FROM THE "EXTERNAL" UNIVERSE.

(c} s The individual per-

ceiver can have reasoned certitude that his own body is really

distinct from the rest of the material universe. This has been

virtually proved by establishing the reasoned certitude of the

perceiver s judgment that a real universe external to himself

1 C/. Ontology, 31, p. 125 n. 2 Ibid,, 64, pp. 229-32.

c/. 115, P. &2.

PERCEPTION OF SENSE QUALITIES 87

exists (109). As sense perception and intellectual reflection

develop, the individual perceiver gradually interprets his organic,

tactual, muscular, visual and auditory sensations as revealing to

him two separate domains of data, the one not only objective to

consciousness but external, the other objective indeed to conscious

ness but internal or identical with the perceiver himself. For

instance, sensations of double touch, experienced when the per

ceiver touches his own body, are consciously and psychologically

different from those experienced when he touches a door or table

or other external object. When he pushes with his hand against

the wall he is conscious of a force or energy opposing his own,

an energy which he cannot identify with his conscious self. When

he pushes his right hand against his left he is also conscious of

a force or energy opposing his own, but which other energy he

also identifies as his own. So also the complex muscular and

auditory sensations experienced in hearing one s own voice are

different from those experienced in hearing another s voice. From

such concrete sense data he abstracts the intellectual concepts

of "self" and " not-self " and applies them in the spontaneous

judgment whereby he pronounces the " externally felt " world to

be really other than and distinct from his own " feeling and felt "

organism. And reflection justifies the spontaneously assumed

validity of the concept of real otherness (105, 109).

We have established the various theses formulated above

(115) under I, and II (a\ (), (c\ on the assumption of percep-

tionism, that reality is directly given in the data or objects of

sense awareness (113). Realist supporters of the theory of

mediate perception establish those same theses by an appeal to

the principle of causality, on the lines already indicated 1 (113).

The theses under II (a) and (b*) assert in general terms the

validity of our belief in the real extramental existence of the

"primary" sense qualities or "common" sensibles. But since

these are complexes of the "secondary" qualities or "proper"

sensibles, the character of their extramental reality is obviously

at least in some measure dependent on that of the latter. We

have now to explain and establish the character of the extra-

mental reality of these latter as formulated in the thesis under

II (d} above (115), and especially to examine that feature of

them referred to in a preceding section (106, V) as their greater

or less relativity to the organic condition of the conscious, sen-

1 Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cit., pp. 400 sqq.

88 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

tient subject. In doing so we must bear in mind the conclusion

just established under II (c] ; for the fact that the conscious, sen

tient subject or perceiver is not merely a mind or conscious prin

ciple, but a conscious, animated organism^ endowed with the

extended, material or corporeal mode of being which also char

acterizes the "external " domain of reality, this fact must have

its influence on the qualities of the "external" data apprehended

through the instrumentality of the bodily organism.

CHAPTER XVII.

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER.

(c} s The individual per-

ceiver can have reasoned certitude that his own body is really

distinct from the rest of the material universe. This has been

virtually proved by establishing the reasoned certitude of the

perceiver s judgment that a real universe external to himself

1 C/. Ontology, 31, p. 125 n. 2 Ibid,, 64, pp. 229-32.

c/. 115, P. &2.

PERCEPTION OF SENSE QUALITIES 87

exists (109). As sense perception and intellectual reflection

develop, the individual perceiver gradually interprets his organic,

tactual, muscular, visual and auditory sensations as revealing to

him two separate domains of data, the one not only objective to

consciousness but external, the other objective indeed to conscious

ness but internal or identical with the perceiver himself. For

instance, sensations of double touch, experienced when the per

ceiver touches his own body, are consciously and psychologically

different from those experienced when he touches a door or table

or other external object. When he pushes with his hand against

the wall he is conscious of a force or energy opposing his own,

an energy which he cannot identify with his conscious self. When

he pushes his right hand against his left he is also conscious of

a force or energy opposing his own, but which other energy he

also identifies as his own. So also the complex muscular and

auditory sensations experienced in hearing one s own voice are

different from those experienced in hearing another s voice. From

such concrete sense data he abstracts the intellectual concepts

of "self" and " not-self " and applies them in the spontaneous

judgment whereby he pronounces the " externally felt " world to

be really other than and distinct from his own " feeling and felt "

organism. And reflection justifies the spontaneously assumed

validity of the concept of real otherness (105, 109).

We have established the various theses formulated above

(115) under I, and II (a\ (), (c\ on the assumption of percep-

tionism, that reality is directly given in the data or objects of

sense awareness (113). Realist supporters of the theory of

mediate perception establish those same theses by an appeal to

the principle of causality, on the lines already indicated 1 (113).

The theses under II (a) and (b*) assert in general terms the

validity of our belief in the real extramental existence of the

"primary" sense qualities or "common" sensibles. But since

these are complexes of the "secondary" qualities or "proper"

sensibles, the character of their extramental reality is obviously

at least in some measure dependent on that of the latter. We

have now to explain and establish the character of the extra-

mental reality of these latter as formulated in the thesis under

II (d} above (115), and especially to examine that feature of

them referred to in a preceding section (106, V) as their greater

or less relativity to the organic condition of the conscious, sen-

1 Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cit., pp. 400 sqq.

88 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

tient subject. In doing so we must bear in mind the conclusion

just established under II (c] ; for the fact that the conscious, sen

tient subject or perceiver is not merely a mind or conscious prin

ciple, but a conscious, animated organism^ endowed with the

extended, material or corporeal mode of being which also char

acterizes the "external " domain of reality, this fact must have

its influence on the qualities of the "external" data apprehended

through the instrumentality of the bodily organism.

CHAPTER XVII.

RELATIVITY OF SENSE QUALITIES TO PERCEIVER.