THEORIES.

 The conclusions we have reached in regard to the

function and force of evidence will affect different types of mind

differently. They show that the human intellect can attain to

some truth 1 with reasoned certitude, provided it prudently follow

its own natural dictates and assent firmly only to such judgments

as it sees to be clearly called for by the real exigencies of the

data presented for its interpretation. They therefore prove the

attitude of Scepticism (chap, iv.) to be unreasonable. On the

other hand they show that although the intellect is infallible in

its assent to self-evident abstract axioms, and to self-evident

interpretations of the immediate concrete data of conscious ex

perience, it is not infallible in interpreting the truth-value or

knowledge- value of such compelled spontaneous assents, or in

interpreting the real nature either of the human mind itself or of

the world that is given it for interpretation. Hence they account

for the possibility of error, and for its prevalence in regard to

the solutions of those ultimate questions that are of the most

profound import to man, the questions which constitute the

domain of philosophy proper. Our conclusions are therefore in

conformity with the broad and undeniable facts which emerge

from the history of philosophy.

But there are many philosophers who will not allow that it

is by the exercise of intellect or reason on the data of experience,

by interpreting these data and reasoning about them in the light

of the demands which they make on this faculty reflecting on

them, that the human mind can or does attain to the possession

of any truth and certitude, or at least to truth and certitude

regarding the great questions of the origin, nature, and destiny

of man and the universe. The anti-intellectualist or voluntarist

1 To how much truth ? Cf. infra, 173.

281

282 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

theories of knowledge, represented by Kant s Practical Philo

sophy, and in our own time by Pragmatism or Humanism, will

be seen below (chap, xxv.) to involve a perversion of the right

use of reason confronted with the problem of knowledge.

Again, there are philosophers who, apparently underrating

and losing faith in the power of the human intellect to attain

to a reasoned certitude on those same fundamental problems by

scrutinizing the evidence furnished by the data of human ex

perience, contend that it is only by the aid of a supernatural

Divine Revelation that man has attained, or can attain, to such

certitude. This theory known as Fideism or Traditionalism

will next claim our attention. In passing, however, from the

subject of evidence as the criterion of truth, we may glance

briefly here at a few theories, some of which are really only

modifications of the scholastic theory, and others attempts to

indicate some means apparently distinct from evidence itself, for

testing the truth of judgments.

(1) We have already examined (43, 44) the test proposed by

Spencer, as the supreme and ultimate criterion of the truth of

a judgment, viz. the "inconceivability of its opposite " ; and we

saw that not all inconceivability is, as he contended, subjective,

psychological, relative and merely negative. There is an incon

ceivability which springs from our direct and positive intuition

of the real, ontological incompatibility of the terms compared in

the "opposite" or "contradictory" of the judgment. Such, for

instance, is the incompatibility of the subject "two straight

lines " with the predicate " enclosing a space ". Such, too, is the

inconceivability of the contradictory of such a judgment as " two

and two are four," or such a judgment as " I exist". Manifestly

the test entitled "inconceivability of the opposite," understood in

this sense of positively apprehended real and objective impossibility,

is precisely the same as the scholastic test of immediate, cogent,

objective evidence, stated, however, in a needlessly indirect and

possibly misleading manner : for such judgments are not seen to

be true because their opposites are seen to be inconceivable, but

rather their opposites are seen to be inconceivable because they

themselves are seen to be objectively and necessarily true.

