171. GENERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRAGMATISM.

 Such

in brief outline is Pragmatism or Humanism. Its advocates

would admit that it is by rational, intellectual reflection on the

facts of experience that they have formed these conclusions

as to what truth, knowledge, belief and certitude really are.

Whatever, therefore, be the nature of the truth-claim which they

make for Pragmatism itself, 2 it will be as lawful for us to use

1 C/. 142, p. 234 n.

2 Do they put forward Pragmatism as true in the ordinary sense of this term,

i.e. as giving us a genuine insight into what knowledge, belief, certitude, etc., really

are ? or only as true in their own sense, i.e. as a theory that is useful, helpful,

suitable, that works well for the time being, but that may possibly have to be

scrapped as no longer " true " at some future stage of man s mental evolution ?

Propounders of anti-intellectualist theories of certitude, theories which, like

evolutionism, relativism (142-5), voluntarism, sentimentalism, moral dogmatism,

etc., give their verdict against the validity of the absolute truth-claim which the

speculative reason makes for its " knowledge "-achievements, must find them

selves in a peculiar position when they put forward any such theory for acceptance

as a philosophical or reasoned solution of the problem of certitude. For if they put

forward any such theory as a true solution of the problem, then since the theory

itself proclaims truth and certitude not to be matters determinable by intellect, its

own truth and certitude, its own worth as a solution, seems to be placed beyond the

pale of rational discussion and intellectual criticism. If, on the other hand, they

allow that the theory, being itself a product of speculative intellectual or rational

reflection, is fairly open to rational criticism, and must stand or fall by the verdict

of such criticism, they seem to be eo ipso giving away their whole position. We

3$8 THEOR V OF KNO WLEDGE

our reason in criticizing the theory as for its advocates to use

theirs in propounding and recommending it. We are justified,

therefore, in offering the following criticisms.

I. All these Pragmatist or Humanist theories contain a de

structive and a constructive portion. On the destructive or

negative side they seek to show that intellect, in its speculative

application to the data of experience, is unable to attain to truth

about reality ; that the traditional conception of truth as intel

lectual insight into reality, or conformity of the mind with

reality, is indefensible ; that the supposed possibility of attaining

to truth as absolute is an illusion ; that truth is essentially

relative and transformable ; that no criterion of truth or motive

of certitude, appealing to mere intellect as objectively valid, or

reputed by intellect to be objectively valid, is so in reality ;

that accordingly the general intellectualist position must be

abandoned as untenable. Secondly, it is as a necessary conse

quence of all this that on the ruins of the demolished intellectual-

ism the human mind must, in obedience to the imperative need

which it feels, construct a theory which will give some better and

more acceptable and satisfactory account of the facts of its ex

perience : an account in which, of necessity, the import of its

own processes and products, truth, knowledge, belief, certitude,

will be quite different from that which was attached to them by

intellectualism. Hence the proposed Pragmatism, with its novel

interpretations of all those mental functions and attainments.

But in the course of our inquiry we hope we have gradually

shown that no such abandonment of intellectualism is either

necessary or justifiable ; that the difficulties urged against it

from whatsoever source are not by any means insuperable ; that

if in fact they were, and if intellect were in fact compelled to

confess that truth, belief, knowledge, certitude, as understood by

intellect itself, were unattainable, or unjustifiable before the bar

of its own critical reflection, no other possible account of them

and no other possible way of grounding them could avail in the

least to save the human mind from blank and hopeless scepticism.

Therefore we see the supposition on which the necessity of

Pragmatism or any similar theory is based, to be not only

unverified but positively erroneous ; and we see also that if such

have already called attention more than once to the inconsistency into which they

are thus forced by this unavoidable dilemma. Cf. vol. i., 59; supra, 144 (3,

d); 167-8.

PRAGMATISM 359

a theory were really necessary the futility of its purpose would

be already intellectually apprehended in the very act by which

reflecting reason would become aware of that necessity.

We have already refuted the Kantian demolition of the speculative

reason, a demolition which some Pragmatists assume as having been de

facto effectual. Moreover, the contention of such writers as Mach, Boutroux,

Poincare, etc., that intellectual knowledge and concepts have a merely re

gulative and practical value, and the contention of Bergson, that, being

static, they give us no insight into a reality which is dynamic and fluent,

are based upon considerations which merely show (i) that such knowledge

is imperfect, inadequate, not comprehensive or exhaustive of the content of

the real ; (2) that all knowledge, even the most speculative, is ultimately

in some way "tendential " or responsive and complementary to some natural

need. Cognition is, of course, subservient to life, is a means of providing

for human needs. But (a) among these needs is the appetitus sciendi, man s

natural, inborn desire for knowledge, and for speculative knowledge oi-what

things are, as well as practical knowledge of what use they are. And further

more (b) we can obviously avail of knowledge to serve human needs only in

so far as it is knowledge, i.e. in so far as it gives us at least some real if

partial and inadequate insight into what things are.

II. According to the Pragmatist view, truth is something

essentially relative, evolving, transformable. But we have al

ready shown, in our analysis of relativist theories of truth (142-

4), that the evolutionist conception simply destroys truth, is

self-contradictory, and in the end unintelligible (144, 3, &). And

in the same context we pointed out the real facts and truths

(143) which the evolution theory distorts and misinterprets.

Moreover, Pragmatism, by wresting the terms "truth" and

" knowledge " from the thought-objects which those terms have

traditionally denoted, and which they are still currently and pro

perly understood to denote, and by applying these terms to other

and quite distinct thought-objects, to other conditions or atti

tudes of the individual mind in its concrete environment (144, 3),

has left unsolved \h& real problem of the nature of that peculiar

and sui generis relation called the knowledge- or truth-relation :

having merely misstated and displaced this problem instead of

solving it.

