127. THE MAIN DIFFICULTY.

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We must next examine a

form of difficulty which is brought against the theory of immedi

ate sense perception and plausibly supported by appeal to a

variety of facts commonly described as "sense illusions" (118).

It may be stated as follows : 3

If that which is present to consciousness in perception, that

of which we are directly and immediately aware, be the external

reality, then contradictory predicates would be true of the same

reality. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore what is

present to consciousness is not the external reality but a psychic

or mental " appearance " or " representation " produced by the

1 And no supporter of the theory of mediate or representative sense perception.

2 Knowing that " what it is really and externally" means "what it appears to

the normal perceiver " : the very real but normal and uniform subjective influence

of the perceiver s organism on " what it appears," being an element of difference

which is tacitly understood to be really there but to be left out of account in equi-

parating the meaning of those two phrases.

3 C/. JEANNIBRE, op. cit., pp. 398-9.

1 60 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

reality, and from which under due conditions we can infer the

latter. 1 And that contradictory predicates are affirmed of what

is present to consciousness is abundantly evident from facts like

the following : " Tepid water is cold to the hot hand and hot to

the cold hand (i.e. is simultaneously cold and not cold) ; the

same house is larger or smaller, the same tower is square or

round, according to the distance of the observer ; the sun is

two feet in diameter to one person and one foot in diameter to

another, though its real magnitude is great and does not change ;

the same colour is red to one and green to another (i.e. to a

Daltonian) ; the same substance is sweet to one and bitter to

another ; the same insect is tiny or large according as seen with

the naked eye or through a microscope ; things are purple or

yellow according as seen through purple or yellow glasses ; stars

are now visible which have ceased to exist long ages ago ;

sometimes people see two suns in the heavens, while there is

only one de facto ; and so of innumerable other examples ". "

Now such facts can be easily explained, and all contradiction

avoided, if the contradictory predicates be understood to have for

their subjects not the one self-identical external reality, but the

mental appearances produced by it ; for while it remains the

same these do indeed differ through change in the subjective

and the external or spatial conditions of perception, so that it is

not to tlie same subject that the contradictory predicates refer.

Hence in all such examples as those referred to, the copula "is"

means "appears " : otherwise error is incurred by an unlawful

transition from the order of appearances to the order of reality. 3

Now in reply to this difficulty we purpose showing firstly,

that the manner it suggests of avoiding self-contradiction is not

the only way of doing so, or in other words that perceptionism

as propounded in the preceding sections is in no way self-con-

1 The conclusion, as formulated by JEANNIKRE (op. cit., pp. 398-9), " Ergo, ne

violctur pyincipium contradictions, dicendum est realitatem sensibus referri, non nt est

in seipsa, sed ut apparet sensibus " : " reality is reported by the senses not as it is in

itself, but as it appears to the senses," seems to make the (perceived) " appearance "

and the (known) " externality" two aspects or modes or conditions of one and the

same reality (cf. infra, 128, 129) ; but he clearly supposes that contradiction|can be

avoided only by holding that in every such case the contradictory predicates should

be understood to refer not to the external reality but to the mental appearances,

which are really different and therefore really susceptible of contradictory predicates,

while the external reality of which they are appearances remains of course one

and the same unchanged reality.

"JEANNIERE, ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 399.

INTUITIVE REALISM 161

tradictory ; and secondly, that there are very grave reasons against

adopting the suggested distinction between " mental appear

ances " and "external reality" as a satisfactory explanation of

the facts.

