MATERIAL UNIVERSE.

 We have already shown that reflection

on the facts of consciousness and memory (97-9) justifies our

spontaneous conviction that the Ego is a real substance which

persists self-identically in existence throughout its intermittent

conscious states, and is not the mere series or stream or current

of these states. Will rational reflection also justify our spon

taneous conviction that of these data the whole domain marked

by the features of "extensity" and " externality," and therefore

designated as " material," is likewise a domain of substantive

realities which persist in their existence independently of their

intermittent presence in consciousness, or of our actual inter

mittent perceptions of them? that the "external" "extended,"

or " material " data are really distinct from the percipient subject

or Ego? and that the "extended" but " internal" material

datum which we call " our body " and which we include in the

total, composite reality of the self or Ego, also persists in ex

istence independently of our intermittent mental awareness of

it? The answer is that rational reflection will justify these

spontaneous convictions and transform them into reasoned or

philosophical certitudes.

If we can justify our conviction that an extended, external

domain of material reality exists independently of, and really

other than, the Ego and its perceptive processes, we shall have

no difficulty in recognizing as also rationally justified the con

viction that the extended, internal material datum which we call

" our body," and which we regard as united with the conscious,

mental principle of our being to form the composite individual

self, also persists in existence independently of its intermittent

presence in consciousness (116).

How, then, are we to vindicate a reasoned, philosophic

certitude for the former spontaneous judgment?

In the first place by a deliberate intellectual scrutiny of the

character of those concrete conscious data which we have called

"common" and "proper" sensibles. It is an absolutely un

deniable and universally admitted fact of introspection that some

at least of those data appear or present themselves to conscious-

so that even the perceptionist s fully reasoned conviction or certitude, that the

directly perceived external reality is indeed external to him, can be legitimately

described as being, unlike his sense perception, an inferential process.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 45

ness endowed with the concrete character of "externality" or

"otherness," that they appear or present themselves as external

to, and other than, the conscious, sentient self or Ego : coloured

external surface extension, resistance or impenetrability, size or

volume, shape, spatial continuity or unity, or discontinuity or

multitude, spatial motion or rest, these undoubtedly appear or

present themselves as external to and other than the percipient

subject. Now if they were not really external to and other than

the Ego, we must ask not only why and how do they appear so,

but also whence could we derive, or how could we possess, the

abstract intellectual concept of "externality" or " otherness-from-

\he-Ego" at all (104). At some stage or other in the develop

ment of the individual s perception-processes certain data are

concretely felt or apprehended as being of such a kind or so

characterized that the individual s intellect derives this concept

from them and interprets them to be really what this concept

represents them to be, viz. external to and other than the self.

But if those consciously apprehended sense data were really only

the self appearing in various phases to the self, and if the felt

concrete character of externality or otherness were merely the

result of subjective processes of the self opposing and externating

certain phases of the self to the self, then the concept of "ex

ternality" or "otherness" (or "real distinction" in the sense of

" otherness- from-the- self") would be objectively and really a

groundless and invalid concept ; and, furthermore, the appear

ance of the concrete feature of externality in certain sense data

would, as a fact of consciousness, be absolutely unexplained and

unaccounted for, nay, would be inexplicable and unaccountable.

For if the datayW/ to be external or other than the self were

not really external to and other than the self, why should they

be. felt so? Or what intelligible ground is there for an assumed

unconscious sense process whereby the self is supposed to "ex-

ternate " certain phases of itself, and thus to mediate and lead

to what would be the illusive and deceptive intellectual processes

of spontaneously conceiving and judging this " externality " or

"otherness" of such data to be real? There is no rational

ground for the gratuitous supposition of such a process, a pro

cess which, if real, would involve in our very nature as cognitive

beings a radical and incurable self-deception.

But if, on the contrary, such data are really external to and

other than the self, there is every reason why they should be felt

4 6 THE OR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

to be so, and as we shall see presently, there is no reason why

they should not. Their character of concrete, felt externality,

then stands explained. The abstract intellectual concept of ex

ternality or otherness is grounded on and derived from an ob

jectively real datum. And the spontaneous judgment which, by

means of this concept, pronounces such data of sense perception

to constitute an external material universe existing independently

of the perceiving subject, is seen to be rationally justified. More

over, just as conscious states, processes, activities, etc., and the

conscious data of memory, involve the reality of the self as a per

manent substance, an abiding, self-identical, substantial subject

and agent of these processes (97, 99), so the concrete sense

apprehension of the "external," "extended" sense data in ques

tion involves the judgment that size, shape, three-dimensional

spatial extension, etc., are qualities of a persisting material sub

stance. Thus, the "sense evidence" or "appearance-to-sense"

of extended externality, is adequate " intellectual evidence " for

the reasoned judgment: " There exists, distinct from and inde

pendently of the Ego and its conscious perceptive processes, a

reality which has the substance-mode of being, i.e. which exists

in itself, and which is material, i.e. endowed at least with the

attribute or quality of spatial extension ".

