TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.

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In the second last section

(109) we vindicated a reasoned or philosophic certitude for the

belief that " there exists, distinct from the Ego, an external

domain of reality which appears as extended or material ". The

argument was based on the evidence furnished by direct intel

lectual scrutiny of the data of conscious external sense perception.

We have likewise shown that our intellectuul concept of " other-

1 op. dt., pp. 124-5.

52 THE OR Y OF A NO W LEDGE

ness-from-the Ego" or "externality," derived from those data, is

objectively and really valid (105). We are therefore now in a

position to corroborate the conclusion of our argument by con

sidering our spontaneous interpretation of sense perception in the

light of a principle, the universal validity of which has likewise

been already established (65, 66, 93) the principle of causality.

Those supporters of realism l who in the present general context rely

mainly or exclusively on the argument from causality to establish the phil

osophical certitude of our knowledge of an external world, emphasize the

universal real validity of the concept of cause ; and consider the argument

peculiarly efficacious as against idealists. 2 But even though the concept is uni

versally applicable to contingent reality, and even if the idealist admits this,

the latter has still to be convinced that there is contingent reality beyond the

domain of the subjects consciousness? or beyond the reality of the Ego if

he recognizes a real Ego as subject and cause of conscious states. And of

this we can hope to convince him, if at all, only by proving to him that the

concept of " reality-other-than-the Ego," which he possesses in common with

us, is an objectively and really valid concept. But how can we prove that

it is ? Only by pointing out that the sensuously felt character of " extended

externality " in certain of our sense data can be seen by intellect to be the

source from which the concept is derived, and to be therefore for intellect

adequate objective evidence of the real validity of the concept (104, 105).

In other words, by the same line of reasoning, by the same sort of direct in

tellectual appeal to the characteristics of conscious sense data, as we have

employed in our main argument for the mind-independent existence of a

real non-self universe (109). It is because we believe that if realism cannot

be effectively vindicated, as against idealism, by that class of consideration,

neither can it be effectively vindicated, apart from such consideration, by the

principle of causality alone (cf. 105-6), it is for that reason we now bring for

ward the argument from causality merely as corroborative, and not in the first

place.

l Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cit., pp. 224-7, 382-92 ; MERCIER, op. cii., 140, pp. 384-9.

a cy. vol. i., 35, p. 134.

3 Kant, for instance, and English phenomenists, admit the validity of causality

(as understood by them in the sense of a provisionally, or an absolutely, necessary

sequence, respectively) as applied within the whole domain of empirical conscious

ness. And even when we have proved against Kant that it is validly applied in in

ferring an ultra-conscious cause of this whole domain, the principle itself will not

enable us to determine whether this latter cause is one or manifold. We prove it

to be manifold, to be in part the real Ego, and in part a whole pluralistic system

of realities external to and other than the real Ego (all alike themselves contingent,

and therefore implying a Supreme Uncaused First Cause), not by the principle of

causality alone, but only by the collateral use of another and distinct intellectual

concept, namely, that of real distinction or real otherness, a concept whose real

validity, as marking off the " Ego- or self-reality " from " rtow-S//-realities " (and

these latter from one another), must be independently established. We have shown

this concept, as applied to the distinction between the Ego and the non-Ego, to

be really valid because grounded in characteristics of the conscious sense data from

which it is derived (101-105).

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 53

We have already proved, as against Kant, 1 that the Ego,

through its conscious activities, apprehends itself as a reality ;

that Descartes, in emphasizing the absolutely indisputable char

acter of our knowledge of the real self in his principle, Cogito,

ergo sum, was only re-echoing the traditional teaching of scholas

ticism from the days of St. Augustine (29, 34). Now this self

reveals itself as consciously affected by what we may call an ever-

changing panorama of apprehended data or objects, namely, the

proper and common sensibles. Our conscious perceptions of

these data are contingent events. Therefore, by virtue of the

principles of sufficient reason and causality (64, 65,) these con

scious perceptions of data or objects have an adequate cause.

