OF " INTERNAL " PERCEPTION.

К оглавлению 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81  83 84
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110  112 113 114 115  117 118
119 120 121 122 123 124 125  127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135
  138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148

According to Kant time is no

more a characteristic of things than space. Like space it is an

a priori form of perception. The arguments 3 by which he seeks

to establish this contention are, mutatis mutandis, the same as

those on which he bases his doctrine of space, and therefore we

need not reconsider them. What they should prove, apparently,

is that time, like space, is an a priori form under which we per

ceive things. Kant, however, concludes from them that time is

the a priori form under which we perceive not things, but ourselves ;

for, he teaches, while space is the form of external sense perception,

does not imply that our spontaneous conviction as to the mind s capacity to attain

to real truth must be assumed from the outset as a reasoned certitude, but only that

the spontaneous conviction can be and will be, if the mind proceeds carefully

transformed by reflection into a reasoned certitude (ff. chap, iii.) ; nor does it imply

that the mind is infallible, but only that in the measure in which it interprets the

given according to the laws of thought and the evidence of reality it will avoid error

and attain to truth about reality.

1 PRICHARD, p. 65. "Cf. MERCIER, op. cit., 147, pp. 401-2 ; supra, no.

Critique, pp. 24-33, 731.

KANTS THEORY OF SENSE PERCEPTION, ETC. 203

time is the form of internal sense perception, or of the internal

sense. Let us see what this can mean.

The distinction to which Kant endeavoured to give expres

sion by the phrases " external sense " and " internal sense " is the

familiar psychological distinction between the group of cognitive

states or activities which make us immediately aware of what

we call things and their qualities, and the cognitive activity where

by we become directly aware of the former activities as states

or activities of our minds. The latter activity is, of course, the

activity of reflection or self-consciousness. Locke, 1 distinguishing

these two main sources of knowledge, called the former " sensa

tion " and the latter " reflection," suggesting at the same time

however, that the latter " though it be not sense as having noth

ing to do with external objects," is nevertheless " very like it

[sense], and might properly enough be called internal sense ".

He realizes that it is not sense, because sense, as he understands

the term, involves the operation upon the mind (through sense

organs) of bodies existing externally, or independently of the

mind, and the production of " perception " in the mind thereby.

Yet he describes the activity in question in terms of sense, adding

the adjective " internal " ; the assumption being, apparently, that

just as in direct cognition external things act on the mind and pro

duce sensation-percepts, or what he calls " ideas of sensation," so

in reflex cognition, where the mind contemplates its own activities,

the mind acts upon itself and produces reflection-percepts, or

what he calls "ideas of reflection ".

Now Kant adopted this description of the facts in terms of

" external sense " and " internal sense ". For him, however, the

term " sense " cannot mean the affecting of physical sense organs

by bodies, but the affecting of the mind by things in themselves,

i.e. things independent of the mind. " External sense " or " outer

sense " is then, for Kant, the mind s capacity for receiving im

pressions (" receptivity of impressions ") produced by things in

dependent of the mind, and of becoming thereby aware of mental

states or appearances or phenomena : the supposed things in

themselves remaining unknowable. So too, the mind, in order

to perceive itself and its own states or activities, must be affected

by itself, by its own states or activities : it must have a capacity

to be affected by its own states (parallel to its capacity to be

affected by things independent of itself), and this capacity Kant

1 Essay, ii., i, 2-4.

204 THEOR V OF k NO WLEDGE

calls the internal sense. Moreover, if the external sense does

not reveal things, but only sensations or representations or ap

pearances produced by things, so too the internal sense cannot

reveal the mind itself or its states or activities, but only appear

ances produced by these: "and since time is a mode of relation

of these appearances, it is a determination not of ourselves [the

real or transcendental Ego], but only of the appearances due

to ourselves [the empirical, phenomenal Ego~\," l just as space is

a determination not of things [the real or transcendental non-Ego]

but only of the appearances due to things [the empirical or pheno

menal universe]. Thus, then, through " external sense " we do not

know whether things in themselves are either spatial or temporal ;

we know the states or appearances produced by them in the mind

to be spatial, because by the a priori form of space we arrange

these appearances spatially ; but by the internal sense we do not

know these mental states to be really and in themselves temporal,

for we do not know these mental states as they are in themselves,-

or in the real mind : we only know the representations pro

duced in our minds by these states or activities. It is only

this second layer, so to speak, of representations representa

tions of ourselves, appearances produced by the action of our own

mental states upon our minds that we can know to be really

temporal : inasmuch as time is the a priori form under which

alone all mental activities, states, appearances, etc., can be per

ceived or apprehended.

