146. DEFINITION OF TRUTH.

 Hence the traditional schol

astic definition of logical truth 2 or the truth of knowledge as "the

conformity of the mind judging about reality, or of the mind s

judgment about reality, with the reality to which the judgment

refers". 3 But for the proper understanding of this definition

certain points must be noted.

In the first place the conformity in question, like the rela

tion which we call " cognition " or " knowledge," is sui generis and

does not admit of illustration by analogies. It is not to be

thought of as physical or photographic ; it has been described as

"mental," "representative," " intentionalis ".

1 All existential judgments are contingent, except the judgment which asserts

the existence of the Necessary Being.

2 Ontological truth is reality itself considered as conformable and conformed

with its mental type or archetype in some mind or intellect. Cf. Ontology, 40-3.

Moral or ethical truth, or veracity, is the conformity of language with thought.

Cf. Science of Logic, ii., 248.

3 Science of Logic, ibid.

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 249

Secondly, it is not adequate : no one true judgment, and no

accumulation of true judgments, can ever adequately conform the

human mind with reality, for the simple reason that the human

mind is finite, imperfect, incapable of exhausting what is know-

able in the real. Hence, although a judgment is true when that

which it expresses is really so, nevertheless it leaves the mind in

ignorance of further knowledge about the real : this absence of

further mental conformity with reality is sometimes spoken of as

" negative discord " of the mind with reality : it is plainly dif

ferent from the positive discord or want of conformity, produced

by the false or erroneous judgment.

Thirdly, the conformity in which logical truth consists, is not

to be found in the mere sense awareness produced by the presence

of a percept, or in the mere intellectual awareness produced by the

presence of a concept, 1 although both in perception and in con

ception there is a conscious relation of subject to object : it is

only when the mind judges, affirms or denies a predicate (which

may be either " existence " or some other abstract note or factor)

of a subject, that there can be question of truth or error, i.e. of

the concord or discord of the mental representation (which is the

formal identification of predicate with subject, or separation of

predicate from subject) with the objective reality so represented

or interpreted. 2 If judgment were the mere passive mirroring of

reality in the mind, then, so far as reality thus revealed itself to

mind there would be a necessary conformity of the latter with

the former : there could be no question of error (17). But judg

ment is no such passive mental assimilation of reality ; it is an

active process of analysis and synthesis, an " actus componendi et

dividendi" an intellectual fractioning or resolution of the stream

of presented reality into abstract aspects, and an interpretation

or mental representation or reconstruction of the presented reality

1 Note the force of the expression " mere . . . awareness " : for both percep

tion and conception are normally accompanied by the active, interpretative process

of judgment, which process, of course, always establishes the relation of logical

truth or error.

2 Hence ST. THOMAS defines truth in these well-known terms : " Veritas in-

tellectus est adaequatio rei et intellectus secundnm quod intellectus dicit esse quod est,

vel non esse quod non est ". Summa Contra Gentes, I., q. 5. And again : " Verum

enim est cum dicitur esse quod est vel non esse quod non est. Falsum autem est cum

dicitur non esse quod est, vel esse quod non est". In Met., iv., L. 8. These formulae

plainly reproduce Aristotle s definition : " Tb JUP 7ap \4ytiv rb %v /UT) efrai 1j rb /j.^ ov

flvai tytvSos, rb 8e rb 6j/ ttvai KO.\ rb ^ ov /u)j tli/ni a.\t\9ts ". -Met., iii., 7 ( ec ^- Didot).

Cf. Science of Logic, ibid.

250

by a series of mental comparisons of these aspects, mental

affirmations or identifications, and mental denials or separations,

of predicates and subjects.

Fourthly, in the definition we understand by "reality"

("ra-"), not of course the reality "as it is in itself" if by this

phrase be meant "standing out of all relation to mind": we

have already shown how absurd and self-contradictory it is to

speak of true knowledge, or any knowledge, of " things as they

are in themselves " in that sense (126, ii.). Against the conception

of truth or true knowledge as the conformity of a mental state

with an extramental reality considered as " in itself," or " un

related to" and " independent of" mind, there is the unanswer

able objection that on such a view we could never know any

judgment to be true inasmuch as the extramental term of the

relation of conformity would be ex hypothesi not present to mind,

so that it could never be known whether the relation is one of

conformity or not.