But such adequate cause cannot be the self, or anything in the

self or really constituting or appertaining to the self. Therefore

there must be, beyond and really distinct from the self, a mind-

independent reality which, co-operating with the consciously per

cipient self, will adequately account for the perceptions de facto

experienced by the latter. Hence there exists, distinct from the

self, and independent of perception, a reality which we call the

external, material universe. 2

Let us consider the steps in this argument. That the Ego

has conscious perceptions whereby data or objects " externally-

appearing," "extended," "coloured," "moving," "resisting,"

"sounding," etc., are presented in consciousness, is a fact ad

mitted by even the most extreme sceptics and subjectivists : as

also is the fact that these perceptions are contingent events, in the

sense that they are not self-explaining, that they come and go,

appear and disappear, begin to be and cease to be, and so call for

explanation or demand a cause. And the objective, real validity

of the principle of causality has been already established. Next,

the adequate cause of them cannot be the self. Why ? This

needs a little reflection.

The main reason is that we feel ourselves passive in experienc

ing such perceptions. Hence Kant recognizes that the empirical

content of perception is given tons from without, that to account

for our perceptions there is and must be a reality beyond and

independent of them, and of the self as empirically revealed

1 Cf, vol. 5., 97, 99, 100. Cf. infra, 134.

a Berkeley s alternative inference" Therefore there exists, distinct from and

independent of our minds, a cause of these conscious states, which cause is the

Divine Spirit " will be examined later, 123. Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cit., pp. 401-4.

5 4 THE OR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

in consciousness (50, 51, 74). Hence, too, Fichte claims that

epistemology must take as starting-point the fact that in the

content of consciousness there is, besides the mobile, subjectively

determined portion, another portion independent of subjective

contingencies and inseparable from what he describes as the

feeling of necessity} We feel ourselves passive, impressed, under

going impressions, in sense perception. That is, though the per

ceptions are ours, though it is we that elicit or exercise the

conscious, perceptive acts, still we feel them as not being wholly

determined by ourselves in regard to what they reveal to us. As

to the specific character of the various data or objects revealed

to us in perception (i.e. " quoad specificationem "), they appear to

arise or take place in us or to present this specific character to

us, independently of ourselves ; and therefore to have, as partial

cause of their concrete happening, some reality other than the

self. Reflection will confirm this spontaneous belief.

(1) It is not merely my will that determines these percep

tions. I cannot have them by merely willing to have them.

And as to what they are, when they happen, they are inde

pendent of my will. I cannot have the perceptions which

consist in "seeing Rome," or " hearing music," or " carrying a

weight," or " tasting sugar," or " inhaling the perfume of violets "

by merely wishing to have such perceptions. And on the other

hand, when I am in the condition in which I do actually ex

perience any such perception I cannot cease to experience it

merely by wishing it to cease.

(2) Nor is it my imagination that determines such percep

tions. There is the most marked and indisputable conscious

difference between the panorama of data or objects brought into

consciousness by the play of the imagination in fancies, day

dreams, reveries, etc., between what are called " mental images "

or " phantasmata," on the one hand, and the data or objects of

sense perception, 2 or what are rightly called percepts, on the other.

Psychologists and philosophers have minutely analysed and

abundantly illustrated these differences. 3 The former class of

data are largely under the control of the will : we can direct, con-

1 Fichte s Werke, i., 419, apud MKRCIER, op. cit., p. 385. To this " feeling of

necessity " belong the feelings of" extensity " and " externality ".

Including the perception of organic states, organic pleasure or pain, etc., in the

perceiver s own body.

1 Cf. BAI.MKS, Fundamental Philosophy, Book II., chap. iv.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 55

trol, modify the order in which such images present themselves ;

we can separate, combine, rearrange the images as we please ; we

can thus " produce " or " construct " new data or objects from

the remembered materials of perception ; and the power of the

" productive imagination " is only limited by the range of those

materials and its own finiteness. The latter class, the percepts,

are, as we saw, beyond the control of the will : the order in

which they succeed each other is not consciously determined by

us, but is felt to be determined by something other than the

self. Moreover, the two classes of data have been distinguished

as "faint" or "weak," and " strong " or " vivid " states, or (as

Hume named them) "ideas" and "impressions," on account of

the superior definiteness, clarity and solidity of the percepts as

compared with the images. Finally, in experiencing the latter

we are conscious that we ourselves, by our own active exercise of

imagination, zxz producing (not ex inhilo, but from the remembered

data of perception) the flow or current of mental objects ; while

in experiencing the former we are rather conscious of passively

undergoing impressions made on us by something independent of

the conscious Ego.

