(INCLUDING CONCRETE EXTERNALITY ITSELF) TO PERCEIVER S

1 I.e., on the assumption thai the extra-organic conditions of perception also are

normal.

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER 99

ORGANISM. The same intellectual reflection which brings out

explicitly the partial dependence of all presented sense data and

their qualities on the nature, structure, and conditions of the per-

ceiver s own sense organs, and their consequent relativity to the

latter, also brings out explicitly the fact that when this total sub

jective factor or determinant of sense data and their qualities is

normal, and therefore uniform for all normal perceivers, its

influence may be and must be ignored as something which,

though essentially involved in the very nature of sense percep

tion, and therefore entering into the very meaning of those sense

data and qualities, does not falsify the judgments by which we

pronounce those data to be perceived realities, and ascribe the

qualities of those data ("externality," "extension" and the rest

of the "common" and "proper" sense qualities) to these per

ceived realities. Let us now examine and illustrate this position

in detail.

The " externality " of the immediate data of external sense

perception, the externality perceived or felt in the concrete and

conceived in the abstract, is not independent of, or unrelated to,

the internal or subjective organic medium through which it is

apprehended. What sort of knowledge of "externality" or

" otherness" a purely spiritual or purely intelligent, non-sentient

being would have, we can only conjecture through analogy with

our own sort of knowledge (100). But the perceived and con

ceived externality or otherness is none the less real because our

knowledge of it involves its presentation to consciousness in the

manner demanded by our nature as organic, sentient beings, or in

other words, because its cognitive union with us as conscious

perceivers must be effected conformably with our nature as per

ceptive, i.e. dependently on the nature and structure of our

sense organs : cognitum est in cognoscente ; and quidquid recipitur,

secundum modum recipientis recipitur.

There is indeed one sense in which it would be absurd to say

that the externality or any other sense quality which we attri

bute to the externally perceived domain of reality is in this

domain, or characterizes this domain, apart from perception or

conception, " in the same way " as it is in this domain as actually

perceived or conceived. It would be absurd, namely, to say that

the feeling of concrete externality, or the conception of abstract ex

ternality, or perceived or conceived externality, is in the domain

of external reality when this domain is not being actually perceived

7*

i oo THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

or conceived. The " externality" (or any other sense quality) as

perceived or conceived, is the term of a vital, conscious act, cog-

nitively one with the conscious perceiver or conceiver. The same

externality (or other sense quality), as it is in the unperceived or

unconceived external reality, is not an actual percept or concept,

is not the actual term of a vital, conscious act, is not affected

with feeling or awareness, with conscious perception or concep

tion, by being cognitively one with a conscious perceiver or con

ceiver : but none the less the externality (or other sense quality)

is a real characteristic of the reality which is perceived or con

ceived, and affects this reality whether or not the latter is being

actually perceived or conceived.

It ought to be fairly obvious that when any sense quality,

such as " externality," " extension," " resistance," " motion,"

"colour," "heat," etc., is claimed to be in the reality which is

perceived, and to be in this reality independently of our actual

perception of the latter, this claim does not at all involve any such

puerile contention as that there is in the unperceived reality a

conscious state, or the term of a conscious process, or a percep

tion or percept (73) of the sense quality, or a perceived sense

quality. 1 Yet some writers appear to think that those who hold

sense qualities to be formally in the perceived external universe

apart from our perception of the latter are committed to a curious

contention of that sort. The impression appears to be due partly

to a failure to distinguish between the conscious perceiver or

subject of perception, the conscious process or state or condition

1 Cf. jKANNikRE, op. cit., p. 425 : " Saepe vitio vertitur Schohsticis quod ex. gr.

dulcedinem subjectivam seu formalem attribuant rebus, vg. saccharo. Quod tamen

est maxime falsum." But the author s explanation seems to attribute the theory of

mediate sense perception to scholastics in general : " Scilicet distinctio est facienda

inter essc physicum quod res habet in se et esse intentionale quod habet in cognoscente.

