TIONISM.

 Our general contention has been that external sense

perception puts us into direct and immediate cognitive contact

with external or non-self reality. But we have not denied that

the specific qualities with which this reality is presented to con

sciousness are partially dependent on and relative to the subjec

tive or self factor which is the perceiver s own organism. 2 On the

contrary, we have contended that such dependence and relativity

must be recognized in every datum or quality or object, including

externality itself, presented to the conscious perceiver (120, 121).

But, distinguishing between normal and abnormal (organic and

external) conditions of perception (119), we have asserted that in

the case of normal sense perception the dependence of the external,

perceived reality on the subjective, organic factor, and the conse

quent relativity of its perceived specific quality to the perceiver,

may be ignored, i.e. that we may abstract from them in attributing

the specific quality to the external reality, not as if the relativity

and dependence were not there, for they are always there, in

volved in the very nature of the perceptive process whether this

be normal or abnormal, and not as if the specific quality as

perceived and attributed to the external reality were understood

1 First Principles, p. 284.

2 We accept MERCIER S summing up of the psychology of external sense per

ception : " The natural specific dispositions of the sense faculties and the nature of

the external excitants constitute the ultimate reason of qualitative diversity of our

sensations. This statement, commonplace as it may appear, is the last word of the

psychology of sensation." Psychologic (6th edit.), vol. i., 75, p. 167. For the re

spective roles of the sense organs and the external reality, in perception, cf. ibid.,

pp. 159-67 ; Origines de la psychologic contetnporaine, p. 365 ; also NYS, Cosmologie,

226, pp. 334-7.

i 5 2 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

to be in the latter irrespectively of the determining influence of

the structure and condition of the perceiver s organism upon it,

but because in normal perception this ever-present influence of

the internal, organic factor, in partially determining what the ex

ternal reality is perceived to be, is itself constant and uniform for

all perceivers, and while tacitly understood to be always present,

is also tacitly and rightly understood to be incapable of uncon

sciously misleading or falsifying the judgments in which we at

tribute the perceived qualities and qualitative differences to the

external reality. 1

It may perhaps occur to the reader to doubt if the view we

are advocating is really a form of perceptionism or intuitionism,

to doubt whether it really admits after all a direct and immediate

awareness of external sense qualities as they are externally. It is

a form of perceptionism. As distinguished from every form of

the theory which holds the direct object of sense awareness to be

an internal, conscious (organic or psychic) " reproduction " or

" representation " or "appearance," and the external to be in

ferred (whether consciously or sub-consciously) from this "repre

sentation," the theory here advocated holds the external reality

to be directly presented to the perceiver s consciousness, and the

perceiver to be directly aware of it. It holds the internal effect

of the external factor in sense perception not to be the produc

tion of a consciously apprehended datum imaging or representing

the external in consciousness, but rather to be the production of

the conscious perception process itself by means of an unconsciously

wrought psychic modification (the "species inipressa"}: this whole

process being an "assimilation" of the perceiver to the external

factor which is the term of the process as consciously perceptive.

1 For instance, we know that sound is a something external, of which we could

not become aware unless through the organ of hearing, and colour a something ex

ternal, of which we could not become aware unless through the organ of vision:

that the perceived difference between colour and sound is partly due to a known

difference (from which, as constant, we abstract) in the specific structure and con

stitution of these two kinds of sense organ, but is also itself externally a perceived

difference in qualities of the external perceived reality ; that the difference between

a high and a low sound perceived in the same conditions of the perceiver, or between

red and blue perceived in unchanged conditions of the perceiver, is in each case a

difference in real modes or characters or qualities of the perceived external reality:

though in each of these cases, likewise, it is functions of different parts of the audi

tory and the visual sense organs respectively that subserve the conscious process of

perception, and therefore in their measure determine the qualities perceived, a de

termining factor from which we abstract in s-o far as we know it to be normal, and

therefore constant and uniform.

INTUITIVE REALISM 153

But it realizes that the unconscious psychic modification, which

determines the conscious perceptive process both quoad exercitium

and quoad specificationem, is itself wrought not by the sole influ

ence of the external factor on the perceiver s mind or conscious

principle, but by this influence as conveyed, and modified or

determined in the transmission, by the perceiver s sense organon.