Now it will be manifest to anyone who follows Kant s line of

thought, as just indicated, that on his own principles he could

have had absolutely no ground for distinguishing between "ex

ternal " and " internal " sense. For, manifestly, if we cannot

know our real selves or minds, any more than real things, we

have no means of determining whether any given representa

tion is due to " things" or to our "selves". To be consistent

he should ascribe all representations alike to "unknowable

reality," and recognize the mind s inability to distinguish this

latter into a transcendental Ego and a transcendental non-Ego, and

consequently to distinguish between " internal " and external "

sense.

1 PIUCHARD, op. cit., p. 107.

2 Therefore it should follow that we do not know even these " phenomena " or

" mental appearances " to be in themselves spatial : it is only our (a priori " tem

poral ") representations of these representations that we could really know to be

(both) spatial (and temporal).

KANT S THEOR Y OF SENSE PERCEPTION, ETC. 205

Not only, however, is the distinction between " external "

and " internal " sense incompatible with the general theory that

reality is in itself unknowable. It can also be shown, and this

is more important still, that Kant s doctrine on the ideal or

phenomenal character of space, and the consequent unknow-

ability of things in themselves, rests on the assumption that we

can at least know our own minds, or our own mental states, as they

really are in themselves, an assumption which, nevertheless, he

flatly contradicts by his contention that time is an a priori form

whereby alone we can perceive our own minds and their states

not as they really are, but only as they appear under this form.

For why does Kant hold that we cannot know things in them

selves, but only the "mental appearances" produced by them?

Why does he hold that space cannot be a determination of things

in themselves, but can only be a determination of phenomena or

mental appearances? Because he accepts unquestioningly the

fundamental postulate of Idealism that the mind cannot trans

cend itself to know the extramental, or what is independent of

mind. But this at least implies that the mind can know the

intramental, or what is dependent on mind, i.e. can know its own

conscious states, representations, etc., as these really are. Other

wise what right has he to assert that space is mental ? or that

any of the other supposed a priori factors of knowledge are

mental ? Therefore it appears that the mind can know its own

states as they really are. But temporal succession is an

essential characteristic of these states ; therefore, since they are

real, and are known as real, time, which is a characteristic of

them, is likewise real, and is not merely an a priori form or

mode under which or in which they are perceived. 1

1 C/. Kant s own formulation of the argument as a difficulty against his doctrine

of the a priori character of time : " Changes are real (this is proved by the change

of our own representations, even if all external phenomena and their changes be

denied). Changes, however, are possible in time only, and therefore time must be

something real." Critique, p. 29. And he rightly points out that the reason why

people urge the objection particularly against the a priori character of time is that

whatever about the extramental reality of external, spatial objects, " the reality of

the object of our internal perceptions (the perception of my own self and of my own

states) is clear immediately through our consciousness. The former might be

merely phenomenal [ blosser Schein, mere illusion cf. PRICHARD, p. 113],

but the latter, according to their opinion, is undeniably something real."-

Critiqne, p. 30. He thinks he answers the difficulty by pointing out that time is real

as a real form of our perception of our own states : but the difficulty is that his own

view of space as a form not of things but only of mental representations, implies

that time is a real form and real characteristic of these representations themselves,

206 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

If, on the other hand, we do not and cannot know the real

mind and its real states (and time as a real characteristic of them),

then (i) we have no intelligible ground for distinguishing in

knowledge some factors as belonging to (and contributed by)

the mind or knowing subject, from other factors as belonging

to (and contributed by) the supposed extramental reality in

contrast with the knowing subject ; and (2) even if we do in

consistently make the distinction, it would appear that what we

can know is neither (a) real things, nor (b} our mental spatial

arrangements of sensations supposed to be caused by such things,

nor (c) any other real state whatsoever of our own minds, but (d)

only temporal mental arrangements which constitute the empirical

or phenomenal Ego, and which are arrangements of spatial sensa

tions, these in turn (being now both temporal and spatial) con

stituting the phenomenal universe or non-Ego. Or rather, to be

accurate we should say that all we have comprehended under

the last head (tf) is not itself known, but furnishes only the data

or material of knowledge : since what we really know is a

and not merely of our perception of them. And from this difficulty there is really no

escape for him : unless indeed by withdrawing his contention that space is a char

acteristic merely of mind-dependent appearances, and at the same time withdrawing

the idealistic principle underlying it, viz. that the mind cannot know things or

realities independent of itself, in other words, by abandoning his general theory.