First, then, the facts alleged are undeniable. Moreover, it

must be admitted that if " what reality appears to the individual

perceiver in any and every condition, organic and extra-organic,

of perception," be judged to be a function of the " reality as it is

externally," in other words if naif perceptionism, which does

not take account of the part played by the actual conditions,

organic and extra-organic, of perception, in determining how the

external reality appears, be adopted, then indeed self-contradic

tion would result : water would be simultaneously hot and not

hot, the same colour would be red and not red, etc., etc. But if,

on the contrary, our interpretation of "what the thing is really

and externally " takes the influence of these conditions into ac

count, and allows for them, if it is realized that we know " what

the thing is really and externally " only by " what it appears to

the normal perceiver," so that this latter appearance is always

understood to be implied in the very meaning of "what the

thing is really and externally," 1 then, while what we perceive

is not a mental appearance but the extramental reality, not a

single one of the predications in the examples cited, or in any

other examples, is really self-contradictory. For whenever in

such a case we make a number of incompatible predications

about the perceived reality, they are incompatible because they

refer to what the thing appears under different sets of (organic or

extra-organic) conditions : and only one predication (in respect to

the domain of predication in question), whether it be among the

predications actually made or not, can refer to " the thing as it

is really and externally," "what it is really and externally"

being known to us only through " what it appears to the normal

perceiver," since this mode of appearance is a real function of

" what the thing is really and externally ". It is a question of

understanding what we mean by our assertions that material

things " are such or such really and externally". This has been

explained already, and we may refer the reader again to our

1 I.e. the function of appearing in a certain way in normal conditions of percep

tion is a real function of the external reality, and is precisely the function, and the

only function, which makes it possible for us to know intellectually what the thing

is, in so far as we have (inadequate) intellectual knowledge of this latter.

VOL. II. II

1 62 THEOR Y OF KNO VVLEDGE

discussion of one of the examples given above, that of Dalton

ism (126). For the sake of illustration let us take another

example. A person in one part of the world sees the sun high

in the heavens " a foot in diameter" ; another in a different part

of the world sees it sinking near the horizon " two feet in dia

meter". Suppose they judge it accordingly. Both judgments

refer to the same "external reality ". Both predicates are right

if they are referred to "what this reality appears" to each in the

two separate sets of spatial conditions ; both predicates are wrong

if they are referred to "what this reality is externally (in respect

of size or diameter) ". What it is externally in this respect is

not what it appears to any one or more individuals, for such

appearances include the influence of different spatial conditions

of distance and perspective: what it is really and externally in

point of size, is what its normally appearing size which differs

in varying spatial conditions is interpreted to be for a reality

situated at such a distance from normal perceivers. 1

This, of course, raises again the question, How do we know

intellectually what a reality is really and externally ? And par

ticularly it raises the question of which more presently as to

the significance of our concept of space. How can we know

(intellectually) that a reality is external, or what it is externally,

otherwise than by seeing, through reflection, that the contents of

our abstract intellectual concepts of extension, externality, space,

etc., given in the concretely felt extensity and externality of the

immediate data of sense perception, are real ; and that when a

sense datum appears to the normal perceiver as extended, spatial,

external, it is therefore not only conceived intellectually to be so,

but is really so ? The two people looking at the sun perceive

something real. How do we or they know? How else but be

cause we and they regard sense perception as a process which

makes us aware of reality? They perceive something extra-

mental and external? Again, how do we or they know? Be

cause we regard the sensuously felt extramentality of the immediate

data of consciousness as being eo ipso real, and the sensuously felt

externality of such data as being in normal conditions of sense per-

1 C/. JEANNIERE, op. cit., pp. 413-14 : " Ex eo quod res apparet vg. dulcis aut

amara, quadrata aut rotunda, rubra aut viridis, non est certum illam rem esse talem

qualis apparet, nisi intellectus attenderit ad omnes sensus qui aliquid de ea referunt,

et constiterit ab eis illam rem mocJo iwrmali referri ".

"/.P. Gxtrz-snbjective,

INTUITIVE REALISM 163

ception eo ipso real. But suppose we refuse to regard any im

mediate data of sense consciousness as being at all extramental,

and insist on regarding them all as infra-subjective, intramental

entities, how then are we ever to know that there is anything

beyond, anything really extramental or external ?

Realist supporters of the theory of mediate sense perception

have recourse to the principle of causality a procedure which we

need not re-examine here. But let us return to the difficulty set

forth above, and endeavour to show in the second place how un

satisfactory it is to account for the apparent contradictions of

sense perception by recourse to the view that in preception we

become immediately aware only of " appearances ".