 Such

in brief outline is Pragmatism or Humanism. Its advocates

would admit that it is by rational, intellectual reflection on the

facts of experience that they have formed these conclusions

as to what truth, knowledge, belief and certitude really are.

Whatever, therefore, be the nature of the truth-claim which they

make for Pragmatism itself, 2 it will be as lawful for us to use

1 C/. 142, p. 234 n.

2 Do they put forward Pragmatism as true in the ordinary sense of this term,

i.e. as giving us a genuine insight into what knowledge, belief, certitude, etc., really

are ? or only as true in their own sense, i.e. as a theory that is useful, helpful,

suitable, that works well for the time being, but that may possibly have to be

scrapped as no longer " true " at some future stage of man s mental evolution ?

Propounders of anti-intellectualist theories of certitude, theories which, like

evolutionism, relativism (142-5), voluntarism, sentimentalism, moral dogmatism,

etc., give their verdict against the validity of the absolute truth-claim which the

speculative reason makes for its " knowledge "-achievements, must find them

selves in a peculiar position when they put forward any such theory for acceptance

as a philosophical or reasoned solution of the problem of certitude. For if they put

forward any such theory as a true solution of the problem, then since the theory

itself proclaims truth and certitude not to be matters determinable by intellect, its

own truth and certitude, its own worth as a solution, seems to be placed beyond the

pale of rational discussion and intellectual criticism. If, on the other hand, they

allow that the theory, being itself a product of speculative intellectual or rational

reflection, is fairly open to rational criticism, and must stand or fall by the verdict

of such criticism, they seem to be eo ipso giving away their whole position. We

3$8 THEOR V OF KNO WLEDGE

our reason in criticizing the theory as for its advocates to use

theirs in propounding and recommending it. We are justified,

therefore, in offering the following criticisms.

I. All these Pragmatist or Humanist theories contain a de

structive and a constructive portion. On the destructive or

negative side they seek to show that intellect, in its speculative

application to the data of experience, is unable to attain to truth

about reality ; that the traditional conception of truth as intel

lectual insight into reality, or conformity of the mind with

reality, is indefensible ; that the supposed possibility of attaining

to truth as absolute is an illusion ; that truth is essentially

relative and transformable ; that no criterion of truth or motive

of certitude, appealing to mere intellect as objectively valid, or

reputed by intellect to be objectively valid, is so in reality ;

that accordingly the general intellectualist position must be

abandoned as untenable. Secondly, it is as a necessary conse

quence of all this that on the ruins of the demolished intellectual-

ism the human mind must, in obedience to the imperative need

which it feels, construct a theory which will give some better and

more acceptable and satisfactory account of the facts of its ex

perience : an account in which, of necessity, the import of its

own processes and products, truth, knowledge, belief, certitude,

will be quite different from that which was attached to them by

intellectualism. Hence the proposed Pragmatism, with its novel

interpretations of all those mental functions and attainments.

But in the course of our inquiry we hope we have gradually

shown that no such abandonment of intellectualism is either

necessary or justifiable ; that the difficulties urged against it

from whatsoever source are not by any means insuperable ; that

if in fact they were, and if intellect were in fact compelled to

confess that truth, belief, knowledge, certitude, as understood by

intellect itself, were unattainable, or unjustifiable before the bar

of its own critical reflection, no other possible account of them

and no other possible way of grounding them could avail in the

least to save the human mind from blank and hopeless scepticism.

Therefore we see the supposition on which the necessity of

Pragmatism or any similar theory is based, to be not only

unverified but positively erroneous ; and we see also that if such

have already called attention more than once to the inconsistency into which they

are thus forced by this unavoidable dilemma. Cf. vol. i., 59; supra, 144 (3,

d); 167-8.

PRAGMATISM 359

a theory were really necessary the futility of its purpose would

be already intellectually apprehended in the very act by which

reflecting reason would become aware of that necessity.

We have already refuted the Kantian demolition of the speculative

reason, a demolition which some Pragmatists assume as having been de

facto effectual. Moreover, the contention of such writers as Mach, Boutroux,

Poincare, etc., that intellectual knowledge and concepts have a merely re

gulative and practical value, and the contention of Bergson, that, being

static, they give us no insight into a reality which is dynamic and fluent,

are based upon considerations which merely show (i) that such knowledge

is imperfect, inadequate, not comprehensive or exhaustive of the content of

the real ; (2) that all knowledge, even the most speculative, is ultimately

in some way "tendential " or responsive and complementary to some natural

need. Cognition is, of course, subservient to life, is a means of providing

for human needs. But (a) among these needs is the appetitus sciendi, man s

natural, inborn desire for knowledge, and for speculative knowledge oi-what

things are, as well as practical knowledge of what use they are. And further

more (b) we can obviously avail of knowledge to serve human needs only in

so far as it is knowledge, i.e. in so far as it gives us at least some real if

partial and inadequate insight into what things are.

II. According to the Pragmatist view, truth is something

essentially relative, evolving, transformable. But we have al

ready shown, in our analysis of relativist theories of truth (142-

4), that the evolutionist conception simply destroys truth, is

self-contradictory, and in the end unintelligible (144, 3, &). And

in the same context we pointed out the real facts and truths

(143) which the evolution theory distorts and misinterprets.

Moreover, Pragmatism, by wresting the terms "truth" and

" knowledge " from the thought-objects which those terms have

traditionally denoted, and which they are still currently and pro

perly understood to denote, and by applying these terms to other

and quite distinct thought-objects, to other conditions or atti

tudes of the individual mind in its concrete environment (144, 3),

has left unsolved \h& real problem of the nature of that peculiar

and sui generis relation called the knowledge- or truth-relation :

having merely misstated and displaced this problem instead of

solving it.