Hence it holds that the external is directly perceived indeed, but

perceived nevertheless only through the instrumentality of the

internal, material organon which presents it to the perceiver s

consciousness. Moreover, it recognizes this influence of the sub

jective, organic factor : it points out that only when this influence

is normal, and therefore uniform for all perceivers, does its pres

ence cease to count in the qualitative differences which come

from the external factor but are presented through the instru

mentality of the internal factor ; and that therefore in normal

perception, and only in normal perception, can the presentation

of the qualities and qualitative differences to consciousness, or

their appearance to consciousness, be identically a part or function

of their external reality. And by recognizing these implications

of the perceptive process the present view avoids the erroneous

implication of naif or unreflecting perceptionism, that the presen

tation or appearance of the external reality to consciousness is

not only direct, but uninfluenced by any subjective factor, and

that therefore the external always really is as it appears to the

perceiver. Our position rather is that the presentation or ap

pearance of any datum to sense consciousness is indeed always

part and parcel, so to speak, of the extramental material domain

of being, and this whether the perception be normal or ab

normal ; but that the presentation or appearance to sense-con

sciousness of a datum as extra-organic, non-self, external, and as

being qualitatively such or such, is part and parcel of the external

reality only when the organic conditions of perception are normal,

and not otherwise.

I. Now the first consideration arising from this view may

appear in the nature of a difficulty. It is this. The distinction

between normal and abnormal perception makes truth and certi

tude about the qualities and nature of the external, material

universe dependent on the common assent or judgment of men.

If, for instance, that only is really and externally red which ap

pears as red to normal perceivers (and not to the colour-blind), it

follows that no individual perceiver can declare a colour to be

i 5 4 THEOR Y OF KNO IV LED GE

really and externally red merely because it appears so to him,

until he knows furthermore that it appears similarly to the

general mass of mankind, i.e. until he knows that his perception

is normal. And so of every other sense quality, primary as well

as secondary. Hence the ultimate test of the truth of the indi

vidual perceiver s spontaneous interpretations of his own percep

tions is not their " sense evidence " for him, or " what they

appear " to him, but this as checked by what they appear to the

general mass of mankind.

On reflection, however, it will be found that this conclusion

goes somewhat too far. The individual perceiver cannot know

that other men exist unless by first believing the evidence of his

senses : so that what or how things appear to them cannot

underlie or replace the evidential function of what or how things

appear to himself. What really happens is that he commences

by accepting the latter evidence ; that he gradually finds it cor

roborated by what he learns of other men s experience ; that if

any of his own senses be abnormal he soon discovers the discrep

ancy between the verdict of this sense in his own case and the

corresponding sense verdict of men generally ; or that he may

learn of the existence of exceptional individuals who have some

sense or senses to which things appear otherwise than they do to

men generally. Thus he realizes not that the reason why each

normal perceiver believes things to be really and externally such

or such is because he knows that other normal perceivers cherish

a similar belief, for he knows that to rely on this as an ulti

mate reason would be to fall into a vicious circle. Rather he

realizes the reason of each normal perceiver s belief that things

are really and externally such or such to be because things ap

pear to each individual to be really and externally such or such ;

but he sees at the same time that there is in this belief the im

plicit assumption or convention that " really and externally such

or such " means " really and externally such or such, abstracting

from the normal, uniform, subjective influence which tJie. perceiver s

organism has on the manner in vvhich the external reality appears,

or is presented, to the consciousness of the perceiver ".

When, for instance, I say " This field of poppies is really and

externally red," my reason for saying so is because it appears so

to me ; and I know the reason to be valid because I have verified

by experience the assumption underlying it, viz. that I am a

normal perceiver. And what J mean by the statement, " This

INTUITIVE REALISM 155

field of poppies is really and externally red," is that the field of

poppies has really and externally a quality which appears in the

same way to all normal perceivers ; which, however, appears in

this way to them not independently of the subjective influence of

each one s sense organon ; but which, nevertheless, abstracting

from this influence because it is normal and uniform, they rightly

regard as being really and externally what it appears to them,

and what they designate as " redness ".

What we mean by saying that any sense quality is "really

and externally such or such " is that it is really and externally

a quality which appears or reveals itself in a certain way to the

normal perceiver ; not that its appearance is uninfluenced by the

subjective, organic factor, but that this influence, when normal

and uniform, does not interfere with our judgment as to what

the quality is really and externally : all such judgments being

based on the tacit assumption or convention that such qualities

are " really and externally " what they appear to the normal per

ceiver. What is " redness " really and externally ? It is really

and externally a quality which is so named because it appears

in a certain uniform way to all normal perceivers, but which ap

pears in a different way to certain individuals whose visual organs

are abnormal, in the way namely in which "green" appears to

normal perceivers. The colour-blind individual, gazing on a

field of red poppies, sees it as green. The cause of the difference

is obviously the subjective organic factor. What, therefore, are

we to infer? That the colour-blind individual sees something

which does not exist really and externally? Or that he does

not see something which does exist really and externally? We

are to infer both, so far as colour-quality is concerned. For by

" real and external " red or green we mean the quality which ap

pears or reveals itself as such to the normal perceiver. The extra-

organic colour datum, which is the field of poppies, exists really

and externally the same, independently of all perceivers, normal

and abnormal alike ; by no one of them, however, is it perceived

independently of the influence of the perceiver s own subjective,

organic factor ; but it is understood to be " really and ex

ternally " what it appears when the organic factor is normal, i.e.

