140. SOME RELATIVIST DIFFICULTIES.

 I. But now, if this

latter view be correct, would it not appear that absolutely neces

sary judgments of the ideal order give us an insight rather into

the constitution of our intellects than into the nature of reality,

just as in Kant s account of them ?

Before meeting this objection we may observe, in reference

to Kant, that according to his account they do not even give us

an insight into the constitution of our own intellects, i.e. of the

real intellect, or the real Ego, but only into our mental representa

tion of the real Ego. And secondly, even waiving that point,

his account gratuitously assumes the impossibility of discriminat

ing the subjective or formal or logical elements from the objective

or given or real elements in things intellectually known : and we

have seen (chap, xii.) the breakdown of his own attempt to trace

all the " affinities " which determine the ultimate conceptual

divisions and classifications of the categories, to subjective, formal,

a priori factors of conception. The Scholastic account, on the

contrary, vindicates for intellectual reflection the power to dis

criminate between the logical attributes and relations which its

own modes of apprehension necessarily attach to the given

reality in its interpretation of this reality, and the modes and

attributes of real being \ which it* represents to itself through

these logical relations.

And now, as to objection itself: such judgments do un

doubtedly give us an insight into the nature of our own intellects,

but an insight which we get only by reflection. Nor is it true

to say that they give in this insight rather than an insight into

the nature of the reality represented in such judgments ; for what

they give us primarily and directly e.g. such judgments as

" The whole is greater than its part," " Whatever happens has a

cause," etc., etc. is an insight into the nature of the reality

1 The possibility and sources of error, of erroneous interpretations or representa

tions of reality, will be dealt with later on.

VOL. II. 15

226 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

represented by the various concepts so related. And this, finally,

is what we have now to fix our attention on.

When we say that such judgments represent reality as it is,

that, therefore, reality is necessarily as thus represented, inas

much as it is represented as being necessarily such or such, that

these judgments are true not merely for all human minds but

for all conceivable intelligences, that reality must be so for all con

ceivable intelligences, what do we really mean ? Do we mean

that all conceivable intelligences, pure spiritual intelligences, or

the Divine Mind, must apprehend reality through our human

modes of abstract conception, intellectual analysis and synthesis,

relating, comparing, generalizing, predicating or judging, etc. ?

that they must have the same qualitative and quantitative con

cepts as we have? that e.g. they can apprehend what we desig

nate " material " reality only through abstract concepts derived

from sense qualities ? By no means ; for we have no proper or

positive knowledge of the modes in which such intelligences

would apprehend reality. 1 What we do mean is simply that

whatsoever intelligence apprehends reality, apprehending human

beings and human minds as part of reality, cannot so apprehend

it as to see it incompatible with, or contradictory of, its function

of being what it is represented to be by human minds in the

judgments referred to. When, for instance, we say that " two

and two must be four even for the Divine Mind " we do not at

all mean that the Divine Mind apprehends reality by comparing

abstract, quantitative concepts, but that the Divine mind sees all

reality (including human minds) to be such that the human re

presentation of an aspect of reality by the human judgment " two

and two must be four " is for the human mind the right and proper

representation of that aspect of reality: or sees the reality appre

hended by the human mind, and the human mind apprehending

it, to be such that a necessary function of reality is to appear to

the human mind as it does in such a representation. And when

we reflect on our motive for assenting to the judgment " two and

two must be four," and on what such a judgment means for us,

we realize (i) that our motive for assenting to it is not because

1 If, therefore, we consider the way in which the Divine Mind apprehends

reality we have to think of the Divine Knowledge after the analogy of human know

ledge : we have no other way in which to think of it. We know that our human

concepts represent it only analogically and negatively : rather what it is not than

what it is. But, allowing for this inadequacy of our concepts, the knowledge they

give us is true as far as it goes. C/. vol. i., 6, 71, 75.

RELATIVIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 227

our intellect is so constituted (whether by custom or habit, or as

a result of evolution, or by virtue of factors operating in an in

scrutable domain of the real self) that it is forced to apprehend

such a relation between its thought-objects, 1 but because reality,

which reveals itself through our concepts, is so constituted that

the abstract aspect of it revealed through the concept "twofl/us

two " must be really identical with the aspect which reveals it

self through the concept "four"; and (2) that its meaning is

that the reality represented by the judgment is such that it is

rightly represented in such a judgment by a mind which has the

judgment-mode of representing reality, and that by no conceivable

mind could it be (rightly) so apprehended as to conflict with its

being thus represented by the human mind.

II. But it will still be urged if the human intellect were

otherwise constituted " two plus two " might after all appear

other than " four," just as sugar may, perhaps, taste not sweet

and pleasant, but bitter and unpleasant, to the palates of some

of the lower animals (43).

