104. CRITICISM OF FIRST ALTERNATIVE.

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Now it might, perhaps, be

objected to this line of argument that it scarcely achieves its purpose. Our

abstract concept of cause has been shown to be derived by intellect from the

individual data of consciousness (65, 75-6, 92-3). The object of this concept

has been shown to be really embodied in these data, and it is therefore validly

applicable to them. These data, however, even those of them characterized

by "extensity" and "externality," belong in the view we are examining

exclusively to the domain of the real Ego. It would appear, therefore, that

the concept of cause has objective reality, no doubt, and is validly applicable

to all the realities revealed at any time within the domain of consciousness, /.<?.

1 This is a fundamental principle of the Aristotelian and scholastic theory of

knowledge. " Cognitum est in cognoscente." " Amina cognosccndo quoJammodo

fit omnia" : " quodammodo," i.e. intentionaliter or representatively . By knowledge

the Ego is a microcosm, a conscious assimilation or apprehension or mirroring of

the cosmos or macrocosm.

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY. EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 27

within the domain of the real Ego ; but since ex hypothesi it does not yet

appear from inspection of the data of consciousness that there is any reality

beyond the domain of the real Ego, it is not clear how the principle of causality

can attain to any such reality for us.

Of course it will be pointed out that our intellect, once it has abstracted

from the data of consciousness the concept of " something happening," and

grasps what this necessarily involves, viz. " having a cause," sees immediately

and intuitively the necessary and universal applicability of this principle to all

contingent reality as such. Granted ; but at this stage the mind has, ex

hypothesi, no knowledge of any reality beyond the Ego : since ex hypothesi

the conscious data characterized by a feeling or sentiment of "otherness " or

" externality " are only modes of the real Ego; and the plain man s spon

taneous interpretation of them as being really other than his Ego, or as

directly and immediately revealing to him a reality other than his Ego, is not

at this stage rationally justified, 1 and therefore is not knowledge of a real

non-Ego.

But, it will be promptly urged, we can see by introspection that the

whole internal panorama of ever changing, ever appearing and disappearing

data, which fill up the conscious domain of the Ego, cannot be adequately

accounted for by the reality which is the Ego, so that we are forced to infer,

by the principle of causality, the existence of a reality beyond, and distinct

from, and other than, the Ego. This seems unanswerable. But let us see.

The panorama referred to certainly cannot be adequately accounted for by

the real Ego so far as this real Ego is revealed in consciousness, by the

real Ego as consciously apprehended, or to put it yet another way by the

portion (of the real Ego) revealed in consciousness. But since, on the

hypothesis under examination, we have at this stage neither knowledge nor

even sense-awareness of any other reality J than the Ego, so far from being

forced to infer, as a necessary factor in the adequate cause of our conscious

states, a reality other than the Ego, we are actually debarred from making

fkis inference, and are forced rather to infer that since the consciously appre

hended portion of the Ego is not the adequate cause of our conscious states,

these must be partially caused by the Ego acting unconsciously and in a

manner unknown to us.

And why are we, on the theory, debarred from inferring a reality other

than the Ego ? Because although the data of our consciousness have

1 Nay, the spontaneous interpretation of these data characterized by " otherness "

or "externality," as being identically the real non-Ego or material universe (thus

thought to be immediately and directly given to the Ego in external sense percep

tion), is regarded as an erroneous conviction by those who reject the theory of im

mediate sense perception in every form.

a It is admitted on the theory that we have sense awareness of conscious data

characterized by the feeling of " externality " or " otherness " ; of what we therefore

call " appearances " or " representations ". But it is held that these are modes of the

Ego, that sense awareness does not extend beyond them, and that the judgment

whereby (without invoking the principle of causality or having recourse to inference

from effect to cause) we spontaneously interpret them as revealing to the Ego a

reality other than the Ego, does not of itself give us direct and ?elf-evidently justified

intellectual knowledge of the existence of a reality other than and distinct from the

Ego.

28 THE OR v OF KNO w LEDGE

furnished us with abstract concepts of unity and plurality, permanence and

change, identity and distinction or otherness, etc., and although these con

cepts are therefore validly applicable to the real Ego in its conscious states,

at the same time if the conscious data from which they are derived are all

modes of the Ego, it is impossible to see how the concept of real otherness

in the sense of disfincfion from the Ego 1 can be obtained from such data ;

and yet, unless we already have such a concept (i.e. of real otherness or dis

tinction from the Ego, or, of real non-sclfncss\ and know it to be objectively

and really valid, it is obvious that the principle of causality cannot avail us

to infer a cause really other than the self.

