FUSED AND AMBIGUOUS.

 A first confusion to be noted in

Kant s treatment of sense perception is his use of the ambiguous

expression "form of intuition " in quite distinct meanings. On the

1 Op. cit., p. 32.

2 Thus, the primary qualities of bodies are, if anything, more subjective than

the secondary inasmuch as those belong to the nature of the mind necessarily and

a priori, while these are originated in it contingently and a posteriori by an unknow

able extramental cause (125). Cf. MAHER, Psychology, 4th edit., p. 121, n. 16 ; p.

154. Of course Kant would claim that space and time, being a priori, and thus ac

counting for the characters of necessity and universality in geometrical and other

mathematical judgments, are more " objective " (in his sense of the term) than the

secondary qualities revealed in our states of sense consciousness. But since his ar

guments for this a priori character of space and time imply that in the empirical,

a posteriori perception of the secondary qualities of bodies, where the data are present

to the percipient, we apprehend these qualities as they are in reality, it should follow

that the former alone are phenomenal, and the latter real. " This conclusion

would of course be absurd, for what Kant considers to be the empirically known

qualities of objects disappear, if the spatial character of objects is removed." PRI-

CHARD, p. 67. Kant escapes the absurdity only by withdrawing the initial realist

assumption regarding empirical perception.

1 88 THEOR Y OF KNO WLED GE

one hand he clearly means by it a general mode or capacity or power

of perceiving, as distinct from the actual perceptions in which this

power is manifested. But then, again, speaking of space, for in

stance, as a form of perception, 1 he also speaks of it as an actual

perception of empty space. Claiming such a perception to be pos

sible (de facto it is not possible), he identifies the supposed actual

perception of empty space with the power of perceiving that

which is spatial, and calls space a pure perception. " The con

fusion," says Prichard, "is possible because it can be said with

some plausibility that a perception of empty space if its possi

bility be allowed does not inform us about actual things, but

only informs us what must be true of things, {/"there prove to be

any ; such a perception, therefore, can be thought of as a possi

bility of knowledge " 2 rather than as actual knowledge.

A second and more serious confusion is that while space, as

a form of intuition, is opposed, as a way in which we perceive things,

to a way in which things are, Kant nevertheless speaks of space

indifferently as a form of intuition and as a form of phenomena, i.e.

of that which we perceive. 3 Sensations alone are " given " to us.

By the aid of the spatial form of sense intuition we so arrange

these sensations as to constitute and to know the spatial world of

bodies. Bodies in space are arrangements of sensations. And so

space, a form of intuition, " being, as it were, a kind of empty vessel

in which sensations are arranged, is said to be the form ol pheno

mena" 4 which latter is really only another way of saying that

all bodies are spatial.

When Kant speaks of removing from " the representation of

a body " on the one hand all that belongs to conception and on

the other hand all that belongs to sensation, and says that "there

still remains something of that empirical intuition, viz. extension

and form" (51), this residue, " extension and form," obviously

belongs to the perceived body : if it is a " form " of anything it

is a " form " of the latter. Yet in the very next sentence he says

that it belongs to " pure intuition, which a priori . . . exists in the

mind as a mere form of sensibility ". But he does not say

whether it belongs to this " pure intuition " as itsfonu, i.e. as a

1 The terms "intuition" and perception" are used throughout as synony

mous.

*0p. cit., p. 37.

3 Cy. passage quoted, 51, vol. i. The confusion is analogous to that of con

ception with objects conceived g^.

4 Ibid., p. 38 (italics ours).

KANT S THEORY OF SENSE PERCEPTION, ETC. 189

general mode or power of perceiving, or rather as identical with

the actual pure a priori intuition itself: because he confounds

the " form " of pure intuition with the actual intuition of empty

space. Prichard thus sums up those various confusions : " The

form of phenomena is said to be the space in which all sensations

are arranged, or in which all bodies are ; space apart from all

sensations of bodies, i.e. empty, being the object of a pure per

ception, is treated as identical with a pure perception, viz. the

perception of empty space ; and the perception of empty space is

treated as identical with a capacity of perceiving that which is

spatial "- 1

Now if Kant meant by "forms of intuition," consistently

and exclusively, mental capacities or powers of apprehending what

we become aware of as being endowed with this, that, or the other

quality, then of course it is true that the mind has such " forms,"

and has them a priori :~ in other words, it is true that the mind,

in order to become aware of anything as e.g. hard, or cold,

or white, or bitter, or loud, or sweet-smelling, or extended, or

moving, etc., must have, as a prerequisite condition for such

actual perceptions, the corresponding mental capacities or powers

of perception. But in that case we should say that there are not

merely two a priori forms of sense perception, but as many as

there are distinct, perceptible sense qualities in physical nature :

and the two forms whereby we apprehended the qualities, space

and time, we should call not space and time, but forms of our

perception of space and time. Kant, however, contends that all

the other sense qualities, except space and time, belong to the

mental material of perception, viz. to sensations, while space and

time alone are mental forms of perception ; and he does so

because [i] he is thinking of " forms" of perception or intuition

not now as capacities of perceiving but as " forms " of phenomena

or things perceived, "i.e. as something in which all bodies or

their states are, or, from the point of view of knowledge, as that

in which sensuous material is to be arranged ; for [2] there is

nothing except space and time in which such arrangement could

be plausibly said to be carried out". 3

l Op. cit.,p. 40.

2 Similarly, the only admissible sense in which we can speak of a priori " con

cepts " or " categories " or forms of the understanding, is that of intellectual powers

or capacities of conceiving or apprehending intellectually the substances and acci

dents, causes and effects, etc., which constitute reality.

