9 Putting Epistemology into Practice: Positive Advice
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Epistemology is but a hollow intellectual exercise if it does not ultimately
provide a framework that yields useful reasoning advice.
Strategic Reliabilism provides a framework for figuring out how one ought
to reason about particular problems. The quality of a reasoning strategy is
a function of the significance of the problems it addresses, of its robust
reliability, and of its costs. Reasoning strategies are better to the extent
they are cheaper, are more robustly reliable, and address more significant
problems. Our aim in this chapter is to employ the tools of our normative
theory as well as various empirical findings to offer some practical advice.
While there are some conclusions to be drawn (perhaps sometimes only
tentatively), we can only go as far as the empirical data take us. Such is
the naturalist’s lot. One virtue of our theory is that, when conjoined with
empirical evidence, it can yield specific reason-guiding recommendations.
But another virtue that is perhaps as important is that our theory can
point us to important gaps in our knowledge. It can tell us specifically
what empirical evidence is missing if we want to offer reasonable guidance
about a reasoning strategy or a range of reasoning problems. In
this way, our theory can help direct us to empirical investigations that
can effectively lead us to better reasoning and (in the long run) better
decisions.
Epistemology is but a hollow intellectual exercise if it does not ultimately
provide a framework that yields useful reasoning advice.
Strategic Reliabilism provides a framework for figuring out how one ought
to reason about particular problems. The quality of a reasoning strategy is
a function of the significance of the problems it addresses, of its robust
reliability, and of its costs. Reasoning strategies are better to the extent
they are cheaper, are more robustly reliable, and address more significant
problems. Our aim in this chapter is to employ the tools of our normative
theory as well as various empirical findings to offer some practical advice.
While there are some conclusions to be drawn (perhaps sometimes only
tentatively), we can only go as far as the empirical data take us. Such is
the naturalist’s lot. One virtue of our theory is that, when conjoined with
empirical evidence, it can yield specific reason-guiding recommendations.
But another virtue that is perhaps as important is that our theory can
point us to important gaps in our knowledge. It can tell us specifically
what empirical evidence is missing if we want to offer reasonable guidance
about a reasoning strategy or a range of reasoning problems. In
this way, our theory can help direct us to empirical investigations that
can effectively lead us to better reasoning and (in the long run) better
decisions.