It may be urged against this that the concept of real distinction or

real otherness, which we undoubtedly derive by abstraction from the real

diversity and real changes in the conscious states of the real Ego, is seen to

be applicable to all reality, and therefore to the relation between " the real

Ego of which we are conscious," as one term, and " some reality other than

this," as the other term. We reply that this is so, provided we already have

this latter concept of "some reality other than the self," and know this

concept to be objectively and really valid. But on the theory we are examin

ing it seems impossible not merely to know this concept to be valid, but

even to have it at all. And why ? Because on this theoiy the only concept

of distinction or otherness which we can derive from the data of our direct

consciousness or awareness is the concept of distinction or otherness among

the data, and witJiin the domain, o/ the real Ego. For on this theory the

sense-feeling of "externality " or "otherness " or "non-selfness" attaching to

some of those data, does not enable us to judge, or justify us in interpreting

intellectually, those data to be really other than the self. How could we,

therefore, on this theory, ever obtain or form the conscious intellectual con

cept of the non-Ego at all, seeing that the theory denies that there is

among the data of our direct consciousness or awareness any counterpart or

foundation for it? In other words, unless reality other than the self is im

mediately given to the self among the data, and in the states, of the latter s

direct consciousness or awareness, it seems impossible for us to attain intel

lectually, by any reflex thought processes of interpreting and reasoning

from such data, to reality other than the self. For the concept really

requisite for such a transition, vi". the objectively and really valid concept

of " non-self reality " would not be in our possession.

If, finally, those who think that the reality of the non-Ego or material

universe is not immediately revealed in direct external sense awareness, but

only a "product," an "appearance," a "representation" of this universe,

a conscious datum which, though characterized by its feeling of externality, is

yet a mode or state of the real Ego, if such philosophers say that in this

same sense-feeling of externality attaching to such data we have the veritable

and sufficient sense-counterpart and foundation whence to derive by in

tellectual abstraction the concept of " reality other than the Ego" then they

account, indeed, for the existence of this intellectual concept and for our con

scious possession of it, but how do they vindicate its objective and real validity ?

1 And not merely in the sense of distinction or otherness of one conscious datum

from another within the Eg a.

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY, EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 29

If the sense-feeling of " externality " (and "extensity") attaching to certain

conscious data of external sense perception cannot be itself interpreted by in

tellect as manifesting those data to be themselves direct and immediate re

velations to the Ego, of a real non-Ego, or a reality other than the Ego, if,

in other words, notwithstanding this remarkable characteristic of such data,

we must on reflection intellectually pronounce such data to be in themselves

and in their reality only modes of the real Ego, then does it not follow that

the abstract intellectual concept of "reality other than the Ego" grounded

as it is on a feeling which is after all subjective and not significant (to in

tellect) of real externality or real non-selfness, cannot be itself objectively and

really valid? If the concept be derived from data which, whatever be their

external reference, are really modes of the Ego, or rather from a sense

feature of these data which has itself for intellect no significance of external

or non-self reality, how can that concept itself enable thottght to attain to an

external reality, seeing that the content or object of the concept is merely

the intellectual abstract of the concrete " sense-feeling of externality," a con

tent which we might describe as "external appearance" or " apparent ex

ternality," or " ultra-conscioits reference of the -ZT^-reality " ? Or how can

recourse to the principle of causality serve to give the concept, as its content

or object, that which we are looking for, namely, "external or non-self

reality 1 *. For this principle, as we saw, can itself merely assure us that the

total conscious content of the Ego is not self-explaining. It is at this point

precisely that the collateral concept of distinction or otherness must come in

to give definite, positive content to the causal or explaining factor to which the

principle of causality refers us. 1 It is not the principle of causality that gives

