THINGS "ARE" AND WHAT THEY "APPEAR".

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Not only in the

preceding section, but time and again from the very commence

ment of our investigation, we have encountered the distinction

between what things are and what they appear. The distinction,

understood in a wide sense, runs through every domain of out

cognitive experience, marking off in a general way the "real "

from the "apparent," the "genuine" from the "seeming" or

" deceptive," the " true " from the " false ". Thus, we are warned

that "appearances are deceptive," and "not to judge by appear

ances ".* Whatever be the implications of the distinction, and

its bearing on the possibility of our knowing what things really

are, it is obvious that the distinction has its origin in the domain

of sense perception, and that it must be closely connected especi

ally with our manner of apprehending space. It is perfectly

familiar even to the " plain man," and fairly perplexing even

to the advanced student of epistemology. It issues in puzzling

problems. For example, if on the one hand we hold that what

appears, or is presented, to consciousness in sense perception is

the real, that (external) sense perception puts us into direct

and immediate cognitive contact with (external) reality ; and

if also what intellect conceives in the abstract is this same

concretely presented reality, i.e. if the thought-objects by which

it represents and interprets the given sense concrete are also

real, how can error or deception be possible, or how can things

ever " appear," or " be judged to be," otherwise than they really

are? 2 If, on the other hand, it be held that sense perception does

1 "The common advice, Do not judge by appearances, would be unmeaning

if it were interpreted literally; for, after all, what have we to judge by except ap

pearances? " Science of Logic, i., 66, p. 128.

a We shall deal later ex professo with this aspect of the matter. Cf. supra,

112.

167

1 68 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

not make us directly aware of, or put us into immediate

cognitive relation with, extramental reality, but directly reveals

to us only mental states provisionally assumed to be " repro

ductions " or " representations " or " appearances " of extramental

reality ; and if also (as before) intellect gets all its interpreting

concepts or thought-objects from tliese mental states, i.e. if the

objects of thought are identically the concrete " intramental "

objects of sense, only apprehended now in the abstract, how can

truth or genuine knowledge be possible, i.e. how can it transcend

what things appear mentally, and attain to what they really are

extramentally ?

It will be worth while, therefore, to examine the distinc

tion, with a view to seeing whether or how it is possible, from

normal sense perception of how things appear spatially, to attain

not only to a knowledge that things are really spatial, but also

to a knowledge as to what sort their real spatial attributes and

relations are. The inquiry will naturally lead up to an ex

position and criticism of Kant s theory on space, time, and

sense qualities generally.

When the plain man distinguishes between " appearance "

and "reality," between what a thing "appears to be" and what

it " really is," he is certainly thinking not of two distinct " things,"

one a " mental " thing (an " appearance ") and the other an

"extramental" thing (a "reality"), but of one and the same

(extramental) thing under two aspects, viz. of this thing as (he

thinks that) it now appears, and of this same thing as (he thinks

that) he otherwise knows it to be. Yet philosophers, reflecting

on the distinction, have come to think of two distinct things,

viz. the extramental thing (the " thing-in-itself " the " nou-

menon ") and a " mental " thing which they call an " appearance"

or " phenomenon " ; and some philosophers have concluded that

we can never get beyond knowledge of the latter, while others

have contended that though we can know directly only the latter

we can derive from this direct knowledge an inferential know

ledge of the former. Since the distinction between what things

really are and what they appear "first arises in our ordinary

or scientific consciousness (i.e. the consciousness for which the

problems are those of science as opposed to philosophy)," 1 we

must inquire whether the distinction as revealed there justifies

1 PRICHARD, o/. cit., p. 79.

IDEALISM ON "APPEARANCE" AND "REALITY" 169

such philosophical conclusions. Let us see how Prichard deals

with it in his criticism of Kant.

" In this consciousness [he writes] we are compelled to distinguish be

tween appearance and reality with respect to the details of a reality which,

as a whole, or in principle, we suppose ourselves to know. Afterwards in

our philosophical consciousness we come to reflect on this distinction and to

raise the question whether it is not applicable to reality as a whole. We

ask with respect to knowledge in general, and not merely with respect to

particular items of knowledge, whether we know or can know reality, and

not merely appearance. . . . Consequently, in order to decide whether the

distinction will bear the superstructure placed upon it by the philosophical

consciousness, it is necessary to examine the distinction as it exists in our

ordinary consciousness.

