SCIOUSNESS.

 Consciousness, of whatsoever kind, makes us di

rectly and immediately aware of something, which "something"

we call the datum or object of consciousness. This, too, is un

deniable. We may, therefore, describe the insight which con

sciousness gives us into its object as " intuitive," as a direct and

immediate awareness of the mental presence of something, or of

something as having an essc ideale, a " mental existence " for us.

This raises two points for consideration.

One is that we must consciously apprehend at least some of

the data thus present to us, as really existing or happening ; or

at all events that we must intellectually interpret our consciousness

of some data as revealing the real existence or happening of such

data. 1 Otherwise we could have no conception of real existence,

whereas it is a fact of consciousness that we have such a concep

tion. But sense consciousness, or the mere direct awareness of

something as present, does not itself analyse the implications of

this presence, or reach the distinction between " existing as an

object of consciousness " and "existing really". It must be in

tellect, or, if we may say so, consciousness as intellectual, that

1 This does not imply anything more than the recognition that the presence of

data in consciousness implies some real existence at least the real existence of the

conscious or cognitive process. But even this attribution of real existence requires

and implies the operation of intellect.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY 3

makes us aware of the " something present " as " something really

happening or existing ".

A second consideration, then, is this : Since all the objects of

consciousness proper are the conscious mental activities, functions,

processes, states, and conditions of the conscious subject; 1 and

since these are all concrete, individual data, even those of them

that belong to the higher domain of mental life, such as judg

ments, inferences, volitions, etc., it follows that if we describe

our direct consciousness of these latter activities as "intellectual

consciousness," we are according to intellect (in its capacity as

"consciousness") a power of intuitively apprehending "indi

viduals," viz. our individual mental acts (thoughts, volitions, etc.)

of the higher or spiritual domain (77). If we hold that in ex

ercising the function of external or internal sense perception, we

are through the sense faculty made concomitantly aware of the act

of perception, 2 we may and ought to hold, too, that in exercis

ing any conscious intellectual function (e.g. conceiving, judging,

reasoning), we are made, through the intellect, indirectly and con

comitantly aware of this individual function as actually taking

place. Every cognitive act, whether sensuous or intellectual,

must thus concomitantly reveal itself in individuo, to the knowing

subject : not the act apart from its content or object, or apart

from its subject or agent, but the whole concrete experience,

afterwards analysed into agent, act, and object. Intellect would

thus, as consciousness, indirectly reveal an individual thing or

event as existing or happening (viz. the higher mental act in

question : judging, reasoning, willing, etc.) ; and would then, as

intellect, apprehend the abstract nature or essence of the act, and

go on to analyse its implications as to the nature of the human

faculty, and of the human agent, capable of eliciting such an act.

If, then, the proper object of the human intellect be the natures

or essences of corporeal things, considered in the abstract and as

universal, it must be added that all our intellectual cognition has,

as concomitant object, its own individual acts, not in the abstract,

1 We do not say " I am conscious of a sound," but, " I hear a sound," and, " I

am conscious of hearing it " ; nor, " I am conscious of material substance," but, " I

am thinking of material substance," and, " I am conscious of thinking about it" ;

nor, " I am conscious that two and two are four," but, " I judge or understand, or see

(intellectually) that two and two are four," and, " I am conscious of seeing it ".

2 Otherwise it would not be a cognitive act : some degree of such concomitant

awareness of the subjection cognoscens is essentially involved in all cognition (S).

4 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

but as the concrete acts of the individual self-conscious Ego ap

prehending some definite datum or object.

It is commonly said that there are data of consciousness which

all philosophers agree in recognizing as such, as being unques

tioned and unquestionable, and as forming the starting-points

of all philosophical discussion. 1 And this is quite true.- But

inasmuch as from the very dawn of reason in each of us our in

tellects have been spontaneously scrutinizing these data, it is not

easy to distinguish between what are really data and what are

interpretations of, and inferences from, the data. And the dif

ficulty is unavoidably aggravated by the fact that we can discuss

these data only as envisaged in introspection by intellectual

scrutiny. The very terms we use in describing them are terms

which apply to them as conceived by intellect. We have, in fact,

no direct conscious experience of these data as they would ap

pear to a being endowed with sense consciousness alone, such as

we suppose the lower animals to be. It is only by a careful

and prolonged process of abstraction that we can mentally sepa

rate our own intellectual interpretation from the data of sense

cognition and sense consciousness, and thus get down to the

ever-changing, fluctuating, ebbing and flowing stream of external

and internal sense impressions which form the elementary con

tents of sense consciousness. From the standpoint of epistemo-

logy, however, the difficulty of thus discriminating between the

data and our interpretations of them, or of drawing the distinc

tion between data of sense consciousness and data of intellectual

consciousness, which is just one example of such interpretation,

is not a serious difficulty. For in regard to every single

assertion of ours on the matter we must be prepared to show

either that it indisputably expresses a datum of consciousness,

or else that it is an interpretation or inference which really has

all the rational justification we claim for it.