If in sense perception we become immediately aware only

of what are (intellectually interpreted to be) subjective, psychic,

mental states, and not of anything (interpreted to be) external

(or even extramental), then, since on the one hand intellect con

ceives, and interprets in judgment, only the content 1 of these

states, and since on the other hand it is not contended that in

tellect can, independently of sense, come into cognitive relation

with (what is interpreted as) external reality, 2 it would seem to

follow necessarily that all our intellectual knowledge, all our con

cepts, predicates, and judgments are of the real domain of inental

states only, externality itself, perceived or conceived, concrete

or abstract, being no exception, but just a mental state like all

the others. No doubt, the concept of cause, like that of sub

stance, is derived from these states and is validly applied to them

to bring to light their real implications ; but how can it bring to

light real externality as an implication of them if the concept of

externality itself is emptied of real validity by the contention

that the concrete sense correlate immediately felt externality

from which the concept is derived, is not real externality at all

but merely a feature of a state of consciousness? (104, in).

When, therefore, Jeanniere asserts that by the senses we attain

1 Including the real implications of this content.

2 I.e. this contention is not put forward at least by scholastics, who, as defenders

of realism, are contemplated in the text. It is the scholastic view that intellect

directly apprehends the real self in its conscious processes, and rightly interprets

the self as an extramental reality, i.e. a reality whose real being (" esse ") is inde

pendent of its being consciously apprehended (its "percifi"), but that even such

conception has for its content only the sense content of the direct conscious pro

cesses by which such intellectual apprehension is conditioned (cf. 100) ; but

scholastics do not contend that intellect has any apprehension or conception of

external or non-self reality independently of the data furnished by sense (100, 105).

1 64 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

" to things not in themselves but in their appearances," T and

that nevertheless * things can be known as they are in themselves,

i.e. so that we can attribute to them predicates which are really

intrinsic to them, " 2 he is equivalently asserting that concepts

whose real contents are derived only from conscious states of

the self have contents which are really intrinsic to external or

non-self reality : for only if they have such contents are they

really intrinsic " (in content) to this reality. But it is only if

the latter is given in the concrete, felt externality of the immedi

ate data of " external " sense perception, and if the abstract con

cept of externality (derived from this concrete) is thus known to

be really valid, that our other concepts can be known to have

contents really intrinsic to external reality.

Furthermore, it is useless to discuss what qualities can or

cannot be attributed to "external " things, or "things as they

really are " until the real validity of our abstract intellectual con

cept of externality is first vindicated. In support of the main

objection stated above, Jeanniere argues that because e.g. the

external object is a square tower, and the perceived object is not

a square tower (but a round tower), therefore the perceived ob

ject is not the external object. But this assumes that we know

that there is a reality external to us, and ivhat it is really and ex

ternally, while the real difficulty of his own position (that sense

only makes us aware of conscious states of the self, called " ap

pearances") is to show how he can know any object whatsoever

to be an external reality.

"According to the perceptionist," he writes, "the appearance (perceived

object) = external object (that which is outside me). Now, facts prove this

to be inadmissible. Let us give these two in syllogistic form : (i) The ex

ternal object is a square tower ; but the perceived object (appearance] is not

a square tower (but a round tower) ; therefore the perceived object is not

the external object. (2} The perceived object (the appearance} is actual ;

but the external object is not actual (v.g. a star extinct ten thousand years

ago} ; therefore tJic perceived object is not the external object. To my very

great confusion (he continues), I have to confess that the replies to those two

common syllogisms (second figure ; mood, Catncstres} have always appeared

to me unintelligible. The data of physiology, says the Abbe COSTE, ;; re-

1 He refers of course to external things; and the expression means that by the

senses we attain not to the external things but to mental states. The ambiguity of

such modes of expression wilt be examined later (128, 129).

2 " Praedicata quae eis vere sint intrinseca." Op. cit., p. 417; supra, 123,

p. 108, n. 2.

K Rev. da Clcrge franfais, ist August, 1903, p. 534.