We reply: If by "otherwise constituted" we are to under

stand "so constituted as not to apprehend reality by means of

such abstract concepts as we have de facto" then obviously there

could be no question of such an intellect apprehending reality

by comparing the abstract concept " two plus two" with the

concept "four," and seeing a relation between them: in that

case whatever way it would understand reality it could not so

apprehend reality as to see it to be wrongly represented in a

human intellect by such a judgment. If, on the other hand,

"otherwise constituted" means simply that such an intellect

would have our human modes of conceiving and judging, and

could nevertheless judge " two //#.$ two " to be other than " four,"

then it must be denied that such a judgment is possible to such

an intellect rationally understanding the concepts in question ;

and it must furthermore be asserted that were such an intellect

1 DC facto, of course, the intellect is so constituted that (a) it has its own specific

ways of apprehending the real, e.g. by abstract conception of the given concrete, by

analysis and synthesis, judgment, reasoning, etc., -and (b) that the given reality im

pels it (by cogent objective evidence) to use its judgment-mode of apprehension by

applying a certain logical relation, -viz. affirmative predication, and not its contradic

tory, to the reality given in the two abstract thought-objects or concepts, " two plus

two" and "four". But all this is not the motive of our direct assent; it is dis

covered by reflection ; and even when discovered, this knowledge of the real nature,

processes and products of intellect does not affect the conviction that the judgment

" two and two must be four " is a representation of reality.

15 *

228 THE OR V OF KNO IV LEDGE

per impossibilc really to formulate and assent to such a judgment,

the judgment would be erroneous, would misinterpret reality.

As to the false analogy drawn from the domain of sense, its

misleading character has been already exposed (135-6). Sense

does not judge; therefore sense does not know : it is incapable

either of truth or error : it merely furnishes the materials for

knowledge. Intellect alone judges ; intellect alone can reflect :

in its interpretation of sense data it can see and allow for the

influence of the subjective, organic factor on the datum as per

ceived : it can, moreover, reflect on its own processes, on its own

modes of cognition, and on the logical attributes and relations

consequent on these modes ; and by distinguishing these from the

given and interpreted reality it can know the latter as it is, and

can see that its own knowledge is not vitiated by any intrusion of

unknowable subjective factors between itself and the known reality.

 I. But now, if this

latter view be correct, would it not appear that absolutely neces

sary judgments of the ideal order give us an insight rather into

the constitution of our intellects than into the nature of reality,

just as in Kant s account of them ?

Before meeting this objection we may observe, in reference

to Kant, that according to his account they do not even give us

an insight into the constitution of our own intellects, i.e. of the

real intellect, or the real Ego, but only into our mental representa

tion of the real Ego. And secondly, even waiving that point,

his account gratuitously assumes the impossibility of discriminat

ing the subjective or formal or logical elements from the objective

or given or real elements in things intellectually known : and we

have seen (chap, xii.) the breakdown of his own attempt to trace

all the " affinities " which determine the ultimate conceptual

divisions and classifications of the categories, to subjective, formal,

a priori factors of conception. The Scholastic account, on the

contrary, vindicates for intellectual reflection the power to dis

criminate between the logical attributes and relations which its

own modes of apprehension necessarily attach to the given

reality in its interpretation of this reality, and the modes and

attributes of real being \ which it* represents to itself through

these logical relations.

And now, as to objection itself: such judgments do un

doubtedly give us an insight into the nature of our own intellects,

but an insight which we get only by reflection. Nor is it true

to say that they give in this insight rather than an insight into

the nature of the reality represented in such judgments ; for what

they give us primarily and directly e.g. such judgments as

" The whole is greater than its part," " Whatever happens has a

cause," etc., etc. is an insight into the nature of the reality

1 The possibility and sources of error, of erroneous interpretations or representa

tions of reality, will be dealt with later on.

VOL. II. 15

226 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

represented by the various concepts so related. And this, finally,

is what we have now to fix our attention on.

