THE PROBLEMS OF EITSTEMOLOGY.

 The human mind, then, can

attain to reasoned and objectively grounded certitude. But it is

neither omniscient nor infallible. It can increase its knowledge,

but without ever exhausting or comprehending the totality of

things. It is, and must remain, in ignorance of much ; for it is

finite. Not only so, but it is imperfect : it can and does err.

We have seen that error is both a possibility and a fact (9, 16).

A false or erroneous judgment is one which represents things

otherwise than they really are, and which, therefore, fro tanto,

puts the mind in positive discord or disconformity with reality ;

and the mental state or condition of error is the firm adherence

of the mind to such a judgment as true.

The possibility of error lies in the fact that human cognition is

not a mere passive intuition or mirroring of reality (17, 22, 75,

1 1 8, 128, 136, 145) by the mind, but an active process whereby

the mind abstracts successive aspects of the given reality, analy

ses and synthesizes, separates and reunites, these aspects, thus

gradually interpreting or representing intelligibly to itself, or re

constructing intelligibly for itself, the presented reality (91, Hi.).

Our main task has been first to investigate the objective reality of

these mental data, to establish the real objectivity of knowledge ;

and secondly, to investigate the mental process of interpreting or

representing the given reality : to vindicate the possibility and

POSSIBILITY OF ERROR 367

indicate the tests or criteria of true representations or true know

ledge. We thus distinguished between the real objectivity and the

truth of knowledge (17, 22, 75, 145); and we endeavoured to

show that in the reality which presents itself objectively to the

human mind the intellect can apprehend adequate objective

evidential grounds for the certain truth of some of its interpreta

tions of this reality. Especially in the chapter (xxxiii.) on Truth

and Evidence we explored, and tried to vindicate, the possibility

of transforming the various classes of our spontaneous assents

and beliefs (148) into reasoned, reflex convictions by the applica

tion of the test of Objective Evidence (154). But from that chapter,

as well as from the whole course of the inquiry, the student will

have learned that the attainment of such certitude is possible

only by a careful, cautious, prudent and patient application of

intellect to the data of experience ; that intellect is infallible only

within such narrow limits as include the very starting points of

knowledge, and with an infallibility that can be realized only by

reflection (153); that, therefore, it requires a judicious and well-

balanced use of this faculty to forestall and ward off error, to

avoid acquiescence in serious errors, and to correct such errors as

may, through the imperfections and limitations that are incidental

to human existence, have crept into our spontaneous assents

(153). Referring to the " testing" of evidence (15 3), we saw that

while the total avoidance of such spontaneous errors is, perhaps,

humanly impossible, it is nevertheless possible to avoid reflex and

deliberate adherence, after due reflection, to a judgment as true

which is really false. And the reason is that on the one hand if

the judgment is really false there cannot be real objective evidence

for it : in that case the reality does not and cannot furnish

objective grounds which the intellect can prudently judge to be

adequate for certain assent to the judgment as true ; while on the

other hand intellect is precisely a faculty of reflection, of discerning

between real and putative or apparent grounds of assent, and so

of giving a certain assent only when it can prudently judge the

grounds of such assent to be real and really adequate. No

erroneous assent can be, therefore, after- due reflection and in spite

of such reflection, absolutely necessary, or absolutely unavoidable by

the human mind.^ For assent can be and ought to be measured

by the evidential value of the grounds for it. Hence the intellect

can avoid error by giving only a provisional or probable assent, or

3 Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cif., p. 342.

368 THKOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

by suspending assent altogether and remaining in doubt or ignor

ance, according to the objective requirements of the presented

reality. But this implies ti\& prudent use of the intellect, a use

which depends on many influences extrinsic to the intellect itself.

Recognizing, then, the possibility and the fact of error, we

might propose to inquire into its actual causes. But here again

we may be very brief, for the student will doubtlessly have de

tected the main causes of the prevalence of errors among men

from the course of our inquiry. 1 They are for the most part un

due haste or precipitancy in assenting ; the irksomeness of doubt

as compared with the satisfaction of assent ; sloth, or neglect to

apply the mind sufficiently to the task of investigating and

sifting evidence ; permission of undue influence of the will, the

passions and emotions, likes and dislikes, on the intellectual

function itself of judging and assenting. From what was said in

the opening chapter (11-15) concerning the influence of the will

on our assents, and concerning voluntarist theories of certitude

in the present closing chapter, it must be apparent that this

whole mass of subjective, instinctive, volitional, emotional, affec

tive influences on the distinctively intellectual function of

knowing, judging, assenting, believing, is very considerable. And

it is to the undue preponderance of those influences that much

error must be ascribed. Intellect is itself an " undetermined "