In classifying the data of consciousness which have an im

mediate bearing on the questions of epistemology, authors com

monly distinguish 3 the direct from the indirect data or objects of

. 1 There is another necessary presupposition of philosophical discussion, viz. the

presupposition on the part of each participant that the data of every other person s

consciousness is of the same general nature and order as those of his own ( 39,

vol. i., p. 144, n. 2).

2 Cf. 37, 39, ibid. 3 C/. JEANNIERK, op. cit. t pp. 358-9.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY 5

consciousness. Among the former they enumerate all conscious

acts, processes, states, and modes of the conscious subject, not

apart from, but as concrete, actually existing modes of, the

subject. As indirect object of consciousness they set down

the existing conscious subject as a consciously acting being ; but

not the nature of the latter : its nature is revealed not by con

sciousness but by intellect or reason interpreting consciousness.

Neither, however, is the existence of the conscious subject re

vealed apart from the existence or happening of the conscious

acts. It is reason or intellect that analyses the whole concrete

datum into acts, states, processes, etc. (accidents), on the one

hand, and an agent, subject (substance), of these on the other ;

and which further interprets this subject or substance as corporeal,

living, sentient, rational, etc. And all these interpretations alike

have to be justified. Again, some of our conscious, cognitive

acts, i.e. our external sense perceptions, reveal their objects as

located in space outside our bodies; and others, i.e. some of our

internal sense perceptions, reveal their objects as located more

or less definitely within our bodies. If, therefore, these percep

tive acts themselves be said to be the direct and proper objects

of consciousness, as being " within " the conscious subject, it must

be admitted that the objects of these perceptive acts themselves

must, as perceived objects, be also indirectly objects of conscious

ness even though they be revealed as "outside" the conscious

subject : for by being " presented " or " present " to the conscious

subject, in and through the perceptive act, they become also data

of consciousness. But here again it is intellect or reason that

distinguishes the conscious subject into "mind" and "body";

that recognizes some of the data or objects of conscious cognition

as constituting the Ego and others as constituting the non-Ego

or "external universe" ; and that interprets the real significance

of the character of " externality " attaching to the latter, and of

" internality " attaching to the former.

 Consciousness, of whatsoever kind, makes us di

rectly and immediately aware of something, which "something"

we call the datum or object of consciousness. This, too, is un

deniable. We may, therefore, describe the insight which con

sciousness gives us into its object as " intuitive," as a direct and

immediate awareness of the mental presence of something, or of

something as having an essc ideale, a " mental existence " for us.

This raises two points for consideration.

One is that we must consciously apprehend at least some of

the data thus present to us, as really existing or happening ; or

at all events that we must intellectually interpret our consciousness

of some data as revealing the real existence or happening of such

data. 1 Otherwise we could have no conception of real existence,

whereas it is a fact of consciousness that we have such a concep

tion. But sense consciousness, or the mere direct awareness of

something as present, does not itself analyse the implications of

this presence, or reach the distinction between " existing as an

object of consciousness " and "existing really". It must be in

tellect, or, if we may say so, consciousness as intellectual, that

1 This does not imply anything more than the recognition that the presence of

data in consciousness implies some real existence at least the real existence of the

conscious or cognitive process. But even this attribution of real existence requires

and implies the operation of intellect.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY 3

makes us aware of the " something present " as " something really

happening or existing ".

A second consideration, then, is this : Since all the objects of

consciousness proper are the conscious mental activities, functions,

processes, states, and conditions of the conscious subject; 1 and

since these are all concrete, individual data, even those of them

that belong to the higher domain of mental life, such as judg

ments, inferences, volitions, etc., it follows that if we describe

our direct consciousness of these latter activities as "intellectual

consciousness," we are according to intellect (in its capacity as

"consciousness") a power of intuitively apprehending "indi

viduals," viz. our individual mental acts (thoughts, volitions, etc.)

of the higher or spiritual domain (77). If we hold that in ex

ercising the function of external or internal sense perception, we

are through the sense faculty made concomitantly aware of the act

of perception, 2 we may and ought to hold, too, that in exercis

ing any conscious intellectual function (e.g. conceiving, judging,

reasoning), we are made, through the intellect, indirectly and con

comitantly aware of this individual function as actually taking

place. Every cognitive act, whether sensuous or intellectual,

must thus concomitantly reveal itself in individuo, to the knowing

subject : not the act apart from its content or object, or apart

from its subject or agent, but the whole concrete experience,

afterwards analysed into agent, act, and object. Intellect would

thus, as consciousness, indirectly reveal an individual thing or

event as existing or happening (viz. the higher mental act in

question : judging, reasoning, willing, etc.) ; and would then, as

intellect, apprehend the abstract nature or essence of the act, and

go on to analyse its implications as to the nature of the human

faculty, and of the human agent, capable of eliciting such an act.