Hinc dulcedo non habet idem esse in gustante et in saccharo. In gustante est

affectio quaedam sui generis, qua sentiens cognoscit id quod hujus affectionis est

causa, et cui tribuit non affectionem sui, sed id ratione cujus haec affectio, ut talis, pro-

ducitur. Idem dicatur de colore et de ceteris sensibilibus. This would seem to

imply that there are two " sweetnesses," one in the perceiver s consciousness and the

other in the sugar ; that the former, which is an " affectio quaedam sui generis" is

what the perceiver first and directly becomes aware of; and that the latter is in

ferred from this as its cause. But there arc not two " sweetnesses " : the " affectio

which is in the perceiver s consciousness is not a perceived (mental or subjective)

" sweetness" but a. perception o/the external, sugar sweetness. The entire percep

tive process is the " esse intentionale " of this external quality. Looked at from the

side of the perceiver it is the latter s " perception " ; looked at from the side of per

ceived external quality it is the "presentation" or "presence "of this quality to

the conscious perceiver. Cf. infra, 125 ; supra, 112.

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER lot

of perception, and the reality which is the object of perception

and which in actual perception becomes the term which the per-

ceiver is made aware of through the process ; and partly to an

unfortunate, though perhaps not wholly avoidable, ambiguity of

meaning in the names of the sense qualities : an ambiguity noted

by Aristotle and St. Thomas, and to which we shall return

presently.

Again, take the common sensibles, superficial and three-

dimensional extension or magnitude, shape and multitude, and

rest or motion, as revealed in the concrete through the co-opera

tion of the internal or "common" sense, or faculty of unification,

with the external senses of touch and sight. 1 These character

istics of immediate sense data are presented with the perceiver s

own organism, no less than with extra-organic or external re

ality, as objects of perception. They are all partly dependent

for what they are on the organic medium through which they are

presented to consciousness. When, therefore, they are presented

in the concrete as qualities of " external " data, and are spon

taneously attributed to the perceived external realities as being

really in these latter, it is not denied that those qualities as per

ceived by us in the external realities are nevertheless relative to

the nature, structure, and conditions of the perceiving organism.

A partial reason why they are presented to us and apprehended

by us, as they are, in all their actual specific and irreducible

varieties, is because the various sense organs through which

they are presented to us are differently constructed. But this

is a partial reason only : because in the first place diversity

of sense organs implies diversity in the qualities of the external

realities apprehended through those organs : if external material

reality were homogeneous there would be no sufficient reason for

heterogeneity or diversity of structure in the sense organs through

which that reality is presented to consciousness. And secondly,

different external qualities, e.g. different colours, different resist

ances, different magnitudes, different rates and directions of

motion, different tastes, smells, temperatures, are presented

through each separate sense organ. This partial dependence of

the sense qualities {quoad specificationevi) on diversity of sense

organ, and their consequent relativity tcr the perceiving subject

1 And possibly with the other external senses in so far as these present a vague

voluminousness or extensity in their respective data. Cf. sufra, 106, p. 37, n. ;

p. 39, n. 2.

1 02 THE OR V OF A NO H LEDGE

as organic, is of course primarily true of the proper sensibles.

But if the common sensibles are objectively unified concrete

complexes of the proper sensibles (114), the dependence of those

also on the perceiver s organism, and their relativity to him as

an organic subject, must likewise be admitted. This dependence

and relativity are indeed involved in the very nature of sense

perception and are presupposed by intellect in its conception of

the sense qualities in the abstract. But when such dependence

and relativity are normal, the intellect properly abstracts from

them in its attribution of the sense qualities and their differ

ences to the extra-organic domain of material reality.

