5. The relationship between Strategic Reliabilism and the theories of Standard Analytic Epistemology

As must be clear by now, we do not believe that constructing theories that

render judgments of justification on belief tokens is a fruitful endeavor in

epistemology. Strategic Reliabilism identifies excellent reasoning strategies,

and it does not require that we render a verdict of ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’

for every belief token produced by a reasoning strategy. In fact,

we find the temptation to construct a theory to separate out the ‘‘justified’’

from the ‘‘unjustified’’ oddly Scholastic—designed for a kind of prim

conceptual tidiness rather than for useful guidance. Still, given the dominance

of Standard Analytic Epistemology, it is reasonable to wonder

about its relation to Strategic Reliabilism.

Strategic Reliabilism is not a theory of justification. However, a highquality

theory can often be shown to be preferable to other theories by

couching it in its opponents’ vocabulary. Strategic Reliabilism recommends

reasoning strategies. And reasoning strategies typically produce

beliefs. So Strategic Reliabilism recommends beliefs at one remove. In the

spirit of comparing our theory to those of SAE, let’s consider the following

proposal: The beliefs that result from the reasoning strategies recommended

by Strategic Reliabilism are justified. We take this to be an inessential

codicil to our view. It is no objection to our view to show that there is a

scenario in which it is the considered judgment of analytic epistemologists

that the belief recommended by Strategic Reliabilism is not justified. But

the inessential codicil allows us to pose a question: Does Strategic Reliabilism

recommend only beliefs that are justified (in whatever sense a

proponent of SAE means by ‘justified’)? One way to put our question is as

follows: Suppose God gave the analytic epistemologist the theory of justification

(Theory J) that satisfied all his (the epistemologist’s) desiderata.

Would Theory J and Strategic Reliabilism (plus the codicil) always agree

about which beliefs are justified? We will argue that no matter how the

question is answered, Strategic Reliabilism is more worthy of belief than

any currently available theory of SAE.

There are two ways to answer the question of whether Theory J and

Strategic Reliabilism (supplemented with the codicil) would always agree

about which beliefs are justified. The first answer is that all beliefs

recommended by Strategic Reliabilism are justified according to Theory J.

Under this scenario, we don’t need the theories of Standard Analytic

Epistemology. Strategic Reliabilism provides us with a straightforward theory

of justification that accurately divides the justified beliefs from the

unjustified beliefs. Suppose two theories of SAE (e.g., a coherentist and a

reliabilist theory) disagree about a particular case. If Strategic Reliabilism

yields the same judgments as Theory J, then there is an obvious way to

break this deadlock: Figure out what Strategic Reliabilism would say is the

best reasoning strategy for S to adopt in this particular situation, and the

belief that results from that reasoning strategy is the one that is justified. If

Strategic Reliabilism is a dependable deadlock breaker, then why do we

need the theories of SAE? We don’t.

Now let’s consider the second answer to our question. Suppose that

the beliefs that are the result of the best reasoning strategies (according to

Strategic Reliabilism) are not always justified (according to theory J). In

this scenario, Strategic Reliabilism will occasionally recommend a belief

that theory J does not count as justified. So which belief should we recommend

from an epistemological perspective? The belief recommended

by Strategic Reliabilism is the result of excellent reasoning on the part of S.

Excellent reasoning maximizes S’s chances of coming to true beliefs about

significant problems. This, in turn, will tend to lead in the long run to

better outcomes for S than if she had adopted reasoning strategies of lesser

quality. So the belief recommended by Strategic Reliabilism has a lot going

for it. What about the belief recommended by SAE? Its main advantage

seems to be that it is the belief that is deemed justified by a bunch of really

smart philosophers who have reflected seriously on their notion of justification.

Perhaps this description of the choice is unfair; perhaps this belief

would be deemed justified by a much wider range of people than just

really smart philosophers. Maybe it would be deemed justified by every

person capable of wielding the concept. Even so, which belief is the one

that deserves to be recommended from an epistemological perspective?

Surely it is the belief that comes with all the practically important empirical

advantages of epistemic goodness and of epistemic success.

Strategic Reliabilism plus the codicil presents the proponent of Standard

Analytic Epistemology with a dilemma. Either Strategic Reliabilism

recommends only justified beliefs or it does not. If it does recommend only

justified beliefs, then there is no need for any other theory of justification.

Strategic Reliabilism will do. If it does not recommend only justified beliefs,

then so much the worse for justification. The excellent reasoner—the person,

who adopts robustly reliable strategies for problems of significance—will

sometimes adopt beliefs that the proponent of SAE deems unjustified. So

what would the proponent of SAE have her do? Adopt less reliable reasoning

strategies or tackle less significant problems or both? If this is the

sort of advice the proponent of SAE intends to offer, then perhaps we need

to recognize that the orthodox concept of justification, no matter how

gilded by philosophical theory, is a crude and insensitive instrument of

evaluation. In the subtle causal nexus of mind and world, no good comes

from wielding such a notion like a mace. Those devoted to offering a

psychologically accurate picture of reasoning strategies and the useful

information they provide are likely to find such ‘‘justification talk’’ quaint,

were it not for the resources squandered by its primping.