" The distinction is applied in our ordinary consciousness both to the

primary and to the secondary qualities of matter. . . . We say, for instance,

that the moon looks * or appears as large as the sun, though really it is much

smaller. We say that railway lines, though parallel, look convergent, just

as we say that the straight stick in water looks bent. We say that at

sunset the sun, though really below the horizon, looks above it. Again we

say that to a person who is colour blind the colour of an object looks different

to what it really is, and that water into which we put our hand may be warmer

than it appears to our touch.

" The case of the primary qualities may be considered first. . . . [And]

it will be sufficient to analyse the simplest, that of the apparent convergence

of the railway lines.

" Two points force themselves upon our notice. In the first place we

certainly suppose that we perceive the reality which we wish to know, i.e.

the reality which, as we suppose, exists independently of our perception, and

not an appearance of it. It is, as we say, the real lines which we see.

Even the term convergent, in the assertion that the lines look convergent,

conveys this implication. . . . We can say neither that an appearance is

convergent nor that the appearance of the lines is convergent. Only a reality

similar to the lines, e.g. two roads, can be said to be convergent. Our

ordinary thought, therefore, furnishes no ground for the view that the object

of perception is not the thing but merely an appearance of or produced by it.

In the second place the assertion that the lines look convergent implies

considerable knowledge of the real nature of the reality to which the assertion

relates. Both the terms lines and convergent imply that the reality is

spatial. Further if the context is such that we mean that, while the lines look

convergent, we do not know their real relation, we imply that the lines really

possess some characteristic which falls within the genus to which convergence

belongs, i.e. we imply that they are convergent or divergent or parallel. If

on the other hand, the context is such that we mean that the lines only look

convergent, we imply that the lines are parallel, and therefore presuppose

111 Looks" means "appears to sight," and ."looks" is throughout used

as synonymous with "appear," where the instance under discussion relates to

visual perception.

1 70 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

complete knowledge in respect of the very characteristic in regard to which

we state what is only appearance. The assertion, then, in respect of a primary

quality, that a thing looks so and so implies knowledge of its general character

as spatial, and ignorance only of a detail ; and the assertion that a thing

only looks or appears so and so implies knowledge of the detail in question." J

He then draws attention to the general difficulty arising from

our use of the terms " looks " and " appears " :

"If the lines are not convergent, how is it possible even to say that they

look convergent ? Must it not be implied that at least under certain circum

stances we should perceive the lines as they are ? Otherwise why should we

use the words look or appear at all ? Moreover this implication can be

pushed further ; for if we maintain that we perceive the real lines, we may

reasonably be asked whether we must not under all circumstances perceive

them as they are. It seems as though a reality cannot be perceived except as

it is.""

Such is the difficulty which has given rise to the philosophical

view that " the object of perception is not the reality but an

appearance ". How has the view arisen from it ? In this way :

" Since we do distinguish between what things look and what they are,

it would seem that the object of perception cannot be the thing, but only an

appearance produced by it. Moreover the doctrine gains in plausibility from

the existence of certain illusions in the case of which the reality to which the

illusion relates seems non-existent. For instance, if we look steadily at the

flame of a candle, and then press one eye-ball with the finger, we see, as we

say, two candles ; but since ex hypothesi there is only one candle, it seems

that what we see must be, not the candle, but two images or appearances

produced by it." :!

Nevertheless such facts furnish no real ground for the phil

osophical view that " the object of perception is not a reality, but

an appearance," and the distinction between " what a thing looks "

and "what it is " can be explained without recourse to such a

supposition. The distinction does imply that "at least under

certain circumstances " we perceive things " as they are " ; but it

does not imply that therefore " under all circumstances " we

should " perceive them as they are ". For, in so far as we know

what external 4 things are really and externally, we know this

1 PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 80-2 (italics in first paragraph ours).

2 Ibid., p. 82. "Ibid., pp. 82-3.

4 Even in abnormal sense perception it is a real function of extramental reality

(including the perceiver^s organism) to appear as it actually does. In the case of

sense illusions and hallucinations it is the intellect that is at fault in judging the

perceived reality to be exclusively external when it is either partly organic (as in

illusions) or wholly organic (as in hallucinations). In both cases a product of

IDEALISM ON APPEARANCE " AND REALITY" \ 7 1

from what they appear in certain, i.e. normal circumstances : our

intellectual knowledge of " what they are really and externally "

is an accumulation of judgments or interpretations of " what

they appear " to our various senses in normal conditions > their

necessary relativity to the subjective organic factor being always

understood in these judgments. 1 Hence it does not follow that

" what a thing appears " in any individual act or process of per

ception must be always a part or function of what the thing is

really and externally, i.e. of what it is known to appear in normal

perception ; for the individual act in question may be abnormal,

and if it is, what the " external " thing appears in it will be

partly due to the abnormal organic factor, and therefore will not

reveal " what the thing is really and externally ".