Finally, if we examine the secondary or "proper" sense

qualities colours, sounds, tastes, smells, qualities of contact,

pressure, resistance, temperature, we shall find that they are

distinctly relative to and dependent on subjective, internal, or

ganic conditions of the perceiver, for the specific characters with

which they present themselves to consciousness in actual percep

tion. Hence there has been much doubt and controversy even

among realists as to whether or how far or in what way these

secondary sense qualities are in the external universe independently

of our actual perception. Can an external material thing or object

be said to have colour or taste or smell apart from all sense percep

tion of it? Is there sound in rushing winds, the falling waters,

the waves crashing on the breakers, if there be no sentient being

present to hear it? Is ice cold and smooth and impenetrable when

there is no sentient being actually touching it? Everyone is

perfectly familiar with each of these sense qualities as it presents

itself to his consciousness in actual external sense perception. But

because every such sense quality is partially determined to be

what it is for the perceiver (in actual perception) by the nature,

structure, and actual condition of the internal or subjective factor

which is his own organism, are we to conclude that the sense

quality which he is immediately and directly aware of is not in

the domain of external reality at all, as the idealist contends ?

Or is it that, being itself a mental impression or representation

produced in his consciousness by the influence of the external

reality on his mind through the medium of a bodily sense organ,

the sense quality is not in the external reality formally, i.e. as

it is consciously represented or apprehended, but is only in the

external reality virtually or causally, so that there is in the ex

ternal reality a quality which is the " analogical " cause of the

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER 103

immediately apprehended conscious impression, as the realist

supporter of mediate or representative sense perception contends P 1

Or perhaps, even though it is partially determined by and rela

tive to the perceiver s own nature as an organic being, neverthe

less the sense quality as immediately present to and consciously

apprehended by him, if it is perceived in normal organic (and

external) conditions, is really, actually, and formally in the ex

ternal domain of reality, as the perceptionist contends ?

Before setting forth in detail some at least of the very many

solutions offered by philosophers, and which may be brought

under one or other of the three broad alternatives just suggested,

we may say that the first or idealist position must be rejected as

erroneous, and that as between the two realist positions the

second ought not to be adopted without sufficient reason for

abandoning the third.

1 Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cit., pp. 425-8.

CHAPTER XVIII.

EXTERNAL REALITY OK ALL SENSE QUALITIES VINDICATED.

"HYPERPHYSICAL IDEALISM" AND "PHYSICAL REALISM".

1 I.e., on the assumption thai the extra-organic conditions of perception also are

normal.

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER 99

ORGANISM. The same intellectual reflection which brings out

explicitly the partial dependence of all presented sense data and

their qualities on the nature, structure, and conditions of the per-

ceiver s own sense organs, and their consequent relativity to the

latter, also brings out explicitly the fact that when this total sub

jective factor or determinant of sense data and their qualities is

normal, and therefore uniform for all normal perceivers, its

influence may be and must be ignored as something which,

though essentially involved in the very nature of sense percep

tion, and therefore entering into the very meaning of those sense

data and qualities, does not falsify the judgments by which we

pronounce those data to be perceived realities, and ascribe the

qualities of those data ("externality," "extension" and the rest

of the "common" and "proper" sense qualities) to these per

ceived realities. Let us now examine and illustrate this position

in detail.

The " externality " of the immediate data of external sense

perception, the externality perceived or felt in the concrete and

conceived in the abstract, is not independent of, or unrelated to,

the internal or subjective organic medium through which it is

apprehended. What sort of knowledge of "externality" or

" otherness" a purely spiritual or purely intelligent, non-sentient

being would have, we can only conjecture through analogy with

our own sort of knowledge (100). But the perceived and con

ceived externality or otherness is none the less real because our

knowledge of it involves its presentation to consciousness in the

manner demanded by our nature as organic, sentient beings, or in

other words, because its cognitive union with us as conscious

perceivers must be effected conformably with our nature as per

ceptive, i.e. dependently on the nature and structure of our

sense organs : cognitum est in cognoscente ; and quidquid recipitur,

secundum modum recipientis recipitur.