As must be clear by now, we do not believe that constructing theories that

render judgments of justification on belief tokens is a fruitful endeavor in

epistemology. Strategic Reliabilism identifies excellent reasoning strategies,

and it does not require that we render a verdict of ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’

for every belief token produced by a reasoning strategy. In fact,

we find the temptation to construct a theory to separate out the ‘‘justified’’

from the ‘‘unjustified’’ oddly Scholastic—designed for a kind of prim

conceptual tidiness rather than for useful guidance. Still, given the dominance

of Standard Analytic Epistemology, it is reasonable to wonder

about its relation to Strategic Reliabilism.

Strategic Reliabilism is not a theory of justification. However, a highquality

theory can often be shown to be preferable to other theories by

couching it in its opponents’ vocabulary. Strategic Reliabilism recommends

reasoning strategies. And reasoning strategies typically produce

beliefs. So Strategic Reliabilism recommends beliefs at one remove. In the

spirit of comparing our theory to those of SAE, let’s consider the following

proposal: The beliefs that result from the reasoning strategies recommended

by Strategic Reliabilism are justified. We take this to be an inessential

codicil to our view. It is no objection to our view to show that there is a

scenario in which it is the considered judgment of analytic epistemologists

that the belief recommended by Strategic Reliabilism is not justified. But

the inessential codicil allows us to pose a question: Does Strategic Reliabilism

recommend only beliefs that are justified (in whatever sense a

proponent of SAE means by ‘justified’)? One way to put our question is as

follows: Suppose God gave the analytic epistemologist the theory of justification

(Theory J) that satisfied all his (the epistemologist’s) desiderata.

Would Theory J and Strategic Reliabilism (plus the codicil) always agree

about which beliefs are justified? We will argue that no matter how the

question is answered, Strategic Reliabilism is more worthy of belief than

any currently available theory of SAE.

There are two ways to answer the question of whether Theory J and

Strategic Reliabilism (supplemented with the codicil) would always agree

about which beliefs are justified. The first answer is that all beliefs

recommended by Strategic Reliabilism are justified according to Theory J.

Under this scenario, we don’t need the theories of Standard Analytic

Epistemology. Strategic Reliabilism provides us with a straightforward theory

of justification that accurately divides the justified beliefs from the

unjustified beliefs. Suppose two theories of SAE (e.g., a coherentist and a

reliabilist theory) disagree about a particular case. If Strategic Reliabilism

yields the same judgments as Theory J, then there is an obvious way to

break this deadlock: Figure out what Strategic Reliabilism would say is the

best reasoning strategy for S to adopt in this particular situation, and the

belief that results from that reasoning strategy is the one that is justified. If

Strategic Reliabilism is a dependable deadlock breaker, then why do we

need the theories of SAE? We don’t.

Now let’s consider the second answer to our question. Suppose that

the beliefs that are the result of the best reasoning strategies (according to

Strategic Reliabilism) are not always justified (according to theory J). In

this scenario, Strategic Reliabilism will occasionally recommend a belief

that theory J does not count as justified. So which belief should we recommend

from an epistemological perspective? The belief recommended

by Strategic Reliabilism is the result of excellent reasoning on the part of S.

Excellent reasoning maximizes S’s chances of coming to true beliefs about

significant problems. This, in turn, will tend to lead in the long run to

better outcomes for S than if she had adopted reasoning strategies of lesser

quality. So the belief recommended by Strategic Reliabilism has a lot going

for it. What about the belief recommended by SAE? Its main advantage

seems to be that it is the belief that is deemed justified by a bunch of really

smart philosophers who have reflected seriously on their notion of justification.

Perhaps this description of the choice is unfair; perhaps this belief

would be deemed justified by a much wider range of people than just

really smart philosophers. Maybe it would be deemed justified by every

person capable of wielding the concept. Even so, which belief is the one

that deserves to be recommended from an epistemological perspective?

Surely it is the belief that comes with all the practically important empirical

advantages of epistemic goodness and of epistemic success.

Strategic Reliabilism plus the codicil presents the proponent of Standard

Analytic Epistemology with a dilemma. Either Strategic Reliabilism

recommends only justified beliefs or it does not. If it does recommend only

justified beliefs, then there is no need for any other theory of justification.

Strategic Reliabilism will do. If it does not recommend only justified beliefs,

then so much the worse for justification. The excellent reasoner—the person,

who adopts robustly reliable strategies for problems of significance—will

sometimes adopt beliefs that the proponent of SAE deems unjustified. So

what would the proponent of SAE have her do? Adopt less reliable reasoning

strategies or tackle less significant problems or both? If this is the

sort of advice the proponent of SAE intends to offer, then perhaps we need

to recognize that the orthodox concept of justification, no matter how

gilded by philosophical theory, is a crude and insensitive instrument of

evaluation. In the subtle causal nexus of mind and world, no good comes

from wielding such a notion like a mace. Those devoted to offering a

psychologically accurate picture of reasoning strategies and the useful

information they provide are likely to find such ‘‘justification talk’’ quaint,

were it not for the resources squandered by its primping.