159. GKNERAL CRITICISM OF TRADITIONALIST THEORIES.

We shall see in the course of our criticism (infra, 163) that there

is much that is useful and true and undeniable in what has been

written by supporters of those fideist and traditionalist theories.

Nevertheless their fundamental contention is profoundly erroneous,

and indeed destructive of all human certitude. This contention

is that human certitude rests ultimately on faith in a Divinely

Delivered Revelation, and that the supreme test of truth must be

the Divine Authority as manifested in the common assents or

collective dictates of mankind. With this position we shall deal

in a general argument ; after which the special forms of general

theory, and the special reasons alleged in support of it, will come

up for consideration.

General Argument against Fideism and Traditionalism.

Extrinsic authority cannot possibly be the ultimate motive of

certitude or the supreme criterion of truth ; nor, therefore, can

the first and fundamental assent of the individual intellect or

reason be an assent of faith, an act of belief, grounded on extrinsic

authority [149 (4), 1 50 (3)]. Accordingly the traditionalist theory

is erroneous. The theory proclaims the necessity and adequacy of

belief or faith as an ultimate ground of certitude, on the assump

tion that no grounds of intrinsic objective evidence are or can be

adequate. But, apart from the fact that this assumption is itself

indefensible, since, as we have shown (149-54), such evidence

precisely is the adequate ultimate ground of certitude, the

alternative offered by traditionalism is an impossible alternative.

For, when the individual assents to the truth of a judgment

on the ground of extrinsic authority, whether human or Divine,

his intellectual attitude towards such authority must assume one

or other of two alternative forms ; he must either assent blindly,

or else he assents because he is convinced on grounds of intel

lectual evidence that such authority is trustworthy and that what

it proposes for his belief is therefore evidently credible. But a

blind assent, a blind faith, elicited by the believer in the absence

of adequate intellectual evidence^ adequate grounds of reason, for

the trustworthiness of the authority, cannot be ultimately reason

able nay, it cannot, on reflection, be ultimately possible psycho

logically Tor a being endowed as man is with the judicial,

reflective faculty of reason or intellect, before the bar of which

he must, nolens volens, summon all the motives of his assents,

and by which he must judge the adequacy of these motives

TRADITIONALISM 299

if his assents are to be whaf they ought to be, viz. reasonable, or

in conformity with his nature as a rational being. 1 Therefore the

other alternative imposes itself. He must be intellectually con

vinced of the trustworthiness of the authority on which he believes.

But how? If he invoke an antecedent authority for this trust

worthiness, as he may, indeed, in a particular case, he only

pushes back the problem one step. And he must avoid the futility

of an endless regress (149-50). Hence for every judgment which

he accepts on extrinsic authority the individual believer must

rely ultimately on intrinsic objective evidence for the trustworthi

ness of the authority, evidence accumulated and apprehended

and judged to be sufficient by the exercise of his own individual

reason? Therefore the act of belief or faith, on extrinsic

authority, cannot possibly be first if it is to be reasonable : it

must be preceded by acts of assent to judgments on intrinsic

objective evidence.

Faith in Divine Revelation, if it is to be a reasonable faith,

presupposes in the individual believer the certain conviction that

God exists ; that if He has made a revelation to mankind such

revelation is credible inasmuch as God can neither deceive nor be

deceived ; that He has made such revelation. And certitude

as to this latter fact means certitude that God has positively

intervened in the course of human history. It means certitude

1 To the supposition that the exercise of the individual s reason must be preceded

by faith inasmuch as otherwise it would lead away from faith rather than conduce to

faith, Bourdaloue replies that such an attitude is the negation of faith, for "the

faith of the Christian is not at all a mere acquiescence in believing, or a simple

surrender of reason, but a reasonable acquiescence and submission ; and if this

acquiescence, this submission, were not reasonable, it would be no longer a virtue.

But how could it be reasonable if reason had no part in it ? " (Pensees stir clivers

sujets de religion et de morale apnd MERCIKR, op. cit., 68, p. 146). And similarly

Fenelon writes: "Were we to suppose that faith comes to man through the heart,

independently of reason, through a blind impulse of grace, without rational investiga

tion of the authority to which we must bow in believing mysteries, we should run

the risk of making Christianity a mere fanaticism, and representing Christians as

[blind, unreasoning] enthusiasts. Nothing would be more dangerous to peace and

right order among men ; nothing could render religion more despicable and hateful "

(Lettre V sur la religion, apnd MERCIER, ibid.)..

2 A person may, for instance, believe in (say) the resurrection of the body because

he believes that God has revealed it : he believes that he has God s authority for it

because the teaching authority of the Church assures him that he has ; he believes

that the Church does vouch for this and is trustworthy in vouching for it because he

has been so informed by his parents, or educators, or religious teachers, etc. ; and

he takes their teaching or testimony as trustworthy because his knowledge and ex

perience of them furnish him with adequate intrinsic objective evidence of the relia

bility of their teaching or testimony.

300 THEOR V OF KNO WLEDGE

on these four questions : Where has God spoken ? When did He

speak? To whom ? And in what manner? But manifestly it

is only by the use of his own reason, brought to bear upon the

facts of his experience, and interpreting them in the light of the

objective evidence presented by them, that the individual can

attain to those various rational convictions, which he must have

before he can reasonably believe in any revelation, and which

are therefore called the preambula fulci. As St. Thomas puts it,

"The individual would not believe the subject matters of faith

unless he saw them to be credible ". 1

We shall see in the course of our criticism (infra, 163) that there

is much that is useful and true and undeniable in what has been

written by supporters of those fideist and traditionalist theories.

