DENCE OF PRINCIPLES OF THE IDEAL ORDER.

 (5) In re

futing Kant s theory that the mind is compelled from the

subjective side by a priori forms to effect the necessary and uni

versal syntheses called axioms or principles (63-65), and in proving

that it is compelled rather from the objective side by what it sees

in the presented reality , in the content of its concepts (68), we

have really proved that objective evidence is the criterion of the

truth of such principles and the motive of our assent to them.

What we there established explicitly was the objectivity, the real

objectivity, of those principles. But in tJieir case objectivity is

really indistinguishable from truth. For the abstract thought-

1 It is the same judicial faculty which judges spontaneously and by critical reflec

tion ; and in obedience to the same order of principles of interpretation and motives

of assent (24).

2 Chaps, xiv. and xv., especially 103-5, 109-11.

3 And a fortiori whatever certain knowledge we may attain to concerning the

qualities and nature of the material universe.

272 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

objects which they compare, and pronounce to be necessarily

inclusive or exclusive of one another, are absolutely simple and

unanalysable. They are the ultimate terms of intellectual

analysis. Hence their mere presence to the intellect simul

taneously (e.g. the presence of " 2 + 2 " and "4" ; or " whole"

and "part"; or "straight line" and "shortest distance between

two points " ; or "event" and "efficient cause" ; or "veracity "

and "virtue"; or "responsibility" and "liberty"; etc., etc.),

necessitates the intuition of a nexus between them, and that in

virtue of their apprehended content. If the intellect apprehends

them at all it necessarily and infallibly apprehends the nexus

between them. That is to say, in the apprehension of axioms

or first principles of the ideal order intellect is infallible, even

though in forming its more complex concepts, and in deriving

remote conclusions from principles, it is fallible. 1 If, therefore,

those ultimate thought-objects are aspects of reality, i.e. if their

content is real and given through sense to intellect, then those

axiomatic syntheses or judgments are genuine intellectual repre

sentations of reality ; they conform the mind with reality ; they

are objectively, really and evidently true. But in dealing with

the relation of conception with perception, the relation of abstract

concepts with their concrete counterparts in sense consciousness,

we have shown that while the form of our concepts (i.e. their

abstractness and universality) is indeed a mode of apprehension

which springs from the nature of the human intellect, and is

therefore an intentio logica, an ens rationis or mental construction,

the matter of our concepts is real, is given to, and not con

structed by intellect. 2 And in dealing with the relation between

sense perception and extramental reality we have shown our

concrete sense percepts to be manifestations or revelations of this

reality to our minds. 3 Hence those self-evident axioms or

principles give us a genuine insight into reality as it is in itself,

and not merely into mentally constructed "objects " or " pheno

mena ". In other words they clo not reveal merely the constitu

tion of the human intellect (140); they reveal the nature of

reality: they are " laws of reality, laws to which whatever is

either actual or possible must conform, laws which are partial ex

pressions of the nature or essence of reality" * Hence the self-

1 Cf. 68, iii., which should be re-read in connexion with the present context.

3 Cf. 69 ; chaps, ix. and xii. 3 Cf. Part IV., passim.

4 Vol. i.,6g, pp. 243-4.

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 273

evidence which compels the assent of the intellect to such axioms

is the manifestation, to the mind, of objective reality or objective

truth as being necessarily representable by the mind through

such axioms (30-33).

 (5) In re

futing Kant s theory that the mind is compelled from the

subjective side by a priori forms to effect the necessary and uni

versal syntheses called axioms or principles (63-65), and in proving

that it is compelled rather from the objective side by what it sees

in the presented reality , in the content of its concepts (68), we

have really proved that objective evidence is the criterion of the

truth of such principles and the motive of our assent to them.

What we there established explicitly was the objectivity, the real

objectivity, of those principles. But in tJieir case objectivity is

really indistinguishable from truth. For the abstract thought-

1 It is the same judicial faculty which judges spontaneously and by critical reflec

tion ; and in obedience to the same order of principles of interpretation and motives

of assent (24).

2 Chaps, xiv. and xv., especially 103-5, 109-11.

3 And a fortiori whatever certain knowledge we may attain to concerning the

qualities and nature of the material universe.

272 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

objects which they compare, and pronounce to be necessarily

inclusive or exclusive of one another, are absolutely simple and

unanalysable. They are the ultimate terms of intellectual

analysis. Hence their mere presence to the intellect simul

taneously (e.g. the presence of " 2 + 2 " and "4" ; or " whole"

and "part"; or "straight line" and "shortest distance between

two points " ; or "event" and "efficient cause" ; or "veracity "

and "virtue"; or "responsibility" and "liberty"; etc., etc.),

necessitates the intuition of a nexus between them, and that in

virtue of their apprehended content. If the intellect apprehends

them at all it necessarily and infallibly apprehends the nexus

between them. That is to say, in the apprehension of axioms

or first principles of the ideal order intellect is infallible, even

though in forming its more complex concepts, and in deriving

remote conclusions from principles, it is fallible. 1 If, therefore,

those ultimate thought-objects are aspects of reality, i.e. if their

content is real and given through sense to intellect, then those

axiomatic syntheses or judgments are genuine intellectual repre

sentations of reality ; they conform the mind with reality ; they

are objectively, really and evidently true. But in dealing with

the relation of conception with perception, the relation of abstract

concepts with their concrete counterparts in sense consciousness,

we have shown that while the form of our concepts (i.e. their

abstractness and universality) is indeed a mode of apprehension

which springs from the nature of the human intellect, and is

therefore an intentio logica, an ens rationis or mental construction,

the matter of our concepts is real, is given to, and not con

structed by intellect. 2 And in dealing with the relation between

sense perception and extramental reality we have shown our

concrete sense percepts to be manifestations or revelations of this

reality to our minds. 3 Hence those self-evident axioms or

principles give us a genuine insight into reality as it is in itself,

and not merely into mentally constructed "objects " or " pheno

mena ". In other words they clo not reveal merely the constitu

tion of the human intellect (140); they reveal the nature of

reality: they are " laws of reality, laws to which whatever is

either actual or possible must conform, laws which are partial ex

pressions of the nature or essence of reality" * Hence the self-

1 Cf. 68, iii., which should be re-read in connexion with the present context.

3 Cf. 69 ; chaps, ix. and xii. 3 Cf. Part IV., passim.

4 Vol. i.,6g, pp. 243-4.

TRUTH AND EVIDENCE 273

evidence which compels the assent of the intellect to such axioms

is the manifestation, to the mind, of objective reality or objective

truth as being necessarily representable by the mind through

such axioms (30-33).