157. FIDEISM: HISTORICAL CAUSES.

 If it be denied that

reality, under the reflective scrutiny of the individual human

mind, can by its own objective evidence produce therein some

true and certain knowledge ; if it be maintained that the indi

vidual human reason, following carefully and cautiously its own

natural dictate to base its judgments and assents on the real

evidence of the data of experience, cannot attain to reflex certi

tude in regard to the most urgent problems concerning man and

the universe, the existence of a Supreme Being, the distinction

of moral good and evil, human freedom and responsibility and

immortality, the duty of religion, etc., etc., then there is no safe

anchorage left for the mind in its search after truth. Never

theless, men have at all times disagreed concerning the validity

and adequacy of evidence as a test of truth and a motive of

certitude ; and many have gone over to scepticism (chap. iv.).

This issue others have sought to avoid, and mainly in one or

other of two directions, viz. by seeking some satisfactory motive

of certitude either (a) in some source extrinsic both to the

object of the assent (the judgment) and to the individual mind

(such as Divine revelation, tradition, the common voice or ver

dict of mankind), or (d) in a source extrinsic to the object of

assent (and therefore non-intellectual), but intrinsic to the indi

vidual (such as a natural "sense " or " feeling " or " yearning " or

TRADITIONALISM 291

" instinct," or "need " or "will " to believe, etc.). Both of these

attitudes have been broadly described as Fideism, because they

have in common both the negative, anti-intellectualist element

of distrust in the capacity of the individual human intellect to

attain to truth, and the positive, dogmatic or anti-sceptical ele

ment of conviction that nevertheless certitude is attainable.

But as to how it is to be attained they differ in the manner just

indicated. 1

The historical reasons for the appeal from the court of indi

vidual rational speculation to that of the collective voice of the

race as the vehicle of an authoritative Divine revelation, are not

far to seek. What does the history of purely rational speculation

present but a medley of discordant voices ? Or what effective

power or authority has the philosopher to teach mankind the

saving truths which he needs most urgently to know? To

philosophize in isolation from, or without regard to, the

authoritative teaching of supernatural, revealed religion, i.e. the

Christian Religion, is worse than vain. The "free" exercise of

the individual human reason is not constructive or conducive to

certitude : it is rather destructive, corrosive, and leads only to

doubts and negations : it raises many questions but can answer

none. The pretension to solve by means of it the problems

and enigmas of human existence is unnatural : and history testi

fies that every attempt of the kind has only led to scepticism and

provoked a reaction in the direction of reposing human certitude

ultimately either on faith in supernatural revelation or in sub

jective, affective instincts, prompting the individual to believe in

defiance of the impotent negations of pure reason.

Thus, the sixteenth century revolt against the authoritative

teachings of revealed religion, the proclamation of the absolute

supremacy of " private judgment," and the cult of an excessive

" rationalism," threw back the warring sects of Protestantism on

a religion of purely personal beliefs which rested only on the

shifting quicksands of individual feeling. Europe in the seven

teenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a widespread disin-

1 MERCIER describes as Fideists only those who propound as the ultimate source

of certitude faith on extrinsic grounds of revelation, tradition, the unanimous assent

of the human race, etc. (op. cit., 61 sqq.). The title is equally, and perhaps more

commonly, applied to those who take refuge ultimately in an internal faith prompted

by non-intellectual motives and influences intrinsic to the individual. Cf. JEAN-

NIERE, op. cit., p. 260. The latter class of motives, which are subjective, will

be examined in the next chapter.

19*

292 THEOR Y OF KNOWLEDGE

tegration and decay of religious faith. The speculations of

Rousseau, Voltaire and the encyclopedists, the spread of atheism

and materialism, the withering influence of an unbridled " freedom

of thought" and "liberty of conscience," the French Revolution

with its apotheosis of "reason" and "liberty," were so many

portents which, in Catholic circles, caused men to inquire

anxiously if any sure defence could be discovered for the founda

tions of belief against the lamentable results of what they natur

ally regarded as the onslaughts of " individual reason " run riot 1

And it is not surprising if some of these, losing all confidence in

the power of this "individual reason," went too far in proclaim

ing the need of its total dethronement in order to place human

certitude under the protecting aegis of faith. This in fact is

what the French Traditionalists attempted. Already Jansenism

had proclaimed the impotence of human reason unaided by

supernatural grace. Already Pascal (1623-62) had given his

verdict against both dogmatism and pyrrhonism, had dismissed

Epictetus and Montaigne as equally futile, and had heralded

the necessity of a primordial act of faith on the part of the indi

vidual human reason in search of truth. - 2 And Huet, Bishop

of Avranches (1630-1721), had proclaimed that without the aid

of Divine Revelation the human mind cannot transcend mere

probability.