(2) We also saw (30, 34) that the first test adopted by Des

cartes was that known as the " clear and distinct idea " : he could

not doubt his own existence because he " saw very clearly that,

in order to think, one must exist " ; and so he accepted as a

INTELLECTUALIST THEORIES OF CERTITUDE 283

general rule the test "that the things which we conceive very

clearly and very distinctly are all true "^ It is beyond doubt,

too, that he accepted this test as guaranteeing the objective truth

of the intuition of his own existence, and not merely in the

Kantian sense of revealing this intuition as a subjective mental

synthesis of conscious thought-products (30, 31). Now, if the

test is understood in this objective sense, 2 if it means that the

clearly apprehended real exigency of a given conscious content

to be represented by some definite judgment or interpretation, or

the cogency with which it compels such a judgment, is to be

taken as adequate ground for the objective truth of this judgment,

then the test is obviously identical with that described by schol

astics as cogent, immediate, objective evidence. Where Descartes

erred, therefore, was (a) in not applying the test impartially to

other self-evident truths besides that of his own existence ; (fr)

in thinking that it was not ultimate, in entertaining a serious

doubt about its real validity, in imagining that its real validity

needed to be vindicated by establishing its dependence on the

Divine Veracity ; and (c} in trying to prove the existence of God

by employing principles and premisses for the truth of which

he had no other test than the one he had just declared to be

unreliable (34).

(3) It is needless to point out that a reasoned knowledge of the -veracity

of God as the author of our faculties cannot possibly be for us the ultimate

guarantee of the truth of our judgments : on such an assumption any and

every attempted proof of God s existence would be a petitio principal

(4) The same is true of the theory according to which the ultimate guar

antee of the truth of necessary principles of the ideal order would be not their

objective self-evidence but the knowledge that they are expressions of the

Eternal Exemplar or Archetype Ideas in the Divine Mind.* In the onto-

logical order, of course, the Divine Essence is the ultimate ground of the

necessary truth of such judgments. 5 But it is another thing altogether to

contend that in the logical order we must know this dependence of truth on

the Divine Intellect before we can have any reasoned certitude : 6 if this were

so, reasoned certitude would be unattainable.

(5) Again, we have seen that the immediate disciples of Descartes, and

notably MALEBRANCHE (80, 123), considering that even immediate sense evi

dence, as presented to the intellect, could give us no cognitive insight into the

1 Discours de la Mcthode, apiid MERCIER, op. cit., pp. 213-14.

2 Cf. vol. i., 30, p. 112, n. i.

3 Cf. MERCIER, op. cit., 94-6, for critique of Descartes arguments.

4 Ibid., too; cf. vol. i., 69, 70, 80; supra, 139.

5 Cf. Ontology, 20. 6 MERCIER, op. cit., 101.

284 TI1EOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

existence of contingent, material reality, i.e. reality transcending the Ego and

external to the Ego, adopted the view that the only rational ground we have

for assenting to judgments which affirm the existence and nature of material

reality must be the conviction that such judgments are intuitions of this

reality in the Divine Mind decreeing its existence. Not only does this theory

confuse our knowledge of the existence of things with our knowledge of the

mode of their origin? but it likewise involves a vicious circle and renders all

knowledge impossible. For we are certainly not conscious of seeing either

the essences or the existences of contingent things in the Divine Mind. The

existence of God has therefore to be proved. But in order to prove it the

individual human being must be certain (a) of the objective and real truth of

principles of the ideal order (on the ground of their immediate intellectual

evidence), and (b] of his own existence as a rent, permanent, abiding, contin

gent being, distinct from the flow of his conscious states. But he cannot

consistently accept the evidence forthcoming for this latter conviction if he

rejects the similar evidence furnished by sense perception for the real,

permanent, abiding existence of a material reality distinct from his perception,

and from himself the perceiver. 2

In a similar way, when Berkeley (failing to see how the conscious sub

ject can transcend his own conscious states, and apparently concluding that

they cannot be transcended) denied that immediate sense evidence must be

interpreted as revealing an external material reality whose real esse would be

independent of \\.s percipi, he was inconsistent in interpreting any of his con

scious states as revealing, beyond themselves, anything in the nature of a real,

permanent, abiding, substantial Ego or mind : an inconsistency which Hume

was not slow to bring to light, and which he himself escaped only by drawing

the logical conclusion of pan-phenomenism. From this intellectual morass

Kant in turn tried to emerge ; but his effort was futile simply because he too

misinterpreted the significance of objective evidence by clinging to the

idealist postulate in the face of this same evidence.