1 Hence the importance of investigating carefully the origin and grounds of our

concept of the absolute or major real distinction, understood as the distinction be

tween one really existing being and another, and the tests for the objectively and

really valid application of this concept. The whole question is discussed in our

Ontology, 23, 35-9. Cf. especially, 38, p. 148, where it is pointed out that the

relation of efficient causality is not of itself sufficient to establish between the terms

of the relation (cause and effect) a real distinction in the sense of a distinction be

tween one existing being (the Ego, for instance) and any second really existing be

ing (e.g. the non-Ego). Of course the relation of efficient causality is sufficient to

justify our concept of a real distinction in the sense of a distinction between real

states (especially successive states) in the really changing contents of the Ego as a

self-conscious reality. But if we reflect, in the light of the principle of causality,

on the fact that we find in our consciousness states or data which, although they are

contingent and therefore caused, we nevertheless do not know to be caused by the

self so far as we are conscious of the latter, this reflection alone cannot possibly re

veal to thought a reality other than the self : it merely identifies the cause (referred

to by the principle) with this reality, provided we have already what we know to be

an objective and really valid concept of non-self reality. The question then is, can

thought (meaning intellectual abstraction, generalization, conception, judgment, and

reasoning) reach a non-self reality if no such reality be directly and immediately

given to the Ego in any of its mental processes of direct conscious cognition or

awareness ? It does not seem possible. We know it is contended by some that

even though direct sense awareness reveals merely the Ego, variously impressed or

affected by conscious states, some of which have an appearance of, or reference to,

externality or non-selfness, nevertheless thought can validly conceive and attain to

non-self reality. But it cannot do so, as we have seen, by the principle of causality,

30 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

a positive content to the concept of otherness-from-the-self. The objective

and real validity of this concept must stand or fall on its own merits. If the

direct conscious data on which it is based, and from which it is derived, reveal

only the Ego, it is objectively and really valid only in its application to these

conscious data within the real Ego. If it is based on, and derived from the

direct sense-feeling tot externality in certain of those data, then (i) if this feel

ing of externality has no significance of real externality for intellect, this con

cept of otherness, together with the principle of causality, can refer us only to

an ultra-conscious domain of the real Ego, but not to a reality other than the

Ego; while (2) if this sense-feeling of externality reveals the data char

acterized by it as really other than, though directly and immediately mani

fested to, the real Ego, and if intellect can and does interpret as really valid

the external significance of this consciously apprehended characteristic of the

data of our external sense awareness or sense perception, then indeed the ab

stract intellectual concept of otherness, in the requisite sense of " otherness-

from-fhe-self," is itself objectively and really valid, and gives definite and

positive content to the ultra-conscious causal factor to which the principle of

causality refers us. But in this case we do not really need the principle of

causality to give us reasoned intellectual certitude of the existence of a real

world distinct from the Ego. P or by virtue of the objective and real validity

of the concept of " reality-other-than-the-^ 1 ^," a validity which it derives

from the conscious data of our external sense awareness, from the fact that

a non-self reality is directly given to the Ego in these data, as evidenced by

their characteristic of " externality," we already possess reasoned intellectual

certitude for the judgment, " That which I apprehend in external sense per

ception, and the nature of which I interpret intellectually by judgment and

inference, I know to be a real universe really existing distinct from, and inde

pendently of, myself the perceiver and knower ".

unless it has already the valid concept of such reality. And how the concept can

be valid if the feeling of externality or non-selfness in the conscious data of external

perception, the feeling from which alone such a concept can be derived, cannot

be itself intellectually interpreted as a direct manifestation of a real non-Ego to the

real Ego, how in such an hypothesis the concept can be regarded as really valid,

we fail to see.

In the context referred to (ibid., 37, p. 147 ; p. 146 n. ; pp. 151-3), the conclu

sion is reached that abstract thought alone cannot attain to, or identify, the distinc

tion which is the most real of all distinctions, viz. that between one individual

existing real being and another : of which distinction the most profoundly important

instance is the distinction between the real Ego and reality other than the Ego. It

is shown there that for the vindication of the objective and real validity of this dis

tinction abstract thought must appeal to direct conscious awareness of realitv in the

concrete. But if in the domain of the mind s direct and intuitive awareness (whether

sentient or intellectual) of reality, there is given only the self-reality, it is not easy

to see how intellectual reflection (through abstract concepts) can ever effect a valid

transition from such real sf//-data to a non-self-reality (and not merely to an un

conscious or subconscious or ultra-conscious domain of the Ego, as the intellectual

analogue of the " externality " and " extensity " of certain of these conscious self-

data).

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY. EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 31