When we say that such judgments represent reality as it is,

that, therefore, reality is necessarily as thus represented, inas

much as it is represented as being necessarily such or such, that

these judgments are true not merely for all human minds but

for all conceivable intelligences, that reality must be so for all con

ceivable intelligences, what do we really mean ? Do we mean

that all conceivable intelligences, pure spiritual intelligences, or

the Divine Mind, must apprehend reality through our human

modes of abstract conception, intellectual analysis and synthesis,

relating, comparing, generalizing, predicating or judging, etc. ?

that they must have the same qualitative and quantitative con

cepts as we have? that e.g. they can apprehend what we desig

nate " material " reality only through abstract concepts derived

from sense qualities ? By no means ; for we have no proper or

positive knowledge of the modes in which such intelligences

would apprehend reality. 1 What we do mean is simply that

whatsoever intelligence apprehends reality, apprehending human

beings and human minds as part of reality, cannot so apprehend

it as to see it incompatible with, or contradictory of, its function

of being what it is represented to be by human minds in the

judgments referred to. When, for instance, we say that " two

and two must be four even for the Divine Mind " we do not at

all mean that the Divine Mind apprehends reality by comparing

abstract, quantitative concepts, but that the Divine mind sees all

reality (including human minds) to be such that the human re

presentation of an aspect of reality by the human judgment " two

and two must be four " is for the human mind the right and proper

representation of that aspect of reality: or sees the reality appre

hended by the human mind, and the human mind apprehending

it, to be such that a necessary function of reality is to appear to

the human mind as it does in such a representation. And when

we reflect on our motive for assenting to the judgment " two and

two must be four," and on what such a judgment means for us,

we realize (i) that our motive for assenting to it is not because

1 If, therefore, we consider the way in which the Divine Mind apprehends

reality we have to think of the Divine Knowledge after the analogy of human know

ledge : we have no other way in which to think of it. We know that our human

concepts represent it only analogically and negatively : rather what it is not than

what it is. But, allowing for this inadequacy of our concepts, the knowledge they

give us is true as far as it goes. C/. vol. i., 6, 71, 75.

RELATIVIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 227

our intellect is so constituted (whether by custom or habit, or as

a result of evolution, or by virtue of factors operating in an in

scrutable domain of the real self) that it is forced to apprehend

such a relation between its thought-objects, 1 but because reality,

which reveals itself through our concepts, is so constituted that

the abstract aspect of it revealed through the concept "twofl/us

two " must be really identical with the aspect which reveals it

self through the concept "four"; and (2) that its meaning is

that the reality represented by the judgment is such that it is

rightly represented in such a judgment by a mind which has the

judgment-mode of representing reality, and that by no conceivable

mind could it be (rightly) so apprehended as to conflict with its

being thus represented by the human mind.

II. But it will still be urged if the human intellect were

otherwise constituted " two plus two " might after all appear

other than " four," just as sugar may, perhaps, taste not sweet

and pleasant, but bitter and unpleasant, to the palates of some

of the lower animals (43).

We reply: If by "otherwise constituted" we are to under

stand "so constituted as not to apprehend reality by means of

such abstract concepts as we have de facto" then obviously there

could be no question of such an intellect apprehending reality

by comparing the abstract concept " two plus two" with the

concept "four," and seeing a relation between them: in that

case whatever way it would understand reality it could not so

apprehend reality as to see it to be wrongly represented in a

human intellect by such a judgment. If, on the other hand,

"otherwise constituted" means simply that such an intellect

would have our human modes of conceiving and judging, and

could nevertheless judge " two //#.$ two " to be other than " four,"

then it must be denied that such a judgment is possible to such

an intellect rationally understanding the concepts in question ;

and it must furthermore be asserted that were such an intellect

1 DC facto, of course, the intellect is so constituted that (a) it has its own specific

ways of apprehending the real, e.g. by abstract conception of the given concrete, by

analysis and synthesis, judgment, reasoning, etc., -and (b) that the given reality im

pels it (by cogent objective evidence) to use its judgment-mode of apprehension by

applying a certain logical relation, -viz. affirmative predication, and not its contradic

tory, to the reality given in the two abstract thought-objects or concepts, " two plus

two" and "four". But all this is not the motive of our direct assent; it is dis

covered by reflection ; and even when discovered, this knowledge of the real nature,

processes and products of intellect does not affect the conviction that the judgment

" two and two must be four " is a representation of reality.

15 *

228 THE OR V OF KNO IV LEDGE

per impossibilc really to formulate and assent to such a judgment,

the judgment would be erroneous, would misinterpret reality.

As to the false analogy drawn from the domain of sense, its

misleading character has been already exposed (135-6). Sense

does not judge; therefore sense does not know : it is incapable

either of truth or error : it merely furnishes the materials for

knowledge. Intellect alone judges ; intellect alone can reflect :

in its interpretation of sense data it can see and allow for the

influence of the subjective, organic factor on the datum as per

ceived : it can, moreover, reflect on its own processes, on its own

modes of cognition, and on the logical attributes and relations

consequent on these modes ; and by distinguishing these from the

given and interpreted reality it can know the latter as it is, and

can see that its own knowledge is not vitiated by any intrusion of

unknowable subjective factors between itself and the known reality.