There is indeed one sense in which it would be absurd to say

that the externality or any other sense quality which we attri

bute to the externally perceived domain of reality is in this

domain, or characterizes this domain, apart from perception or

conception, " in the same way " as it is in this domain as actually

perceived or conceived. It would be absurd, namely, to say that

the feeling of concrete externality, or the conception of abstract ex

ternality, or perceived or conceived externality, is in the domain

of external reality when this domain is not being actually perceived

7*

i oo THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

or conceived. The " externality" (or any other sense quality) as

perceived or conceived, is the term of a vital, conscious act, cog-

nitively one with the conscious perceiver or conceiver. The same

externality (or other sense quality), as it is in the unperceived or

unconceived external reality, is not an actual percept or concept,

is not the actual term of a vital, conscious act, is not affected

with feeling or awareness, with conscious perception or concep

tion, by being cognitively one with a conscious perceiver or con

ceiver : but none the less the externality (or other sense quality)

is a real characteristic of the reality which is perceived or con

ceived, and affects this reality whether or not the latter is being

actually perceived or conceived.

It ought to be fairly obvious that when any sense quality,

such as " externality," " extension," " resistance," " motion,"

"colour," "heat," etc., is claimed to be in the reality which is

perceived, and to be in this reality independently of our actual

perception of the latter, this claim does not at all involve any such

puerile contention as that there is in the unperceived reality a

conscious state, or the term of a conscious process, or a percep

tion or percept (73) of the sense quality, or a perceived sense

quality. 1 Yet some writers appear to think that those who hold

sense qualities to be formally in the perceived external universe

apart from our perception of the latter are committed to a curious

contention of that sort. The impression appears to be due partly

to a failure to distinguish between the conscious perceiver or

subject of perception, the conscious process or state or condition

1 Cf. jKANNikRE, op. cit., p. 425 : " Saepe vitio vertitur Schohsticis quod ex. gr.

dulcedinem subjectivam seu formalem attribuant rebus, vg. saccharo. Quod tamen

est maxime falsum." But the author s explanation seems to attribute the theory of

mediate sense perception to scholastics in general : " Scilicet distinctio est facienda

inter essc physicum quod res habet in se et esse intentionale quod habet in cognoscente.

Hinc dulcedo non habet idem esse in gustante et in saccharo. In gustante est

affectio quaedam sui generis, qua sentiens cognoscit id quod hujus affectionis est

causa, et cui tribuit non affectionem sui, sed id ratione cujus haec affectio, ut talis, pro-

ducitur. Idem dicatur de colore et de ceteris sensibilibus. This would seem to

imply that there are two " sweetnesses," one in the perceiver s consciousness and the

other in the sugar ; that the former, which is an " affectio quaedam sui generis" is

what the perceiver first and directly becomes aware of; and that the latter is in

ferred from this as its cause. But there arc not two " sweetnesses " : the " affectio

which is in the perceiver s consciousness is not a perceived (mental or subjective)

" sweetness" but a. perception o/the external, sugar sweetness. The entire percep

tive process is the " esse intentionale " of this external quality. Looked at from the

side of the perceiver it is the latter s " perception " ; looked at from the side of per

ceived external quality it is the "presentation" or "presence "of this quality to

the conscious perceiver. Cf. infra, 125 ; supra, 112.

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER lot

of perception, and the reality which is the object of perception

and which in actual perception becomes the term which the per-

ceiver is made aware of through the process ; and partly to an

unfortunate, though perhaps not wholly avoidable, ambiguity of

meaning in the names of the sense qualities : an ambiguity noted

by Aristotle and St. Thomas, and to which we shall return

presently.

Again, take the common sensibles, superficial and three-

dimensional extension or magnitude, shape and multitude, and

rest or motion, as revealed in the concrete through the co-opera

tion of the internal or "common" sense, or faculty of unification,

with the external senses of touch and sight. 1 These character

istics of immediate sense data are presented with the perceiver s

own organism, no less than with extra-organic or external re

ality, as objects of perception. They are all partly dependent

for what they are on the organic medium through which they are

presented to consciousness. When, therefore, they are presented

in the concrete as qualities of " external " data, and are spon

taneously attributed to the perceived external realities as being

really in these latter, it is not denied that those qualities as per

ceived by us in the external realities are nevertheless relative to

the nature, structure, and conditions of the perceiving organism.

