

matters and a posteriori matters when doing epistemology; a priori epistemologists

permit only the former. Therefore, the epistemological assumptions

of a priori epistemology are safer and more likely to be true.

Even if we grant this point, why is safer better? Epistemologists have a

choice about what sorts of epistemic assumptions to adopt when doing

epistemology. We suspect that many epistemologists haven’t explicitly

made a choice about this. They have simply absorbed a tradition still

haunted by Descartes and the neurotic abhorrence of error. But error isn’t

the only enemy—or even the greatest enemy—in life, or in philosophy. Our approach does risk error by taking Ameliorative Psychology seriously.

But what is the risk of constructing an epistemological theory in happy

ignorance of such findings—findings that have a half-century’s worth of

empirical support? Two possible risks stand out. First, if our a priori theories

contradict such findings, we risk error. Second, if our a priori

theories imply nothing very specific about such findings, we risk irrelevance.

And if the proponent of a priori epistemology insists that his approach

does not carry these risks, we wonder: How on earth could he

possibly be so sure? Any choice we make about where to begin our epistemological

investigations carries risk of some kind. From our perspective,

there are moral, political and pragmatic grounds for doing what we can to

make sure that our epistemological theory is informed by our best scientific

findings about how we can reason better about significant matters

(for an interesting discussion of failures to meet this standard in moral

reasoning, see Sunstein 2003). After all, when people fail to heed the advice

offered by Ameliorative Psychology about how best to reason about diagnosing

disease or predicting violence, people die. Why build an epistemological

theory that risks endorsing or not condemning such epistemic

practices?

Let’s end our thoughts about the circularity objection by considering

why the objection is supposed to be damning. The problem, presumably,

is that the epistemological assumptions the naturalist begins with will

ultimately be vindicated by the naturalist’s epistemological theory. In this

way, the naturalist’s epistemology is self-justifying and so viciously circular.

There are three points to make about the viciousness contention.

First, it can be made equally well against any epistemological method or

theory, no matter how pristinely a priori. After all, the a priori epistemologist

must begin her investigations with epistemological assumptions

of some sort. Presumably, these assumptions will be vindicated by her

epistemological theory. So a priori epistemologies are just as viciously

circular as naturalistic epistemologies. Second, it is hard to see how the

viciousness claim can be reasonably made with any confidence (including

the viciousness claim we just made against a priori epistemology). After

all, no one has a clear and compelling account of what epistemological

assumptions are being presupposed by epistemologists, naturalists or otherwise.

Without knowing this, how can anyone be sure that the prescriptions

coming out of such theories will be the same as those that went in?

And how can anyone be sure that the prescriptions coming out of such

theories will vindicate those that went in? Third, suppose that Strategic

Reliabilism really does end up vindicating the epistemological assumptions of science. Would that mean that the naturalistic method was vicious? Not

unless there was something necessary or inevitable about this outcome. But

let’s stop to consider what it would be for Strategic Reliabilism to vindicate

every epistemological assumption of all of our best scientific theories.

This would mean that the methods and substance of every scientific theory

and discipline presuppose epistemological principles that yield prescriptive

judgments that are identical to those of Strategic Reliabilism. As we’ve

already admitted, we have no idea whether this sort of vindication is in the

offing (although we have serious reservations). But we are most eager to

see this case made by the proponent of the circularity objection. We are

confident that after articulating the epistemological assumptions of (say)

nuclear physics, cognitive psychology and evolutionary biology, and then

determining if these assumptions are vindicated by Strategic Reliabilism,

our overwhelmed philosopher will grant that there is nothing inevitable

about the outcome. And let’s suppose that after decades of work, the

proponent of the circularity objection finds—to everyone’s surprise—that

Strategic Reliabilism does vindicate all the epistemological assumptions of

our best science. Given that this result was not inevitable, we would have

no need to take this as an objection. We could simply conclude that science

makes even more terrific epistemological presuppositions than we thought.