With De Bonald (1754-1840) commences the line of

traditionalists proper, including De Lamennais (1782-1854),

Bautain (1795-1 867), Bonnetty( 1798- 1879), Ventura (1792-1861),

] An anxiety which was accentuated by the conviction that the stability of

social order is absolutely dependent on the general acceptance and public recogni

tion of the great fundamental truths of religion and morality : the existence of a

Supreme Being ; Divine Governance of the universe ; human freedom, responsibility

and immortality ; Divine Sanctions for human conduct.

* Cf. MKRCIER, op. cit., 61, 65. Pascal was not a sceptic, but a convinced

and fervent believer in the truths of Christianity. His Pcnsccs is a work of

apologetics rather than a philosophy. Reason, he holds, is impotent, and must

recognize its impotence, to give us certitude concerning the fundamental truths of

religion. We must begin by ignoring its questionings, and simply believe in God,

Immortality, Revelation, and the Christian Religion. But why must we believe ?

Not because reason can or does establish, on grounds of evidence, the credibility of

those truths ; or because any extrinsic authority convinces us of their credibility (as

the traditionalists contended later on) ; but because our whole nature prompts and

forces us to believe them: the human heart, too, has reasons which lie beyond mere

reason. Let us yield to them and believe those truths: then wu shall understand

how the Original Fall of man accounts for the imbecility ol mere reason. Thus

Pascal belongs to the subjectivist, affective school, rather than to the traditionalist

school, of fideism.

TRADITIONALISM 293

and Ubaghs (1800-75). The two first-mentioned writers pro

pound traditionalism in its most pronounced and extreme form,

the others in a mitigated and milder form.

 If it be denied that

reality, under the reflective scrutiny of the individual human

mind, can by its own objective evidence produce therein some

true and certain knowledge ; if it be maintained that the indi

vidual human reason, following carefully and cautiously its own

natural dictate to base its judgments and assents on the real

evidence of the data of experience, cannot attain to reflex certi

tude in regard to the most urgent problems concerning man and

the universe, the existence of a Supreme Being, the distinction

of moral good and evil, human freedom and responsibility and

immortality, the duty of religion, etc., etc., then there is no safe

anchorage left for the mind in its search after truth. Never

theless, men have at all times disagreed concerning the validity

and adequacy of evidence as a test of truth and a motive of

certitude ; and many have gone over to scepticism (chap. iv.).

This issue others have sought to avoid, and mainly in one or

other of two directions, viz. by seeking some satisfactory motive

of certitude either (a) in some source extrinsic both to the

object of the assent (the judgment) and to the individual mind

(such as Divine revelation, tradition, the common voice or ver

dict of mankind), or (d) in a source extrinsic to the object of

assent (and therefore non-intellectual), but intrinsic to the indi

vidual (such as a natural "sense " or " feeling " or " yearning " or

TRADITIONALISM 291

" instinct," or "need " or "will " to believe, etc.). Both of these

attitudes have been broadly described as Fideism, because they

have in common both the negative, anti-intellectualist element

of distrust in the capacity of the individual human intellect to

attain to truth, and the positive, dogmatic or anti-sceptical ele

ment of conviction that nevertheless certitude is attainable.

But as to how it is to be attained they differ in the manner just

indicated. 1

The historical reasons for the appeal from the court of indi

vidual rational speculation to that of the collective voice of the

race as the vehicle of an authoritative Divine revelation, are not

far to seek. What does the history of purely rational speculation

present but a medley of discordant voices ? Or what effective

power or authority has the philosopher to teach mankind the

saving truths which he needs most urgently to know? To

philosophize in isolation from, or without regard to, the

authoritative teaching of supernatural, revealed religion, i.e. the

Christian Religion, is worse than vain. The "free" exercise of

the individual human reason is not constructive or conducive to

certitude : it is rather destructive, corrosive, and leads only to

doubts and negations : it raises many questions but can answer

none. The pretension to solve by means of it the problems

and enigmas of human existence is unnatural : and history testi

fies that every attempt of the kind has only led to scepticism and

provoked a reaction in the direction of reposing human certitude

ultimately either on faith in supernatural revelation or in sub

jective, affective instincts, prompting the individual to believe in

defiance of the impotent negations of pure reason.