 The conclusions we have reached in regard to the

function and force of evidence will affect different types of mind

differently. They show that the human intellect can attain to

some truth 1 with reasoned certitude, provided it prudently follow

its own natural dictates and assent firmly only to such judgments

as it sees to be clearly called for by the real exigencies of the

data presented for its interpretation. They therefore prove the

attitude of Scepticism (chap, iv.) to be unreasonable. On the

other hand they show that although the intellect is infallible in

its assent to self-evident abstract axioms, and to self-evident

interpretations of the immediate concrete data of conscious ex

perience, it is not infallible in interpreting the truth-value or

knowledge- value of such compelled spontaneous assents, or in

interpreting the real nature either of the human mind itself or of

the world that is given it for interpretation. Hence they account

for the possibility of error, and for its prevalence in regard to

the solutions of those ultimate questions that are of the most

profound import to man, the questions which constitute the

domain of philosophy proper. Our conclusions are therefore in

conformity with the broad and undeniable facts which emerge

from the history of philosophy.

But there are many philosophers who will not allow that it

is by the exercise of intellect or reason on the data of experience,

by interpreting these data and reasoning about them in the light

of the demands which they make on this faculty reflecting on

them, that the human mind can or does attain to the possession

of any truth and certitude, or at least to truth and certitude

regarding the great questions of the origin, nature, and destiny

of man and the universe. The anti-intellectualist or voluntarist

1 To how much truth ? Cf. infra, 173.

281

282 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

theories of knowledge, represented by Kant s Practical Philo

sophy, and in our own time by Pragmatism or Humanism, will

be seen below (chap, xxv.) to involve a perversion of the right

use of reason confronted with the problem of knowledge.

Again, there are philosophers who, apparently underrating

and losing faith in the power of the human intellect to attain

to a reasoned certitude on those same fundamental problems by

scrutinizing the evidence furnished by the data of human ex

perience, contend that it is only by the aid of a supernatural

Divine Revelation that man has attained, or can attain, to such

certitude. This theory known as Fideism or Traditionalism

will next claim our attention. In passing, however, from the

subject of evidence as the criterion of truth, we may glance

briefly here at a few theories, some of which are really only

modifications of the scholastic theory, and others attempts to

indicate some means apparently distinct from evidence itself, for

testing the truth of judgments.

(1) We have already examined (43, 44) the test proposed by

Spencer, as the supreme and ultimate criterion of the truth of

a judgment, viz. the "inconceivability of its opposite " ; and we

saw that not all inconceivability is, as he contended, subjective,

psychological, relative and merely negative. There is an incon

ceivability which springs from our direct and positive intuition

of the real, ontological incompatibility of the terms compared in

the "opposite" or "contradictory" of the judgment. Such, for

instance, is the incompatibility of the subject "two straight

lines " with the predicate " enclosing a space ". Such, too, is the

inconceivability of the contradictory of such a judgment as " two

and two are four," or such a judgment as " I exist". Manifestly

the test entitled "inconceivability of the opposite," understood in

this sense of positively apprehended real and objective impossibility,

is precisely the same as the scholastic test of immediate, cogent,

objective evidence, stated, however, in a needlessly indirect and

possibly misleading manner : for such judgments are not seen to

be true because their opposites are seen to be inconceivable, but

rather their opposites are seen to be inconceivable because they

themselves are seen to be objectively and necessarily true.