(3) Nor is it my thought that determines such perceptions

or originates such data or objects. By thought the individual

self or Ego elaborates logical relations, judgments, systems of

knowledge, sciences, concerning the domain of perceived data ;

but it certainly does not produce or construct this domain.

(4) But perhaps the same Ego, which consciously perceives

these data, itself constructs or produces them by an internal, in

stinctive, unconsciously operating influence of its own nature?

Well, if it did, such influence would have no other claim than its

blind, unconscious character, to be described as an "instinct".

For the forms of energy we describe as " instincts " in sentient

beings follow fixed laws and are uniform and circumscribed in

their results. But there is nothing of this in the ever-changing

panorama of percepts which constitute the world of any indivi

dual perceiver s sense experience. Psychologists can with some

success explore and formulate the laws according to which "in

stincts " operate ; but who has ever dreamt of seeking or formu

lating laws according to which the world of each individual s

sense experience unfolds itself in the order, and with the qualities,

which actually characterize it ?

(5) But, dismissing the term " instinctive," may it not finally

56 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

be urged that, for all we know, it may be the real Ego ifself that

in some unconscious way, and by some unknown and unknowable

laws, produces this whole panorama of sense percepts which we

spontaneously and inevitably, but so far as reflecting reason

goes, unwarrantably believe to be a domain of reality other

than, and external to, the self, unwarrantably, since on this

possible hypothesis it would be but a phase or manifestation of

the real self? Perhaps, to use the picturesque words of Huxley, 1

"For any demonstration that can be given to the contrary

effect, the collection of perceptions which makes up our con

sciousness may be an orderly phantasmagoria, generated by the

Ego unfolding its successive scenes on the background of the

abyss of nothingness ; as a firework, which is but cunningly

arranged combustibles, grows from a spark into a corruscation,

and from a corruscation into figures and words and cascades of

devouring flames, and then vanishes into the darkness of night ".

The concession Huxley had just made to realism was that

" there may be a real something which is the cause of our experi

ence ". J And this something he now declares to be a hypo

thetical and unknowable real Ego, in the sceptical spirit of

Hume. Kant, as we have seen, so far from refuting this scepticism

which was the avowed object of his Critique (46, 48) once

more declared the real Ego to be unknowable ; and straightway

illogically asserted a real distinction between the unknowable

real Ego and the equally unknowable real non-Ego.

But, assuming that the idealist admits at least a real Ego,

how are we to meet his assertion that perhaps the whole domain

of data or objects of sense perception, i.e. the seemingly external

material universe, is after all a creation of this real Ego, and

therefore not really distinct from, and external to, the latter?

Let us see what the supposition entails as a possible interpreta

tion of experience. A simple example will help us. 3 Standing

at the door and looking into the street, I consciously perceive a

succession of data or objects : men, horses, trams, cyclists, etc.,

passing. Closing and opening my eyes alternately I apprehend

different objects after each interval. My action is certainly the

cause of my seeing or not seeing (i.e. the cause quoad exercitium

actus}. But my action of opening my eyes and seeing is not the

cause of the order and diversity and variety of the perceived data

1 HUXLEY S Hume, chap, iii., p. 81, apnd RICKABY, First Principles, p. 273.

3 Ibid. 3 C/. JEANNIERE, p. cit., p. 391.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 57

(i.e. the cause quoad specificationem actus). But perhaps the opera

tion of some unconscious and unknown principle of my own being,

of my own real self, is the cause of the specifically diversified suc

cessive data? If so, then, why is it that throughout the same total

experience, with no apparent change in my whole self other than

the successive closing and opening of my eyes, while some data

constantly change, viz. the passing men, horses, vehicles, etc.,

other data reappear as self -identical each time I open my eyes,

viz., the pathway, the pavement, the houses and windows op

posite, etc. ? Because, the idealist will answer, not, perhaps,

without some sense of uneasiness, there may be some uncon

scious, unknowable factor of the Ego so operating as to make

certain data merely occur, without recurring, and to make others

recur repeatedly. So this is the final assertion of the idealist

who regards the cognitive transcendence of the self, in the process

of cognition, as an impossibility : and indeed if he holds it to be

an impossibility his only alternative is that there must be such an

unconscious or subconscious factor of the real Ego as he refers to.