in the present case " red ". The colour-blind individual, there

fore, has a real perception of a real quality which is " really and

externally " what it appears to normal perceivers, viz. red, but

which, while appearing thus to normal perceivers, appears to

i 56 Tf/EOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

him otherwise than it does to them, i.e. otherwise than it is

"really and externally," and this because of his subjective,

organic abnormality, for which he must learn to allow, by

correcting what it registers, so as to judge in conformity with

normal perceivers.

II. From the relativity just recognized there arises this

general difficulty : If what is consciously apprehended in sense

perception is even partially dependent on the perceiving subject,

then sense perception does not reveal to us extra-subjective or

extramental reality as it is in itself. Hence the realist inter

pretation of sense perception is unwarranted, and must be

abandoned for idealism. This difficulty we now purpose to

examine explicitly.

There is no getting away from this relativity of all sense

qualities to the structure and conditions of the perceiver s sense

organs. It has to be recognized by the supporter of mediate or

representative sense perception no less than by the perceptionist.

If what we become immediately aware of be a mental appearance

or representation (from which the real and external quality be

inferred), then it becomes necessary to distinguish between normal

or "absolute," and abnormal or "relative" or "subjective"

appearances, and to hold that it is only from the former we

are entitled to infer what the perceived quality is really and

externally : thereby recognizing the implicit convention that

what the quality is " really and externally " is determined for

our knowledge by what it " appears " to the normal perceiver,

the subjective, organic contribution to this " appearance " being

left out of account because it is normal and uniform. 1

But what the student has to bear in mind is that this in

evitable relativity of external reality, as a datum of sense per

ception, to the constitution of the perceiving subject as organic,

in no way compromises the validity of external sense perception

as a conscious apprehension of external reality. We can apply

both to sense perception and to intellectual knowledge^ i.e. con

ception, judgment, interpretation, what Maher has so clearly

expressed concerning the relativity of knowledge in general. In

his Psychology ~ he distinguishes between the false sense in which

the Relativity of Knowledge is understood by idealists and the

1 C/. jKANNlfeRE, Op. Clt., pp. 417-18. 2 Pp. 157-8.

INTUITIVE REALISM 157

sense in which it can be truly said that all knowledge is relative.

After explaining the former sense 1 he continues :

Another, and what we maintain to be the true expression of the Re

lativity of Knowledge, and one which is in harmony with the theory of im

mediate or presentative perception, holds (a) that we can only know as

much as our faculties, limited in number and range, can reveal to us ;

(b) that these faculties can inform us of objects only so far, and according as

the latter manifest themselves ; (c} that accordingly (a) there may remain

always an indefinite number of qualities which we do not know, and (/3) what

is known must be set in relation to the mind, and can only be known in such

relation.

So much relativity is necessarily involved in the very nature of know

ledge, but it in no way destroys the worth of that knowledge. If knowledge

is defined to imply a relation between the mind and the known object, and if

the noumenon or thing-in-itself is defined to signify some real element of an

object which never stands in any relation to our cognitive powers, then a

knowledge of noumena or things-in-themselves is obviously an absurdity. 2

111 All systems of philosophy," he writes, "which reject the doctrine of im

mediate perception of extended reality must maintain that our knowledge is relative

to the mind in the sense that we can never know anything but our own subjective

states." This opening statement goes, perhaps, too far, at least if we are to under

stand by " extended reality " " external extended reality " ; for, as we have seen,

there are many realists who hold that although the object of our " immediate per

ception " is always a state of the self, nevertheless we can infer by the principle of

causality an external or non-self reality. " Among these [systems]," he continues,