or "indifferent " faculty. It must be determined to elicit the act

of assent. On those influences the intellect can reflect ; and,

though " subjective" or appertaining to the "self," they may be

considered objectively, or as objects, by intellect, and, as such,

may have a certain value as evidential, which the intellect can

appraise (148). But if the total objective evidence, including

such indirectly objective evidential value as those subjective in

fluences may be judged to have, is not adequate, not sufficient

to exclude all prudent fear of error and thus determine the

firm or certain assent of the intellect; and if nevertheless the

intellect does give its assent, then it must be because it has

1 It is one of the functions of Logic, as a practical science, to train and help the

mind to avoid error by exploring, analysing and laying bare its various sources and

causes. Cf. Science of Logic, ii., Part v., chap, iii., especially the suggestive treat

ment of the subject of Fallacies by Bacon and by J. S. Mill (ibid., 272). Some of

the fallacies incident to method ( 275), those, namely, that bear on Demonstration,

Explanation, Assumption of Axioms and Postulates, raise issues that are distinctly

epistemological. We may, therefore, refer the student here to what we have already

said upon them, op. cit., pp. 315-37.

CA USES OF ERROR 369

allowed itself to be determined not by evidence but by the blind

or inevidential influence of those subjective factors. And it is

thus that error can and does arise.

But in addition to all those sources of error there is to be

taken into account also the very illusive but very real and potent

influence of what we may call the intellectual and moral environ

ment or " climate " in which the individual has been brought up

from infancy : the influences that have formed his whole mentality,

his " receptiveness " or " preparedness " for the evidential appeal

of truth to his intellect : the spontaneous beliefs and convictions

in which he has been trained: his "prejudices," conscious and

unconscious, whether they happen to be objectively true or ob

jectively erroneous : his moral habits and character : his " in

herited " religious beliefs, whether these happen to be true or

false ; and so on. What an enormous influence all these factors

will have, when we come to the case of the actual individual

man in his concrete surroundings, in determining just how far,

and with what measure of success, he will avoid error, and attain

to truth ! In dealing with Traditionalism (158-62) we touched

upon this question of the actual individual in human society : on

the question whether, or under what conditions, the average in

dividual human being can attain to certitude concerning the

great problems that count most : his own nature, end, and

destiny ; God, freedom, morality, religion, immortality. There

we found ourselves face to face with the question of Christian

Evidences, of God s actual dispensations to mankind : with the pro

blem of a Supernatural Revelation, involving the gratuitousness

of the gift of Supernatural Faith, its necessity for the attainment

of man s Supernatural End, and the mystery of God s Providence

in the communication of that saving Faith to individual men.

And there we must leave that momentous question of fact, with

all its mysterious implications, to be dealt with by the Christian

apologist and theologian.

Well, we have seen at any rate that the human mind, with

all its limitations, can give to itself a reasonable account of itself;

and can satisfy itself fully that Reality is its object, that to some

measure of truth about reality it can certainly attain. Was not

this our appointed task ? Or have we to determine, further, to

how much truth can the human mind attain ? No ; this is not

for us to determine in Epistemology, except in principle and in

broad outline. To show that the attainment of some true and

VOL. ii. 24

370 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

certain knowledge is possible concerning the data which constitute

the various departments of human experience : to vindicate a

reasoned certitude that the human mind can reach some degree

of genuine insight into the real nature of man and the universe :

to justify by critical introspective analysis the principles and pre

suppositions involved in knowing : to distinguish between right

and wrong methods of interpreting and appraising the grounds

on which human convictions are based (whether these be spon

taneous or reflex; whether they be called "knowledges," or

" beliefs " ; whether they be " ordinary," " scientific," " philosophi

cal," " ethical," or " religious ") : to show that the human mind

can increase its knowledge both in extent and in depth : and to

indicate in principle the means and methods of such progress,

these are the duties of the epistemologist, rather than to decide

e.g. whether or not any suggested interpretation of any portion

of human experience is or is not true.