INTUITIVE REALISM 165

move all doubt that the direct object of our visual perception is the effect of

the retinal image, as the retinal image itself is the effect of the external

body. With the same author, I regard the thesis of the Abbe DuBOSC on

TV/,? Formal Objectivity of Colours * as undoubtedly ingenious, but as not

proven." 2

Now we doubt if any reflecting perceptionist would allow that his view is

fairly expressed by the formula " appearance (perceived object) = external ob

ject ". We doubt if even the unreflecting plain man would hold that what

an individual perceives (" perceived object ") is always the " external object ".

Bearing in mind that sense itself does not pronounce or judge its object to

be internal or external, and that when we speak of the " sense verdict " or

"sense evidence " we always mean our intellectual interpretation of what is

given or presented in sense consciousness, a fact which is sometimes lost

sight of in this connexion, bearing that in mind, our statement of percep-

tionism would be rather something like this : " The object perceived under

normal conditions is identically the real, external object : not of course ade

quately the latter, but a real function or aspect of the latter ". In the second

place we believe that even the naif, unreflecting perceptionist would agree

with us in repudiating the identification of " appearance " and " perceived

object" in the author s description of perceptionism. When an object "ap

pears " or " is presented " to consciousness, whatever be the nature of this

object, whether it be mental or extramental, internal or external, we have a

right to demand justification for the very questionable procedure of setting

up this process of " appearing " or " being presented " as a new object sup

posed to intervene between consciousness and the original object/ 1 Of this

more anon (128, 129). Coming now to the syllogisms, we might ask how any

one who holds that sense reveals to him only mental states can know that

what he judges to be "a square tower" or to be "not actual" is an " ex

ternal object" at all, as distinct from a mental state. But letting even that

pass, the major of the first syllogism means that what appears in sense per

ception tinder normal conditions of distance and perspective as a square

tower is judged to be therefore really and externally a square tower ; and the

minor means that this same reality appears under other conditions as a round

tower, i.e. otherwise than it appears under normal conditions, i.e. otherwise

as "it really and externally is " : from which the only legitimate conclusion is

that what a thing appears under special conditions is not what it appears under

normal conditions (i.e. " what it really and externally is " : the "external ob

ject"). The distinction between what a thing may "look" or "appear"

and what it "is," will be examined below (128, 129). The major of the

second syllogism means " The object (or reality) here and now perceived or

appearing is judged to be (externally) actual " ; the minor means that what

we know otherwise through inferences from other perceptions of external

reality (and we could know nothing of external reality were real externality

not presented, and known to be presented, to sense) enables us to judge

not that the appearing reality (the " perceived object ") has no present exter

nal actuality, and that our present perception is merely of a mental state or

1 Ann. de philos. chret., 1895, t. 130, pp. 449 sqq.; 592 sqq.

"Op. tit., p. 399, n. 3 C/. PRICHARD, op. cit., p. 133.

1 66 THEOR r OF KNO W LEDGE

" appearance," but that the perceived object has not all the external actuality

which we would naturally attribute to it if we interpreted external reality ac

cording to present perceptions and without taking note of the knowledge

gathered from other perceptions, and interpretations and inferences from

these. 1 In the present instance though the star is itself extinct there is real

and external light still travelling from it. The legitimate conclusion from the

premisses is simply that the total actual reality of the external object is not

identical with, or determined solely by, the portion which at any given

moment we can perceive.

As to the Abbe COSTE S assertion, we may merely remark that while the

physiologist can trace the physiological effects of the retinal image on the

optic nerves and on the brain, and while he can say that the concomitant,

or immediate consequent, of the cerebral excitation is a conscious act of

visual perception, no facts brought to light by his order of investigation can

help him in the least to make any assertion whatever on a question con

cerning this wholly new order of phenomenon (i.e. the consciously perceptive

visual act), the question, namely, as to what is the direct object apprehended

through this perceptive act (112, 124).

1 Cf. JEANMERE, op. cit., pp. 413-14 ; supra, p. 162, n. i.

CHAPTER XX.

IDEALISM AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "APPEARANCE"

AND "REALITY".