" the most consistent thinkers . . . are the idealists proper. They logically main

tain that if we have no knowledge of anything beyond consciousness, it is un-

philosophical to suppose that anything else exists. This thoroughgoing view is

represented by Hume, and by Mill at times. The great majority of modern

philosophers, however, shrinking back from this extreme, have adopted some

intermediate position akin to that of Kant or Mr. Spencer. They maintain that

while all our knowledge is relative to our own mental states, and in no way

represents or reflects reality, yet there is de facto some sort of reality outside of our

minds. Our imaginary cognitions of space, time, and causality are universal sub

jective illusions either inherited [Spencer] or elaborated by the mind [Kant] ; con

sequently since these fictitious elements mould or blend with all our experience, we

can have no knowledge of things in themselves, of noumena, of the absolute. But

notwithstanding this, and in spite of the fact that the principle of causality has no

more real validity than a continuous hallucination, these philosophers are curiously

found to maintain the existence of a cause, and even of an external, non-mental

cause, of our sensations. . . . [But] if by noumena are understood, as Kant on the

one side, and sensationalists like Mr. Spencer on the other seem to mean, hypo

thetical external causes of our sensations, then we must, in the first place, deny the

assumption that we can only know our own conscious states, and, in the second, we

must point out the fundamental contradiction common to both schools of disputing

the objective or real validity of the principle of causality, whilst in virtue of a sur

reptitious use of this rejected principle they affirm the reality of an unknowable

noumenal cause."

3 O/>. cit., p. 158. Cf. ibid., n. 26, quotation from MARTINEAU, A Study of Re

ligion, vol. i., p. 119 : " To speak of knowing things in themselves or things

as they are, is to talk of not simply an impossibility, but a contradiction ; for these

i 58 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

It is obvious, of course, that there may l>e in the real world

multitudes of qualities of which we can know nothing, through

lack of appropriate perceptive faculties ; and it is even possible

that some of the lower animals may have organic perceptive

powers which make them aware of some such qualities, just as

we know that in some of those animals the perceptive powers

they have in common with us far exceed ours in range and

intensity (44). The more important point, however, is that

those qualities which we do know we know only in so far as

these "manifest themselves to us" and are "set in relation to

the mind " ; and that they " can only be known in such relation "- 1

Applying this to sense perception it means that all the data

which make up the whole domain of sense experience, and all

the sensible qualities and characteristics of these data, can be

consciously perceived, can become objects of sense awareness,

only in so far as they are " set in relation," or " appear," or

"manifest," or "reveal" themselves, to the perceiver. But we

have seen that they depend partially, for what they appear, on

the subjective, organic factor of the perceiver : that they appear

as they do to the perceiver partly because the perceiver himself

is organically constituted as he is. When, therefore, he judges

that they really are as they appear to the normal perceiver, he is

not at all denying that in the process of "appearing" or "being

presented" to consciousness in sense perception the sense realities

(whether organic or extra-organic) are partially specified, modi

fied, we may even say transformed or metamorphosed, to use

the very language affected by the more moderate school of

phrases are invented to denote what is in the sphere of being and not in the sphere

of thought ; and to suppose them known is ipso facto to take away this character.

The relativity of cognition (i.e. in the sense defined) imposes on us no forfeiture of

privilege, no humiliation of pride; there is not any conceivable form of apprehen

sion from which it excludes us."

1 Even such material things and qualities as are known without their having

been ever perceived by any human being (and all who admit the existence of an

external material universe at all will admit that we can have reasoned certitude

about the existence of portions of it which have never been perceived) are known

only by being related to the mind through other things or qualities directly per

ceived. " What is given in one or more relations may necessarily implicate other

relations, and these may subsist not merely between the mind and other objects, but

between the several objects themselves. Still, mediate cognitions of this kind are

knowledge only in so far as they are rationally connected with what is immediately

given. Our knowledge of the mutual dynamical influence of two invisible planets,

which faithfully reflects their reciprocal relations, is but an elaborate evolution of

what is apprehended by sense and intellect in experiences where subject and object

stand in immediate relations." Ibid., n. 25, italics ours.

INTUITIVE REALISM 159

idealists, by the subjective, organic factor. He merely holds

that such subjective influence, and such relativity of sense realities

to the perceiver s own organic constitution, being inseparable

from the very nature of the perceptive process, are tacitly under

stood to be always there, but are likewise understood when

normal not to affect the truth of the judgment whereby he

interprets those sense realities to be "really" (and "externally"

in the case of " externally appearing " data) as they appear to

the normal perceiver. Furthermore, when he asserts that in sense

perception he is directly aware, not of a "conscious state" or

" psychic appearance " or " mental representation," but of an

extramental reality, his interpretation is one which no idealist ]

can disprove until the idealist assumption that nothing extra-

mental can be in direct cognitive relation to mind, that the mind

can know only its own states, is vindicated. And finally, when

he asserts that in external sense perception he is directly aware

neither of a mental appearance nor of an organic condition, but

of an extra-organic, external, and sometimes spatially distant

reality, and that he is aware of this reality as it is really and

externally, 2 his interpretation cannot be shaken until it be

proved that a material reality, spatially distant from a perceiver,

cannot become the direct term of the latter s awareness by

awakening his conscious perceptive activity through its operative

influence on his bodily sense organs.

