DISTINCTIONS.
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When
examining the terms and data of our
general
inquiry in the opening chapter, we distinguished (8) be
tween
knowledge proper and mere consciousness ; between reflex
consciousness
and the implicit, concomitant awareness which
the
conscious subject necessarily has of itself in all its conscious
states or
activities, without which these could not be conscious,
and which
is usually described as direct consciousness ; between
non-cognitive
(volitional, emotional, etc.) and cognitive con
sciousness
; between the interpretative objectivity of those cog
nitive
states of consciousness which fall short of judgment, and
the formal
or consciously asserted objectivity of the judgment
itself. We
have also been obliged, in our exposition of the
doctrines
of Descartes, Kant and Scholasticism (77), to discuss at
some length
the nature and validity of our awareness of the self
as a
concrete, existing, individual reality. Presupposing what
has been
said already in those connexions we may be brief in
our present
exposition of the cognitive value or significance of
the facts
of consciousness and memory, an exposition which
will serve
as a necessary and natural transition from intellectual
knowledge
to sense knowledge.
The
psychological distinction between intellectual conscious
ness,
whereby we are aware of our intellectual activities such as
thought and
volition, and sense consciousness, whereby we are
aware of
our external sense functions and the states and con
ditions of
our bodies, is not itself a datum of consciousness,
but an
inference arising from introspection and based on the
VOL. II. I
2 THEOR Y
OF KNO WLEDGE
diversity
of the objects presented in the conscious states. As an
activity,
consciousness of whatsoever kind reveals itself as be
longing
wholly to the one conscious self or Ego.
The
distinction between direct and reflex consciousness is
itself a
datum of human consciousness : we are aware of the
difference
between any direct cognitive act (direct consciousness)
and the act
whereby we deliberately make our own conscious
activities
{psychological reflection), or their objects (pntological
reflection),
the object of special and distinct contemplation. From
the nature
of this activity scholastic psychologists infer the im
material or
spiritual nature of the faculty which elicits it, the
intellect,
for the reason that no cognitive power of the sense
order,
functioning through an animated material organ, could
possibly
elicit such a reflex cognitive act. Whatever about the
nature of
the faculty, or the implications of the fact, of reflex
consciousness,
there can at all events be no doubt about the fact
itself.
When
examining the terms and data of our
general
inquiry in the opening chapter, we distinguished (8) be
tween
knowledge proper and mere consciousness ; between reflex
consciousness
and the implicit, concomitant awareness which
the
conscious subject necessarily has of itself in all its conscious
states or
activities, without which these could not be conscious,
and which
is usually described as direct consciousness ; between
non-cognitive
(volitional, emotional, etc.) and cognitive con
sciousness
; between the interpretative objectivity of those cog
nitive
states of consciousness which fall short of judgment, and
the formal
or consciously asserted objectivity of the judgment
itself. We
have also been obliged, in our exposition of the
doctrines
of Descartes, Kant and Scholasticism (77), to discuss at
some length
the nature and validity of our awareness of the self
as a
concrete, existing, individual reality. Presupposing what
has been
said already in those connexions we may be brief in
our present
exposition of the cognitive value or significance of
the facts
of consciousness and memory, an exposition which
will serve
as a necessary and natural transition from intellectual
knowledge
to sense knowledge.
The
psychological distinction between intellectual conscious
ness,
whereby we are aware of our intellectual activities such as
thought and
volition, and sense consciousness, whereby we are
aware of
our external sense functions and the states and con
ditions of
our bodies, is not itself a datum of consciousness,
but an
inference arising from introspection and based on the
VOL. II. I
2 THEOR Y
OF KNO WLEDGE
diversity
of the objects presented in the conscious states. As an
activity,
consciousness of whatsoever kind reveals itself as be
longing
wholly to the one conscious self or Ego.
The
distinction between direct and reflex consciousness is
itself a
datum of human consciousness : we are aware of the
difference
between any direct cognitive act (direct consciousness)
and the act
whereby we deliberately make our own conscious
activities
{psychological reflection), or their objects (pntological
reflection),
the object of special and distinct contemplation. From
the nature
of this activity scholastic psychologists infer the im
material or
spiritual nature of the faculty which elicits it, the
intellect,
for the reason that no cognitive power of the sense
order,
functioning through an animated material organ, could
possibly
elicit such a reflex cognitive act. Whatever about the
nature of
the faculty, or the implications of the fact, of reflex
consciousness,
there can at all events be no doubt about the fact
itself.