1 08. THE PROBLEMS AND THE THEORIES.

 Can we, reflect

ing on the data of sense perception, have reasoned or phil

osophical certitude for the spontaneous judgment and belief

that these data reveal (a) the existence, and (fr) something as to

the nature, of an external, material universe distinct from the

perceiving subject or Ego? The answers of philosophers to

these questions have varied from the most extreme subjective

idealism to an equally extreme affirmation of the naif realism of

the credulous and unreflecting mind. Broadly speaking, the

two alternative attitudes of those who doubt or deny, and

of those who affirm and maintain, that we can have such certi

tude may be described as Idealism and Realism respectively.

But there are many different phases and degrees of both.

I. Idealism doubts or denies that anything beyond the

Ego, the psychic facts of the self, can be objects of knowledge,

1 Cf. JfiANNlfeRE, Op. tit., pp. 380-!.

42 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

can be known really to exist. Hence it is also called Subjectiv

ism : sceptical if it doubts, dogmatic if it denies the possibility

of such (reasoned) knowledge of a universe beyond the Ego.

This is the logical issue of the Idealist Postulate, that the

mind cannot transcend itself to know anything beyond its

own states : a postulate insinuated by Locke, partially applied

by Berkeley to deny the reality of matter, fully applied by

Hume to reduce all knowledge to awareness of mental "appear

ances" or " phenomena," and by Mill in his reduction of all

reality to " sensations///^ permanent possibilities of sensations ", l

Idealism is absolute or total if it holds the sole knowable reality,

the sole object of knowledge, to be the subject s own conscious

states or " representations " : the position of Fichte, Schelling,

Hegel, Schopenhauer, Renouvier, 2 etc. Akin to this is what

Leibniz first called "Solipsism " : the view that the conscious self

is the sole reality with the unverifiable possibility of other simi

lar but really distinct conscious " selves ". Idealism is relative

or partial if it admits philosophical certitude as to the existence

of something, some reality, other than the Ego, but interprets

too narrowly the nature, scope, and object of this certitude.

Thus, Berkeley s Immaterialism is subjectivist in so far as it

denies the existence of a material universe as a mind-independ

ent reality, but is " realist " or " objectivist " 3 in so far as it

accords to this universe the reality which consists in its being

a system of perceived, mind-dependent ideas, 4 produced in finite

spirits or human minds by the Infinite Spirit, the Deity. Again,

Kant s Transcendental Idealism is a partial or relative idealism

inasmuch as, while it denies that a real non-Ego or mind-in

dependent reality can ever become an object of knowledge, or

be known, it admits that this ("unknowable") reality must be

thought or postulated as really existing, and that belief in the

validity of this postulate is justifiable. So, too, the agnostic

position of positivism and phenomenism, in recognizing the

rational necessity of postulating a reality beyond the domain

of the conscious self, and at the same time denying that we can

know anything about this reality, is a partial or relative ideal-

1 Cf. Ontology, 61, 63, 75.

2 C/. JEANNIKRE, op. cit., pp. 381, 438.

Hence it has been described as " objective idealism". Cf. I.E. Record, vol.

xxiv., pp. 280-2 ; infra, 123.

4 Entities the esse of which is identically their percipi (cf. 102).

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 43

ism : a position for which Spencer lays claim to the title of

Transfigured Realism. 1

II. Realism maintains that we have adequate intellectual

justification for (a) the spontaneous judgment that a real,

external, material universe exists independently of our per

ception of it ; and for (fr) many of the spontaneous judgments

we form as to its nature and qualities ; while (c) reflection can

correct the errors of other spontaneous judgments too hastily

formed by misinterpretation of our sense perceptions. But be

tween the nai f, ingenuous, unreflecting realism which, by over

looking the part which the sentient self or subject has in

determining how external things "appear "in sense perception,

often erroneously attributes to these external things qualities

or natures which they do not really possess in themselves,

between this extreme form of realism on the one hand and

certain other extreme or hypercritical forms of realism on the

other hand, forms which almost merge into idealism by de

claring all our qualitatively differentiated sense data to be

subjective, conscious products, which are merely symbolically

indicative of the real nature and qualities of the external or

non-self universe, 2 there are many intermediate shades of what

is known as moderate or critical realism. Naturally, too, as

regards the manner in which we come to know the indepen

dent reality of an external universe, the advocates of nai f realism

hold the theory of immediate or presentative or intuitional sense

perception ; the advocates of hypercritical realism, that of

mediate or representat^^ e or inferential sense perception ; while

among the supporters of moderate or critical realism some hold

that sense perception is immediate or presentative or intuitional,

others that it is mediate or representative or inferential. 3

1 C/. JEANNIERE, op. cit., p. 437. For different kinds of idealism, historical

sketch of its development, and bibliography, cf. ibid., pp. 430-40.

2 Ibid., p. 425, n. 2.

3 It may be well to note that the term " inferential " in this general context is

ambiguous. What it can mean as descriptive of the process of sense perception

itself we shall inquire later. Here we need only call attention to the fact that even

if the process of sense perception itself be held to be an immediate intuition of a

presented external sense datum, and even if the spontaneous intellectual processes

whereby we conceive this presented datum and judge it to be really external to us

be held to be not " inferential," but motived by immediately apprehended intellectual,

objective grounds or evidence, we can also, by intellectual reflection on these direct

sensuous and intellectual processes, infer from the data of sense, by means of the

principle of causality (105), that there is a reality external to us, or that it is really

such or such, and that our direct, spontaneous judgment was justifiable and correct :

44 THEOR Y OF KNO IVLEDGE

 Can we, reflect

ing on the data of sense perception, have reasoned or phil

osophical certitude for the spontaneous judgment and belief

that these data reveal (a) the existence, and (fr) something as to

the nature, of an external, material universe distinct from the

perceiving subject or Ego? The answers of philosophers to

these questions have varied from the most extreme subjective

idealism to an equally extreme affirmation of the naif realism of

the credulous and unreflecting mind. Broadly speaking, the

two alternative attitudes of those who doubt or deny, and

of those who affirm and maintain, that we can have such certi

tude may be described as Idealism and Realism respectively.

