CHARACTERISTICS OF EXTERNAL SENSE DATA.

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This brings

us to the second of the above-mentioned (103) alternative

methods of vindicating a reasoned certitude for men s spontane

ous conviction that they can and do know the existence, and

something of the nature, of a real material universe independent

of their own minds. According to this view a real external uni

verse, a reality other than the Ego, is given or presented to the

latter in the data which we are made directly aware of in external

sense perception. The Ego has from the beginning conscious

data characterized by the feelings of what we intellectually con

ceive and describe as " voluminousness " or " ex tensity," and

" externality ". The data so characterized are the foundation

and source of our abstract concepts of "extension," "impene

trability," "matter" or "body," "non-self," 1 concepts which

we compare and contrast with the concepts of "conscious appre

hension," "conscious unity of the manifold," "conscious being,"

"mind," "self" or "Ego" concepts simultaneously formed by

intellectual activity, direct and reflex, from all the data of our

direct awareness. Now we spontaneously judge or interpret the

data which furnish us with the former set of concepts, especially

the data accompanied and marked by the feeling of exter

nality " to be a reality other than the perceiving and thinking

self. And reflecting on this spontaneous judgment, and on the

concepts whereby we formed it, we can and do see the judgment

to be true and the concepts to be objectively and really valid.

That is to say, external sense perception, by revealing to us

" external " data, reveals to us what we, by interpreting them,

rightly judge to be a reality other than the self. In other words,

the characteristics of extensity and externality, in certain con

scious data, which made these latter appear as external to the

1 The concept of " object-of- awareness " is also derived de facto from such data,

though it can be derived even from the most purely subjective data of conscious

ness : for intellect sees involved in all possible awareness duality of " conscious

subject " and " apprehended object ".

- The feelings of " extensity " and " voluminousness," which yield the concepts

of " extended or spatial reality," " matter " or " body," we do not at first, but only

later, detect as characterizing some data which do not appear as " external " but as

"internal" or "self "data; and thus we come to realize that the "self" is not

merely a " thinking subject," but likewise " a sense-perceiving subject," and is as

such corporeal as well as conscious or mental. Cf. infra, 116.

3 2 THEOR V OF KNO H LEDGE

Ego when directly aware of them, are now regarded, and rightly

regarded, by intellect reflecting on them, as furnishing to intellect

direct and immediate evidence, objective and real evidence, for

the reasoned judgment that "those data are really an actually

existing material universe distincf from the reality of the self or

Ego".

According to this view of the matter, therefore, the real non-Ego is just

as directly and immediately given in cognition as the Ego (100). It is given

in our direct conscious awareness of data marked by "extensity " and " ex

ternality ". In our spontaneous interpretations of these data of external sense

perception it is cognized as really other than the Ego. And rational reflec

tion on the direct data from which we form the concept of a " real non-Ego"

justifies the objective validity of this concept, and the truth of the judgment

wherein we predicate it of these data.

It is true, indeed, that the reality of the Ego is the reality about whose

actual existence reflection shows our spontaneous conviction to be most un-

shakeable (31, 35). But do I know my "self" or Ego as a permanent

being, abiding self-identical amid change of conscious states, as a being

which persists in existence independently of my awareness of it, and whose

"esse" is not mere "percipi" have I this sort of knowledge of the Ego

antecedently to, and as a prerequisite condition for, my reasoned conviction 1

that there also exists, besides myself, a real non-Ego which is also a being

or domain of being that persists independently of my awareness of it ?

The former conviction is not a prerequisite of the latter. For the very con

cepts, by the application of which to some of the conscious data of the

Ego as a self-conscious subject, I reach the former conviction, viz. the

concepts of "actually existing being" (objective to a subject aware of it,

and involved in this awareness), "substance," "states," "change," "per

manence 1 or "duration," "identity," etc., these very same concepts I

simultaneously and independently apply to other of these data (those affected

by "externality"), and I do so with a consciousness that the application is

valid ; and I thus reach the latter conviction (vi~. that there is a real non-Ego,

which also permanently persists throughout change and independently of ray

awareness of it) concomitantly with my reaching the former.

I see, of course, that this real non-Ego must be cognitively related to my

real self, must be " made one " with me "cognitively " or " intentionaliter"

in order that I become aware of it or know it at all, and that this holds good

even for my direct sentient awareness, no less than for my thought and re

flection. But just as I do not see that a real identity of that which I know

or become aware of, with myself knowing or aware of it, is essential to my

knowing or being aware of it, or how such supposition can in the least help

1 It is obvious that such a knowledge of the self is not a prerequisite condition

for (a) my awareness of " externality," or awareness of a distinction between con

scious data of external perception (" strong " or " vivid " data) and conscious data of

imagination, conception, etc. (" weak " or " dim " data) ; or (b) for my spontaneous

intellectual conviction or judgment that the data which thus appear as external are

really external to myself who am aware of them.

