3. The structure of a healthy epistemological tradition

On our approach to epistemology, a healthy epistemological tradition

must have three vigorous and interrelated components: theoretical, practical,

and social. The practical or applied component of epistemology is

an extension of what people do every day. Everyone who has ever thought

about how to tackle a particular reasoning problem has engaged in applied

epistemology. As is standard with an applied venture, some people do it

better than others. Ameliorative Psychology is the science of applied epistemology.

Much of the point of Ameliorative Psychology is to provide

advice that will help people reason better about the world.

The second component of a healthy epistemological tradition is theory.

We take theory and application to be mutually informing and supporting.

Theory is extracted from practice. One of the goals—and one of

the tests—of a theory of reasoning excellence is that it should be faithful to

the practice of Ameliorative Psychology. When conjoined with the descriptive

results of Ameliorative Psychology, the correct epistemological

theory should yield the recommendations of Ameliorative Psychology. One

of our primary goals in this book is to offer a theory that accurately depicts

the normative machinery that guides the prescriptions of Ameliorative

Psychology. But theory should do more than mimic. It should explain what

makes some reasoning strategies epistemically better than others; it should

also play a role in a full explanation for why good reasoning tends to lead to

good outcomes. (To see how our theory addresses these explanatory

challenges, see Appendix, section 8.) Further, a theory of reasoning excellence

should be able to be applied back to Ameliorative Psychology.

Practice informs theory; but good theory repays the kindness. When a

disagreement erupts in the applied domain, and that disagreement is at

bottom a theoretical one, a good theory should be able to clarify and, in

some cases at least, resolve the issues. In chapter 8, we will apply our theory

of reasoning excellence in an effort to resolve two disputes that have arisen

in Ameliorative Psychology.

We have suggested that the theoretical part of a healthy epistemological

tradition will be firmly connected to its applied components. As we

have already suggested, by this yardstick, the standard analytic approach to

epistemology does not seem to be a healthy tradition. As far as we have

been able to tell, the theoretical musings of analytic epistemologists have

not led to very much, if any, useful guidance about how people should

reason. We will argue eventually that this prescriptive impotence is a

natural consequence of the methods of Standard Analytic Epistemology. If

this is right, it is a shame. It is the normative, reason-guiding promise of

epistemology that makes it so much more than intellectual sport.

While a healthy epistemological tradition will provide useful reasoning

guidance, good advice we keep to ourselves is no advice at all. Ameliorative

Psychology is the science of applied epistemology, and theoretical epistemology

is theoretical Ameliorative Psychology (i.e., a theoretical science).

As with any science, it is important to think about what it would take for it

to be a well-ordered social system (Kitcher 2001). An important aspect of

epistemology’s social presence is how it communicates its practical recommendations

to the wider public. We don’t have any detailed picture

of what a socially well-ordered epistemology would look like. But we are

confident that it would have at least two features. First, in order to achieve

its ameliorative potential, epistemology should be organized so that it provides

a way to effectively communicate its established findings, particularly

its practical content, to a wide audience. Second, in order to minimize the

risk of promulgating harmful or mistaken findings, epistemology should

be organized so that whatever findings are communicated widely will have

passed rigorous examination and empirical testing.

On our approach to epistemology, a healthy epistemological tradition

must have three vigorous and interrelated components: theoretical, practical,

and social. The practical or applied component of epistemology is

an extension of what people do every day. Everyone who has ever thought

about how to tackle a particular reasoning problem has engaged in applied

epistemology. As is standard with an applied venture, some people do it

better than others. Ameliorative Psychology is the science of applied epistemology.

Much of the point of Ameliorative Psychology is to provide

advice that will help people reason better about the world.

The second component of a healthy epistemological tradition is theory.

We take theory and application to be mutually informing and supporting.

Theory is extracted from practice. One of the goals—and one of

the tests—of a theory of reasoning excellence is that it should be faithful to

the practice of Ameliorative Psychology. When conjoined with the descriptive

results of Ameliorative Psychology, the correct epistemological

theory should yield the recommendations of Ameliorative Psychology. One

of our primary goals in this book is to offer a theory that accurately depicts

the normative machinery that guides the prescriptions of Ameliorative

Psychology. But theory should do more than mimic. It should explain what

makes some reasoning strategies epistemically better than others; it should

also play a role in a full explanation for why good reasoning tends to lead to

good outcomes. (To see how our theory addresses these explanatory

challenges, see Appendix, section 8.) Further, a theory of reasoning excellence

should be able to be applied back to Ameliorative Psychology.

Practice informs theory; but good theory repays the kindness. When a

disagreement erupts in the applied domain, and that disagreement is at

bottom a theoretical one, a good theory should be able to clarify and, in

some cases at least, resolve the issues. In chapter 8, we will apply our theory

of reasoning excellence in an effort to resolve two disputes that have arisen

in Ameliorative Psychology.

We have suggested that the theoretical part of a healthy epistemological

tradition will be firmly connected to its applied components. As we

have already suggested, by this yardstick, the standard analytic approach to

epistemology does not seem to be a healthy tradition. As far as we have

been able to tell, the theoretical musings of analytic epistemologists have

not led to very much, if any, useful guidance about how people should

reason. We will argue eventually that this prescriptive impotence is a

natural consequence of the methods of Standard Analytic Epistemology. If

this is right, it is a shame. It is the normative, reason-guiding promise of

epistemology that makes it so much more than intellectual sport.

While a healthy epistemological tradition will provide useful reasoning

guidance, good advice we keep to ourselves is no advice at all. Ameliorative

Psychology is the science of applied epistemology, and theoretical epistemology

is theoretical Ameliorative Psychology (i.e., a theoretical science).

As with any science, it is important to think about what it would take for it

to be a well-ordered social system (Kitcher 2001). An important aspect of

epistemology’s social presence is how it communicates its practical recommendations

to the wider public. We don’t have any detailed picture

of what a socially well-ordered epistemology would look like. But we are

confident that it would have at least two features. First, in order to achieve

its ameliorative potential, epistemology should be organized so that it provides

a way to effectively communicate its established findings, particularly

its practical content, to a wide audience. Second, in order to minimize the

risk of promulgating harmful or mistaken findings, epistemology should

be organized so that whatever findings are communicated widely will have

passed rigorous examination and empirical testing.