Now, if the idealist were to interpret this, his own final

assertion, as necessarily implying literal solipsism,- the doctrine

that himself, the individual perceiver, is the only reality, and that

the whole universe is merely a manifestation of himself to him

self, we might feel in charity bound to warn his friends of his

mental condition. But the idealists we have to meet in real life

are those who give a quite sane interpretation of their position.

Such a one will say to the realist: "The whole external uni

verse (including yourself) is for me simply my representation, just

as the whole universe (including myself), external to you, is

for you simply your representation. But because you are for me

simply part of my representation I am not so unreasonable, or

unreasoning, or discourteous, as to regard you as being on that

account one whit less real than myself. What I do contend for

is that all reality so far as it is knowable by me is simply a re

presentation in me of I-know-not-what, a something, which I

necessarily think to lie beyond or below my consciousness, but

which I cannot think to be a reality distinct from myself in so far

as I think my conscious self to be a representation of it. And

since I regard you and other men as having a mental constitution

similar to my own, I am forced to conclude that each of us must

finally regard his own conscious self, i.e. the sum-total of his

conscious representations, and all other similar selves, as

58 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

partial self- revelations or self-manifestations of One, Sole, Ulti

mate and Unknowable Reality, the Absolute." 1

As against this attitude, how can it be shown that the ultra-

conscious partial cause of my perceptions, the cause which accounts

for their specific contents and diversity, for the element of orderli

ness in their sequence, for the persistence with which certain

groups recur, for the character of mutual affinity which Kant had

to recognize in them and il logically referred to the unknowable

Ego-cause rather than to the unknowable non-Ego-coMSt (vol. i.,

p. 214, n. 2 ; pp. 347-52), how can it be shown that this ultra-

conscious partial cause is really distinct from, and external to, the

real Ego? Not otherwise than by such an appeal as Jeanniere

makes in the example given above to what consciousness testifies

as actually happening in sense perception. But if in such an

appeal we merely emphasize the total absence of any evidence for

identifying this ultra-conscious specifying cause of our perceptions

zuith the real Ego, the appeal is not conclusive. For the idealist,

as we saw, can still urge the possibility of such identity. To

meet this final position we must go farther and show, by such an

appeal, the presence of adequate evidence in conscious sense per

ception for the judgment whereby we assert a real distinction, a

relation of real otherness, between the real Ego and the other real

determining factor or factors of our perceptions. In other words

we must show, as has been shown above (109), by a, direct appeal

to sense consciousness, that our intellectual concept of " real-

distinction-from-the-Ego," or " real-otherness-from-the-Ego " is

objectively and validly grounded in the feeling of externality

attaching to the data of external sense perception.

The authors who rely principally on the argument from causality to

vindicate a reasoned certitude for our knowledge of a really external universe

1 The whole universe, then, in so far as men can know it, including men them

selves, is a universe of mental phenomena, appearances, representations, of an

Unknowable Reality in individual minds. It may be recognized as such to be

orderly, to be a cosmos, to reveal purpose, intelligence, design ; and may be therefore

interpreted as indicating that the Reality of which it is a self-evolution or mani

festation is Intelligence, Mind, Spirit. This is not far removed from the Hegelian

form of Monism. In so far as subjective idealism identifies " essc " (or, at least,

knowable being) with " pcrcipi," the only difference between it and Berkeley s " im-

materialism " is that the panorama of data consciously apprehended by the individual

mind is regarded by the former as subjectively produced by the one ultra-conscious

" Absolute Reality " (Monism), whereas in the latter it is regarded as a system of