If, then, the proper object of the human intellect be the natures

or essences of corporeal things, considered in the abstract and as

universal, it must be added that all our intellectual cognition has,

as concomitant object, its own individual acts, not in the abstract,

1 We do not say " I am conscious of a sound," but, " I hear a sound," and, " I

am conscious of hearing it " ; nor, " I am conscious of material substance," but, " I

am thinking of material substance," and, " I am conscious of thinking about it" ;

nor, " I am conscious that two and two are four," but, " I judge or understand, or see

(intellectually) that two and two are four," and, " I am conscious of seeing it ".

2 Otherwise it would not be a cognitive act : some degree of such concomitant

awareness of the subjection cognoscens is essentially involved in all cognition (S).

4 THEOR Y OF KNO W LEDGE

but as the concrete acts of the individual self-conscious Ego ap

prehending some definite datum or object.

It is commonly said that there are data of consciousness which

all philosophers agree in recognizing as such, as being unques

tioned and unquestionable, and as forming the starting-points

of all philosophical discussion. 1 And this is quite true.- But

inasmuch as from the very dawn of reason in each of us our in

tellects have been spontaneously scrutinizing these data, it is not

easy to distinguish between what are really data and what are

interpretations of, and inferences from, the data. And the dif

ficulty is unavoidably aggravated by the fact that we can discuss

these data only as envisaged in introspection by intellectual

scrutiny. The very terms we use in describing them are terms

which apply to them as conceived by intellect. We have, in fact,

no direct conscious experience of these data as they would ap

pear to a being endowed with sense consciousness alone, such as

we suppose the lower animals to be. It is only by a careful

and prolonged process of abstraction that we can mentally sepa

rate our own intellectual interpretation from the data of sense

cognition and sense consciousness, and thus get down to the

ever-changing, fluctuating, ebbing and flowing stream of external

and internal sense impressions which form the elementary con

tents of sense consciousness. From the standpoint of epistemo-

logy, however, the difficulty of thus discriminating between the

data and our interpretations of them, or of drawing the distinc

tion between data of sense consciousness and data of intellectual

consciousness, which is just one example of such interpretation,

is not a serious difficulty. For in regard to every single

assertion of ours on the matter we must be prepared to show

either that it indisputably expresses a datum of consciousness,

or else that it is an interpretation or inference which really has

all the rational justification we claim for it.

In classifying the data of consciousness which have an im

mediate bearing on the questions of epistemology, authors com

monly distinguish 3 the direct from the indirect data or objects of

. 1 There is another necessary presupposition of philosophical discussion, viz. the

presupposition on the part of each participant that the data of every other person s

consciousness is of the same general nature and order as those of his own ( 39,

vol. i., p. 144, n. 2).

2 Cf. 37, 39, ibid. 3 C/. JEANNIERK, op. cit. t pp. 358-9.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY 5

consciousness. Among the former they enumerate all conscious

acts, processes, states, and modes of the conscious subject, not

apart from, but as concrete, actually existing modes of, the

subject. As indirect object of consciousness they set down

the existing conscious subject as a consciously acting being ; but

not the nature of the latter : its nature is revealed not by con

sciousness but by intellect or reason interpreting consciousness.

Neither, however, is the existence of the conscious subject re

vealed apart from the existence or happening of the conscious

acts. It is reason or intellect that analyses the whole concrete

datum into acts, states, processes, etc. (accidents), on the one

hand, and an agent, subject (substance), of these on the other ;

and which further interprets this subject or substance as corporeal,

living, sentient, rational, etc. And all these interpretations alike

have to be justified. Again, some of our conscious, cognitive

acts, i.e. our external sense perceptions, reveal their objects as

located in space outside our bodies; and others, i.e. some of our

internal sense perceptions, reveal their objects as located more

or less definitely within our bodies. If, therefore, these percep

tive acts themselves be said to be the direct and proper objects

of consciousness, as being " within " the conscious subject, it must

be admitted that the objects of these perceptive acts themselves

must, as perceived objects, be also indirectly objects of conscious

ness even though they be revealed as "outside" the conscious

subject : for by being " presented " or " present " to the conscious

subject, in and through the perceptive act, they become also data

of consciousness. But here again it is intellect or reason that

distinguishes the conscious subject into "mind" and "body";

that recognizes some of the data or objects of conscious cognition

as constituting the Ego and others as constituting the non-Ego

or "external universe" ; and that interprets the real significance

of the character of " externality " attaching to the latter, and of

" internality " attaching to the former.