SIGNIFICANCE FOR EPISTEMOLOGY.

 Now, psychologists are con

cerned with explaining the origin or genesis, and the growth or

1 I.e. concrete multitude apprehended through awareness of discontinuity or

interruption in our feelings of magnitude or voluminousntss.

a All the senses apprehend change in intensity of their respective data. The

sense of hearing can thus, at least indirectly and by association, make us aware of

local motion. Sensations of taste, being inseparable from accompanying sensations

of touch, have a distinctly "voluminous" character; those of smell also yield a

vague feeling of extensity.

3 C/. MAHER, op. cit., p. 87. * Ibid., cf. pp. 129, 135-144.

40 TffEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

development, of the various phenomena just enumerated : of the

conscious feelings of extensity and externality in certain data of

our awareness ; of our spontaneous judgment that an external,

material universe exists independently of our awareness ; of our

spontaneous conviction that the existence of such a universe is

self-evident ; of our spontaneous belief that we know something

of the nature and qualities of this material universe ; of our

spontaneous discrimination between our minds, our own bodies,

and external bodies ; etc., etc. They are not concerned with the

validity of these spontaneous judgments and beliefs, but only with

the mode of their genesis and development from the primitive

content of consciousness with its vague characteristics of "ex-

tensity" and "externality" . Starting from these primitive data,

they differ in their accounts of the way in which we come to

form the spontaneous judgment and conviction that there exists

a non-Ego or external universe really distinct from, and other

than, and independent of, the Ego.

I. Some maintain that the reality of the non-Ego is given in

external sense perception just as early and just as immediately

as the reality of the Ego is given in all conscious cognition ; and

that therefore the spontaneous conviction of the reality of a non-

Ego or external universe is an immediate interpretation of this

originally presented distinction. This position is described as

Perceptionism, or Intuitionism, or the Theory of Immediate or

Presentative Sense Perception. 1

II. Others maintain that the non-Ego, as distinct from the

Ego, is not a primitive datum of conscious awareness ; that only

the Ego is apprehended first and immediately ; that from its data

there is evolved and mediated a conscious discrimination or dis

tinction between a non-Ego and the Ego, and a spontaneous belief

in the distinct reality of the former. This position is variously

described as Representationism* or the Theory of Mediate or

Representative or Inferential Sense Perception. But its supporters

differ in regard to the nature of the process by which apprehen

sion of the non-Ego, and belief in its distinct and independent

reality, are " mediated " : some holding that in the early stages

of the conscious life of the individual all the conscious data are

"internal" or "self" data, and that the individual gradually " ex-

1 Cf. MAHRR, op. cit., pp. 101 sqq. ; JEANNI&RE, op. cit., pp. 379, 382.

2 Or " Conceptionism " (cf. ibid., pp. 223-4, 379), a designation to be avoided

as fostering a misleading use of a term proper to the domain of intellect.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 41

ternalizes" or "projects outward" certain of these data, thus

building up an " external " domain opposed to, and distinguished

from, the " subjective " or " self" domain of reality ; others hold

ing, on the contrary, that the actual process is quite the reverse,

that it is a process of " subjectivation " or " internalization," that

at first all conscious data appear to the individual as a confused

and undifferentiated ocean of " objects," that most of them

are gradually apprehended as " external " through a process by

which others are " subjectivated " to form a conscious, sentient,

organic self or Ego, and thus opposed to, and distinguished from,

the main group as "objective," "external," or non-Ego^

Whichever of these accounts of the genesis of our perception

of, and spontaneous belief in, an external universe be adopted,

the epistemological problem the question of the validity of this

belief still remains. If men spontaneously judge that what is

"given" in consciousness, as an "external," "extended" datum,

is a reality other than the Ego, are they right in judging so ?

Is the judgment justifiable before the bar of reason reflecting on

the grounds of it ? Or, if from the original data, in which that

alone which is the real Ego is " presented," there is evolved by

some process a mediate awareness wherein a " non-Ego " is

" represented," what rational justification have we for the spon

taneous judgment which, in asserting the independent existence

of this " non-Ego " or external universe, assumes the validity of the

"representative " or quasi-" inferential " process?