A partial reason why they are presented to us and apprehended

by us, as they are, in all their actual specific and irreducible

varieties, is because the various sense organs through which

they are presented to us are differently constructed. But this

is a partial reason only : because in the first place diversity

of sense organs implies diversity in the qualities of the external

realities apprehended through those organs : if external material

reality were homogeneous there would be no sufficient reason for

heterogeneity or diversity of structure in the sense organs through

which that reality is presented to consciousness. And secondly,

different external qualities, e.g. different colours, different resist

ances, different magnitudes, different rates and directions of

motion, different tastes, smells, temperatures, are presented

through each separate sense organ. This partial dependence of

the sense qualities {quoad specificationevi) on diversity of sense

organ, and their consequent relativity tcr the perceiving subject

1 And possibly with the other external senses in so far as these present a vague

voluminousness or extensity in their respective data. Cf. sufra, 106, p. 37, n. ;

p. 39, n. 2.

1 02 THE OR V OF A NO H LEDGE

as organic, is of course primarily true of the proper sensibles.

But if the common sensibles are objectively unified concrete

complexes of the proper sensibles (114), the dependence of those

also on the perceiver s organism, and their relativity to him as

an organic subject, must likewise be admitted. This dependence

and relativity are indeed involved in the very nature of sense

perception and are presupposed by intellect in its conception of

the sense qualities in the abstract. But when such dependence

and relativity are normal, the intellect properly abstracts from

them in its attribution of the sense qualities and their differ

ences to the extra-organic domain of material reality.

Finally, if we examine the secondary or "proper" sense

qualities colours, sounds, tastes, smells, qualities of contact,

pressure, resistance, temperature, we shall find that they are

distinctly relative to and dependent on subjective, internal, or

ganic conditions of the perceiver, for the specific characters with

which they present themselves to consciousness in actual percep

tion. Hence there has been much doubt and controversy even

among realists as to whether or how far or in what way these

secondary sense qualities are in the external universe independently

of our actual perception. Can an external material thing or object

be said to have colour or taste or smell apart from all sense percep

tion of it? Is there sound in rushing winds, the falling waters,

the waves crashing on the breakers, if there be no sentient being

present to hear it? Is ice cold and smooth and impenetrable when

there is no sentient being actually touching it? Everyone is

perfectly familiar with each of these sense qualities as it presents

itself to his consciousness in actual external sense perception. But

because every such sense quality is partially determined to be

what it is for the perceiver (in actual perception) by the nature,

structure, and actual condition of the internal or subjective factor

which is his own organism, are we to conclude that the sense

quality which he is immediately and directly aware of is not in

the domain of external reality at all, as the idealist contends ?

Or is it that, being itself a mental impression or representation

produced in his consciousness by the influence of the external

reality on his mind through the medium of a bodily sense organ,

the sense quality is not in the external reality formally, i.e. as

it is consciously represented or apprehended, but is only in the

external reality virtually or causally, so that there is in the ex

ternal reality a quality which is the " analogical " cause of the

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER 103

immediately apprehended conscious impression, as the realist

supporter of mediate or representative sense perception contends P 1

Or perhaps, even though it is partially determined by and rela

tive to the perceiver s own nature as an organic being, neverthe

less the sense quality as immediately present to and consciously

apprehended by him, if it is perceived in normal organic (and

external) conditions, is really, actually, and formally in the ex

ternal domain of reality, as the perceptionist contends ?

Before setting forth in detail some at least of the very many

solutions offered by philosophers, and which may be brought

under one or other of the three broad alternatives just suggested,

we may say that the first or idealist position must be rejected as

erroneous, and that as between the two realist positions the

second ought not to be adopted without sufficient reason for

abandoning the third.

1 Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cit., pp. 425-8.

CHAPTER XVIII.

EXTERNAL REALITY OK ALL SENSE QUALITIES VINDICATED.

"HYPERPHYSICAL IDEALISM" AND "PHYSICAL REALISM".