"ideas" placed or produced by the Divine Spirit in really distinct created human

spirits or minds (Pluralism, Theism). Cf. infra, 123, 155.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 59

would, we presume, admit that the proved validity of the concept of " real

otherness " is essential to their conclusion. They hold, of course, the real

validity of this concept. And if faced, for instance, with Kant s contention

that all so-called real distinctions are merely phenomenal, i.e. mental,

and therefore validly applicable only within the domain of consciously

apprehended data, they would have to show in the domain of direct con

sciousness real grounds for the validity of this concept, just as for the

concepts of substance and cause. Now it is easy to show that the concepts

of substance and cause are necessarily apprehended by intellect considering

the data of direct consciousness, and that these data necessarily imply the

real Ego as real substance and real cause. But in order to show that they

imply other real substances and real causes, the concept of real-otherness-

from-the-Ego must be likewise shown to be validly grounded in these data.

Now we can show that it is so grounded only by pointing to its obvious basis

in direct sense consciousness, viz. the felt concrete character of " extended exter

nality " in those data, as adequate intellectual evidence of its real validity, and

of its valid application in the spontaneous judgment whereby we affirm those

data or objects to constitute a domain of reality other than the real (per

ceiving) Ego. But we thereby justify philosophically this latter judgment

without appealing to causality at all : and that is why we have put this line

of argument, rather than the argument from causality, in the first place (109).

Our position is that the spontaneous judgment whereby we affirm the

external existence of extended material realities is a direct interpretation of

the concrete, intuitively apprehended character of extended externality in

certain sense data ; that we can rationally justify our certitude as to the

truth of this spontaneous judgment by intellectual reflection on that concrete

feature of the sense data, inasmuch as such reflection reveals to us the

validity of the concept of " real-otherness-from-the-^"^," which concept we

have already spontaneously utilized in that judgment ; that, granted the

validity of this concept, we can also infer as a conclusion, by reasoning from

the conceived character of these data as contingent, in the light of the

principle of causality, the judgment which we have already spontaneously

formed, and already j ustified by direct rational reflection on the immediately

and intuitively perceived concrete character of felt externality in those same

data, thus corroborating, by such inference, our already reasoned conviction ;

that, finally, our conviction that this domain of external reality persists in

existence when we are not actually perceiving it, is on a level with our

conviction that the self or Ego persists in existence when as during dream

less sleep or periods of unconsciousness we are not actually aware of the

self or Ego, i.e. both convictions have the same title to be called inferences

from the direct data of consciousness, and, both being equally immediate or

equally mediate, neither is strictly an inference from the other (97, 100, IO5). 1

I ]EANNIERE (op. cit., p. 391 n.) quotes the following extract from PIAT ([/

revenant tternel, in the Correspondant, Oct. 25, 1895, pp. 357-8) : " When I place

my hand against the wall of my room I establish conscious commerce with an

object which is not myself, whose existence is independent of my own. ... If

after a time I again place my hand against the wall I experience once more the

same phenomenon of resistance. The same a third time, and as often as I repeat

the experiment. Whence I infer that there is beyond my sensation a reality which

60 THE OR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

" There are many," writes Mercier, 1 " who refuse to admit the necessity

of an appeal to causality for certitude of the existence of an external world.

They believe that we have a direct intuition of such existence. We are

convinced that in this they are mistaken. We perceive immediately in our

acts the existence of an internal [i.e. self, ] reality. We have direct sense

intuition of external things? and, without intermediary, we form the abstract

notion of what they are [ de ce qu elles sont, apparently the notion of

them as external, extended, material, etc.; and, he should add, the

spontaneous judgment that they are such as this (complex) notion represents

them to be, with the spontaneous conviction that this judgment is true].

But it is impossible for us to affirm with certitude the existence of one or of

many extramental realities without employing the principle of causality. In

the ordinary course of life we do not advert to this inferential procedure,

it has become so familiar to us ; habit diminishes the effort of attention and,

by consequence, the consciousness of our [discursive or inferential] activity."