 Now, psychologists are con

cerned with explaining the origin or genesis, and the growth or

1 I.e. concrete multitude apprehended through awareness of discontinuity or

interruption in our feelings of magnitude or voluminousntss.

a All the senses apprehend change in intensity of their respective data. The

sense of hearing can thus, at least indirectly and by association, make us aware of

local motion. Sensations of taste, being inseparable from accompanying sensations

of touch, have a distinctly "voluminous" character; those of smell also yield a

vague feeling of extensity.

3 C/. MAHER, op. cit., p. 87. * Ibid., cf. pp. 129, 135-144.

40 TffEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

development, of the various phenomena just enumerated : of the

conscious feelings of extensity and externality in certain data of

our awareness ; of our spontaneous judgment that an external,

material universe exists independently of our awareness ; of our

spontaneous conviction that the existence of such a universe is

self-evident ; of our spontaneous belief that we know something

of the nature and qualities of this material universe ; of our

spontaneous discrimination between our minds, our own bodies,

and external bodies ; etc., etc. They are not concerned with the

validity of these spontaneous judgments and beliefs, but only with

the mode of their genesis and development from the primitive

content of consciousness with its vague characteristics of "ex-

tensity" and "externality" . Starting from these primitive data,

they differ in their accounts of the way in which we come to

form the spontaneous judgment and conviction that there exists

a non-Ego or external universe really distinct from, and other

than, and independent of, the Ego.

I. Some maintain that the reality of the non-Ego is given in

external sense perception just as early and just as immediately

as the reality of the Ego is given in all conscious cognition ; and

that therefore the spontaneous conviction of the reality of a non-

Ego or external universe is an immediate interpretation of this

originally presented distinction. This position is described as

Perceptionism, or Intuitionism, or the Theory of Immediate or

Presentative Sense Perception. 1

II. Others maintain that the non-Ego, as distinct from the

Ego, is not a primitive datum of conscious awareness ; that only

the Ego is apprehended first and immediately ; that from its data

there is evolved and mediated a conscious discrimination or dis

tinction between a non-Ego and the Ego, and a spontaneous belief

in the distinct reality of the former. This position is variously

described as Representationism* or the Theory of Mediate or

Representative or Inferential Sense Perception. But its supporters

differ in regard to the nature of the process by which apprehen

sion of the non-Ego, and belief in its distinct and independent

reality, are " mediated " : some holding that in the early stages

of the conscious life of the individual all the conscious data are

"internal" or "self" data, and that the individual gradually " ex-

1 Cf. MAHRR, op. cit., pp. 101 sqq. ; JEANNI&RE, op. cit., pp. 379, 382.

2 Or " Conceptionism " (cf. ibid., pp. 223-4, 379), a designation to be avoided

as fostering a misleading use of a term proper to the domain of intellect.

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 41

ternalizes" or "projects outward" certain of these data, thus

building up an " external " domain opposed to, and distinguished

from, the " subjective " or " self" domain of reality ; others hold

ing, on the contrary, that the actual process is quite the reverse,

that it is a process of " subjectivation " or " internalization," that

at first all conscious data appear to the individual as a confused

and undifferentiated ocean of " objects," that most of them

are gradually apprehended as " external " through a process by

which others are " subjectivated " to form a conscious, sentient,

organic self or Ego, and thus opposed to, and distinguished from,

the main group as "objective," "external," or non-Ego^

Whichever of these accounts of the genesis of our perception

of, and spontaneous belief in, an external universe be adopted,

the epistemological problem the question of the validity of this

belief still remains. If men spontaneously judge that what is

"given" in consciousness, as an "external," "extended" datum,

is a reality other than the Ego, are they right in judging so ?

Is the judgment justifiable before the bar of reason reflecting on

the grounds of it ? Or, if from the original data, in which that

alone which is the real Ego is " presented," there is evolved by

some process a mediate awareness wherein a " non-Ego " is

" represented," what rational justification have we for the spon

taneous judgment which, in asserting the independent existence

of this " non-Ego " or external universe, assumes the validity of the

"representative " or quasi-" inferential " process?