We mean, therefore, simply the extramental reality, internal

or external, Ego or non-Ego, as it really is when it stands related

to the mind by being "present" or "presented" to the mind in

and through our direct perceptual and conceptual processes.

Reality is presented to intellect through sense as a collection

or series of individual data each of which is first apprehended

intellectually through the transcendental concept of " thing,"

" being," " reality," individuated as "this thing," "this being,"

"this reality," "hoc aliquid" roSe rL Each such datum the

intellect proceeds to "interpret" or "represent" by discovering

in it, and identifying with it in affirmative judgments, previously

conceived aspects of reality, specific and generic, and by denying

other aspects or thought-objects of it in negative judgments : a

process which likewise involves comparisons of these abstract

aspects with one another and judgments asserting their mutual

compatibility or incompatibility as factors of one and the same

reality. The affirmative judgment pronounces two formally

distinct concepts (subject and predicate) to be objectively and

really identical ; the negative judgment pronounces them to be

diverse or separate, pronounces the predicate to be not really

identical with the subject. The affirmative judgment is true if

the identity represented by it expresses an objective, real identity

(e.g. "Man is mortal"; "England declared war on Germany in

August, 1914"); otherwise it is false (e.g. "The sun moves

7-7? UTH AND E VIDENCE 2 5 1

round the earth " ; "The human soul is mortal "). Similarly the

negative judgment is true if the diversity or non-identity repre

sented by it expresses an objective, real diversity or non-identity

(e.g. " Not all wars are just " ; " 1917 is not a leap-year ") ; other

wise it is false (e.g. "There is no God " ; " The human will is not

free "). Hence judgment might also be defined as a mental act

which represents a reality by objectively and really identifying

formally distinct aspects of that reality (affirmative] , or by ob

jectively and really separating some thought-object (or aspect of

reality) from that reality (negative}. And the truth of a judg

ment might similarly be defined as the conformity of the

identifying (affirmative] or discriminating (negative] representa

tion with an objective and real identity or diversity, respec

tively. 1

 Hence the traditional schol

astic definition of logical truth 2 or the truth of knowledge as "the

conformity of the mind judging about reality, or of the mind s

judgment about reality, with the reality to which the judgment

refers". 3 But for the proper understanding of this definition

certain points must be noted.

In the first place the conformity in question, like the rela

tion which we call " cognition " or " knowledge," is sui generis and

does not admit of illustration by analogies. It is not to be

thought of as physical or photographic ; it has been described as

"mental," "representative," " intentionalis ".

1 All existential judgments are contingent, except the judgment which asserts

the existence of the Necessary Being.

2 Ontological truth is reality itself considered as conformable and conformed

with its mental type or archetype in some mind or intellect. Cf. Ontology, 40-3.

Moral or ethical truth, or veracity, is the conformity of language with thought.

Cf. Science of Logic, ii., 248.

3 Science of Logic, ibid.

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 249

Secondly, it is not adequate : no one true judgment, and no

accumulation of true judgments, can ever adequately conform the

human mind with reality, for the simple reason that the human

mind is finite, imperfect, incapable of exhausting what is know-

able in the real. Hence, although a judgment is true when that

which it expresses is really so, nevertheless it leaves the mind in

ignorance of further knowledge about the real : this absence of

further mental conformity with reality is sometimes spoken of as

" negative discord " of the mind with reality : it is plainly dif

ferent from the positive discord or want of conformity, produced

by the false or erroneous judgment.

Thirdly, the conformity in which logical truth consists, is not

to be found in the mere sense awareness produced by the presence

of a percept, or in the mere intellectual awareness produced by the

presence of a concept, 1 although both in perception and in con

ception there is a conscious relation of subject to object : it is

only when the mind judges, affirms or denies a predicate (which

may be either " existence " or some other abstract note or factor)

of a subject, that there can be question of truth or error, i.e. of

the concord or discord of the mental representation (which is the

formal identification of predicate with subject, or separation of

predicate from subject) with the objective reality so represented

or interpreted. 2 If judgment were the mere passive mirroring of

reality in the mind, then, so far as reality thus revealed itself to

mind there would be a necessary conformity of the latter with

the former : there could be no question of error (17). But judg

ment is no such passive mental assimilation of reality ; it is an

active process of analysis and synthesis, an " actus componendi et

dividendi" an intellectual fractioning or resolution of the stream

of presented reality into abstract aspects, and an interpretation

or mental representation or reconstruction of the presented reality

1 Note the force of the expression " mere . . . awareness " : for both percep

tion and conception are normally accompanied by the active, interpretative process

of judgment, which process, of course, always establishes the relation of logical

truth or error.