The distinction in question certainly supposes that in some

cases at least we perceive things as they are ; for in regard to

external things part of what we mean by " what they are really

and externally" is "what we know them to appear in normal

sense perception ". Let us pursue Prichard s analysis. He

continues : 2

The distinction between the actual and the apparent angle made by two

straight lines presupposes a limiting case in which they coincide. If the line

of sight along which we observe the point of intersection of two lines is known

to be at right angles to both lines, we expect, and rightly expect, to see the

angle of intersection as it is. Again if we look at a short portion of two rail

way lines from a point known to be directly above them, and so distant that

the effects of perspective are imperceptible, we can say that the lines look what

they are, viz. parallel. Thus from the point of view of the difficulty which

has been raised, there is this justification in general for saying that two lines

look parallel or look at right angles, that we know that in certain cases what

they look is identical with what they are. In the same way assertions that

the moon looks as large as the sun receive justification from our knowledge

that two bodies of equal size and equally distant from the observer are what

they look, vis. of the same size. And in both cases the justification pre

supposes knowledge of the reality of space and also such insight into its

nature as enables us to see that in certain cases there must be an identity

between what things look and what they are in respect of certain spatial

relations. Again, in such cases we see that so far is it from being necessary

to think that a thing must be perceived as it is, that it is not only possible but

necessary to distinguish what a thing looks from what it is, and precisely in con

sequence of the nature of space. The visual perception of spatial relations from

its very nature presupposes a particular point of view . . . and is therefore

imagination (a genuine " mental image") is confused in consciousness with the per

ceived object, or mistaken for a perceived object.

1 Cf. supra, 120-2. 2 Op. cit., pp. 83-5.

1 72 THEOR V OF KNO PLEDGE

subject to conditions of perspective. This is best realized by considering the

supposition that perfect visual powers would enable us to see the whole of a

body at once, and that this perception would be possible if we had eyes

situated all round the body. The supposition obviously breaks down through

the impossibility of combining two or more points of view in one perception.

But if visual perception is necessarily subject to conditions of perspective, the

spatial relations of bodies can never look what they are except in the limiting

case referred to. Moreover, this distinction is perfectly intelligible, as we

should expect from the necessity we are under of drawing it. We understand

perfectly why it is that bodies must, in respect of their spatial relations, look

[i.e. to sight] different to what they are. ... It is, therefore, needless to make

the assertion " Two lines appear convergent " intelligible by converting the

verb " appears " into a substantive, ? /r. an " appearance," and then making

the assertion relate to an " appearance ". For . . . the assertion ... is

perfectly intelligible in itself though not capable of being stated in terms of

anything else. 1 If we generalize this result [he concludes], we may say that

the distinction between appearance and reality, drawn with regard to the

primary qualities of bodies, throughout presupposes the reality of space, 2 and

is made possible, and indeed necessary, by the nature of space itself.

The distinction, therefore, between what the primary qualities

or spatial relations of things "look" or "appear" to sight, and

what these qualities or relations are "really and externally," is

1 " It is important," the author adds (ibid., p. 85 n.), " to notice that the proper

formula to express what is loosely called an appearance is A looks or appears

B, and that this cannot be analysed into anything more simple and, in particular, into

a statement about appearances . Even in the case of looking at the candle, there

is no need to speak of two appearances or images . Before we discover the

truth the proper assertion is The body which we perceive looks as if it were two

candles, and, after we discover the truth, the proper assertion is The candle looks

as if it were in two places ."

The inclination to speak, in such cases, of perceiving " two images " (and to

draw the erroneous conclusion that what we always perceive is merely a mental

" image " or " appearance," and never the " external reality ") is due to the fact that

we have, and are constantly exercising, the faculty (imagination) of reproducing

" mental images" of perceived objects in the absence of these latter. The case in

point is a simple and admirable instance of an " optical illusion ". We " know "

that " what appears" is external to us because we interpret the concrete " felt ex

ternality" to be real, and arc conscious that the actual conditions, abnormal though

they are, are not so abnormal as to vitiate this interpretation. But " what it ap

pears " (" two candles ") is not " what it is really and externally " (" one candle ").