But there are many different phases and degrees of both.

I. Idealism doubts or denies that anything beyond the

Ego, the psychic facts of the self, can be objects of knowledge,

1 Cf. JfiANNlfeRE, Op. tit., pp. 380-!.

42 THEOR Y OF KNO WLEDGE

can be known really to exist. Hence it is also called Subjectiv

ism : sceptical if it doubts, dogmatic if it denies the possibility

of such (reasoned) knowledge of a universe beyond the Ego.

This is the logical issue of the Idealist Postulate, that the

mind cannot transcend itself to know anything beyond its

own states : a postulate insinuated by Locke, partially applied

by Berkeley to deny the reality of matter, fully applied by

Hume to reduce all knowledge to awareness of mental "appear

ances" or " phenomena," and by Mill in his reduction of all

reality to " sensations///^ permanent possibilities of sensations ", l

Idealism is absolute or total if it holds the sole knowable reality,

the sole object of knowledge, to be the subject s own conscious

states or " representations " : the position of Fichte, Schelling,

Hegel, Schopenhauer, Renouvier, 2 etc. Akin to this is what

Leibniz first called "Solipsism " : the view that the conscious self

is the sole reality with the unverifiable possibility of other simi

lar but really distinct conscious " selves ". Idealism is relative

or partial if it admits philosophical certitude as to the existence

of something, some reality, other than the Ego, but interprets

too narrowly the nature, scope, and object of this certitude.

Thus, Berkeley s Immaterialism is subjectivist in so far as it

denies the existence of a material universe as a mind-independ

ent reality, but is " realist " or " objectivist " 3 in so far as it

accords to this universe the reality which consists in its being

a system of perceived, mind-dependent ideas, 4 produced in finite

spirits or human minds by the Infinite Spirit, the Deity. Again,

Kant s Transcendental Idealism is a partial or relative idealism

inasmuch as, while it denies that a real non-Ego or mind-in

dependent reality can ever become an object of knowledge, or

be known, it admits that this ("unknowable") reality must be

thought or postulated as really existing, and that belief in the

validity of this postulate is justifiable. So, too, the agnostic

position of positivism and phenomenism, in recognizing the

rational necessity of postulating a reality beyond the domain

of the conscious self, and at the same time denying that we can

know anything about this reality, is a partial or relative ideal-

1 Cf. Ontology, 61, 63, 75.

2 C/. JEANNIKRE, op. cit., pp. 381, 438.

Hence it has been described as " objective idealism". Cf. I.E. Record, vol.

xxiv., pp. 280-2 ; infra, 123.

4 Entities the esse of which is identically their percipi (cf. 102).

VALIDITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION 43

ism : a position for which Spencer lays claim to the title of

Transfigured Realism. 1

II. Realism maintains that we have adequate intellectual

justification for (a) the spontaneous judgment that a real,

external, material universe exists independently of our per

ception of it ; and for (fr) many of the spontaneous judgments

we form as to its nature and qualities ; while (c) reflection can

correct the errors of other spontaneous judgments too hastily

formed by misinterpretation of our sense perceptions. But be

tween the nai f, ingenuous, unreflecting realism which, by over

looking the part which the sentient self or subject has in

determining how external things "appear "in sense perception,

often erroneously attributes to these external things qualities

or natures which they do not really possess in themselves,

between this extreme form of realism on the one hand and

certain other extreme or hypercritical forms of realism on the

other hand, forms which almost merge into idealism by de

claring all our qualitatively differentiated sense data to be

subjective, conscious products, which are merely symbolically

indicative of the real nature and qualities of the external or

non-self universe, 2 there are many intermediate shades of what

is known as moderate or critical realism. Naturally, too, as

regards the manner in which we come to know the indepen

dent reality of an external universe, the advocates of nai f realism

hold the theory of immediate or presentative or intuitional sense

perception ; the advocates of hypercritical realism, that of

mediate or representat^^ e or inferential sense perception ; while

among the supporters of moderate or critical realism some hold

that sense perception is immediate or presentative or intuitional,

others that it is mediate or representative or inferential. 3

1 C/. JEANNIERE, op. cit., p. 437. For different kinds of idealism, historical

sketch of its development, and bibliography, cf. ibid., pp. 430-40.

2 Ibid., p. 425, n. 2.

3 It may be well to note that the term " inferential " in this general context is

ambiguous. What it can mean as descriptive of the process of sense perception

itself we shall inquire later. Here we need only call attention to the fact that even

if the process of sense perception itself be held to be an immediate intuition of a

presented external sense datum, and even if the spontaneous intellectual processes

whereby we conceive this presented datum and judge it to be really external to us

be held to be not " inferential," but motived by immediately apprehended intellectual,

objective grounds or evidence, we can also, by intellectual reflection on these direct

sensuous and intellectual processes, infer from the data of sense, by means of the

principle of causality (105), that there is a reality external to us, or that it is really

such or such, and that our direct, spontaneous judgment was justifiable and correct :

44 THEOR Y OF KNO IVLEDGE