From all that we have said, the reader will see that we cannot agree

with this view of the matter. Just as we " perceive immediately in our acts

the existence of an internal reality," so we perceive immediately in the data

or objects of these perceptive acts an external reality : as, indeed, the author

himself asserts in the same context. Then, as to the existence of " extra-

mental " realities, such existence can be affirmed with certitude " without

employing the principle of causality," provided the extramental realities are

cognitively related, or given, or presented, to the consciously perceiving,

conceiving and judging mind, as they are in its concretely felt " external," " ex

tended " percepts, and in the concepts of "extended externality" or "other

ness " abstracted from those percepts : just as " without employing the principle

of causality " the existence of the reality which is the Ego, the existence of

the real Ego* can be affirmed with certitude provided, and because, this

real Ego is related, or given, or presented, to the mind in the intuitively

persists in its absence, a reality endowed with a principle of permanence. The

astronomer who measures the earth s orbit apprehends the planet only at certain

points in its course ; and these points he links up with lines which he has not

experienced. It is by an analogous procedure that the psychologist works up his

proof of an external universe."

It is quite true that such a process of inference enters, perhaps half un

consciously, into the formation of our conviction that the external world persists

when we are not perceiving it. But it plays precisely the same role in forming our

conviction that the real Ego persists in existence when we are not aware of it.

This, however, does not alter the fact that without recourse to such a process in

either case we can in actual direct consciousness apprehend both the real Ego and

the real non-Ego ; and spontaneously judge both of them to be real, and really

distinct ; and by immediate reflection on the characters of the actually apprehended

conscious data convince ourselves that there is in these data adequate intellectual

evidence to justify both judgments alike.

l Op. cit., 140, p. 386. 2 Italics ours.

3 I.e. the real Ego which is not merely the sum-total or current or series of all

conscious data, but which is the substantial unifying principle of all of them ; and

which, be it remarked, is partly " extramental " in the sense that it includes the felt,

extended, material organism or body, and is therefore as such partly " extramental "

to consciousness in the same sense as the rest of the material universe is.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 61

apprehended " internal-seeming " data of direct consciousness, both sensuous

and intellectual. We can of course infer, by the principle of causality, the

reality of the non-Ego which we have already both spontaneously and

reflectively asserted to exist, 1 just as we can infer the reality of the Ego by

the principle that perceptions imply a real perceiver. But the ordinary

judgments by which men assert with certitude that this, that, or the other

material thing is external to them, are not conclusions of an inference which

has become sub-conscious through custom and familiarity. Whether the

process of perception itself is not a sort of " inference " we shall see later.

But after all, it may be urged, is not the real existence of the Ego

known prior to that of the non-Ego f Proximus sum mihimttipsi. Have

we not emphasized the truth of the positive element in Descartes principle,

Cogito, ergo sum ? (100). Is not it indubitable even to one who doubts the

reality of the non-Ego f And therefore, is not knowledge of the latter some

how dependent on, and mediated by, knowledge of the former ? Let us see.

It is quite true that since knowing is a function of the Ego, knowledge

of reality other than the Ego must imply that such reality is related, presented,

given to, and made cognitively one with the Ego. But so must the Ego

itself be presented to itself in order to be known. Now let us take the only

fact which has never been doubted by any sceptic, -viz, the existence of a

"stream," or " series," or "panorama "of "perceptions," "presentations,"

" representations," " conscious states," " objects or data of awareness " call

them what you will. If we limit the term "mental" to these "perceived

entities," and call them "the Ego" then of course the most extreme sceptic

will admit that the existence of the Ego is indubitably known. But was this

what Descartes meant by the Ego, or what we mean by it ? No ; but the

real perceiver, thinker, knower (30, 31). And when he claimed certitude for

the judgment that such a reality really exists, he was assuming (and rightly) the

validity of certain intellectual concepts, those, namely, of substance and

cause or agent. But was such a judgment really indubitable ? Well, Kant,

for one, held it to be groundless, pointing out that the only Ego of which

we are certain is the " mental," " phenomenal " Ego, which consists in the

panorama of representations, and that the ./5^0-substance, the ><?-cause or

agent (which he of course recognized to be what people ordinarily mean by

the "real" Ego], being " extramental" or " noumenal," i.e. not being any or

all of the " phenomena," is necessary unknowable. And prior to Kant, the

pan-phenomenism of Hume had likewise doubted the knowableness of the

real Ego which Descartes declared to be indubitably known because in

dubitably given in and with the " representations ". And so it is given ;

only that the reasoned intellectual assertion of it implies the real validity of

the concepts of substance and cause or agent. Reasoned intellectual certi

tude of the existence of the real Ego is, therefore, not wholly beyond the

possibility of at least an unreasonable and de facto unwarranted doubt.