3 Ibid.

190 THEOR V OF KNO J1 LEDGE

 A first confusion to be noted in

Kant s treatment of sense perception is his use of the ambiguous

expression "form of intuition " in quite distinct meanings. On the

1 Op. cit., p. 32.

2 Thus, the primary qualities of bodies are, if anything, more subjective than

the secondary inasmuch as those belong to the nature of the mind necessarily and

a priori, while these are originated in it contingently and a posteriori by an unknow

able extramental cause (125). Cf. MAHER, Psychology, 4th edit., p. 121, n. 16 ; p.

154. Of course Kant would claim that space and time, being a priori, and thus ac

counting for the characters of necessity and universality in geometrical and other

mathematical judgments, are more " objective " (in his sense of the term) than the

secondary qualities revealed in our states of sense consciousness. But since his ar

guments for this a priori character of space and time imply that in the empirical,

a posteriori perception of the secondary qualities of bodies, where the data are present

to the percipient, we apprehend these qualities as they are in reality, it should follow

that the former alone are phenomenal, and the latter real. " This conclusion

would of course be absurd, for what Kant considers to be the empirically known

qualities of objects disappear, if the spatial character of objects is removed." PRI-

CHARD, p. 67. Kant escapes the absurdity only by withdrawing the initial realist

assumption regarding empirical perception.

1 88 THEOR Y OF KNO WLED GE

one hand he clearly means by it a general mode or capacity or power

of perceiving, as distinct from the actual perceptions in which this

power is manifested. But then, again, speaking of space, for in

stance, as a form of perception, 1 he also speaks of it as an actual

perception of empty space. Claiming such a perception to be pos

sible (de facto it is not possible), he identifies the supposed actual

perception of empty space with the power of perceiving that

which is spatial, and calls space a pure perception. " The con

fusion," says Prichard, "is possible because it can be said with

some plausibility that a perception of empty space if its possi

bility be allowed does not inform us about actual things, but

only informs us what must be true of things, {/"there prove to be

any ; such a perception, therefore, can be thought of as a possi

bility of knowledge " 2 rather than as actual knowledge.

A second and more serious confusion is that while space, as

a form of intuition, is opposed, as a way in which we perceive things,

to a way in which things are, Kant nevertheless speaks of space

indifferently as a form of intuition and as a form of phenomena, i.e.

of that which we perceive. 3 Sensations alone are " given " to us.

By the aid of the spatial form of sense intuition we so arrange

these sensations as to constitute and to know the spatial world of

bodies. Bodies in space are arrangements of sensations. And so

space, a form of intuition, " being, as it were, a kind of empty vessel

in which sensations are arranged, is said to be the form ol pheno

mena" 4 which latter is really only another way of saying that

all bodies are spatial.

When Kant speaks of removing from " the representation of

a body " on the one hand all that belongs to conception and on

the other hand all that belongs to sensation, and says that "there

still remains something of that empirical intuition, viz. extension

and form" (51), this residue, " extension and form," obviously

belongs to the perceived body : if it is a " form " of anything it

is a " form " of the latter. Yet in the very next sentence he says

that it belongs to " pure intuition, which a priori . . . exists in the

mind as a mere form of sensibility ". But he does not say

whether it belongs to this " pure intuition " as itsfonu, i.e. as a

1 The terms "intuition" and perception" are used throughout as synony

mous.

*0p. cit., p. 37.

3 Cy. passage quoted, 51, vol. i. The confusion is analogous to that of con

ception with objects conceived g^.

4 Ibid., p. 38 (italics ours).

KANT S THEORY OF SENSE PERCEPTION, ETC. 189

general mode or power of perceiving, or rather as identical with

the actual pure a priori intuition itself: because he confounds

the " form " of pure intuition with the actual intuition of empty

space. Prichard thus sums up those various confusions : " The

form of phenomena is said to be the space in which all sensations

are arranged, or in which all bodies are ; space apart from all

sensations of bodies, i.e. empty, being the object of a pure per

ception, is treated as identical with a pure perception, viz. the

perception of empty space ; and the perception of empty space is

treated as identical with a capacity of perceiving that which is

spatial "- 1

Now if Kant meant by "forms of intuition," consistently

and exclusively, mental capacities or powers of apprehending what

we become aware of as being endowed with this, that, or the other

quality, then of course it is true that the mind has such " forms,"

and has them a priori :~ in other words, it is true that the mind,

in order to become aware of anything as e.g. hard, or cold,

or white, or bitter, or loud, or sweet-smelling, or extended, or

moving, etc., must have, as a prerequisite condition for such

actual perceptions, the corresponding mental capacities or powers

of perception. But in that case we should say that there are not

merely two a priori forms of sense perception, but as many as

there are distinct, perceptible sense qualities in physical nature :

and the two forms whereby we apprehended the qualities, space

and time, we should call not space and time, but forms of our

perception of space and time. Kant, however, contends that all

the other sense qualities, except space and time, belong to the

mental material of perception, viz. to sensations, while space and

time alone are mental forms of perception ; and he does so

because [i] he is thinking of " forms" of perception or intuition

not now as capacities of perceiving but as " forms " of phenomena

or things perceived, "i.e. as something in which all bodies or

their states are, or, from the point of view of knowledge, as that

in which sensuous material is to be arranged ; for [2] there is

nothing except space and time in which such arrangement could

be plausibly said to be carried out". 3

l Op. cit.,p. 40.

2 Similarly, the only admissible sense in which we can speak of a priori " con

cepts " or " categories " or forms of the understanding, is that of intellectual powers

or capacities of conceiving or apprehending intellectually the substances and acci

dents, causes and effects, etc., which constitute reality.

3 Ibid.

190 THEOR V OF KNO J1 LEDGE