142. THE EVOLUTIONARY FORM OF RELATIVISM.

We

pointed out above (135) that the absolute character which we

claim for the truth of knowledge presupposes "that all human

intellects are similarly constituted . . . and make use of the

same ultimate concepts. . . ." And we saw that this presupposi

tion, which is justified by experience, does not interfere with the

absolute character of the truth of knowledge (137, p. 218, n). We

also pointed out (136) that the organic relativity of the sense

qualities and nature of external, material reality to the perceiving

subject can be detected by intellectual reflection, and therefore,

being allowed for in our intellectual judgments, cannot destroy

the absolute character of the truth of these judgments. Finally

we emphasized the fact (136) that intellect is not a mere organic

faculty of awareness, but an inorganic or spiritual faculty which

apprehends what the object presented to it really is ; which,

being spiritual or immaterial, can abstract from, and transcend,

the time-and-space limitations that characterize the concrete

mode of existence of the material things presented to it through

sense ; which can therefore apprehend, as they realty are, all the

presented aspects, the dynamic and kinetic or changing, no less

than the static aspects, the becoming no less than the being, of

the reality that is given to it for interpretation. By true intel

lectual knowledge of reality, interpretation of reality, insight

into reality, we therefore come into conscious, cognitive possession

of the real : so far as we know reality truly, we appropriate or

possess it mentally, " intentionaliter " ; we become cognitively

assimilated to, or identified with, the real. The individual

human intellect is assimilated to, or identified with, the real

by asserting in the true judgment that what is is, what is not is

not, what is permanent is permanent, what becomes or changes

becomes or changes, etc. In so far, therefore, as the individual

human intellect judges truly of the existence or nature of any

presented portion of reality, since by so judging it is so far

assimilated to the real, and since it is absolutely and necessarily

true that " what reality is, that it is," it necessarily follows that

what reality is thus truly pronounced to be by the individual

human intellect, that it must also be for every human intellect,

RELATIVIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 233

for all times and in all places : once true, true always and every

where, and for all intellects.

Now directly opposed to this view of the absolute character

of truth or true knowledge there is a widely prevalent form of

relativism which extends the concept of " evolution " from the

domain of material phenomena, organic and inorganic, where

it has been utilized to explain or render intelligible the distribu

tion in space and succession in time of those physical realities,

to the human mind itself, to all its knowledge and all its objects,

to all concepts and categories of the knowable, to all truths

whether scientific, philosophical, ethical, or religious. According

to this theory no truth or true knowledge is anything absolute

or fixed or achieved or unchanging, but, on the contrary, all truth

is in a state of continuous "making" or "fieri" or evolution:

truth is always relative to the actual stage of evolution attained

by the individual or by the human race generally : therefore,

what is true for men in one age, or at one particular stage of

their mental, social, ethical, or religious progress ceases to be

true and becomes false and is supplanted by something different

from, or even contradictory of and incompatible with, that former

truth when men have reached a new stage of development, the

supplanting view or conception being now true for the time, but

only to be supplanted in turn by some other conception of

things.

The theory is, of course, not applied, even by its most extreme

advocates, to the truth of judgments which merely express the

existence or happening of things or events : for instance, to

judgments formulating historical facts such as the defeat of

Napoleon or the assassination of Julius Caesar or the crucifixion

of Christ or the existence of Alexander the Great : the truth of

such judgments, they would admit, can never evolve" into

falsity. It is judgments interpreting the nature, meaning, signi

ficance, and implications of the "things" and "events" which

make up the universe, that they have in mind : and more

especially the philosophical judgments by which we seek to inter

pret the ultimate significance of human experience as a whole.

