4. A circularity objection

A standard concern about naturalistic approaches to epistemology is that

they are viciously circular. We want to distinguish between two circularity

arguments. First, one might argue that any naturalistic theory is inevitably

viciously circular because such theories rely on empirical hypotheses which require for their justification epistemological assumptions. We will

consider this objection in the Appendix, section 2. A second type of circularity

objection raises worries about the application of a naturalistic

theory. In particular, in applying Strategic Reliabilism, we must employ an

explicitly epistemic notion (i.e., overwhelming evidence that one strategy

is more reliable than another). One might argue that this is a problem.

The second circularity objection is not concerned about whether a

naturalistic theory, like Strategic Reliabilism, might in some sense be viciously

circular. (That is the charge leveled by the first objection.) Strategic

Reliabilism says a reasoning strategy’s quality is a function of its reliability

score, robustness, the significance of the problems it targets, and how

difficult it is to implement. As Strategic Reliabilists, we can take these facts

to be independent of our epistemic access to them. But when it comes to

implementing Strategic Reliabilism, we are up to our ears in epistemic notions.

In order to apply our epistemological theory, we will typically have

to rely on observed reliability scores (and the quality of our evidence for

them). But this is not a vicious circularity. Any epistemological theory that

offers epistemic guidance will appeal to empirical notions in its application.

Unless an epistemological theory is meant to be useless to real reasoners,

it is hard to see how its application can avoid defeasible judgments

based on explicitly epistemic notions. (This argument is made persuasively

in Stich 1990, 145–149.)

A standard concern about naturalistic approaches to epistemology is that

they are viciously circular. We want to distinguish between two circularity

arguments. First, one might argue that any naturalistic theory is inevitably

viciously circular because such theories rely on empirical hypotheses which require for their justification epistemological assumptions. We will

consider this objection in the Appendix, section 2. A second type of circularity

objection raises worries about the application of a naturalistic

theory. In particular, in applying Strategic Reliabilism, we must employ an

explicitly epistemic notion (i.e., overwhelming evidence that one strategy

is more reliable than another). One might argue that this is a problem.

The second circularity objection is not concerned about whether a

naturalistic theory, like Strategic Reliabilism, might in some sense be viciously

circular. (That is the charge leveled by the first objection.) Strategic

Reliabilism says a reasoning strategy’s quality is a function of its reliability

score, robustness, the significance of the problems it targets, and how

difficult it is to implement. As Strategic Reliabilists, we can take these facts

to be independent of our epistemic access to them. But when it comes to

implementing Strategic Reliabilism, we are up to our ears in epistemic notions.

In order to apply our epistemological theory, we will typically have

to rely on observed reliability scores (and the quality of our evidence for

them). But this is not a vicious circularity. Any epistemological theory that

offers epistemic guidance will appeal to empirical notions in its application.

Unless an epistemological theory is meant to be useless to real reasoners,

it is hard to see how its application can avoid defeasible judgments

based on explicitly epistemic notions. (This argument is made persuasively

in Stich 1990, 145–149.)