If we " know " this is the case, how do we know it ? Because we know (r) that " what

it is really and externally " means (i.e. means partially, inadequately : the part of its

reality known through interpretation of what it reveals to us through the sense of

vision means) what it is known by us to appear in normal conditions of visual per

ception ; and (2) that the conditions of our actual perception are not normal, and

therefore do not reveal " what the thing is really and externally ".

2 Rather " presupposes that we know spatial relations to characterize, and apper

tain to, the extramentally external thing or reality which appears". But how we

know or can know this, the author seems to us to leave unexplained. Cf. supra.

125 ; infra, pp. 173-5.

IDEALISM ON "APPEARANCE" AND "REALITY" 173

quite intelligible without recourse to the assumption that what

we see are only mental appearances. It presupposes (i) that we

know what things are really and externally in respect of these

qualities ; and (2) that we know the nature of space and the

conditions of visual perception to be such that only in certain

cases is " what the thing appears to sight " (as regards spatial

relations) identical with what we otherwise know these spatial

relations to be " really and externally ". But of course we know

intellectually what space is and what spatial relations are " really

and externally," only from the way in which things appear

spatially to our senses especially to sight and touch (active

and passive touch, including the muscular sense of motion and

resistance to muscular effort) in normal sense perception. Re

flection shows us that in the end it is really meaningless to

contend that things never reveal to us their primary qualities or

spatial relations as these are " really and externally " ; for by

what these qualities and relations are "really and externally"

we mean what they appear to us in normal sense perception, i.e.

what we judge them to be by interpreting them as thus appear

ing, through the aid of concepts derived from what they reveal

to our consciousness in sense perception. 1

Hence we are forced to disagree with Prichard when, after pronounc

ing all the secondary qualifies to be merely conscious states or " sensa

tions " (and to be by implication incapable of giving us any knowledge about

extramental reality) he goes on to contend that our sense apprehension even

of the primary qualities or spatial relations never reveals these as they are

really and externally " (and by implication that our intellectual knowledge of

what real extension, externality, space, and spatial relations are, is altogether

independent of what they appear in sense perception). On the contrary, we

do perceive (i) not only the primary qualities, but (2) the secondary qualities,

as they are really and externally ; and moreover (3) if this were not so we

could never prove against any form of idealism that the intellectual know

ledge we have of a world of data characterized by such qualities is knowledge

of a really extramental, external, spatial universe, and not merely a knowledge

of subjective mental phenomena or conscious states (125).

1 It must not be forgotten that we accumulate our knowledge of what things

are "really and externally" by using concepts derived from all the data of the

various senses. Therefore what an external thing presents in any individual act of

perception is usually only a small part of what we already know the total external

reality of the thing to be. And this knowledge is always helping us to check, and

adjust, and if necessary correct, " what the thing appears " in any individual per

ceptive act whose object we are interpreting : it is constantly guarding us from

erroneous and hasty spontaneous interpretations. Cf. supra, 127, pp. 162, n. i ;

166, n.

- Cf. supra, 125, pp. 144 sqq.

1 74 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

(i) Prichard s own analysis of the convergence of the railway lines

proves that " in limiting cases " we visually apprehend spatial relations as

these are " really and externally ". But what they are " really and externally,"

in respect of spatial relations, we can know only by intellectual interpretation

of what they appear in normal perception to all the senses which reveal " ex-

tensity," " externality," " voluminousness," especially to the senses of sight

and touch. Prichard, however, holding that our intellectual knowledge of what

things are spatially is independent of perception and always represents them

otherwise than as they look in perception, goes on to contend that even in the

limiting cases referred to " what a thing looks and what it is " are after all not

" identical "- 1 The reason he gives is plausible but not convincing : it is

that all such limiting cases refer only to two dimensions of space, " e.g. con

vergence and bentness,"- whereas real spatial relations are always thrce-

dimensional, so that what a thing appears spatially to sight can never be

identical with what it really is spatially. Now, even if we grant that sight

alone can apprehend only two-dimensional extension," it would follow merely

that what a spatial thing appears to sight is not the whole of what it really

is spatially ; but surely it would not follow that what the thing appears spatially

to sight cannot be a real part or ftmction of its total spatial reality. " It is

obvious," says Prichard, 4 " that two dimensions are only an abstraction from

three, and that the spatial relations of bodies, considered fully, involve three

dimensions." Of course ; but because the two dimensions are only abstrac

tions, are they on that account not real ? Are the two dimensions, perceived

by sight in the spatial things, not really in the latter ? They certainly are.