 We have already shown that reflection

on the facts of consciousness and memory (97-9) justifies our

spontaneous conviction that the Ego is a real substance which

persists self-identically in existence throughout its intermittent

conscious states, and is not the mere series or stream or current

of these states. Will rational reflection also justify our spon

taneous conviction that of these data the whole domain marked

by the features of "extensity" and " externality," and therefore

designated as " material," is likewise a domain of substantive

realities which persist in their existence independently of their

intermittent presence in consciousness, or of our actual inter

mittent perceptions of them? that the "external" "extended,"

or " material " data are really distinct from the percipient subject

or Ego? and that the "extended" but " internal" material

datum which we call " our body " and which we include in the

total, composite reality of the self or Ego, also persists in ex

istence independently of our intermittent mental awareness of

it? The answer is that rational reflection will justify these

spontaneous convictions and transform them into reasoned or

philosophical certitudes.

If we can justify our conviction that an extended, external

domain of material reality exists independently of, and really

other than, the Ego and its perceptive processes, we shall have

no difficulty in recognizing as also rationally justified the con

viction that the extended, internal material datum which we call

" our body," and which we regard as united with the conscious,

mental principle of our being to form the composite individual

self, also persists in existence independently of its intermittent

presence in consciousness (116).

How, then, are we to vindicate a reasoned, philosophic

certitude for the former spontaneous judgment?

In the first place by a deliberate intellectual scrutiny of the

character of those concrete conscious data which we have called

"common" and "proper" sensibles. It is an absolutely un

deniable and universally admitted fact of introspection that some

at least of those data appear or present themselves to conscious-

so that even the perceptionist s fully reasoned conviction or certitude, that the

directly perceived external reality is indeed external to him, can be legitimately

described as being, unlike his sense perception, an inferential process.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 45

ness endowed with the concrete character of "externality" or

"otherness," that they appear or present themselves as external

to, and other than, the conscious, sentient self or Ego : coloured

external surface extension, resistance or impenetrability, size or

volume, shape, spatial continuity or unity, or discontinuity or

multitude, spatial motion or rest, these undoubtedly appear or

present themselves as external to and other than the percipient

subject. Now if they were not really external to and other than

the Ego, we must ask not only why and how do they appear so,

but also whence could we derive, or how could we possess, the

abstract intellectual concept of "externality" or " otherness-from-

\he-Ego" at all (104). At some stage or other in the develop

ment of the individual s perception-processes certain data are

concretely felt or apprehended as being of such a kind or so

characterized that the individual s intellect derives this concept

from them and interprets them to be really what this concept

represents them to be, viz. external to and other than the self.

But if those consciously apprehended sense data were really only

the self appearing in various phases to the self, and if the felt

concrete character of externality or otherness were merely the

result of subjective processes of the self opposing and externating

certain phases of the self to the self, then the concept of "ex

ternality" or "otherness" (or "real distinction" in the sense of

" otherness- from-the- self") would be objectively and really a

groundless and invalid concept ; and, furthermore, the appear

ance of the concrete feature of externality in certain sense data

would, as a fact of consciousness, be absolutely unexplained and

unaccounted for, nay, would be inexplicable and unaccountable.

For if the datayW/ to be external or other than the self were

not really external to and other than the self, why should they

be. felt so? Or what intelligible ground is there for an assumed

unconscious sense process whereby the self is supposed to "ex-

ternate " certain phases of itself, and thus to mediate and lead

to what would be the illusive and deceptive intellectual processes

of spontaneously conceiving and judging this " externality " or

"otherness" of such data to be real? There is no rational

ground for the gratuitous supposition of such a process, a pro

cess which, if real, would involve in our very nature as cognitive

beings a radical and incurable self-deception.

But if, on the contrary, such data are really external to and

other than the self, there is every reason why they should be felt

4 6 THE OR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

to be so, and as we shall see presently, there is no reason why

they should not. Their character of concrete, felt externality,

then stands explained. The abstract intellectual concept of ex

ternality or otherness is grounded on and derived from an ob

jectively real datum. And the spontaneous judgment which, by

means of this concept, pronounces such data of sense perception

to constitute an external material universe existing independently

of the perceiving subject, is seen to be rationally justified. More

over, just as conscious states, processes, activities, etc., and the

conscious data of memory, involve the reality of the self as a per

manent substance, an abiding, self-identical, substantial subject

and agent of these processes (97, 99), so the concrete sense

apprehension of the "external," "extended" sense data in ques

tion involves the judgment that size, shape, three-dimensional

spatial extension, etc., are qualities of a persisting material sub

stance. Thus, the "sense evidence" or "appearance-to-sense"

of extended externality, is adequate " intellectual evidence " for

the reasoned judgment: " There exists, distinct from and inde

pendently of the Ego and its conscious perceptive processes, a

reality which has the substance-mode of being, i.e. which exists

in itself, and which is material, i.e. endowed at least with the

attribute or quality of spatial extension ".