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY. EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 33

me to realize how I even know or become aware of my self (17, ig, 35, 75,

i o i ) ; so, too, I do not see how I can attain to a reasoned conviction of the

separate existence of the real non-Ego by thought, i.e. by way of inferring

such existence from my own self-known real existence, or even by the use of con

cepts in jttdgment to interpret certain data as revealing a real non-Ego, unless

these concepts are really and validly applicable to these data, and are already

known by me to be thus applicable : but they cannot be, and be known to be,

thus applicable, unless the concrete data of my direct sentient awareness

the data from which the concepts are derived reveal to me, and put me into

direct and immediate cognitive relation with, a real non-Ego (and not merely

with an " externally appearing " phase or aspect of the reality which is my

self). The fact is, therefore, that a real non-Ego is revealed to me in the

data of my direct external sense awareness or perception, and because it is,

the concepts which I use in judging spontaneously that they reveal a really

existing non-Ego or external universe are objectively and really valid ; and

because reflection shows the fact and the reason of their validity, our spon

taneous conviction of the actual existence of an external material universe

independent of conscious perception, and distinct from the Ego, is eo ipso

transformed into a reasoned philosophical certitude.

Not only, therefore, does it appear superfluous to appeal to the principle

of causality as a means of vindicating philosophical certitude for the spon

taneous conviction that the perceived external material universe exists in

dependently of our perception and thought ; but such an appeal would even

appear to be futile in the very hypothesis in which it is deemed essential, and

to be useful as a corroborative vindication only in the hypothesis in which

it is not really essential, for this purpose. For if we hold that the Ego

can and does directly apprehend a real non-Ego in the data of external sense

perception, and that therefore the concepts whereby we spontaneously judge

these data to be a real non-Ego are validly applied, then by mere reflection

on these percepts, concepts, and judgments, and without any appeal to the

principle of causality, we have transformed our spontaneous conviction into a

reflex certitude. 3 While if we hold that the Ego can directly and im

mediately apprehend, in and through the concrete data of its direct sense

consciousness or awareness, only itself (however variously impressed or

affected), how can thought, by means of concepts derived from such data,

interpret these or any of them to be a real non-Ego, or infer that any of them

involve real otherness or a real non-Ego f

At the same time it is conceivable that reflection on the difficulties which

may be urged against the possibility of a direct sense awareness of anything

really of her than states of the conscious Ego would destroy a person s spon-

tanoeus belief that he has in fact such a direct sense awareness of a real non-

self world or universe. And such a person might nevertheless not only

rationally justify his conviction that he knows his own self as a real existence ;

but also convince himself that the concepts abstracted by his thought activity

1 By the principle of causality.

2 Of course the argument from causality will then confirm this certitude (m) by

making us realize that without the already discovered real non-Ego as partial cause

of our conscious cognitive states, the succession of these in the Ego would be in

explicable and unintelligible.

VOL. II. 3

34 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

from the concrete data of his direct awareness, and the necessary principles

apprehended by thought in the domain of such concepts, are objectively and

universally valid in their application to all reality, whether in the domain of

thought or of sense. The exercise of thought (thus admittedly valid) in in

ferring the actual existence and nature of a real non-Ego by virtue of the

principle of causality, might then effect for such a person the transcending of

the self, or the transition to a real non-Ego, even though he had persuaded

himself that such transcendence or transition was a feat that lay beyond the

power of the mind s direct " external " sense awareness. 1

But it is not likely that many of those who deny that there is any rational

justification in the conscious data of external sense perception for the spon

taneous judgment that " a reality other than the self exists," will admit that the

argument from causality rationally justifies this judgment (vol. i., p. 134).

Moreover, the inference from the real Ego to a real non-Ego by way of

the principle of causality, seems to us to labour under the drawback already

indicated : a that the principle of causality obliges us to infer merely that there

is and must be an adequate cause of our conscious states, that if the Ego as

consciously apprehended is not adequate cause of them there must be some

partial real cause of them beyond consciousness ; but it does not assure us that

this something beyond consciousness is a reality other than the permanently

subsisting real Ego itself. In other words, the argument does not seem

effectively to exclude monism of some form or other. The falsity of monism

can be effectively established only by vindicating the validity of the major

real distinction in its application to the objects of our concepts of the real

Ego and the real non-Ego: Of course our concept of " real distinction " or

"real otherness," applied to the non-Ego as compared with the Ego, will be

shown to be valid if we can show that it has a real foundation in the concrete

data from which we abstract the concepts of "self," "non-self," and "other

ness " or " distinction," in the domain of our direct consciousness or aware

ness. Now if we divide this latter domain into immediate data of intellectual

thought (" intellectual " consciousness) and immediate data of sense awareness

(" sense " consciousness), and hold that intellect or thought proper (as well as

sense) has direct intuitions of individual concrete existences or happenings, it

will not be contended that any of these intuitions reveal, or furnish data for

the abstract concept of, a real non-Ego. For such intellectual intuitions are

generally understood to apprehend exclusively the Ego consciously think

ing, conceiving, judging, reasoning, willing, etc. ; the view of William of

Occam, that intellect has direct and immediate intuition of external or non-

self reality (82), being regarded as singular and erroneous. The concepts

abstracted from such intuitions, therefore, cannot reveal a real non-Ego to us,

for although they are of course indirectly applicable to all the conscious data

we can think of (even those characterized by " externality "), by being directly

applicable to our processes of thinking of these latter, nevertheless, since our

consciousness of this "externality" is ex hyfothesi not recognized to be a

valid cognition or awareness of an external or non-self reality, the application

of such concepts to "external seeming" data of consciousness cannot trans-

1 Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cit., p. 224 n. a Supra, 104.