" A body may be cylindrical, and we may see a cylindrical body ; but such

a body can never, strictly speaking, look cylindrical." 5 It can never look

cylindrical to sight alone, because of the conditions of perspective ; but it can

look what our knowledge of the real spatial shape of a cylindrical body tells

us that it ought to look in such conditions. And how do we know the real

spatial shape of a cylindrical body, or that any body is really and externally

cylindrical, unless by interpreting what it appears to sight and touch in

normal conditions ? From the fact that real spatial relations are three-

dimensional Prichard infers " that terms which fully state spatial character

istics can never express what things look, but only what they are ". B The

inference is quite too sweeping. Such terms can never express what things

look to sight in any individual perception, or what they appear to touch in

any individual tactile or muscular or motor perception ; but such terms can

and do express (our intellectual interpretation of) what things appear to us in

all our various normal visual, tactile and other " extension-revealing " per

ceptions : for this is precisely what such terms do express to us about things

by expressing " what they are ". How otherwise could we know what things

are " really and externally " in respect of spatial relations ? It is by "judging

from what it looks under various conditions," 7 and in no other possible way,

that we know intellectually whatever we do know about the spatial qualities

1 Op. cit., p. 90. - Ibid.

* Binocular vision would appear to give us at least a rudimentary visual con

sciousness of objects in relief, i.e. of the third dimension of space. Possibly,

however, such consciousness is not independent of muscular sense data.

*Ibid. 5 P. 91. *Ibid. 7 P. 99. Cf. supra, 125, p. 149.

IDEALISM ON "APPEARANCE" AND "REALITY" 175

and relations which a body has really and externally. And these spatial

qualities which we judge to be in the body " really and externally " we judge

to be there not only " independently of all perception," l but independently of

all conception, thought, judgment, as well. But to say that they are there in

dependently of perception and thought is very different from saying that we

can reach knowledge of them by thought independently of perception ; for

their reality cannot be known unless by coming into relation with sense, and

through sense with intellect : and that they can be known to be there really

and externally and independently of perception and thought, means simply

that by rejection on our cognitive processes we can see that their relation to

sense and intellect does not transform their presentation to sense or falsify

their representation by intellect.

(2) The secondary qualities likewise are perceived in normal conditions

of perception " as they are really and externally ". The distinction can like

wise be drawn between what they "appear " in any individual act of percep

tion, and what they are known to be "really and externally," i.e. what they

are known to be by "judging from what " they look "under various [normal]

conditions ". 2 Of course the distinction between what things look or appear

and what they are is of most frequent occurrence in reference to spatial

qualities as apprehended by sight. But it is also drawn in reference to

colour. Arguing against the externality of colour, Prichard refers to the

difficulty of determining " the right colour of individual bodies " as "insuper

able " ; and he concludes that they have no colour, that " colour is not a

quality of bodies ". 3 But even if colours were mere " mental facts " or " sensa

tions " we should have to recognize the distinction between " right " and

" wrong " colour-sensations ; and if the cause of the distinction be not extra-

mental* (whether organic or extra-organic), the distinction is inexplicable.

Colour is, however, a real quality of external bodies. What a colour appears

in any individual act of perception depends partly on organic conditions :

hence the phenomenon of colour blindness. But even in normal organic con

ditions there is the further consideration that the same body seen from differ

ent standpoints " presents " different colours. This, however, only proves that

it has these colours simultaneously, that it reflects different " light vibrations "

in different directions.

So, too, in regard to the other secondary qualities. It is possible to draw

a distinction between " what they appear" in any individual act of sense per

ception and " what they are really and externally " ; this latter meaning

what they are known to appear in normal conditions of perception. 5 It may

indeed be " difficult and, in the end, impossible to say that a bell appears

noisy " ; 6 but we can and do rightly say, " the pitch of the whistle from the

approaching train appears to grow higher, but I know it really remains the

same," 7 or again, " I seem to hear a humming noise around me, but I know

1 Op. cit., p. 99. Cf. supra, 125, p. 149.

2 P- 99- 3 P. 87. i Cf. supra, 125.

5 Relativity to normal organic factors being tacitly understood not to falsify the

interpretation of what they are extra-organically or "externally". Cf. supra,

122.