There is, for instance, scarcely an intelligible sense in which it

could be maintained that a stage of mental evolution may some

time be reached in which what we now call the " truths " of

mathematics would become "false": the very most the theory

might hazard in this direction would be the suggestion that pos-

234 THE OR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

sibly the human mind and its "objects" might so "evolve" that

the whole category of " quantity," as a mode or form o( cognition

or of its objects, would disappear or be worked over into a totally

heterogeneous category of conscious experience. The theory is

more plausible when it points to the succession of scientific con

ceptions each of which prevailed for a time in the positive or

inductive sciences, only to be cast aside and replaced by others :

but here its plausibility depends on whether such conceptions or

hypotheses were "true" for those who accepted them, and while

they were accepted ; or, in other words, on whether the " truth "

of a judgment consists in its "suitability," on whether a judg

ment is " true" in so far as it "works," a notion of truth on

which we shall have more to say later. It is, however, to philo

sophical judgments, metaphyscial, ethical, and religious, to

judgments regarding the great, outstanding problems of the

origin, nature, and destiny of man and the universe, and to the

religious beliefs and practices of the human race as determined

by such judgments, that the " evolution " theory of truth is

nowadays most persistently applied. It is contended, for

instance, that although all the great religious (or philosophi

cal and ethical) systems of history, Confucianism, Buddhism,

Judaism, Christianity, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Mahomedanism,

Naturalism, Rationalism, Pantheism, Positivism, etc. cannot all

be " true " at the same time, or in the same age and for the same

people, nevertheless each is true for the people who accept it in

the epoch during which it prevails, inasmuch as it harmonizes

with their mentality at that particular stage of their mental

evolution. And it is suggested, furthermore, that this evolution

of ethical and religious truth is guided by certain spiritual laws

or impulses operating subconsciously in the mentality of the

human race and giving rise at intervals to the appearance of

great religious teachers, " prophets," " saints," " heroes," etc.,

who exercise a profound and salutary influence on the religious

beliefs of their fellow-men by elevating these beliefs to a higher

plane in the progressive evolution process. 1

1 Cf. JEANNI&RE, op. clt., pp. 318 sqq. This theory of the relative and evolu

tionary character of religious truth is the cardinal error of Modernism, propounded

by Loisy, Sabatier, Tyrrell, Le Roy, etc., and condemned by the late Pope Pius X.

in the Encyclical Pascendi and in the Decree Lamentabili (July 3rd, 1907). The

fifty-eighth proposition condemned in the Decree reads : " Veritas non est im-

mutabilis plus quam ipse homo, quippe quae cum ipso, in ipso et per ip^um evolvi-

tur ". A modern pragmatist, F. C. SCHILLER, writing in the Hibbert Journal on

RELATIVIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 23$

We

pointed out above (135) that the absolute character which we

claim for the truth of knowledge presupposes "that all human

intellects are similarly constituted . . . and make use of the

same ultimate concepts. . . ." And we saw that this presupposi

tion, which is justified by experience, does not interfere with the

absolute character of the truth of knowledge (137, p. 218, n). We

also pointed out (136) that the organic relativity of the sense

qualities and nature of external, material reality to the perceiving

subject can be detected by intellectual reflection, and therefore,

being allowed for in our intellectual judgments, cannot destroy

the absolute character of the truth of these judgments. Finally

we emphasized the fact (136) that intellect is not a mere organic

faculty of awareness, but an inorganic or spiritual faculty which

apprehends what the object presented to it really is ; which,

being spiritual or immaterial, can abstract from, and transcend,

the time-and-space limitations that characterize the concrete

mode of existence of the material things presented to it through

sense ; which can therefore apprehend, as they realty are, all the

presented aspects, the dynamic and kinetic or changing, no less

than the static aspects, the becoming no less than the being, of

the reality that is given to it for interpretation. By true intel

lectual knowledge of reality, interpretation of reality, insight

into reality, we therefore come into conscious, cognitive possession

of the real : so far as we know reality truly, we appropriate or

possess it mentally, " intentionaliter " ; we become cognitively

assimilated to, or identified with, the real. The individual

human intellect is assimilated to, or identified with, the real

by asserting in the true judgment that what is is, what is not is

not, what is permanent is permanent, what becomes or changes

becomes or changes, etc. In so far, therefore, as the individual

human intellect judges truly of the existence or nature of any

presented portion of reality, since by so judging it is so far

assimilated to the real, and since it is absolutely and necessarily

true that " what reality is, that it is," it necessarily follows that

what reality is thus truly pronounced to be by the individual

human intellect, that it must also be for every human intellect,

RELATIVIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 233

for all times and in all places : once true, true always and every

where, and for all intellects.

