11.4. Significance

К оглавлению 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

Finally, what about significance? The idea that good reasoning is reasoning

about significant matters is, of course, a central idea of the pragmatic

tradition in epistemology. And plenty of non-pragmatists have pointed

out that not all truths are created equal. But in recent years, this point has

been made best by a philosopher of science, Philip Kitcher (1993, 2001).

Not only has Kitcher written forcefully about significance, but the final

chapter of The Advancement of Science (1993; see also his 1990) is a fascinating

attempt to view social epistemology from a cost-benefit perspective.

There are three features of this emerging trend that give reason

for optimism. First, it honors what psychologists have already shown:

Good reasoning is an intricate achievement of busy brains in complex

environments. Second, treating cost-benefit measures as an essential

component in epistemology allows economics and psychology—the current

and future tools of public policy—to recruit and assimilate the

normative, theory-building efforts of properly trained epistemologists.

The third reason for optimism is more self-serving: This approach places

epistemology not just where it belongs, but where this book began—in the

philosophy of science, and in so doing, in science itself.

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Index

ABC Research Group, The, 55, 75

Abela, P., ix

Alexander, S. A., 30

Ameliorative Psychology, 3,

11–16, 26, 54–70, 154–157,

170–171

normative nature of, 14–16, 54–55,

167–169, 169–170

Anderson, E., 81

applied epistemology, 6–7, 17, 24–25,

58–70, 138

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11.4. Significance