" EGO," COMPARED WITH REALITY OF THEIR OBJECTS.

We

have already adverted more than once to the fact that philo

sophers generally appear to have experienced much more

serious difficulty in explaining how the conscious self or subject

can come to know any extra-subjective or mind-independent

reality, than in explaining how the subject can apprehend its

own reality as self or Ego.^ The possibility of knowing a real,

external, material, extended universe, distinct from the perceiving

mind, has now to be examined by investigating the significance

and validity of external sense perception.

We can, perhaps, best approach this subject by indicating

here one reason of the idealist tendency to regard the only direct

object of our knowledge as being something essentially mental,

a reason bearing on the nature of the objects of reflex or

psychological introspection. These objects are our direct, con

scious, cognitive acts. Now these acts are themselves realities :

they constitute a domain of reality which we discover by turning

our attention inwards from their objects to themselves. When

we thus make them objects of our reflex consideration we tend

to assimilate them to their own objects, i.e. to regard them as

realities (or objects of cognition) merely, and to forget that they

are realities of an altogether special kind, quite sui generis, inas

much as they are realities which, unlike other realities, are not

merely objects of cognition but are themselves cognitions of objects.

If, therefore, we think of our direct knowledge (or cognitive acts)

merely as a reality, of the mental order of course, but yet as

something which merely is, rather than as something which not

merely is, but knows, or has itself an object, we are tacitly ac

cepting the implication that in this direct knowledge

1 Vol. i., 17, 19, 35, 75. Cf. PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 124-6.

19 2*

20 THEQR I OF KNO IV LEDGE

"the world is not, at any rate directly, object of mind, for ex hypothesi a

reality which merely is and is not the knowledge of anything has no object.

Hence it comes to be thought that the only object or, at least the only direct

object of the mind is this mental reality itself, which is the object of reflection ;

in other words, that the only immediate object of the mind comes to be

thought of as its own idea. The root of the mistake lies in the initial sup

positionwhich, it may be noted, seems to underlie the whole treatment of

knowledge by empirical psychology that knowledge can be treated as a

reality to be apprehended, in the way in which any reality which is not know

ledge is a reality to be apprehended." 1

Now, if the only direct object of the individual mind be as

sumed to be the mind itself as revealed in its own conscious

states, and if some of these conscious states be regarded as

" ideas" or "representations" or "appearances" of an external,

material universe supposed to have a real being or existence be

yond consciousness and independently of the Ego, a universe

which men spontaneously believe themselves to be directly aware

of through their conscious acts of external sense perception, the

problem at once arises : Can we know with reasoned certitude

that any such mind-independent reality exists, any reality whose

real existence or esse reale is really distinct from the conscious

states, or "ideas," "appearances," "representations," etc., of

which alone we are assumed to be directly aware, and whose

reality or esse reale is supposed to consist in their esse ideale, in

their being objects of awareness, in their "being actually per

ceived," in their " percipt" J And if such reasoned certitude of

a mind-independent, external, material reality be possible, how

do we attain to it? This brings out the distinction between the

real being, which things are supposed to have in themselves in

dependently of our knowledge or awareness of them, or "things-

as-they-are-in-themselves," or things-in-themselves," on the one

hand, and " consciously apprehended being," or " the being things

have in and for cognition," or consciously apprehended "appear

ances " or " phenomena," on the other hand. The distinction,

which will recur repeatedly, will be found to have originated for

each of us, and to be familiar to each of us, from the ordinarily

experienced facts of external sense perception ; and in due course

we shall examine its significance.- It seems to suggest that

while the reality of directly apprehended facts of consciousness

is beyond all possible dispute, being identical with the conscious

1 PKICHARD, op. cit., p. 126. Cf. infra, chap. xx.

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY. EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 21

apprehension of them, the reality of anything beyond these is

problematical. 1

We

have already adverted more than once to the fact that philo

sophers generally appear to have experienced much more

serious difficulty in explaining how the conscious self or subject

can come to know any extra-subjective or mind-independent

reality, than in explaining how the subject can apprehend its

own reality as self or Ego.^ The possibility of knowing a real,

external, material, extended universe, distinct from the perceiving

mind, has now to be examined by investigating the significance

and validity of external sense perception.

We can, perhaps, best approach this subject by indicating

here one reason of the idealist tendency to regard the only direct

object of our knowledge as being something essentially mental,

a reason bearing on the nature of the objects of reflex or

psychological introspection. These objects are our direct, con

scious, cognitive acts. Now these acts are themselves realities :

they constitute a domain of reality which we discover by turning

our attention inwards from their objects to themselves. When

we thus make them objects of our reflex consideration we tend

to assimilate them to their own objects, i.e. to regard them as

realities (or objects of cognition) merely, and to forget that they

are realities of an altogether special kind, quite sui generis, inas

much as they are realities which, unlike other realities, are not

merely objects of cognition but are themselves cognitions of objects.

If, therefore, we think of our direct knowledge (or cognitive acts)

merely as a reality, of the mental order of course, but yet as

something which merely is, rather than as something which not

merely is, but knows, or has itself an object, we are tacitly ac

cepting the implication that in this direct knowledge

1 Vol. i., 17, 19, 35, 75. Cf. PRICHARD, op. cit., pp. 124-6.

19 2*

20 THEQR I OF KNO IV LEDGE

"the world is not, at any rate directly, object of mind, for ex hypothesi a

reality which merely is and is not the knowledge of anything has no object.

Hence it comes to be thought that the only object or, at least the only direct

object of the mind is this mental reality itself, which is the object of reflection ;

in other words, that the only immediate object of the mind comes to be

thought of as its own idea. The root of the mistake lies in the initial sup

positionwhich, it may be noted, seems to underlie the whole treatment of

knowledge by empirical psychology that knowledge can be treated as a

reality to be apprehended, in the way in which any reality which is not know

ledge is a reality to be apprehended." 1

Now, if the only direct object of the individual mind be as

sumed to be the mind itself as revealed in its own conscious

states, and if some of these conscious states be regarded as

" ideas" or "representations" or "appearances" of an external,

material universe supposed to have a real being or existence be

yond consciousness and independently of the Ego, a universe

which men spontaneously believe themselves to be directly aware

of through their conscious acts of external sense perception, the

problem at once arises : Can we know with reasoned certitude

that any such mind-independent reality exists, any reality whose

real existence or esse reale is really distinct from the conscious

states, or "ideas," "appearances," "representations," etc., of

which alone we are assumed to be directly aware, and whose

reality or esse reale is supposed to consist in their esse ideale, in

their being objects of awareness, in their "being actually per

ceived," in their " percipt" J And if such reasoned certitude of

a mind-independent, external, material reality be possible, how

do we attain to it? This brings out the distinction between the

real being, which things are supposed to have in themselves in

dependently of our knowledge or awareness of them, or "things-

as-they-are-in-themselves," or things-in-themselves," on the one

hand, and " consciously apprehended being," or " the being things

have in and for cognition," or consciously apprehended "appear

ances " or " phenomena," on the other hand. The distinction,

which will recur repeatedly, will be found to have originated for

each of us, and to be familiar to each of us, from the ordinarily

experienced facts of external sense perception ; and in due course

we shall examine its significance.- It seems to suggest that

while the reality of directly apprehended facts of consciousness

is beyond all possible dispute, being identical with the conscious

1 PKICHARD, op. cit., p. 126. Cf. infra, chap. xx.

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY. EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 21

apprehension of them, the reality of anything beyond these is

problematical. 1