Now directly opposed to this view of the absolute character

of truth or true knowledge there is a widely prevalent form of

relativism which extends the concept of " evolution " from the

domain of material phenomena, organic and inorganic, where

it has been utilized to explain or render intelligible the distribu

tion in space and succession in time of those physical realities,

to the human mind itself, to all its knowledge and all its objects,

to all concepts and categories of the knowable, to all truths

whether scientific, philosophical, ethical, or religious. According

to this theory no truth or true knowledge is anything absolute

or fixed or achieved or unchanging, but, on the contrary, all truth

is in a state of continuous "making" or "fieri" or evolution:

truth is always relative to the actual stage of evolution attained

by the individual or by the human race generally : therefore,

what is true for men in one age, or at one particular stage of

their mental, social, ethical, or religious progress ceases to be

true and becomes false and is supplanted by something different

from, or even contradictory of and incompatible with, that former

truth when men have reached a new stage of development, the

supplanting view or conception being now true for the time, but

only to be supplanted in turn by some other conception of

things.

The theory is, of course, not applied, even by its most extreme

advocates, to the truth of judgments which merely express the

existence or happening of things or events : for instance, to

judgments formulating historical facts such as the defeat of

Napoleon or the assassination of Julius Caesar or the crucifixion

of Christ or the existence of Alexander the Great : the truth of

such judgments, they would admit, can never evolve" into

falsity. It is judgments interpreting the nature, meaning, signi

ficance, and implications of the "things" and "events" which

make up the universe, that they have in mind : and more

especially the philosophical judgments by which we seek to inter

pret the ultimate significance of human experience as a whole.

There is, for instance, scarcely an intelligible sense in which it

could be maintained that a stage of mental evolution may some

time be reached in which what we now call the " truths " of

mathematics would become "false": the very most the theory

might hazard in this direction would be the suggestion that pos-

234 THE OR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

sibly the human mind and its "objects" might so "evolve" that

the whole category of " quantity," as a mode or form o( cognition

or of its objects, would disappear or be worked over into a totally

heterogeneous category of conscious experience. The theory is

more plausible when it points to the succession of scientific con

ceptions each of which prevailed for a time in the positive or

inductive sciences, only to be cast aside and replaced by others :

but here its plausibility depends on whether such conceptions or

hypotheses were "true" for those who accepted them, and while

they were accepted ; or, in other words, on whether the " truth "

of a judgment consists in its "suitability," on whether a judg

ment is " true" in so far as it "works," a notion of truth on

which we shall have more to say later. It is, however, to philo

sophical judgments, metaphyscial, ethical, and religious, to

judgments regarding the great, outstanding problems of the

origin, nature, and destiny of man and the universe, and to the

religious beliefs and practices of the human race as determined

by such judgments, that the " evolution " theory of truth is

nowadays most persistently applied. It is contended, for

instance, that although all the great religious (or philosophi

cal and ethical) systems of history, Confucianism, Buddhism,

Judaism, Christianity, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Mahomedanism,

Naturalism, Rationalism, Pantheism, Positivism, etc. cannot all

be " true " at the same time, or in the same age and for the same

people, nevertheless each is true for the people who accept it in

the epoch during which it prevails, inasmuch as it harmonizes

with their mentality at that particular stage of their mental

evolution. And it is suggested, furthermore, that this evolution

of ethical and religious truth is guided by certain spiritual laws

or impulses operating subconsciously in the mentality of the

human race and giving rise at intervals to the appearance of

great religious teachers, " prophets," " saints," " heroes," etc.,

who exercise a profound and salutary influence on the religious

beliefs of their fellow-men by elevating these beliefs to a higher

plane in the progressive evolution process. 1

1 Cf. JEANNI&RE, op. clt., pp. 318 sqq. This theory of the relative and evolu

tionary character of religious truth is the cardinal error of Modernism, propounded

by Loisy, Sabatier, Tyrrell, Le Roy, etc., and condemned by the late Pope Pius X.

in the Encyclical Pascendi and in the Decree Lamentabili (July 3rd, 1907). The

fifty-eighth proposition condemned in the Decree reads : " Veritas non est im-

mutabilis plus quam ipse homo, quippe quae cum ipso, in ipso et per ip^um evolvi-

tur ". A modern pragmatist, F. C. SCHILLER, writing in the Hibbert Journal on

RELATIVIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 23$