Thus, the sixteenth century revolt against the authoritative

teachings of revealed religion, the proclamation of the absolute

supremacy of " private judgment," and the cult of an excessive

" rationalism," threw back the warring sects of Protestantism on

a religion of purely personal beliefs which rested only on the

shifting quicksands of individual feeling. Europe in the seven

teenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a widespread disin-

1 MERCIER describes as Fideists only those who propound as the ultimate source

of certitude faith on extrinsic grounds of revelation, tradition, the unanimous assent

of the human race, etc. (op. cit., 61 sqq.). The title is equally, and perhaps more

commonly, applied to those who take refuge ultimately in an internal faith prompted

by non-intellectual motives and influences intrinsic to the individual. Cf. JEAN-

NIERE, op. cit., p. 260. The latter class of motives, which are subjective, will

be examined in the next chapter.

19*

292 THEOR Y OF KNOWLEDGE

tegration and decay of religious faith. The speculations of

Rousseau, Voltaire and the encyclopedists, the spread of atheism

and materialism, the withering influence of an unbridled " freedom

of thought" and "liberty of conscience," the French Revolution

with its apotheosis of "reason" and "liberty," were so many

portents which, in Catholic circles, caused men to inquire

anxiously if any sure defence could be discovered for the founda

tions of belief against the lamentable results of what they natur

ally regarded as the onslaughts of " individual reason " run riot 1

And it is not surprising if some of these, losing all confidence in

the power of this "individual reason," went too far in proclaim

ing the need of its total dethronement in order to place human

certitude under the protecting aegis of faith. This in fact is

what the French Traditionalists attempted. Already Jansenism

had proclaimed the impotence of human reason unaided by

supernatural grace. Already Pascal (1623-62) had given his

verdict against both dogmatism and pyrrhonism, had dismissed

Epictetus and Montaigne as equally futile, and had heralded

the necessity of a primordial act of faith on the part of the indi

vidual human reason in search of truth. - 2 And Huet, Bishop

of Avranches (1630-1721), had proclaimed that without the aid

of Divine Revelation the human mind cannot transcend mere

probability.

With De Bonald (1754-1840) commences the line of

traditionalists proper, including De Lamennais (1782-1854),

Bautain (1795-1 867), Bonnetty( 1798- 1879), Ventura (1792-1861),

] An anxiety which was accentuated by the conviction that the stability of

social order is absolutely dependent on the general acceptance and public recogni

tion of the great fundamental truths of religion and morality : the existence of a

Supreme Being ; Divine Governance of the universe ; human freedom, responsibility

and immortality ; Divine Sanctions for human conduct.

* Cf. MKRCIER, op. cit., 61, 65. Pascal was not a sceptic, but a convinced

and fervent believer in the truths of Christianity. His Pcnsccs is a work of

apologetics rather than a philosophy. Reason, he holds, is impotent, and must

recognize its impotence, to give us certitude concerning the fundamental truths of

religion. We must begin by ignoring its questionings, and simply believe in God,

Immortality, Revelation, and the Christian Religion. But why must we believe ?

Not because reason can or does establish, on grounds of evidence, the credibility of

those truths ; or because any extrinsic authority convinces us of their credibility (as

the traditionalists contended later on) ; but because our whole nature prompts and

forces us to believe them: the human heart, too, has reasons which lie beyond mere

reason. Let us yield to them and believe those truths: then wu shall understand

how the Original Fall of man accounts for the imbecility ol mere reason. Thus

Pascal belongs to the subjectivist, affective school, rather than to the traditionalist

school, of fideism.

TRADITIONALISM 293

and Ubaghs (1800-75). The two first-mentioned writers pro

pound traditionalism in its most pronounced and extreme form,

the others in a mitigated and milder form.