The historian marshals the evidence for certitude about past

facts ; but the epistemologist shows that assent based on human

authority is reasonable. The physical scientist is constantly ex

tending the domain of our "knowledge " concerning the material

universe ; but the epistemologist proves that such knowledge is

indeed a genuine insight into the reality of a material universe

which exists independently of our perception of it. The psycho

logist, assuming the capacity of the mind to discover the ex

istence, and reach some certain knowledge of the nature, of a

hyperphysical or suprasensible domain of reality, explores the

origin, nature and destiny of the human soul ; but the epistem

ologist has to examine, and if so be to justify, that assumption.

The metaphysician, or philosopher, or theologian seeks the

ultimate causes and reasons which will explain or make intellig

ible the totality of direct human experience : he infers from the

data of this experience that a Supreme Being exists, that He

created and conserves and rules the universe, that He has revealed

Himself to man, that man depends on Him and owes Him the

worship He demands, that ethical distinctions of right and wrong

in human conduct are grounded on man s relations to the Deity,

etc., etc. ; but the epistemologist must explore the validity of the

mental processes (of perception, conception, judgment, inference)

by which such investigations are prosecuted and such conclusions

reached. Moreover, the masses of mankind have ethical and re

ligious convictions of some sort : convictions which differ widely

CONCLUSION 371

in detail but have certain fundamental elements in common : con

victions, too, which the masses of men profess and hold because

they have, so to speak, inherited them, or been born into them,

having received them on the authority of their parents, elders,

teachers, etc. But the epistemologist, though he has not to

decide which of these are true, or which false, has nevertheless to

say whether or not there can be any truth-value or knowledge-

value proper in convictions of such an order, concerning such a

domain of objects : he has to say whether this domain of so-called

"invisible or suprasensible realities," or "the unseen world" as

it is also termed, is indeed a domain about the reality and ex

istence of which man can have certain knowledge, or only con

jectural knowledge, or only instinctive hopes and fears that have

no sufficient ground in his nature as a rational being. And if

man can attain to a certain knowledge of God and immortality

and a future life, the epistemologist has to show that the rational

principles and methods by which he attains to it, and the grounds

on which he bases it, are in fact reliable.

Such are the tasks to which we have been devoting our at

tention throughout the course of the inquiry which we now bring

to a close. That our investigations may have proved helpful to

the student of such serious and engrossing problems is our very

earnest hope.

24*

 The human mind, then, can

attain to reasoned and objectively grounded certitude. But it is

neither omniscient nor infallible. It can increase its knowledge,

but without ever exhausting or comprehending the totality of

things. It is, and must remain, in ignorance of much ; for it is

finite. Not only so, but it is imperfect : it can and does err.

We have seen that error is both a possibility and a fact (9, 16).

A false or erroneous judgment is one which represents things

otherwise than they really are, and which, therefore, fro tanto,

puts the mind in positive discord or disconformity with reality ;

and the mental state or condition of error is the firm adherence

of the mind to such a judgment as true.

The possibility of error lies in the fact that human cognition is

not a mere passive intuition or mirroring of reality (17, 22, 75,

1 1 8, 128, 136, 145) by the mind, but an active process whereby

the mind abstracts successive aspects of the given reality, analy

ses and synthesizes, separates and reunites, these aspects, thus

gradually interpreting or representing intelligibly to itself, or re

constructing intelligibly for itself, the presented reality (91, Hi.).

Our main task has been first to investigate the objective reality of

these mental data, to establish the real objectivity of knowledge ;