* Ibid., p. 29, n. i.

EXTRAMENTAL REALITY. EXTERNAL UNIVERSE 35

form these latter into a non-self reality. Moreover, as was pointed out above

(100) the intuitions and concepts of this intellectual or thought-domain of

consciousness are dependent for their existence or occurrence on the direct

conscious activities whereby we become aware of what are known as concrete

sense data : nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu : the

original data of all cognitive activity are given in direct sense awareness.

In these latter, therefore, we must finally seek a valid foundation for our

abstract concepts of a " real non-Ego" and " real otherness or distinction

from the Ego ". Now, if reflection were to pronounce these sense data,

including their felt characteristic of "externality" to be really modes or

phases or manifestations of the reality of the Ego, how would the abstract

concepts (of "extension," "matter," "otherness" or "distinction," etc.)

abstracted from such data by conception and validly applied to them again in

judgment^ transcend the real Ego in such application ? They could not

transcend it. Or if we applied such concepts in such a way as to make them

transcend the real Ego, i.e. by assuming them to reveal to us a real non-Ego,

would such application be really valid ? It would not ; for such concepts

would, ex hypothesi, not have been derived from any real non-self data;

they would have had, ex hypothesi, no foundation in any real non-self data ;

since the seeming or felt " externality " of sense data would have been, ex

hypothesi, not an evidence of real externality or non-selfness, but only after

all a peculiar and unexplained feature of certain conscious states of the Ego

itself.

Of course, if our intellectual concepts were innate, i.e. obtained by us

independently of sense data and sense activities, and if in addition it could be

proved that intellectual cognition revealed to us, through such concepts, and

therefore also independently of sense, a domain of real being that would be

"objective" not merely in the sense in which every cognition as an act of

awareness has an "object," but in the sense of "non-self" or "really distinct

from and other than the knowing subject," then indeed it could be intelligibly

maintained that even though sense did not attain in perception to the real

non-self, but only to a consciously apprehended mode of the self, nevertheless

intellect could attain to the real non-self (namely, by the concept of " cause "

and the principle of causality) and could prove the "consciously apprehended

mode of the self," present in perception, to be at once a product and a repre

sentation of the non-self in the perceiving and knowing subject. 1 But our

concepts are not innate ; they are not formed independently of sense-data ;

our vindication of their real validity (i.e. of Moderate Realism, cf. 76-8) has con

sisted in showing that the objects or contents revealed by them in the abstract

to consciousness are the identical objects or contents revealed to conscious

ness in the concrete in our acts of internal and external sense perception on

the assumption, which we then promised (72) to prove at a later stage, that

these latter objects or contents are realities. Now the concept of real

externality or real-otherness-from-the-self is a concept of supreme importance

in its bearing on the problem of the knowing subject s capability of trans

cending self in the process of cognition ; and upon the validity of its appli-

1 Cf. PRICHARD S analogous view that our intellectual knowledge of space and

spatial relations is independent of sense perception, infra, 125, 128.

36 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

cation to the whole domain of reality which we spontaneously believe to be

external the validity of this belief depends. If, therefore, the concrete sense

datum (of "felt externality") from which this concept is formed, cannot be

shown, by direct intellectual reflection upon it, to be real, i.e. if the data

which arc felt (or appear) to be external in normal external sense perception

cannot be seen by intellect reflecting on them to be eo ipso really external,

how can we hope to vindicate such real externality for those data, and such

real validity for the concept of externality, by appealing to any evidence that

can be furnished by another concept, namely, that of causality, if this concept

too be derived, at, it is, from immediate data of conscious, concrete (internal)

intuition and (external) perception, while as yet none of these immediate data

have been shown to be themselves externally real ?

But the contention that intellect, contemplating the direct

and immediate data of conscious external sense perception, finds

these to constitute an external, material universe distinct from

the Ego, is not without its difficulties. These we shall examine

in the course of the exposition of facts and theories in the para

graphs that follow. The facts are not very numerous ; but the

theories, from absolute subjectivism, idealism, or scepticism, to

the most "ingenuous" or "naif" realism, are even bewildering

in their abundance.

CHAPTER XV.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION : REAL EXISTENCE OF AN

EXTERNAL, MATERIAL UNIVERSE.