6 Op. cit., p. 86.

7 Cf. " The railway lines only appear convergent, but I know they are really

parallel ".

1 76 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

there is really no noise but only an organic affection of the ear ". Similarly,

it is not impossible to say that " sugar appears sweet V No doubt, the

usual expression is " sugar tastes sweet " ; which is another way of saying

that "sugar appears sweet to normal perceivers," which again, intellectually

interpreted, means " sugar is sweet ". But a person whose sense of taste

is, from whatsoever cause, abnormal, can and does rightly say, " this sugar

only tastes or appears bitter to me, but I know it is really not bitter but

sweet ". Similar instances may be discovered in sensations of temperature,

touch, and smell. And the implication of the distinction is the same through

out : in no case does it imply that what we perceive is only a " mental state,"

whether we call this a " sensation " or an " appearance " ; but in all cases it

implies (a) that what appears in any and every act of sense perception " is

extramental reality ; (b) that what this extramental reality appears in the

individual perception is partly dependent on subjective, organic factors, and

on extra-organic or external conditions ; (c) that what it appears will differ

from what it is if those factors are abnormal ; inasmuch as (d) by what it is

(in so far as we know what it is) we mean the knowledge we have of it by

interpreting what it appears in normal conditions of perception.

(3) Finally this latter knowledge is as far as it goes knowledge of an

extramental universe as it is extramentally, because cognitive relation of the

latter to the mind, whether in perception or in conception, does not transform

or alter it by the projection into it of any subjective mental factors. Further

more it is knowledge of an external, spatial (and otherwise physically "quali

tative ") universe as it is externally, because its cognitive relation to the

perceiving subject as organic can be known by intellect reflecting on the pro

cess of perception ; can be discovered to be normal or abnormal as the case

may be ; is understood, when known to be normal and uniform, to be included

in what we mean by real externality, and, when known to be abnormal, can

safeguard us from the error of judging that "what the thing appears " in such

circumstances is " what it is really and externally ".

On the other hand, if we held the secondary sense qualities to be " mental

states," and the primary qualities or "spatial determinations" never to be

really and extramentally what they appear, or as they are perceived, then,

since we have no other way of knowing intellectually what spatial qualities

and things are really and extramentally than by judging from what they

appear, it would inevitably follow that our supposed knowledge of what they

are really and extramentally is an illusion.

The assumption that we can have intellectual knowledge of an extra-

mental, real, spatial universe, independently of all that appears to consciousness

in sense perception, is gratuitous and erroneous. If there is such a universe,

intellectual knowledge of it is conditioned by its being cognitively related to

intellect ; and it cannot be cognitively related to intellect unless through its

cognitive relation to sense. If, then, it always appears to sense otherwise

than it is, so consequently must it appear to intellect otherwise than it is : in

J O/. cit., p. 86.

2 Including sense " illusions," i.e. misinterpreted perceptions of external things

really presented to the perceiver ; but not including hallucinations which, being

imagination processes, do not " present " any external object, though they have an

extramental, organic, ical cause.

IDEALISM ON "APPEARANCE" AND "REALITY" 177

which case all our knowledge would be illusory if understood to refer to what

reality is extramentally ; but if understood to refer to "how it appears " it

would still be possible to distinguish between " what it appears " normally and

" what it appears " in abnormal, special conditions, and to designate the

former "true knowledge," and the latter "false or illusory knowledge," of

"how reality appears". This is Kant s position. It cannot be met by argu

ing that, in the distinction between what things appear (e.g. in respect of

spatial relations) and what they are, (a) we know " what they are " irre

spectively of what they appear, or that (<5) by " what they are " we mean

" what they are but never appear " ; for neither of these contentions can be

sustained. We refute his position rather by recognizing that the distinction

between " what things appear " (in regard to spatial and other sense

qualities) and " what they are " is a distinction between what they may

appear in an individual, abnormal case, and what they are known to appear

normally ; by admitting also the possibility of confining the distinction be

tween abnormal (" Schein ") and normal (" Erscheimtng"} to " what things

appear" ; but by showing that there is no ground whatsoever for supposing

either that "what things appear" in normal perception is anything other or

otherwise than " what they are really and extramentally and externally," or

for supposing that " what they appear to intellect" i.e. what they are in

terpreted or represented to be by intellect, is a metamorphosis or transfigura

tion of what they really are, a transformation gratuitously supposed to be

effected by subjective, mental factors contributed in the process whereby

they are cognitively related to the intellect.