Cf. MAHER, Psychology (4th edit.), p. 120 : " A conscious state cannot have any

exlstence-in-itsclfa.pa.rt from what it is apprehended to be. Its essc is fcrcipi. Since,

then, mental states are as they are apprehended, and since they are apprehended as

successive, they must form a real succession in-themselves. They cannot be timeless

as they are non-spatial. But if so Kant s form of the internal sense the intuition

of time as extinguished." And Maher further argues that therefore time-succession

must likewise be a real characteristic of the extramental world which causes these

successive states: "As . . . there is a real succession in our ideas there is a true

correlate to the notion of time. A sequence of changes being once admitted in our

conscious states, an analogous succession of alterations cannot be denied to the

external reality which acts upon us, and so we are justified in maintaining the

objective reality of the notion " p. 120. Cf. ibid., pp. 474-5 : " Consciousness

affords at all events an immediate knowledge of my states and of myself in those

states. There is no room for appearances or phenomena here; the mind, the

object of knowledge, is really immediately present to itself."

In accordance with the view that time is an a priori form under which alone we

can apprehend all mental representations whatsoever, Kant holds that " the con

cept of change, and with it the concept of motion (as change of place) is possible

only through and in the representation of time ; and that, if this representation were

not intuitive (internal) a priori, no concept, whatever it be, could make us under

stand the possibility of change ". Critique, p. 721. This is an inversion of the facts.

Time, apprehended in the manner in which Kant deals with it, is not a percept at all,

but an abstract concept ; and it is a concept based upon, and derived from, our per

ception of motion or change. Cf. Ontology, 85, pp. 322-8.

KANTS THEORY OF SENSE PERCEPTION, ETC. 207

synthesis of these mental materials with the a priori concepts of

the understanding.

The argument, then, against Kant s view that time is an a

priori form of our perception of our own mental states or activities,

or, in other words, that it is a " form of internal sense intuition,"

is briefly this, that his own proof of the phenomenality of space

(if we may coin the expression) implies the reality of time. As

Prichard puts it, " Kant must at least concede that ive undergo a

succession of changing states, even if he holds that things, being

independent of the mind, cannot be shown to undergo such a

succession ; consequently he ought to allow that time is not a way

in which we apprehend ourselves, but a real feature of our real

states". 1 Or, finally, to put the argument in the converse way,

if Kant will not allow that we can apprehend any " real feature

of our real states," or that we can therefore know time to be such,

then he destroys the ground of his own contention that space is

not a characteristic of things but only of mental representations or

phenomena, for the ground of this contention is that whereas we

cannot know things that are " external " or " independent of the

mind," as they really are, we can know states that are "internal "

or "dependent on the mind," as these states really are.

One final and fatal flaw in Kant s thesis that time is a form

of our perceptions of events is this. He himself is forced to

recognize that some temporal relations belong to the physical

events which we perceive : that there are, in these, temporal

successions, which, by virtue of their irreversibility, differ from

mere successions of our perceptions : that we can apprehend

this distinction in general, and apply it in detail so as to appre

hend some successions (e.g. that of the moon moving round the

earth), as objective, from other successions (e.g. of our impres

sions as we survey the parts of a house), as subjective (cf. 93).

Hence time would not be a form or character of our perceptions

exclusively, but also of things perceived. Of course if Kant

were consistent he should see that his theory, by identifying

perceptions with things perceived, makes it impossible to appre

hend, either in general or in detail, any such distinction between

two classes of temporal successions. 2

1 Op. cit., p. 114. 2 C/. PRICHARU, op. cit., p. 139.

PART V.

TRUTH AND CERTITUDE: THEIR CRITERIA AND

MOTIVES.

CHAPTER XXII.

RETROSPECT. RELATIVIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE.