AND THE ULTIMATE MOTIVE OF CERTITUDE.

 When scholastics

contend that evidence is a test of truth, and that it is indeed the

supreme and ultimate criterion of all truth, what do they mean

by the term evidence ?

Etymologically the term designates the condition of a material

object which is clearly visible (e-videre) to the eyes. An object

which is thus clearly visible is evident. But the language de

scriptive of corporeal vision and its objects has been transferred

to mental apprehension and its objects. Intellect or reason is

the " eye " of the mind. Intellectual apprehension is a kind of

" vision ". And so whatever is objectively clear to the intellect

is described as "evident," and the corresponding condition of

the thought-object is described as its " evidence ". Now the

object of the intellectual act which attains to truth, the act of

judgment, is a relation between two thought-objects, a relation

that is enunciable by an act of affirmation or denial. To say

that the truth of the judgment is evident is to say that in the

objective reality which is being interpreted, in the whole concrete

context of its objective presentation, the mind clearly sees or

apprehends adequate ground for the relation whereby the reality

is interpreted or represented in the act of judgment : and not

only sees this ground, but is conscious that it asserts and assents

to the relation because the ground of it is really there and really

apprehended (67), so that this condition of the reality, this "evi

dence " of the reality, is not only the reason of the truth of the

judgment, the objective " deciding factor " or " test " or "criterion "

of the truth of the judgment, but is also and eo ipso the " motive "

of the mind s assent to the judgment.

But there are many kinds of evidence, (i) There is perfect

or cogent evidence, and there is evidence which is not cogent or

perfect but yet sufficient to reveal the relation asserted in the

judgment, and consequently sufficient to gain for the judgment

the firm assent of certitude excluding all prudent fear of error.

(2) There is immediate evidence and mediate evidence. If

the ground of the relation of identity or diversity between

subject and predicate, asserted in the judgment, be clearly

revealed in these objective aspects themselves of the presented

reality, then the judgment is said to be immediately evident or

262 THEOR Y OF KNO WLRDGR

self-evident: e.g. "two straight lines cannot enclose a space";

"this paper is white". It the ground of the relation is not

manifest from an inspection of the compared aspects or thought-

objects themselves, but only from relations already apprehended

between them and other concepts, then the judgment is only

mediately evident : e.g. " the three interior angles of a plane

triangle are equal to two right angles"; "St. Peter suffered

martyrdom ". It is plain that mediate evidence implies and rests

ultimately on immediate evidence, that the former cannot be an

adequate test of truth or motive of certitude unless the latter is.

(3) We can distinguish between evidence o^ fact, of actual

existence or happening, and evidence of possibility or impossibility, of

essential relations between abstract aspects of reality : i.e. evidence

for judgments of the existential order, and evidence for judgments

of the ideal order. In the former, if the evidence of existence

or happening is not immediate, i.e. if the reality of which it is

predicated be not directly apprehended as existing or happening,

then its existence or happening must be seen to be involved in

some directly apprehended existence or happening. For ex

ample, I know that "Corn was sown in this field last Spring"

because I see that "Corn is here and now growing in this field".

(4) Finally not to mention less important distinctions

there is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence

for the truth of a judgment. The evidence is said to be intrinsic

when the grounds of assent to the judgment as true are seen

to lie immediately or mediately in the reality itself which the

judgment interprets ; and in this case the assent is said to be an

assent of reason or science. When the ground of our assent lies

not in the interpreted reality itself, but in some testimony or

authority which is considered to vouch sufficiently for the truth

of the judgment, the evidence is said to be extrinsic ; and the

assent is then described as an assent of belief or faith (10, e).

It is clear that extrinsic evidence can be an adequate test of the

truth of a judgment, and a sufficient motive of certitude, only

when and because the testimony or authority on which we rely

is already judged by us to have the requisite conditions for

guaranteeing the truth of the judgment and grounding our firm

assent thereto. These conditions, in the source of our informa

tion, are two in number, viz. knowledge and veracity (" scientia et

veracitas"}. In other words, before accepting a judgment on

authority we must first be certain of these two other judgments,

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 263

"The authority in question is not deceived, but well-informed,"

and "The authority is not deceiving us, but is trustworthy".

Now for the truth of these two judgments we must ultimately

have adequate intrinsic evidence, i.e. evidence lying in the sub

ject-matter itself of these two judgments : for if we accepted

these judgments also only on some other authority, the same

question would arise about the credentials of this latter, and thus

we should find ourselves involved in an endless regress. All

extrinsic evidence therefore rests ultimately on intrinsic evidence,

and cannot itself be the supreme test of truth or the ultimate

motive of certitude. 1

 When scholastics

contend that evidence is a test of truth, and that it is indeed the

supreme and ultimate criterion of all truth, what do they mean

by the term evidence ?

Etymologically the term designates the condition of a material

object which is clearly visible (e-videre) to the eyes. An object

which is thus clearly visible is evident. But the language de

scriptive of corporeal vision and its objects has been transferred

to mental apprehension and its objects. Intellect or reason is

the " eye " of the mind. Intellectual apprehension is a kind of

" vision ". And so whatever is objectively clear to the intellect

is described as "evident," and the corresponding condition of

the thought-object is described as its " evidence ". Now the

object of the intellectual act which attains to truth, the act of

judgment, is a relation between two thought-objects, a relation

that is enunciable by an act of affirmation or denial. To say

that the truth of the judgment is evident is to say that in the

objective reality which is being interpreted, in the whole concrete

context of its objective presentation, the mind clearly sees or

apprehends adequate ground for the relation whereby the reality

is interpreted or represented in the act of judgment : and not

only sees this ground, but is conscious that it asserts and assents

to the relation because the ground of it is really there and really

apprehended (67), so that this condition of the reality, this "evi

dence " of the reality, is not only the reason of the truth of the

judgment, the objective " deciding factor " or " test " or "criterion "

of the truth of the judgment, but is also and eo ipso the " motive "

of the mind s assent to the judgment.

But there are many kinds of evidence, (i) There is perfect

or cogent evidence, and there is evidence which is not cogent or

perfect but yet sufficient to reveal the relation asserted in the

judgment, and consequently sufficient to gain for the judgment

the firm assent of certitude excluding all prudent fear of error.

(2) There is immediate evidence and mediate evidence. If

the ground of the relation of identity or diversity between

subject and predicate, asserted in the judgment, be clearly

revealed in these objective aspects themselves of the presented

reality, then the judgment is said to be immediately evident or

262 THEOR Y OF KNO WLRDGR

self-evident: e.g. "two straight lines cannot enclose a space";

"this paper is white". It the ground of the relation is not

manifest from an inspection of the compared aspects or thought-

objects themselves, but only from relations already apprehended

between them and other concepts, then the judgment is only

mediately evident : e.g. " the three interior angles of a plane

triangle are equal to two right angles"; "St. Peter suffered

martyrdom ". It is plain that mediate evidence implies and rests

ultimately on immediate evidence, that the former cannot be an

adequate test of truth or motive of certitude unless the latter is.

(3) We can distinguish between evidence o^ fact, of actual

existence or happening, and evidence of possibility or impossibility, of

essential relations between abstract aspects of reality : i.e. evidence

for judgments of the existential order, and evidence for judgments

of the ideal order. In the former, if the evidence of existence

or happening is not immediate, i.e. if the reality of which it is

predicated be not directly apprehended as existing or happening,

then its existence or happening must be seen to be involved in

some directly apprehended existence or happening. For ex

ample, I know that "Corn was sown in this field last Spring"

because I see that "Corn is here and now growing in this field".

(4) Finally not to mention less important distinctions

there is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence

for the truth of a judgment. The evidence is said to be intrinsic

when the grounds of assent to the judgment as true are seen

to lie immediately or mediately in the reality itself which the

judgment interprets ; and in this case the assent is said to be an

assent of reason or science. When the ground of our assent lies

not in the interpreted reality itself, but in some testimony or

authority which is considered to vouch sufficiently for the truth

of the judgment, the evidence is said to be extrinsic ; and the

assent is then described as an assent of belief or faith (10, e).

It is clear that extrinsic evidence can be an adequate test of the

truth of a judgment, and a sufficient motive of certitude, only

when and because the testimony or authority on which we rely

is already judged by us to have the requisite conditions for

guaranteeing the truth of the judgment and grounding our firm

assent thereto. These conditions, in the source of our informa

tion, are two in number, viz. knowledge and veracity (" scientia et

veracitas"}. In other words, before accepting a judgment on

authority we must first be certain of these two other judgments,

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 263

"The authority in question is not deceived, but well-informed,"

and "The authority is not deceiving us, but is trustworthy".

Now for the truth of these two judgments we must ultimately

have adequate intrinsic evidence, i.e. evidence lying in the sub

ject-matter itself of these two judgments : for if we accepted

these judgments also only on some other authority, the same

question would arise about the credentials of this latter, and thus

we should find ourselves involved in an endless regress. All

extrinsic evidence therefore rests ultimately on intrinsic evidence,

and cannot itself be the supreme test of truth or the ultimate

motive of certitude. 1