 Our general contention has been that external sense

perception puts us into direct and immediate cognitive contact

with external or non-self reality. But we have not denied that

the specific qualities with which this reality is presented to con

sciousness are partially dependent on and relative to the subjec

tive or self factor which is the perceiver s own organism. 2 On the

contrary, we have contended that such dependence and relativity

must be recognized in every datum or quality or object, including

externality itself, presented to the conscious perceiver (120, 121).

But, distinguishing between normal and abnormal (organic and

external) conditions of perception (119), we have asserted that in

the case of normal sense perception the dependence of the external,

perceived reality on the subjective, organic factor, and the conse

quent relativity of its perceived specific quality to the perceiver,

may be ignored, i.e. that we may abstract from them in attributing

the specific quality to the external reality, not as if the relativity

and dependence were not there, for they are always there, in

volved in the very nature of the perceptive process whether this

be normal or abnormal, and not as if the specific quality as

perceived and attributed to the external reality were understood

1 First Principles, p. 284.

2 We accept MERCIER S summing up of the psychology of external sense per

ception : " The natural specific dispositions of the sense faculties and the nature of

the external excitants constitute the ultimate reason of qualitative diversity of our

sensations. This statement, commonplace as it may appear, is the last word of the

psychology of sensation." Psychologic (6th edit.), vol. i., 75, p. 167. For the re

spective roles of the sense organs and the external reality, in perception, cf. ibid.,

pp. 159-67 ; Origines de la psychologic contetnporaine, p. 365 ; also NYS, Cosmologie,

226, pp. 334-7.

i 5 2 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

to be in the latter irrespectively of the determining influence of

the structure and condition of the perceiver s organism upon it,

but because in normal perception this ever-present influence of

the internal, organic factor, in partially determining what the ex

ternal reality is perceived to be, is itself constant and uniform for

all perceivers, and while tacitly understood to be always present,

is also tacitly and rightly understood to be incapable of uncon

sciously misleading or falsifying the judgments in which we at

tribute the perceived qualities and qualitative differences to the

external reality. 1

It may perhaps occur to the reader to doubt if the view we

are advocating is really a form of perceptionism or intuitionism,

to doubt whether it really admits after all a direct and immediate

awareness of external sense qualities as they are externally. It is

a form of perceptionism. As distinguished from every form of

the theory which holds the direct object of sense awareness to be

an internal, conscious (organic or psychic) " reproduction " or

" representation " or "appearance," and the external to be in

ferred (whether consciously or sub-consciously) from this "repre

sentation," the theory here advocated holds the external reality

to be directly presented to the perceiver s consciousness, and the

perceiver to be directly aware of it. It holds the internal effect

of the external factor in sense perception not to be the produc

tion of a consciously apprehended datum imaging or representing

the external in consciousness, but rather to be the production of

the conscious perception process itself by means of an unconsciously

wrought psychic modification (the "species inipressa"}: this whole

process being an "assimilation" of the perceiver to the external

factor which is the term of the process as consciously perceptive.

1 For instance, we know that sound is a something external, of which we could

not become aware unless through the organ of hearing, and colour a something ex

ternal, of which we could not become aware unless through the organ of vision:

that the perceived difference between colour and sound is partly due to a known

difference (from which, as constant, we abstract) in the specific structure and con

stitution of these two kinds of sense organ, but is also itself externally a perceived

difference in qualities of the external perceived reality ; that the difference between

a high and a low sound perceived in the same conditions of the perceiver, or between

red and blue perceived in unchanged conditions of the perceiver, is in each case a

difference in real modes or characters or qualities of the perceived external reality:

though in each of these cases, likewise, it is functions of different parts of the audi

tory and the visual sense organs respectively that subserve the conscious process of

perception, and therefore in their measure determine the qualities perceived, a de

termining factor from which we abstract in s-o far as we know it to be normal, and

therefore constant and uniform.

INTUITIVE REALISM 153

But it realizes that the unconscious psychic modification, which

determines the conscious perceptive process both quoad exercitium

and quoad specificationem, is itself wrought not by the sole influ

ence of the external factor on the perceiver s mind or conscious

principle, but by this influence as conveyed, and modified or

determined in the transmission, by the perceiver s sense organon.

Hence it holds that the external is directly perceived indeed, but

perceived nevertheless only through the instrumentality of the

internal, material organon which presents it to the perceiver s

consciousness. Moreover, it recognizes this influence of the sub

jective, organic factor : it points out that only when this influence

is normal, and therefore uniform for all perceivers, does its pres

ence cease to count in the qualitative differences which come

from the external factor but are presented through the instru

mentality of the internal factor ; and that therefore in normal

perception, and only in normal perception, can the presentation

of the qualities and qualitative differences to consciousness, or

their appearance to consciousness, be identically a part or function

of their external reality. And by recognizing these implications

of the perceptive process the present view avoids the erroneous

implication of naif or unreflecting perceptionism, that the presen

tation or appearance of the external reality to consciousness is

not only direct, but uninfluenced by any subjective factor, and

that therefore the external always really is as it appears to the

perceiver. Our position rather is that the presentation or ap

pearance of any datum to sense consciousness is indeed always

part and parcel, so to speak, of the extramental material domain

of being, and this whether the perception be normal or ab

normal ; but that the presentation or appearance to sense-con

sciousness of a datum as extra-organic, non-self, external, and as

being qualitatively such or such, is part and parcel of the external

reality only when the organic conditions of perception are normal,

and not otherwise.

I. Now the first consideration arising from this view may

appear in the nature of a difficulty. It is this. The distinction

between normal and abnormal perception makes truth and certi

tude about the qualities and nature of the external, material

universe dependent on the common assent or judgment of men.

If, for instance, that only is really and externally red which ap

pears as red to normal perceivers (and not to the colour-blind), it

follows that no individual perceiver can declare a colour to be

i 5 4 THEOR Y OF KNO IV LED GE

really and externally red merely because it appears so to him,

until he knows furthermore that it appears similarly to the

general mass of mankind, i.e. until he knows that his perception

is normal. And so of every other sense quality, primary as well

as secondary. Hence the ultimate test of the truth of the indi

vidual perceiver s spontaneous interpretations of his own percep

tions is not their " sense evidence " for him, or " what they

appear " to him, but this as checked by what they appear to the

general mass of mankind.

On reflection, however, it will be found that this conclusion

goes somewhat too far. The individual perceiver cannot know

that other men exist unless by first believing the evidence of his

senses : so that what or how things appear to them cannot

underlie or replace the evidential function of what or how things

appear to himself. What really happens is that he commences

by accepting the latter evidence ; that he gradually finds it cor

roborated by what he learns of other men s experience ; that if

any of his own senses be abnormal he soon discovers the discrep

ancy between the verdict of this sense in his own case and the

corresponding sense verdict of men generally ; or that he may

learn of the existence of exceptional individuals who have some

sense or senses to which things appear otherwise than they do to

men generally. Thus he realizes not that the reason why each

normal perceiver believes things to be really and externally such

or such is because he knows that other normal perceivers cherish

a similar belief, for he knows that to rely on this as an ulti

mate reason would be to fall into a vicious circle. Rather he

realizes the reason of each normal perceiver s belief that things

are really and externally such or such to be because things ap

pear to each individual to be really and externally such or such ;

but he sees at the same time that there is in this belief the im

plicit assumption or convention that " really and externally such

or such " means " really and externally such or such, abstracting

from the normal, uniform, subjective influence which tJie. perceiver s

organism has on the manner in vvhich the external reality appears,

or is presented, to the consciousness of the perceiver ".

When, for instance, I say " This field of poppies is really and

externally red," my reason for saying so is because it appears so

to me ; and I know the reason to be valid because I have verified

by experience the assumption underlying it, viz. that I am a

normal perceiver. And what J mean by the statement, " This

INTUITIVE REALISM 155

field of poppies is really and externally red," is that the field of

poppies has really and externally a quality which appears in the

same way to all normal perceivers ; which, however, appears in

this way to them not independently of the subjective influence of

each one s sense organon ; but which, nevertheless, abstracting

from this influence because it is normal and uniform, they rightly

regard as being really and externally what it appears to them,

and what they designate as " redness ".

What we mean by saying that any sense quality is "really

and externally such or such " is that it is really and externally

a quality which appears or reveals itself in a certain way to the

normal perceiver ; not that its appearance is uninfluenced by the

subjective, organic factor, but that this influence, when normal

and uniform, does not interfere with our judgment as to what

the quality is really and externally : all such judgments being

based on the tacit assumption or convention that such qualities

are " really and externally " what they appear to the normal per

ceiver. What is " redness " really and externally ? It is really

and externally a quality which is so named because it appears

in a certain uniform way to all normal perceivers, but which ap

pears in a different way to certain individuals whose visual organs

are abnormal, in the way namely in which "green" appears to

normal perceivers. The colour-blind individual, gazing on a

field of red poppies, sees it as green. The cause of the difference

is obviously the subjective organic factor. What, therefore, are

we to infer? That the colour-blind individual sees something

which does not exist really and externally? Or that he does

not see something which does exist really and externally? We

are to infer both, so far as colour-quality is concerned. For by

" real and external " red or green we mean the quality which ap

pears or reveals itself as such to the normal perceiver. The extra-

organic colour datum, which is the field of poppies, exists really

and externally the same, independently of all perceivers, normal

and abnormal alike ; by no one of them, however, is it perceived

independently of the influence of the perceiver s own subjective,

organic factor ; but it is understood to be " really and ex

ternally " what it appears when the organic factor is normal, i.e.

in the present case " red ". The colour-blind individual, there

fore, has a real perception of a real quality which is " really and

externally " what it appears to normal perceivers, viz. red, but

which, while appearing thus to normal perceivers, appears to

i 56 Tf/EOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

him otherwise than it does to them, i.e. otherwise than it is

"really and externally," and this because of his subjective,

organic abnormality, for which he must learn to allow, by

correcting what it registers, so as to judge in conformity with

normal perceivers.

II. From the relativity just recognized there arises this

general difficulty : If what is consciously apprehended in sense

perception is even partially dependent on the perceiving subject,

then sense perception does not reveal to us extra-subjective or

extramental reality as it is in itself. Hence the realist inter

pretation of sense perception is unwarranted, and must be

abandoned for idealism. This difficulty we now purpose to

examine explicitly.

There is no getting away from this relativity of all sense

qualities to the structure and conditions of the perceiver s sense

organs. It has to be recognized by the supporter of mediate or

representative sense perception no less than by the perceptionist.

If what we become immediately aware of be a mental appearance

or representation (from which the real and external quality be

inferred), then it becomes necessary to distinguish between normal

or "absolute," and abnormal or "relative" or "subjective"

appearances, and to hold that it is only from the former we

are entitled to infer what the perceived quality is really and

externally : thereby recognizing the implicit convention that

what the quality is " really and externally " is determined for

our knowledge by what it " appears " to the normal perceiver,

the subjective, organic contribution to this " appearance " being

left out of account because it is normal and uniform. 1

But what the student has to bear in mind is that this in

evitable relativity of external reality, as a datum of sense per

ception, to the constitution of the perceiving subject as organic,

in no way compromises the validity of external sense perception

as a conscious apprehension of external reality. We can apply

both to sense perception and to intellectual knowledge^ i.e. con

ception, judgment, interpretation, what Maher has so clearly

expressed concerning the relativity of knowledge in general. In

his Psychology ~ he distinguishes between the false sense in which

the Relativity of Knowledge is understood by idealists and the

1 C/. jKANNlfeRE, Op. Clt., pp. 417-18. 2 Pp. 157-8.

INTUITIVE REALISM 157

sense in which it can be truly said that all knowledge is relative.

After explaining the former sense 1 he continues :

Another, and what we maintain to be the true expression of the Re

lativity of Knowledge, and one which is in harmony with the theory of im

mediate or presentative perception, holds (a) that we can only know as

much as our faculties, limited in number and range, can reveal to us ;

(b) that these faculties can inform us of objects only so far, and according as

the latter manifest themselves ; (c} that accordingly (a) there may remain

always an indefinite number of qualities which we do not know, and (/3) what

is known must be set in relation to the mind, and can only be known in such

relation.

So much relativity is necessarily involved in the very nature of know

ledge, but it in no way destroys the worth of that knowledge. If knowledge

is defined to imply a relation between the mind and the known object, and if

the noumenon or thing-in-itself is defined to signify some real element of an

object which never stands in any relation to our cognitive powers, then a

knowledge of noumena or things-in-themselves is obviously an absurdity. 2

111 All systems of philosophy," he writes, "which reject the doctrine of im

mediate perception of extended reality must maintain that our knowledge is relative

to the mind in the sense that we can never know anything but our own subjective

states." This opening statement goes, perhaps, too far, at least if we are to under

stand by " extended reality " " external extended reality " ; for, as we have seen,

there are many realists who hold that although the object of our " immediate per

ception " is always a state of the self, nevertheless we can infer by the principle of

causality an external or non-self reality. " Among these [systems]," he continues,

" the most consistent thinkers . . . are the idealists proper. They logically main

tain that if we have no knowledge of anything beyond consciousness, it is un-

philosophical to suppose that anything else exists. This thoroughgoing view is

represented by Hume, and by Mill at times. The great majority of modern

philosophers, however, shrinking back from this extreme, have adopted some

intermediate position akin to that of Kant or Mr. Spencer. They maintain that

while all our knowledge is relative to our own mental states, and in no way

represents or reflects reality, yet there is de facto some sort of reality outside of our

minds. Our imaginary cognitions of space, time, and causality are universal sub

jective illusions either inherited [Spencer] or elaborated by the mind [Kant] ; con

sequently since these fictitious elements mould or blend with all our experience, we

can have no knowledge of things in themselves, of noumena, of the absolute. But

notwithstanding this, and in spite of the fact that the principle of causality has no

more real validity than a continuous hallucination, these philosophers are curiously

found to maintain the existence of a cause, and even of an external, non-mental

cause, of our sensations. . . . [But] if by noumena are understood, as Kant on the

one side, and sensationalists like Mr. Spencer on the other seem to mean, hypo

thetical external causes of our sensations, then we must, in the first place, deny the

assumption that we can only know our own conscious states, and, in the second, we

must point out the fundamental contradiction common to both schools of disputing

the objective or real validity of the principle of causality, whilst in virtue of a sur

reptitious use of this rejected principle they affirm the reality of an unknowable

noumenal cause."

3 O/>. cit., p. 158. Cf. ibid., n. 26, quotation from MARTINEAU, A Study of Re

ligion, vol. i., p. 119 : " To speak of knowing things in themselves or things

as they are, is to talk of not simply an impossibility, but a contradiction ; for these

i 58 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

It is obvious, of course, that there may l>e in the real world

multitudes of qualities of which we can know nothing, through

lack of appropriate perceptive faculties ; and it is even possible

that some of the lower animals may have organic perceptive

powers which make them aware of some such qualities, just as

we know that in some of those animals the perceptive powers

they have in common with us far exceed ours in range and

intensity (44). The more important point, however, is that

those qualities which we do know we know only in so far as

these "manifest themselves to us" and are "set in relation to

the mind " ; and that they " can only be known in such relation "- 1

Applying this to sense perception it means that all the data

which make up the whole domain of sense experience, and all

the sensible qualities and characteristics of these data, can be

consciously perceived, can become objects of sense awareness,

only in so far as they are " set in relation," or " appear," or

"manifest," or "reveal" themselves, to the perceiver. But we

have seen that they depend partially, for what they appear, on

the subjective, organic factor of the perceiver : that they appear

as they do to the perceiver partly because the perceiver himself

is organically constituted as he is. When, therefore, he judges

that they really are as they appear to the normal perceiver, he is

not at all denying that in the process of "appearing" or "being

presented" to consciousness in sense perception the sense realities

(whether organic or extra-organic) are partially specified, modi

fied, we may even say transformed or metamorphosed, to use

the very language affected by the more moderate school of

phrases are invented to denote what is in the sphere of being and not in the sphere

of thought ; and to suppose them known is ipso facto to take away this character.

The relativity of cognition (i.e. in the sense defined) imposes on us no forfeiture of

privilege, no humiliation of pride; there is not any conceivable form of apprehen

sion from which it excludes us."

1 Even such material things and qualities as are known without their having

been ever perceived by any human being (and all who admit the existence of an

external material universe at all will admit that we can have reasoned certitude

about the existence of portions of it which have never been perceived) are known

only by being related to the mind through other things or qualities directly per

ceived. " What is given in one or more relations may necessarily implicate other

relations, and these may subsist not merely between the mind and other objects, but

between the several objects themselves. Still, mediate cognitions of this kind are

knowledge only in so far as they are rationally connected with what is immediately

given. Our knowledge of the mutual dynamical influence of two invisible planets,

which faithfully reflects their reciprocal relations, is but an elaborate evolution of

what is apprehended by sense and intellect in experiences where subject and object

stand in immediate relations." Ibid., n. 25, italics ours.

INTUITIVE REALISM 159

idealists, by the subjective, organic factor. He merely holds

that such subjective influence, and such relativity of sense realities

to the perceiver s own organic constitution, being inseparable

from the very nature of the perceptive process, are tacitly under

stood to be always there, but are likewise understood when

normal not to affect the truth of the judgment whereby he

interprets those sense realities to be "really" (and "externally"

in the case of " externally appearing " data) as they appear to

the normal perceiver. Furthermore, when he asserts that in sense

perception he is directly aware, not of a "conscious state" or

" psychic appearance " or " mental representation," but of an

extramental reality, his interpretation is one which no idealist ]

can disprove until the idealist assumption that nothing extra-

mental can be in direct cognitive relation to mind, that the mind

can know only its own states, is vindicated. And finally, when

he asserts that in external sense perception he is directly aware

neither of a mental appearance nor of an organic condition, but

of an extra-organic, external, and sometimes spatially distant

reality, and that he is aware of this reality as it is really and

externally, 2 his interpretation cannot be shaken until it be

proved that a material reality, spatially distant from a perceiver,

cannot become the direct term of the latter s awareness by

awakening his conscious perceptive activity through its operative

influence on his bodily sense organs.