and secondly, to investigate the mental process of interpreting or

representing the given reality : to vindicate the possibility and

POSSIBILITY OF ERROR 367

indicate the tests or criteria of true representations or true know

ledge. We thus distinguished between the real objectivity and the

truth of knowledge (17, 22, 75, 145); and we endeavoured to

show that in the reality which presents itself objectively to the

human mind the intellect can apprehend adequate objective

evidential grounds for the certain truth of some of its interpreta

tions of this reality. Especially in the chapter (xxxiii.) on Truth

and Evidence we explored, and tried to vindicate, the possibility

of transforming the various classes of our spontaneous assents

and beliefs (148) into reasoned, reflex convictions by the applica

tion of the test of Objective Evidence (154). But from that chapter,

as well as from the whole course of the inquiry, the student will

have learned that the attainment of such certitude is possible

only by a careful, cautious, prudent and patient application of

intellect to the data of experience ; that intellect is infallible only

within such narrow limits as include the very starting points of

knowledge, and with an infallibility that can be realized only by

reflection (153); that, therefore, it requires a judicious and well-

balanced use of this faculty to forestall and ward off error, to

avoid acquiescence in serious errors, and to correct such errors as

may, through the imperfections and limitations that are incidental

to human existence, have crept into our spontaneous assents

(153). Referring to the " testing" of evidence (15 3), we saw that

while the total avoidance of such spontaneous errors is, perhaps,

humanly impossible, it is nevertheless possible to avoid reflex and

deliberate adherence, after due reflection, to a judgment as true

which is really false. And the reason is that on the one hand if

the judgment is really false there cannot be real objective evidence

for it : in that case the reality does not and cannot furnish

objective grounds which the intellect can prudently judge to be

adequate for certain assent to the judgment as true ; while on the

other hand intellect is precisely a faculty of reflection, of discerning

between real and putative or apparent grounds of assent, and so

of giving a certain assent only when it can prudently judge the

grounds of such assent to be real and really adequate. No

erroneous assent can be, therefore, after- due reflection and in spite

of such reflection, absolutely necessary, or absolutely unavoidable by

the human mind.^ For assent can be and ought to be measured

by the evidential value of the grounds for it. Hence the intellect

can avoid error by giving only a provisional or probable assent, or

3 Cf. JEANNIERE, op. cif., p. 342.

368 THKOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

by suspending assent altogether and remaining in doubt or ignor

ance, according to the objective requirements of the presented

reality. But this implies ti\& prudent use of the intellect, a use

which depends on many influences extrinsic to the intellect itself.

Recognizing, then, the possibility and the fact of error, we

might propose to inquire into its actual causes. But here again

we may be very brief, for the student will doubtlessly have de

tected the main causes of the prevalence of errors among men

from the course of our inquiry. 1 They are for the most part un

due haste or precipitancy in assenting ; the irksomeness of doubt

as compared with the satisfaction of assent ; sloth, or neglect to

apply the mind sufficiently to the task of investigating and

sifting evidence ; permission of undue influence of the will, the

passions and emotions, likes and dislikes, on the intellectual

function itself of judging and assenting. From what was said in

the opening chapter (11-15) concerning the influence of the will

on our assents, and concerning voluntarist theories of certitude

in the present closing chapter, it must be apparent that this

whole mass of subjective, instinctive, volitional, emotional, affec

tive influences on the distinctively intellectual function of

knowing, judging, assenting, believing, is very considerable. And

it is to the undue preponderance of those influences that much

error must be ascribed. Intellect is itself an " undetermined "

or "indifferent " faculty. It must be determined to elicit the act

of assent. On those influences the intellect can reflect ; and,

though " subjective" or appertaining to the "self," they may be

considered objectively, or as objects, by intellect, and, as such,

may have a certain value as evidential, which the intellect can

appraise (148). But if the total objective evidence, including

such indirectly objective evidential value as those subjective in

fluences may be judged to have, is not adequate, not sufficient

to exclude all prudent fear of error and thus determine the

firm or certain assent of the intellect; and if nevertheless the

intellect does give its assent, then it must be because it has

1 It is one of the functions of Logic, as a practical science, to train and help the

mind to avoid error by exploring, analysing and laying bare its various sources and

causes. Cf. Science of Logic, ii., Part v., chap, iii., especially the suggestive treat

ment of the subject of Fallacies by Bacon and by J. S. Mill (ibid., 272). Some of

the fallacies incident to method ( 275), those, namely, that bear on Demonstration,

Explanation, Assumption of Axioms and Postulates, raise issues that are distinctly

epistemological. We may, therefore, refer the student here to what we have already

said upon them, op. cit., pp. 315-37.

CA USES OF ERROR 369

allowed itself to be determined not by evidence but by the blind

or inevidential influence of those subjective factors. And it is

thus that error can and does arise.