(2) We also saw (30, 34) that the first test adopted by Des

cartes was that known as the " clear and distinct idea " : he could

not doubt his own existence because he " saw very clearly that,

in order to think, one must exist " ; and so he accepted as a

INTELLECTUALIST THEORIES OF CERTITUDE 283

general rule the test "that the things which we conceive very

clearly and very distinctly are all true "^ It is beyond doubt,

too, that he accepted this test as guaranteeing the objective truth

of the intuition of his own existence, and not merely in the

Kantian sense of revealing this intuition as a subjective mental

synthesis of conscious thought-products (30, 31). Now, if the

test is understood in this objective sense, 2 if it means that the

clearly apprehended real exigency of a given conscious content

to be represented by some definite judgment or interpretation, or

the cogency with which it compels such a judgment, is to be

taken as adequate ground for the objective truth of this judgment,

then the test is obviously identical with that described by schol

astics as cogent, immediate, objective evidence. Where Descartes

erred, therefore, was (a) in not applying the test impartially to

other self-evident truths besides that of his own existence ; (fr)

in thinking that it was not ultimate, in entertaining a serious

doubt about its real validity, in imagining that its real validity

needed to be vindicated by establishing its dependence on the

Divine Veracity ; and (c} in trying to prove the existence of God

by employing principles and premisses for the truth of which

he had no other test than the one he had just declared to be

unreliable (34).

(3) It is needless to point out that a reasoned knowledge of the -veracity

of God as the author of our faculties cannot possibly be for us the ultimate

guarantee of the truth of our judgments : on such an assumption any and

every attempted proof of God s existence would be a petitio principal

(4) The same is true of the theory according to which the ultimate guar

antee of the truth of necessary principles of the ideal order would be not their

objective self-evidence but the knowledge that they are expressions of the

Eternal Exemplar or Archetype Ideas in the Divine Mind.* In the onto-

logical order, of course, the Divine Essence is the ultimate ground of the

necessary truth of such judgments. 5 But it is another thing altogether to

contend that in the logical order we must know this dependence of truth on

the Divine Intellect before we can have any reasoned certitude : 6 if this were

so, reasoned certitude would be unattainable.

(5) Again, we have seen that the immediate disciples of Descartes, and

notably MALEBRANCHE (80, 123), considering that even immediate sense evi

dence, as presented to the intellect, could give us no cognitive insight into the

1 Discours de la Mcthode, apiid MERCIER, op. cit., pp. 213-14.

2 Cf. vol. i., 30, p. 112, n. i.

3 Cf. MERCIER, op. cit., 94-6, for critique of Descartes arguments.

4 Ibid., too; cf. vol. i., 69, 70, 80; supra, 139.

5 Cf. Ontology, 20. 6 MERCIER, op. cit., 101.

284 TI1EOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

existence of contingent, material reality, i.e. reality transcending the Ego and

external to the Ego, adopted the view that the only rational ground we have

for assenting to judgments which affirm the existence and nature of material

reality must be the conviction that such judgments are intuitions of this

reality in the Divine Mind decreeing its existence. Not only does this theory

confuse our knowledge of the existence of things with our knowledge of the

mode of their origin? but it likewise involves a vicious circle and renders all

knowledge impossible. For we are certainly not conscious of seeing either

the essences or the existences of contingent things in the Divine Mind. The

existence of God has therefore to be proved. But in order to prove it the

individual human being must be certain (a) of the objective and real truth of

principles of the ideal order (on the ground of their immediate intellectual

evidence), and (b] of his own existence as a rent, permanent, abiding, contin

gent being, distinct from the flow of his conscious states. But he cannot

consistently accept the evidence forthcoming for this latter conviction if he

rejects the similar evidence furnished by sense perception for the real,

permanent, abiding existence of a material reality distinct from his perception,

and from himself the perceiver. 2

In a similar way, when Berkeley (failing to see how the conscious sub

ject can transcend his own conscious states, and apparently concluding that

they cannot be transcended) denied that immediate sense evidence must be

interpreted as revealing an external material reality whose real esse would be

independent of \\.s percipi, he was inconsistent in interpreting any of his con

scious states as revealing, beyond themselves, anything in the nature of a real,

permanent, abiding, substantial Ego or mind : an inconsistency which Hume

was not slow to bring to light, and which he himself escaped only by drawing

the logical conclusion of pan-phenomenism. From this intellectual morass

Kant in turn tried to emerge ; but his effort was futile simply because he too

misinterpreted the significance of objective evidence by clinging to the

idealist postulate in the face of this same evidence.