Now let us look at the relation of our certitude of a real non-Ego to

the really indubitable stream of representations. And let us ask ourselves

is doubt about this certitude really more possible or plausible, really less

arbitrary and unwarranted, than the corresponding doubt about our certitude

1 On the ground of the proved validity of our concept of real externality or real

otherness.

62 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

in regard to the real Ego. It is hard to see how it can be so. We will not

ask is the ordinary man really one whit less certain of the existence of an ex

ternal universe than he is of his own existence. For of course he is not, but

this is spontaneous certitude. Let us rather ask does the stream of conscious

data furnish equally valid and equally immediate ground for the reasoned

assertion that a real non-Ego exists, as it does for the reasoned assertion that

a real Ego exists ? The reader must answer this for himself. To us it seems

that the answer must be in the affirmative. The spontaneous judgment that

a real Ego exists, employs as valid the concepts of substance and cause ; and

reflection justifies the assumption of their validity by seeing them to be

grounded in, and implied by, the stream of events called perceptions, repre

sentations, etc. So, too, the spontaneous judgment that a real non-Ego exists,

employs as valid the concepts of substance * and real otherness or real extern

ality, and reflection likewise justifies the assumption of their validity, that of

the concept cf real externality by seeing this concept to be grounded in

and implied by the concrete, felt feature of externality in certain of the con

tents of the stream or panorama of perceptions, and that of the concept of

substance as in the former case.

It seems to us, therefore, that the rationally indubitable character of out-

spontaneous judgment that "there exists a real Ego (which is not merely the

stream of representations but the living subject or substance that has or ex

periences them)," does not warrant us in pronouncing as any less indubitable,

or more liable to rational doubt, the spontaneous judgment that "there exists

1 And also the concept of extension, if the spontaneous judgment be taken to be

as it really is " An extended non-Ego or external reality exists ". Does this

spontaneous judgment also imply as valid the concept of cause ? We think that

de facto it does not. If you ask the ordinary man why he is certain that you your

self are really external to him, his answer will not be, " Because I have certain

sense impressions of which not I myself, but you, must be the cause"; rather his

answer will be, " Because I see you ". We think, moreover, that the spontaneous

judgment can be rationally justified by the reflection which will show the concept

of " real externality " to be a valid concept. No doubt the consciously apprehended

character of external sense perception as a process in which we feel ourselves pas

sive, impressed, influenced, acted on, is one of the sources of the concept of cause;

and this concept may be, and perhaps often is, unconsciously operative in our spon

taneous interpretations of the data of external sense perception. But nevertheless it

is not the concept of causality, but the concept of real otherness or real externality,

that gives the spontaneous judgment its specific meaning as an assertion that

" External reality exists " ; and moreover the proved validity of this concept is so

essential to the justification of the spontaneous judgment that without it the concept

of causality would, as we have seen, be unable to justify this judgment. The two

concretely felt characteristics of the whole conscious content of external sense per

ceptions, viz. the feeling of subjective passivity, or of their being specifically

determined independently of the self as conscious, i.e. of the self as concomitantly

revealed in the perceiving acts, and secondly the feeling of extended externality of

the perceived objects, are themselves consciously distinct data. The former feel

ing is present even in conscious states identified with the Ego or subject as sentient,

e.g. in perceptions of organic conditions, organic pleasures and pains. It is, there

fore, not on the intellectual evidence furnished by that feature of our conscious per

cepts, but rather on the intellectual evidence furnished by the sense feature of

externality, that our spontaneous judgment of real externality must primarily rely

for its rational justification.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 63

a real non-Ego (which is not identical with this stream of conscious percep

tion-processes but has a real being that is independent of its being perceived

in these processes) " ; nor does it warrant us in denying that the latter judg

ment can be rationally justified by the same sort of immediate appeal to the

direct data of consciousness whereby we justify the former judgment, or in

contending that it can be justified only mediately by an appeal to the principle

of causality.

CHAPTER XVI.

PERCEPTION OF SENSE QUALITIES.