But in addition to all those sources of error there is to be

taken into account also the very illusive but very real and potent

influence of what we may call the intellectual and moral environ

ment or " climate " in which the individual has been brought up

from infancy : the influences that have formed his whole mentality,

his " receptiveness " or " preparedness " for the evidential appeal

of truth to his intellect : the spontaneous beliefs and convictions

in which he has been trained: his "prejudices," conscious and

unconscious, whether they happen to be objectively true or ob

jectively erroneous : his moral habits and character : his " in

herited " religious beliefs, whether these happen to be true or

false ; and so on. What an enormous influence all these factors

will have, when we come to the case of the actual individual

man in his concrete surroundings, in determining just how far,

and with what measure of success, he will avoid error, and attain

to truth ! In dealing with Traditionalism (158-62) we touched

upon this question of the actual individual in human society : on

the question whether, or under what conditions, the average in

dividual human being can attain to certitude concerning the

great problems that count most : his own nature, end, and

destiny ; God, freedom, morality, religion, immortality. There

we found ourselves face to face with the question of Christian

Evidences, of God s actual dispensations to mankind : with the pro

blem of a Supernatural Revelation, involving the gratuitousness

of the gift of Supernatural Faith, its necessity for the attainment

of man s Supernatural End, and the mystery of God s Providence

in the communication of that saving Faith to individual men.

And there we must leave that momentous question of fact, with

all its mysterious implications, to be dealt with by the Christian

apologist and theologian.

Well, we have seen at any rate that the human mind, with

all its limitations, can give to itself a reasonable account of itself;

and can satisfy itself fully that Reality is its object, that to some

measure of truth about reality it can certainly attain. Was not

this our appointed task ? Or have we to determine, further, to

how much truth can the human mind attain ? No ; this is not

for us to determine in Epistemology, except in principle and in

broad outline. To show that the attainment of some true and

VOL. ii. 24

370 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

certain knowledge is possible concerning the data which constitute

the various departments of human experience : to vindicate a

reasoned certitude that the human mind can reach some degree

of genuine insight into the real nature of man and the universe :

to justify by critical introspective analysis the principles and pre

suppositions involved in knowing : to distinguish between right

and wrong methods of interpreting and appraising the grounds

on which human convictions are based (whether these be spon

taneous or reflex; whether they be called "knowledges," or

" beliefs " ; whether they be " ordinary," " scientific," " philosophi

cal," " ethical," or " religious ") : to show that the human mind

can increase its knowledge both in extent and in depth : and to

indicate in principle the means and methods of such progress,

these are the duties of the epistemologist, rather than to decide

e.g. whether or not any suggested interpretation of any portion

of human experience is or is not true.

The historian marshals the evidence for certitude about past

facts ; but the epistemologist shows that assent based on human

authority is reasonable. The physical scientist is constantly ex

tending the domain of our "knowledge " concerning the material

universe ; but the epistemologist proves that such knowledge is

indeed a genuine insight into the reality of a material universe

which exists independently of our perception of it. The psycho

logist, assuming the capacity of the mind to discover the ex

istence, and reach some certain knowledge of the nature, of a

hyperphysical or suprasensible domain of reality, explores the

origin, nature and destiny of the human soul ; but the epistem

ologist has to examine, and if so be to justify, that assumption.

The metaphysician, or philosopher, or theologian seeks the

ultimate causes and reasons which will explain or make intellig

ible the totality of direct human experience : he infers from the

data of this experience that a Supreme Being exists, that He

created and conserves and rules the universe, that He has revealed

Himself to man, that man depends on Him and owes Him the

worship He demands, that ethical distinctions of right and wrong

in human conduct are grounded on man s relations to the Deity,

etc., etc. ; but the epistemologist must explore the validity of the

mental processes (of perception, conception, judgment, inference)

by which such investigations are prosecuted and such conclusions

reached. Moreover, the masses of mankind have ethical and re

ligious convictions of some sort : convictions which differ widely

CONCLUSION 371

in detail but have certain fundamental elements in common : con

victions, too, which the masses of men profess and hold because

they have, so to speak, inherited them, or been born into them,

having received them on the authority of their parents, elders,

teachers, etc. But the epistemologist, though he has not to

decide which of these are true, or which false, has nevertheless to

say whether or not there can be any truth-value or knowledge-

value proper in convictions of such an order, concerning such a

domain of objects : he has to say whether this domain of so-called

"invisible or suprasensible realities," or "the unseen world" as

it is also termed, is indeed a domain about the reality and ex

istence of which man can have certain knowledge, or only con

jectural knowledge, or only instinctive hopes and fears that have

no sufficient ground in his nature as a rational being. And if

man can attain to a certain knowledge of God and immortality

and a future life, the epistemologist has to show that the rational

principles and methods by which he attains to it, and the grounds

on which he bases it, are in fact reliable.

Such are the tasks to which we have been devoting our at

tention throughout the course of the inquiry which we now bring

to a close. That our investigations may have proved helpful to

the student of such serious and engrossing problems is our very

earnest hope.

24*