160. EXAMINATION OF DE BONALD S THEORY.

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--The

premisses of the argument based on the origin of language are

unproven, and at least in part erroneous ; and the conclusion

drawn from them does not follow logically from them. God is,

of course, the author of human language in the sense that He is

author of all creation ; but it is not proven that He did not, or

could not, leave man to form rational speech for himself by his

natural faculties under pressure of natural and social needs. De

Bonald contends that language must precede thought ; but, with

out going into the psychology of the connexion, we can see at

all events that thought must be prior to language if not by

priority of time, certainly by priority of nature. For words

that did not embody and express thoughts would not be

language, but mere sounds, mere parrot-cries. Therefore, how

ever God may have given language to man, whether immedi

ately or mediately, i.e. whether by giving him a ready-made

1 " Ea quae subsunt fidei aliquis non crederet nisi videret ea esse credenda."-

Siimma Theol., ii. 2 Q. i, a. 4, ad 2. Although reason has not to see positively the

intrinsic evidence for the truths of faith, nevertheless it is needed to enable us to

believe in a reasonable manner, in a manner suited to our nature as intelligent beings :

" Fides non habet inquisitionem rationis naturalis demonstrantis id quod creditur :

habet tamen inquisitionem quamdam eorum, per quae inducitur homo ad creden-

dum ; puta quia sunt dicta a Deo et miraculis confirmata ". Ibid., Q. n. a. i, ad i.

Similarly St. Augustine, explaining the sense in which faith must precede rational

investigation of revealed truths, says that the reasonableness of this primacy must

be apparent to reason. Faith in the mysteries of revealed religion cleanses the

heart, fosters humility and reverence, and thus induces the disposition which enables

the believer to apply his reason profitably and fruitfully to the contemplation and

appreciation of such mysteries : " Ut ergo in quibusdam rebus ad doctrinam salu-

tarem pertinentibus, quas ratione nondum percipere valemus, sed aliquando valcbimus,

(ides praecedat rationem, qua cor mundetur, ut magnae rationis capiat et perferat

lucem, hoc utique rationis cst. Et ideo rationabiliter dictum est per Prophetam :

Nisi credideritis non intelligetis . ... Si igitur rationabile est, ut acl magna

quaedam, quae capi nondum possunt, (ides praecedat rationem, procul dubio quan-

iulacumque ratio quae hoc pcrsuadet ctiam ipsa antccedit fdem." Epist. 120, 3

(italics ours).

TRADITIONALISM 301

language, so to speak, or by endowing him with the faculties

and organs for forming and utilizing language, He must first

have given him ideas or the faculties for forming ideas. And

since we see men universally forming their own ideas from

the data of conscious experience ; and moulding, developing,

modifying language according to their progressive needs, if in

the beginning, by an exceptional privilege of the Creator, they

received their thoughts and language otherwise, the onus of

proving such a privilege to have been accorded to our first

parents lies on those who contend that it was. And they have

not proved it.

But even granting that such a privilege were accorded to

our first parents, that ideas and language were divinely com

municated to them ab initio, it does not follow, as De Bonald

contends, that language is or can be the infallible vehicle of a

divinely revealed deposit of knowledge. For in the first place

neither ideas nor their verbal expressions constitute knozvledge ;

neither ideas nor words are true or false. Judgments alone em

body knowledge ; and hence judgments too, ready-made and

a priori syntheses of ideas, must have been divinely communi

cated ab initio. Secondly, even if this were so, the transmission

of ideas, or rather of language which expresses them, does not in

volve the transmission of the Judgments, i.e. of the knowledge, of

which such ideas are the elementary factors or materials. For

it is notorious that the possession of the same ideas and the

same language by men does not by any means involve their

possession of the same convictions or beliefs. Thirdly, granting

that God communicated words and ideas and even judgments,

to our first parents, does this necessarily involve a Divine

Revelation, calling for an act or exercise of faith on their part?

Not necessarily ; for God could have communicated the know

ledge not as Revealer, but as Teacher, Instructor ; not as an

Authority demanding belief, but as an Instructor aiding pupils to

learn, to apply their mental faculties to the interpretation of ex

perience, so that they would gradually acquire a rational and

reasoned knowledge on grounds of nafural evidence, and without

being called upon to elicit a single act of faith. 1

As to the considerations urged in De Donald s second

argument (158), they are in the main true; but they do not

1 Cf. ST. THOMAS, De Vcritate, Q. XI, a. i, apud MERCIER, op. cit., 70, whose

line of argument we have merely paraphrased above.

3 02 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

warrant his conclusion. It is true that children believe before

they understand ; that men hold on authority practically all the

convictions on which the physical, intellectual, moral, and re

ligious well-being of the individual and of society depends (15) ;

that the truths which make for social order and well-being could

not be attained with sufficient facility and universality were their

discovery at the mercy of unaided individual initiative ; that,

even were they attainable by the vast majority, they could not

impose themselves on mankind with the efficacy needed for

social order were there no authority to impose and sanction

them. All this, however, merely proves the practical insufficiency

of the isolated individual reason, and the practical necessity of

social conditions and moral and religious guidance for the in

dividual in order that man be enabled to work out his destiny

in conformity with his nature. But that has nothing to do with

the critical question raised by reflection on all the data of ex

perience, including those very facts themselves. For the facts

just mentioned concern the order of spontaneous human assents.

And as soon as human reason comes to maturity in the in

dividual, as soon as he realizes the errors, deceptions, discordant

and conflicting views, which prevail in that external social, in

tellectual, moral and religious milieu on the authority of which

he has hitherto accepted his own convictions, his individual

reason must inevitably take the initiative and proceed to inquire

into the credentials of that external authority in all its shapes

and forms. He becomes conscious that it is due to his nature

and dignity as a rational being to inquire into those credentials.

He sees that it would be unreasonable for him to give a final

and definitive assent to all generally accepted propositions merely

because they are generally accepted ; that the argument based

on the value or authority of universal agreement has only a

provisional value. Nor will it suffice for him to hold this general

agreement, with De Lamennais, to be infallible, as being the

voice of human nature ; or, in other words, to suppose human

nature to be rightly and wisely constituted for the discovery of

truth, and error to be only accidental. For he must still ask

himself these further questions :

If I consider this general agreement to be in any measure in

fallible, what rational ground have I for thinking that it is ? Why

do men generally assent to any propositions as true ? How can I

be sure that human nature or human reason, whether collectively

TRADITIONALISM 303

or individually, does or can attain to any truth ? If it does, is

it by some automatic process like breathing ? Is it protected

from error by an apparatus of reflex movements like those

whereby the animal organism instinctively avoids what is hurt

ful ? Clearly not ; for the attainment of truth and the avoidance

of error can be only the work of reason, of judgment ; and

ultimately of the individual s reason, since certain knowledge, if

it exists at all, exists in individual minds.

The individual has therefore to seek, in his own experience

and its data, an ultimate test of truth, an ultimate motive

that will justify his spontaneous intellectual assents, including

those which he has heretofore grounded provisionally on ex

trinsic authority. Extrinsic authority itself, therefore, cannot be

this test or this motive. " The authority of society and tradi

tion is a provisional motive, a very widely operative motive, of

spontaneous assents ; reflecting reason subjects the affirmations

of authority to the test of criticism in order to reject such as

are prompted by prejudices and to bring to light the deeper

motive of those that really put reason in possession of the

truth ".- 1 That underlying and ultimate motive is, as we have

seen, intrinsic objective evidence.