Nevertheless their fundamental contention is profoundly erroneous,

and indeed destructive of all human certitude. This contention

is that human certitude rests ultimately on faith in a Divinely

Delivered Revelation, and that the supreme test of truth must be

the Divine Authority as manifested in the common assents or

collective dictates of mankind. With this position we shall deal

in a general argument ; after which the special forms of general

theory, and the special reasons alleged in support of it, will come

up for consideration.

General Argument against Fideism and Traditionalism.

Extrinsic authority cannot possibly be the ultimate motive of

certitude or the supreme criterion of truth ; nor, therefore, can

the first and fundamental assent of the individual intellect or

reason be an assent of faith, an act of belief, grounded on extrinsic

authority [149 (4), 1 50 (3)]. Accordingly the traditionalist theory

is erroneous. The theory proclaims the necessity and adequacy of

belief or faith as an ultimate ground of certitude, on the assump

tion that no grounds of intrinsic objective evidence are or can be

adequate. But, apart from the fact that this assumption is itself

indefensible, since, as we have shown (149-54), such evidence

precisely is the adequate ultimate ground of certitude, the

alternative offered by traditionalism is an impossible alternative.

For, when the individual assents to the truth of a judgment

on the ground of extrinsic authority, whether human or Divine,

his intellectual attitude towards such authority must assume one

or other of two alternative forms ; he must either assent blindly,

or else he assents because he is convinced on grounds of intel

lectual evidence that such authority is trustworthy and that what

it proposes for his belief is therefore evidently credible. But a

blind assent, a blind faith, elicited by the believer in the absence

of adequate intellectual evidence^ adequate grounds of reason, for

the trustworthiness of the authority, cannot be ultimately reason

able nay, it cannot, on reflection, be ultimately possible psycho

logically Tor a being endowed as man is with the judicial,

reflective faculty of reason or intellect, before the bar of which

he must, nolens volens, summon all the motives of his assents,

and by which he must judge the adequacy of these motives

TRADITIONALISM 299

if his assents are to be whaf they ought to be, viz. reasonable, or

in conformity with his nature as a rational being. 1 Therefore the

other alternative imposes itself. He must be intellectually con

vinced of the trustworthiness of the authority on which he believes.

But how? If he invoke an antecedent authority for this trust

worthiness, as he may, indeed, in a particular case, he only

pushes back the problem one step. And he must avoid the futility

of an endless regress (149-50). Hence for every judgment which

he accepts on extrinsic authority the individual believer must

rely ultimately on intrinsic objective evidence for the trustworthi

ness of the authority, evidence accumulated and apprehended

and judged to be sufficient by the exercise of his own individual

reason? Therefore the act of belief or faith, on extrinsic

authority, cannot possibly be first if it is to be reasonable : it

must be preceded by acts of assent to judgments on intrinsic

objective evidence.

Faith in Divine Revelation, if it is to be a reasonable faith,

presupposes in the individual believer the certain conviction that

God exists ; that if He has made a revelation to mankind such

revelation is credible inasmuch as God can neither deceive nor be

deceived ; that He has made such revelation. And certitude

as to this latter fact means certitude that God has positively

intervened in the course of human history. It means certitude

1 To the supposition that the exercise of the individual s reason must be preceded

by faith inasmuch as otherwise it would lead away from faith rather than conduce to

faith, Bourdaloue replies that such an attitude is the negation of faith, for "the

faith of the Christian is not at all a mere acquiescence in believing, or a simple

surrender of reason, but a reasonable acquiescence and submission ; and if this

acquiescence, this submission, were not reasonable, it would be no longer a virtue.

But how could it be reasonable if reason had no part in it ? " (Pensees stir clivers

sujets de religion et de morale apnd MERCIKR, op. cit., 68, p. 146). And similarly

Fenelon writes: "Were we to suppose that faith comes to man through the heart,

independently of reason, through a blind impulse of grace, without rational investiga

tion of the authority to which we must bow in believing mysteries, we should run

the risk of making Christianity a mere fanaticism, and representing Christians as

[blind, unreasoning] enthusiasts. Nothing would be more dangerous to peace and

right order among men ; nothing could render religion more despicable and hateful "

(Lettre V sur la religion, apnd MERCIER, ibid.)..

2 A person may, for instance, believe in (say) the resurrection of the body because

he believes that God has revealed it : he believes that he has God s authority for it

because the teaching authority of the Church assures him that he has ; he believes

that the Church does vouch for this and is trustworthy in vouching for it because he

has been so informed by his parents, or educators, or religious teachers, etc. ; and

he takes their teaching or testimony as trustworthy because his knowledge and ex

perience of them furnish him with adequate intrinsic objective evidence of the relia

bility of their teaching or testimony.

300 THEOR V OF KNO WLEDGE

on these four questions : Where has God spoken ? When did He

speak? To whom ? And in what manner? But manifestly it

is only by the use of his own reason, brought to bear upon the

facts of his experience, and interpreting them in the light of the

objective evidence presented by them, that the individual can

attain to those various rational convictions, which he must have

before he can reasonably believe in any revelation, and which

are therefore called the preambula fulci. As St. Thomas puts it,

"The individual would not believe the subject matters of faith

unless he saw them to be credible ". 1