2 Hence ST. THOMAS defines truth in these well-known terms : " Veritas in-

tellectus est adaequatio rei et intellectus secundnm quod intellectus dicit esse quod est,

vel non esse quod non est ". Summa Contra Gentes, I., q. 5. And again : " Verum

enim est cum dicitur esse quod est vel non esse quod non est. Falsum autem est cum

dicitur non esse quod est, vel esse quod non est". In Met., iv., L. 8. These formulae

plainly reproduce Aristotle s definition : " Tb JUP 7ap \4ytiv rb %v /UT) efrai 1j rb /j.^ ov

flvai tytvSos, rb 8e rb 6j/ ttvai KO.\ rb ^ ov /u)j tli/ni a.\t\9ts ". -Met., iii., 7 ( ec ^- Didot).

Cf. Science of Logic, ibid.

250

by a series of mental comparisons of these aspects, mental

affirmations or identifications, and mental denials or separations,

of predicates and subjects.

Fourthly, in the definition we understand by "reality"

("ra-"), not of course the reality "as it is in itself" if by this

phrase be meant "standing out of all relation to mind": we

have already shown how absurd and self-contradictory it is to

speak of true knowledge, or any knowledge, of " things as they

are in themselves " in that sense (126, ii.). Against the conception

of truth or true knowledge as the conformity of a mental state

with an extramental reality considered as " in itself," or " un

related to" and " independent of" mind, there is the unanswer

able objection that on such a view we could never know any

judgment to be true inasmuch as the extramental term of the

relation of conformity would be ex hypothesi not present to mind,

so that it could never be known whether the relation is one of

conformity or not.

We mean, therefore, simply the extramental reality, internal

or external, Ego or non-Ego, as it really is when it stands related

to the mind by being "present" or "presented" to the mind in

and through our direct perceptual and conceptual processes.

Reality is presented to intellect through sense as a collection

or series of individual data each of which is first apprehended

intellectually through the transcendental concept of " thing,"

" being," " reality," individuated as "this thing," "this being,"

"this reality," "hoc aliquid" roSe rL Each such datum the

intellect proceeds to "interpret" or "represent" by discovering

in it, and identifying with it in affirmative judgments, previously

conceived aspects of reality, specific and generic, and by denying

other aspects or thought-objects of it in negative judgments : a

process which likewise involves comparisons of these abstract

aspects with one another and judgments asserting their mutual

compatibility or incompatibility as factors of one and the same

reality. The affirmative judgment pronounces two formally

distinct concepts (subject and predicate) to be objectively and

really identical ; the negative judgment pronounces them to be

diverse or separate, pronounces the predicate to be not really

identical with the subject. The affirmative judgment is true if

the identity represented by it expresses an objective, real identity

(e.g. "Man is mortal"; "England declared war on Germany in

August, 1914"); otherwise it is false (e.g. "The sun moves

7-7? UTH AND E VIDENCE 2 5 1

round the earth " ; "The human soul is mortal "). Similarly the

negative judgment is true if the diversity or non-identity repre

sented by it expresses an objective, real diversity or non-identity

(e.g. " Not all wars are just " ; " 1917 is not a leap-year ") ; other

wise it is false (e.g. "There is no God " ; " The human will is not

free "). Hence judgment might also be defined as a mental act

which represents a reality by objectively and really identifying

formally distinct aspects of that reality (affirmative] , or by ob

jectively and really separating some thought-object (or aspect of

reality) from that reality (negative}. And the truth of a judg

ment might similarly be defined as the conformity of the

identifying (affirmative] or discriminating (negative] representa

tion with an objective and real identity or diversity, respec

tively. 1